Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2017, the plaintiff was involved in a low-speed collision when the defendant, driving a car, struck the plaintiff riding a motorcycle. The plaintiff did not fall or receive immediate medical attention and reported pain only in his hip, leg, and foot the following day. He later claimed the accident caused severe and lasting neck and groin injuries. The defense contested the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries, noting his continued participation in physical activities after the accident. As trial approached, the plaintiff, who had previously designated numerous expert witnesses, visited a new doctor—Dr. Gravori—just days before trial. Dr. Gravori recommended spine surgery, introducing a new theory of injury not previously disclosed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County allowed Dr. Gravori to testify as an expert, provided he was immediately made available for a deposition at the plaintiff’s expense. The defense objected, arguing the late disclosure of this expert was prejudicial and violated procedural rules. The deposition took place during jury selection, and the court maintained its ruling, permitting Gravori’s testimony. The jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff substantial damages, including future medical expenses and pain and suffering.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the late expert witness. The appellate court found that the plaintiff offered no reasonable justification for the delayed designation of Dr. Gravori and failed to follow statutory requirements for augmenting the expert witness list. The court held that this was an abuse of discretion and that the error was prejudicial, likely affecting the outcome. Accordingly, the judgment and costs order were vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Costs were awarded to the appellants. View "Fancourt v. Zargaryan" on Justia Law

A Singapore-based company that supplies offshore vessels entered into a charter agreement with a Mexico-based marine oil and gas company. The agreement allowed the Mexican company to charter a vessel for eighteen months, with provisions for termination if payments were not made and an obligation to redeliver the vessel at the end of the term. After the charter expired, the Singaporean company alleged that the Mexican company failed to pay required fees and did not return the vessel, leading to arbitration in Singapore. The arbitrator awarded the Singaporean company damages and ordered the vessel’s return, but the Mexican company did not comply. Meanwhile, an email revealed that the Mexican company was set to receive a large refund from a third party, to be sent to a U.S. bank account in the name of a related U.S. entity.The Singaporean company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking to attach the funds in the U.S. account as security for the arbitration award under federal maritime law and, later, Texas state law. The district court initially granted the writ of garnishment, but after limited discovery, vacated the writ, finding no evidence that the Mexican company owned the funds in the U.S. account. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend its complaint to assert an alter ego theory, which would have permitted attachment based on state law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider relevant evidence and legal standards regarding ownership and control of the funds. The appellate court also determined that the district court erred in denying leave to amend without adequate explanation. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case, instructing the district court to allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint. View "CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean" on Justia Law

A community group challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Regents of the University of California for UC Berkeley’s 2021 long range development plan and a specific student housing project at People’s Park. The plaintiffs alleged that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze certain environmental impacts, including noise from student parties and the consideration of alternative sites for the housing project, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the group’s petition and entered judgment for the Regents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially agreed with the plaintiffs on two issues: the EIR should have evaluated noise impacts from student parties and considered alternative locations for the housing project. Both parties sought review in the California Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition on one issue, it granted the Regents’ petition on the two issues where the plaintiffs had prevailed. During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature enacted new statutes specifically addressing and abrogating the appellate court’s holdings on noise and site alternatives for residential projects. The California Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court’s decision on those two issues, holding that the legislative changes rendered the EIR adequate and directed judgment in favor of the Regents.After remand, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, arguing they had been a “successful party” by securing important legal precedent. The trial court denied the motion, finding the plaintiffs did not achieve their litigation objectives. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five affirmed, holding that because the Supreme Court reversed the rulings on which the plaintiffs claimed success, those opinions were no longer citable precedent and the plaintiffs did not qualify as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

