Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Edward Skorick, who has a long history of sex offenses dating back to 1980, was incarcerated and later civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual in North Dakota. After his transfer to the state hospital in 2018, he was committed under state law in 2019. Skorick has previously petitioned for discharge from commitment, with mixed results on appeal, including a remand due to evidentiary issues and subsequent affirmances of continued commitment. In August 2024, Skorick again sought discharge, prompting an annual evaluation by a state-appointed psychologist, who recommended continued commitment. Skorick also requested an independent evaluation, but that expert did not testify or submit a report.The District Court of Burleigh County held a discharge hearing, where only the state’s expert, Dr. Byrne, testified. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Skorick remained a sexually dangerous individual with serious difficulty controlling his behavior, citing his diagnoses, risk assessments, recent behavioral infractions, lack of treatment participation, and the likelihood that his behavior would worsen outside a controlled environment. The court also drew a negative inference from Skorick’s failure to present testimony from his independent examiner.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s decision under a modified clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s findings were sufficient and supported by clear and convincing evidence. The court distinguished Skorick’s case from others where limited infractions or lack of treatment progress were insufficient to show serious difficulty controlling behavior, emphasizing Skorick’s ongoing behavioral issues and refusal to participate in treatment. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s order denying Skorick’s petition for discharge. View "Interest of Skorick" on Justia Law

Puerto Rico Telephone Company (PRTC) sought to confirm an arbitration award against WorldNet Telecommunications in federal court under section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). PRTC relied on then-existing First Circuit precedent, which allowed federal courts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over such applications if the underlying dispute involved a federal question. After the district court dismissed PRTC’s action for lack of Article III standing, PRTC appealed.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed the case, finding that PRTC had not shown the necessary injury-in-fact to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution. PRTC then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. While the appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Badgerow v. Walters, which held that federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over applications to confirm or vacate arbitration awards under sections 9 and 10 of the FAA, except in circumstances not present in this case. PRTC requested that the First Circuit vacate the district court’s judgment and direct dismissal without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, so that PRTC could pursue relief in the Commonwealth courts. WorldNet argued that the First Circuit should instead affirm the district court’s dismissal on standing grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that, in light of Badgerow v. Walters, federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over PRTC’s application to confirm the arbitration award under section 9 of the FAA. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court did not address the standing issue. View "Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. Worldnet Telecommunications, LLC" on Justia Law

The petitioner submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) to the New York City Department of Education (DOE), seeking all emails exchanged between the DOE and a specific domain name over a period from April 2021 to August 2022. The DOE responded that the request did not "reasonably describe" the records because it could not conduct an effective search with reasonable effort, citing technical difficulties in searching its vast email database. The DOE asked the petitioner to narrow the request, but when the petitioner declined, the DOE treated the request as withdrawn.On administrative appeal, the DOE maintained that the request was not reasonably described, as its electronic searches failed to execute due to the large number of email accounts. The petitioner then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding, seeking a court order for the DOE to provide the requested records. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, holding that the request did not meet the statutory requirement of being "reasonably described" because the DOE could not retrieve the documents through a reasonable electronic search.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the lower courts and the DOE had improperly conflated the requirement that a request "reasonably describe" the records with the separate requirement that an agency retrieve records if it can do so with reasonable effort. The Court clarified that a request is reasonably described if the agency understands what is sought and knows where to look, regardless of the effort required to retrieve it. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the matter to the DOE for a new determination under the correct legal standard, requiring separate consideration of whether the request was reasonably described and whether the records can be retrieved with reasonable effort. View "Wagner v New York City Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor to the plaintiffs conveyed land to the United States in a land exchange but retained certain water rights that could only be accessed through the conveyed property, now managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The conveyance documents did not mention these water rights or provide any right of access. Over the years, the plaintiffs and their predecessors sought permits from the Forest Service to access and develop the water rights, but the agency repeatedly expressed concerns about environmental impacts and indicated it had the authority to deny access. In 2010, the Forest Service formally opposed the plaintiffs’ efforts to maintain the water rights in state court, asserting it would not grant the necessary land use authorization.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The court found the QTA claim time-barred by the statute’s twelve-year limitations period, reasoning that the plaintiffs or their predecessors were on notice of the government’s adverse claim well before the suit was filed in 2022. The court also dismissed the DJA claim, holding it was essentially a quiet title claim subject to the same limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the QTA claim was untimely because, by 2006 at the latest, the Forest Service had asserted exclusive control sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice of its adverse claim, causing the limitations period to expire before the suit was filed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief and that the third, alleging a taking, was not ripe because the plaintiffs had not first sought compensation under the Tucker Act. View "Purgatory Recreation I v. United States" on Justia Law

