Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Bryan and Ami Hauxwell, farmers using ground and surface water for irrigation, were involved in a dispute with the Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) over alleged violations of the NRD’s rules and regulations. The NRD claimed the Hauxwells used ground water to irrigate uncertified acres, failed to install flowmeters, and used non-compliant flowmeters. The NRD issued a cease-and-desist order and penalties after a 2020 hearing, where the NRD’s general manager and counsel participated in the board’s deliberations.The Hauxwells challenged the 2020 findings in the district court for Frontier County, which ruled in their favor, citing due process violations and remanded the case. In 2021, the NRD issued a new complaint and held another hearing, excluding the general manager and counsel from deliberations. The board again found violations but deferred penalties to a later hearing. The district court dismissed the Hauxwells' challenge to the 2021 findings, stating it was not a final order as penalties were not yet determined.In 2022, the NRD held a hearing to determine penalties, resulting in restrictions on the Hauxwells' water use. The Hauxwells filed another petition for review, arguing that the 2020 due process violations tainted the subsequent hearings. The district court agreed, reversing the NRD’s 2022 findings and vacating the penalties.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in concluding that the 2020 due process violations tainted the 2021 and 2022 hearings. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with directions to address the other claims in the Hauxwells' petition for review. The court emphasized that the NRD’s actions in 2021 and 2022 were separate and not influenced by the 2020 hearing’s procedural issues. View "Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

John P. Middleton filed a defamation lawsuit against Roy Lee, The Hollywood Reporter LLC, and Gary Baum in the Southern District of Florida. The case stemmed from a professional and personal fallout between Middleton and Lee, which began and ended in California. Middleton had sued Lee in California for millions of dollars, and during the ongoing legal battle, Middleton relocated to Florida. In June 2020, The Hollywood Reporter published an article by Baum that detailed the feud and contained allegedly false statements about Middleton. Middleton claimed these statements were defamatory and filed the lawsuit in June 2022.The district court dismissed Middleton's action, applying California's one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims, which rendered the claims time-barred. The court concluded that Florida's borrowing statute and choice-of-law rules required the application of California law due to the significant relationship factors. The court also denied Middleton's motion to amend the complaint, deeming it futile as the proposed amendments did not alter the determination that California's statute of limitations applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that California had the most significant relationship to the defamation claims, considering factors such as the place where the injury and conduct causing the injury occurred, the domicile and residence of the parties, and where the relationship between the parties was centered. Consequently, California's one-year statute of limitations applied, and Middleton's claims were time-barred. The court upheld the dismissal of the action and the denial of the motion to amend the complaint. View "Middleton v. The Hollywood Reporter LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land situated at the border of adjoining properties in Owings Mills, Maryland. Dr. Sharon Saunders owns one property, while Steven and Ellen Gilman own the neighboring property. The Gilmans claimed ownership of the disputed land through adverse possession, having maintained and used the land for several decades. In 2018, the Gilmans constructed a fence on the disputed property, prompting Dr. Saunders to commission a property survey and subsequently file a lawsuit to establish the boundary line and seek damages for trespass and other tort claims.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County ruled in favor of the Gilmans, declaring them the absolute owners of the disputed property by adverse possession. The court ordered the Gilmans to prepare and file an amended deed and plat reflecting their ownership. Dr. Saunders appealed the decision, but the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the order was not a final judgment and did not fall under any exceptions allowing for an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to determine whether the Appellate Court erred in its decision. The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court's order declaring the Gilmans as owners by adverse possession and directing the preparation of a deed was immediately appealable under Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article §§ 12-303(1) and 12-303(3)(v). The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the merits of Dr. Saunders's appeal. View "Saunders v. Gilman" on Justia Law

John Bludworth Shipyard, L.L.C. (JBS) performed nearly $3 million in services to combine three vessels into a single dredging unit for a project along the Gulf Coast. The vessels involved were the Captain Frank Bechtolt, the CIT-103, and the Idler Barge. T.W. LaQuay Marine, L.L.C., which owned the Idler Barge and leased the other two vessels, requested the work without the knowledge or consent of the owners, Manson Construction Company and Caillou Island Towing Company, Inc. JBS asserted maritime liens on each vessel for the services provided.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied JBS’s motion for interlocutory sale of the three-vessel unit and JBS’s motion for summary judgment to confirm the validity of its maritime liens. The court granted Caillou’s motion to vacate the arrest of the CIT-103, finding that JBS did not provide necessaries to the CIT-103 and that there were fact issues regarding the Bechtolt and the Idler Barge. The district court focused on the CIT-103’s old function, disregarding any new function that JBS’s work might have equipped it to perform.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by considering only the CIT-103’s former function and not its new function after the alterations. The appellate court vacated the district court’s grant of Caillou’s motion to vacate the arrest of the CIT-103 and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether JBS’s work constituted necessaries for the CIT-103’s new function. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the remainder of JBS’s appeal challenging the denial of its motions for summary judgment and interlocutory sale. View "Bludworth v. Manson Construction" on Justia Law