A public hospital in New York contracted with a new parking management company to provide valet services, replacing a previous vendor whose employees were represented by a union and were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After winning the contract, the new company considered retaining the existing unionized valet attendants but ultimately did not hire any of them, despite initially recruiting them. Instead, the company posted job listings for the same roles and hired other workers, leaving the former unionized employees without jobs. Evidence suggested that the new company’s refusal to hire was motivated by the employees’ union affiliation.After the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) filed a petition with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking a temporary injunction under § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. The requested injunction would have required the company to reinstate the discharged employees, recognize the union, and bargain in good faith. The district court denied the petition in a brief text order, finding no cognizable irreparable harm and noting the delay in seeking relief. Meanwhile, an Administrative Law Judge found that the company violated the Act by refusing to hire the unionized employees and failing to recognize and bargain with the union.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The Second Circuit held that the district court’s order violated Rule 52(a)(2) by failing to provide adequate findings and conclusions. The Second Circuit further found that the Regional Director had met all four prongs required for a § 10(j) injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for entry of the requested injunction. View "Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc." on Justia Law

A Florida resident who worked as an independent contractor driver for an Indiana-based transportation company initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, alleging violations of Iowa’s business opportunity promotions statutes. The Indiana company, registered to do business in Iowa as a foreign corporation and having appointed an agent for service of process as required by Iowa law, argued that it had no substantial presence or employees in Iowa. The plaintiff asserted that the company’s registration and agent appointment constituted consent to personal jurisdiction, among other arguments.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the Indiana company’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It concluded that, under Iowa law, a foreign corporation consents to personal jurisdiction by registering to do business in Iowa and designating an agent for service. However, recognizing the absence of controlling Iowa precedent on this issue, the federal court certified a question of state law to the Iowa Supreme Court for resolution.The Iowa Supreme Court answered the certified question and held that, under Iowa law, a foreign corporation does not consent to personal jurisdiction merely by registering to do business in Iowa, appointing an agent for service of process, or receiving service through that agent. The court determined that Iowa Code chapter 490 does not require foreign corporations to consent to personal jurisdiction as a condition of registration or agent appointment, and declined to interpret the statute as implicitly imposing such consent. The Iowa Supreme Court’s answer was in the negative, clarifying that registration and agent appointment do not constitute consent to personal jurisdiction in Iowa. View "Kelchner v. CRST Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

A New Mexico insurance company initiated a lawsuit in Nebraska against two insurance companies, asserting claims for contribution and indemnity. One defendant, a New York insurance company, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, while the other defendant, a surplus insurance company, challenged a default judgment and sought to file a responsive pleading. The district court in Douglas County issued separate orders: it dismissed the New York insurer with prejudice and set aside the default judgment against the other defendant, allowing additional proceedings.After the dismissal order concerning the New York insurer, the plaintiff appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The case returned to the district court, where the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims against the remaining defendant without prejudice. This second dismissal order did not reference the prior dismissal of the New York insurer. The plaintiff then filed another appeal, again challenging the earlier dismissal order. The Court of Appeals dismissed this second appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the absence of a single judgment resolving all claims against all parties as required by Nebraska statutes and referencing the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in Elbert v. Keating, O’Gara. The plaintiff petitioned for further review.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, because the district court had not entered a single written judgment adjudicating all claims and all parties, nor certified any order as final under the applicable statute, there was no final, appealable order. Therefore, the Supreme Court determined it lacked appellate jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals. The court emphasized that jurisdiction cannot be created by voluntary dismissal without prejudice of unresolved claims or parties in the absence of a final judgment. View "Continental Indem. Co. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co." on Justia Law

The underlying dispute arose after an individual was convicted of a crime in Louisiana, served part of his sentence, and later had his conviction reversed or vacated. Claiming factual innocence, he sought compensation under Louisiana’s wrongful conviction statute, which provides monetary awards to qualifying persons. Prior to filing this petition in state court, he had also initiated a separate federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights stemming from the same prosecution and conviction.In the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, the State requested a stay of the wrongful conviction compensation proceedings, citing Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 532. This provision allows a court to stay proceedings when there is a related action in another jurisdiction involving the same parties and occurrence. The State argued that the federal suit should proceed first. The district court denied the motion to stay in open court on March 27, 2025. The State then sought supervisory review from the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which also denied relief on April 30, 2025.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the district court’s denial of the stay. The court examined the statutory differences between the state law compensation claim, which requires proof of factual innocence, and the federal civil rights action, which focuses on constitutional violations by individual actors. Concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to stay the state court proceedings—especially in light of the legislative instruction to decide wrongful conviction claims expeditiously—the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that denial of the State’s motion to stay the wrongful conviction compensation proceedings was proper under the circumstances. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