Tussahaw Reserves, LLC and Keys Ferry Crossing, LLC owned two parcels of land in Butts County, Georgia, zoned for agricultural and residential use. In 2020, they applied to rezone the property for use as a rock quarry, but the Butts County Board of Commissioners denied the applications in early 2021. Tussahaw then filed an “Appeal and Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Verified Complaint” in the Butts County Superior Court, challenging the Board’s decision. The complaint named the Board and its members as “respondents-in-certiorari” and the County as “defendant.” The claims included a writ of certiorari against the Board and its members, and alternative claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County.After the Board and its members filed an answer and moved to be discharged from the case, the superior court denied their motion. Following the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in State v. SASS Group, Butts County moved to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit violated the Georgia Constitution’s requirement that actions against a county be brought exclusively against the county and in its name. Tussahaw moved to drop the respondents-in-certiorari, but the superior court did not rule on that motion and instead dismissed the lawsuit, finding it barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the substance of the complaint sought relief against the Board, not just the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with the constitutional naming requirement is not a jurisdictional bar and does not preclude the trial court from considering motions to drop parties. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the superior court to vacate its dismissal order and address the pending motions. View "TUSSAHAW RESERVES, LLC v. BUTTS COUNTY" on Justia Law

Carol Rose, a prominent figure in the American Quarter Horse industry, entered into a series of agreements with Lori and Philip Aaron in 2013. The Aarons agreed to purchase a group of Rose’s horses at an auction, lease her Gainesville Ranch with an option to buy, and employ her as a consultant. The relationship quickly soured after the auction, with both sides accusing each other of breaches. Rose locked the Aarons out of the ranch and asserted a stable keeper’s lien for charges exceeding those related to the care of the Aarons’ horses. The Aarons paid the demanded sum and removed their horses. Litigation ensued, including claims by Jay McLaughlin, Rose’s former trainer, for damages related to the value of two fillies.The bankruptcy filings by Rose and her company led to the removal of the ongoing state-court litigation to the United States Bankruptcy Court. After trial, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Aarons on their breach of contract and Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA) claims, awarding damages and attorneys’ fees, and in favor of McLaughlin on his claim. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reversed the bankruptcy court’s rulings on the Aarons’ claims and McLaughlin’s claim, vacating the damages and fee awards.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s reversal of the damages award for the Aarons’ breach of contract claim, holding that the Aarons failed to prove damages under any recognized Texas law measure. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on the TTLA claim, holding that Rose’s threat to retain the Aarons’ horses for more than the lawful amount could constitute coercion under the TTLA, and remanded for further fact finding on intent and causation. The court also reversed and remanded the judgment regarding McLaughlin’s claim, finding his damages testimony legally insufficient. The court left the issue of attorneys’ fees for further proceedings. View "Rose v. Equis Equine" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, S.C., filed a civil action in September 2022 against Doe 1, alleging that she was sexually assaulted by her foster father while in foster care under Doe 1’s custody, care, and control, “in approximately 1981.” S.C. complied with the statutory requirement to file certificates of merit, which were approved by the Tulare County Superior Court. Later, upon receiving her juvenile case records, S.C. discovered she was not placed in foster care by Doe 1 until March 1984, and thus sought to amend her complaint to reflect that the alleged abuse occurred between 1984 and 1986.The Tulare County Superior Court denied S.C.’s motion for leave to amend her complaint, reasoning that the certificate of merit requirement under former section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not allow for amendments to the complaint or certificates of merit after filing. The court subsequently granted Doe 1’s motion for summary judgment, finding that S.C. was not in Doe 1’s custody in 1981, as alleged in the original complaint, and therefore Doe 1 could not have owed or breached any duty to S.C. at that time.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed both the summary judgment and the orders denying S.C.’s motion for leave to amend. The court held that former section 340.1 does not prohibit amendments to the complaint under section 473, subdivision (a)(1), and that the certificates of merit may be amended in accordance with the relation-back doctrine. The appellate court directed the superior court to allow S.C. to amend her complaint to allege the abuse occurred between 1984 and 1986 and to permit the filing of amended certificates of merit. Costs on appeal were awarded to S.C. View "S.C. v. Doe 1" on Justia Law