Rajiv Sangha (landlord) rented a house to Jeremy Keen and Racheal Lomas (tenant) in 2021. In November 2023, the tenant stopped paying rent. In April 2024, the landlord served a 14-day notice to pay rent or vacate, but the tenant did not respond. In May 2024, the landlord commenced an unlawful detainer action, serving the tenant with a summons and complaint. The tenant faxed a written notice of appearance to the landlord, indicating their intention to be present at any court case or appearance. Despite this, the landlord moved for a default judgment due to the tenant's failure to file an answer by the specified date. The trial court granted the default judgment and issued a writ of restitution.The tenant received the motion for default and notice of hearing but was allegedly informed by the King County Superior Court Clerk’s Office that they did not need to attend the hearing. In July 2024, the trial court found the tenant in default for lack of answer and issued the default judgment and writ of restitution. The tenant retained counsel and moved to vacate the default judgment and quash the writ, arguing that default for an appearing tenant violated their statutory right to counsel and contradicted the statutory summons language requiring a show cause hearing. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the landlord that the Civil Rules required an answer and that the landlord had complied with statutory notice requirements.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that RCW 59.18.365(3) precludes a default judgment against a tenant who appears but does not submit a written answer in an unlawful detainer action. The tenant’s written notice of appearance constituted a response to the summons, and the trial court erred in entering a default judgment based on the tenant’s failure to answer. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s entry of default and remanded the case for further proceedings. The landlord's request for appellate attorney fees was denied. View "Sangha v. Keen" on Justia Law

Sokunthim Nou appeals from a divorce judgment entered by the District Court in which the court allocated property between her and Rotanak Huot and awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities and shared residency of their children. Sokunthim challenges the court’s property determinations on multiple grounds, but does not contest the custody determination. The court found that all the parties’ assets were marital because they were acquired during the marriage and through significant effort by both parties. The court allocated just over half of the net value of the parties’ properties to Sokunthim and the remainder to Rotanak. The court also found Sokunthim’s income to be $435,598, based largely on Rotanak’s testimony about Punky’s LLC’s daily sales.The District Court held a trial with both parties represented by counsel and interpreters present. The court heard testimony from the parties, a real estate broker, Sokunthim’s accountant, and her father. The court entered a comprehensive divorce judgment, determining that all the parties’ assets were marital and allocating them accordingly. The court’s judgment awarded Panyah LLC to Rotanak and implicitly awarded Punky’s LLC to Sokunthim. Sokunthim filed motions for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law and for a new trial, which the court denied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s determination of Sokunthim’s income was unsupported by the evidence. The court’s finding as to her income may have influenced other financial aspects of the judgment. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the division of property and child support award and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Nou v. Huot" on Justia Law

The appellant, a mother of two minor children, regained custody of her children through a federal district court action in Illinois under the Hague Convention and ICARA after the children were wrongfully removed from Slovakia by their father. Subsequently, she filed a state court action in Cook County against her former mother-in-law and brother-in-law, alleging tortious interference with her custodial rights and aiding and abetting such interference, seeking to recover expenses incurred in the federal action.The Cook County circuit court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The appellate court concluded that Illinois courts have consistently declined to recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with a parent’s custodial rights, regardless of the damages claimed.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reiterated its position that Illinois does not recognize the tort of interference with the parent-child relationship, regardless of the damages claimed. The court emphasized that it has consistently deferred the question of whether to recognize such a cause of action to the legislative branch. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, maintaining that the creation of new causes of action is more appropriately addressed by the legislature. The court also noted that the appellant had already obtained a remedy under ICARA, which provided for the recovery of necessary expenses incurred in regaining custody of her children. View "Hulsh v. Hulsh" on Justia Law

Elsa M. Tronsrue filed for dissolution of marriage from George M. Tronsrue III, and George filed a counterpetition. In 1992, the Du Page County circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage, incorporating a marital settlement agreement that required George to pay Elsa one-half of the marital portion of his federal veterans’ disability payments. In 2019, George sought to terminate these payments, arguing that the division of his benefits was void under federal law. Elsa moved to dismiss George’s petition, and the circuit court granted her motion, found George in contempt for non-payment, and ordered him to pay Elsa’s attorney fees.The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the marital settlement agreement was not void despite potentially violating federal law, as the circuit court had jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings. The dissenting justice argued that federal law preempted the agreement, rendering it void. In a related order, the appellate court also affirmed the contempt finding, reasoning that George was required to make the payments because the judgment was not void. The dissenting justice again argued that the provision was void, providing George with a compelling justification for non-compliance.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgments. The court held that federal law did not preempt the state law authorizing the marital settlement agreement, as George voluntarily agreed to use his disability benefits to pay Elsa after receiving them. The court also found that the circuit court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the judgment of dissolution, and thus, the judgment was not void. Consequently, the court upheld the award of attorney fees to Elsa for George’s failure to comply with the agreement. View "In re Marriage of Tronsrue" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted the State of Louisiana primary enforcement authority over a class of underground carbon sequestration wells. Three environmental organizations, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Healthy Gulf, and Alliance for Affordable Energy, petitioned for review of the final rule granting that authorization, arguing that the rule would harm their interests.The petitioners claimed that the EPA's approval would force them to reallocate resources from their usual activities to oppose the Class VI well program. They also argued that the program would lead to increased energy costs, health risks, and environmental damage. The organizations asserted both organizational and associational standing, with Deep South claiming direct injury to its operations and Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy claiming injury on behalf of their members.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the petition, finding that all three organizations lacked standing. The court held that Deep South's claimed injuries were not cognizable under Article III because they were self-inflicted and amounted to a setback to abstract social interests. The court also found that Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy's alleged injuries were too speculative and attenuated to meet the requirements of imminence and traceability. The court emphasized that the petitioners' theories of injury relied on a chain of speculative events that were not certainly impending.Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that was fairly traceable to the EPA's action and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Therefore, the petitions for review were dismissed. View "Deep South Center for Environmental Justice v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law