A motorcyclist attending the Sturgis Motorcycle Rally in South Dakota was injured in a 2017 collision when another driver allegedly pulled out in front of him. The injured party, a resident of Canada, filed a negligence lawsuit against the driver in July 2020. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff’s counsel granted the defendant’s insurance carrier an open-ended extension to file an answer, due to ongoing medical treatment and uncertainty about the extent of injuries. The parties operated under this informal agreement while the plaintiff continued treatment and sought additional information related to his injuries and damages.Over the next several years, the Meade County clerk of courts issued three notices of intent to dismiss the case for inactivity, to which the plaintiff timely objected, citing the ongoing extension and the need to collect further information. In August 2024, the defendant retained counsel, who acknowledged and reaffirmed the open-ended extension agreement. However, two months later, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, granted the dismissal with prejudice under SDCL 15-11-11 and SDCL 15-6-41(b) (Rule 41(b)), concluding there was unreasonable and unexplained delay.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that dismissal was improper. The Court found that the mutual open-ended extension agreement between the parties constituted good cause for delay under SDCL 15-11-11. Additionally, the Court determined that the plaintiff’s conduct did not rise to the level of egregiousness required for dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b), especially given the reaffirmed extension and lack of prejudice to the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Arrowsmith v. Odle" on Justia Law

Florida PACE Funding Agency initiated a proceeding in the Second Judicial Circuit to validate the issuance of $5 billion in bonds for financing certain property improvements under the PACE Act. The agency complied with statutory notice requirements, and a hearing was held where State Attorneys from the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits were represented. No party objected to the entry of final judgment validating the bonds, and the judgment became final without any appeal. Over a year later, various governmental entities—including state attorneys, counties, and tax collectors (most of whom did not participate in the original proceedings)—filed motions under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, seeking relief from the judgment, raising arguments such as lack of jurisdiction, due process violations, and alleged surprise.The circuit court allowed discovery and held an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied all motions for relief from judgment. For the parties who had not appeared previously, the court found that rule 1.540 did not apply to bond validation judgments due to the strict finality requirements of chapter 75, Florida Statutes, and that the motions were untimely and insufficient. For the state attorneys who had participated, the court concluded they were procedurally barred from seeking relief under rule 1.540 because it could not substitute for appellate review.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed whether rule 1.540 applies to final judgments in bond validation proceedings under chapter 75. The court held that chapter 75’s finality language—specifically section 75.09—precludes the use of rule 1.540 to collaterally attack such judgments after the time for appeal has expired. The court concluded that the statutory scheme is exclusive, and the rules of civil procedure do not override the statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motions for relief from judgment. View "State Attorneys for the Second, Seventh and Ninth Judicial Circuits v. Florida Pace Funding Agency" on Justia Law

A South Korean entertainment company that owns trademarks for the popular “Baby Shark” song and related products brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against dozens of China-based businesses. The company alleged these businesses manufactured or sold counterfeit Baby Shark merchandise, violating trademark, copyright, and unfair competition laws. Seeking to stop the alleged counterfeiting, the company obtained temporary and preliminary injunctions and moved to serve the defendants by email, arguing that this method was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).After the plaintiff served process by email, most defendants did not respond, leading to default judgments against many of them. However, two defendants appeared and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that service by email violated the Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and China are parties. The district court agreed, finding that the Convention did not permit service by email on parties in China, and dismissed the claims against these defendants without prejudice for improper service. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention does not allow email service on defendants located in China, as China has expressly objected to alternative methods such as those in Article 10 of the Convention. The court further held that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2) nor any purported emergency exception permitted email service in these circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of a default judgment, finding no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the dismissal of the claims against the two China-based defendants for lack of proper service was affirmed. View "Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi" on Justia Law