A management company brought suit in federal court against a contractor and its surety, seeking to recover financial losses allegedly suffered by several subcontractors after the contractor and surety failed to pay for work performed on post-hurricane rebuilding projects in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The management company’s claims were based on assignments it had received from the subcontractors, who were not themselves parties to the suit. The complaint asserted that federal diversity jurisdiction existed because the management company was completely diverse from the defendants and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico stayed the case, requiring the plaintiff to pursue certain remedies in local courts first. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit identified a potential jurisdictional defect: the complaint did not allege the citizenship of the subcontractors, whose assignments formed the basis of the claims. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the subcontractors were completely diverse from the defendants and whether the assignments were collusive attempts to manufacture federal jurisdiction.After remand, the district court found that the plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish the subcontractors’ citizenship or to show that the assignments were not collusive. The First Circuit held that the plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bore the burden of establishing complete diversity and the validity of the assignments for jurisdictional purposes. Because the plaintiff failed to meet this burden, the First Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Costs were awarded to the appellees. View "Gore and Assoc. Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. SLSCO Ltd." on Justia Law

Elena Kouvabina and Jacob Veltman, both attorneys, were married in 2010, had a child in 2012, and separated in 2017. Since their separation, Kouvabina, acting as a self-represented litigant, initiated a series of contentious legal proceedings related to their dissolution, custody, support, and related family law matters. Over a five-year period, she commenced, prosecuted, or maintained eleven appeals and writs in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three. Of these, nine—comprising five appeals and four writ petitions—were finally determined adversely to her, including repeated unsuccessful efforts to disqualify trial judges and appeals from orders on spousal support, child support, custody, visitation, and attorney fees.The San Mateo County Superior Court previously handled the underlying family law proceedings, issuing various orders and judgments that Kouvabina challenged through appeals and writs. In each instance, the appellate court either affirmed the lower court’s decisions or summarily denied her writ petitions. These adverse outcomes formed the basis for the appellate court’s review of her litigation conduct.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, on its own motion, reviewed whether Kouvabina met the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1). The court found that she had, within the preceding seven years, while self-represented, commenced at least five litigations that were finally determined adversely to her. The court rejected her arguments that appeals do not constitute “litigation” under the statute and that family law matters should be treated differently. The court declared Kouvabina a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation in California courts while self-represented without first obtaining leave from the presiding judge or justice. No costs were awarded. View "in re Marriage of Kouvabina" on Justia Law

In this case, the owners of a residential property in Fayetteville, Arkansas, sought to rent their home as a short-term rental when not in residence. The City of Fayetteville had enacted an ordinance regulating short-term rentals, requiring a license for all such properties and a conditional-use permit for certain types in residential zones. The ordinance also imposed a cap on the number of these rentals. After applying for a conditional-use permit, the property owners’ application was denied by the Fayetteville Planning Commission, which found the proposed rental incompatible with the neighborhood due to the number of similar rentals nearby.Following the denial, the property owners attempted to appeal to the Fayetteville City Council, but their appeal was not sponsored by the required number of council members. They then filed an administrative appeal in the Washington County Circuit Court, along with claims for declaratory and constitutional relief. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance while their case was pending. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the administrative appeal was untimely. The circuit court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but left the constitutional claims pending.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed only the denial of the preliminary injunction, as the dismissal of the administrative appeal was not properly before it due to the absence of a final, appealable order. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, finding no irreparable harm and no likelihood of success on the merits at this stage. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed, and the appeal of the administrative dismissal was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "HAUSE v. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS; THE FAYETTEVILLE PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law