Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (collectively "RSA"), which received a land-use certificate from the Baldwin County zoning administrator to construct a five-story structure at The Grand Hotel. The Point Clear Property Owners Association, Inc. (PCPOA), representing around 400 members in the district, appealed the issuance of the certificate to the Baldwin County Board of Adjustment. The Board agreed with PCPOA and rescinded the certificate.RSA appealed the Board's decision to the Baldwin Circuit Court, which affirmed the Board's ruling. RSA then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that PCPOA was not "aggrieved" by the issuance of the certificate and thus lacked standing to appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals held that RSA had waived this argument by not raising it before the Board and cited the precedent set in City of Mobile v. Lee. The court also noted in a footnote that PCPOA did qualify as a "person aggrieved."The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that whether PCPOA was "aggrieved" was a waivable issue of capacity, not subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, RSA's failure to raise the issue before the Board constituted a waiver. The court did not address whether PCPOA was actually "aggrieved," as it affirmed the lower court's decision based on the waiver. View "Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and Employees' Retirement System of Alabama v. Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Department" on Justia Law

A state agency, WorkForce West Virginia, and its Acting Commissioner, Scott A. Adkins, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of three orders issued by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. These orders granted a writ of mandamus to the plaintiffs, denied WorkForce’s motion to dismiss, and allowed the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. The plaintiffs, who received unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic, alleged that WorkForce engaged in illegal collection activities by attempting to recover overpayments beyond the statutory time limits.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that WorkForce’s collection activities were time-barred by West Virginia Code § 21A-10-21, which imposes a two-year statute of limitations for recovering overpayments made due to error. The court also concluded that WorkForce could not determine overpayments due to nondisclosure or misrepresentation through its administrative process and must instead pursue such claims in circuit court. Based on this interpretation, the circuit court granted mandamus and injunctive relief, ordering WorkForce to cease its collection activities and comply with the statutory time limits.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes. The higher court concluded that the administrative process established by the Legislature allows WorkForce to determine whether overpayments occurred due to error, nondisclosure, or misrepresentation. The court emphasized that claimants must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, as mandated by West Virginia Code § 21A-7-19. Since the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition and directed the circuit court to dismiss the case. View "Adkins v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Ty Whitehead suffered a serious head injury during a bicycle training ride for a charity fundraiser due to a large pothole on Skyline Boulevard in Oakland. Whitehead alleged that the City of Oakland breached its statutory duty to maintain a safe roadway. Prior to the ride, Whitehead signed a release and waiver of liability, which included a provision discharging the City from any liability for negligence.The Alameda County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the release was valid and enforceable, thus barring Whitehead’s claim. The court reasoned that the release did not affect the public interest, relying on the multifactor test from Tunkl v. Regents of University of California. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, also relying on the Tunkl framework.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and concluded that the release was against public policy under Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits contracts that exempt a party from responsibility for their own fraud, willful injury, or violation of law. The court held that an agreement to exculpate a party for future violations of a statutory duty designed to protect public safety is unenforceable. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the City to argue the doctrine of primary assumption of risk on remand. View "Whitehead v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc., and OFLC, Inc. (collectively Moosehead) filed a civil action against Carmen Rebozo Foundation, Inc., alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of good faith and fair dealing. The dispute arose from a promissory note for $6,350,000 executed by Moosehead and assigned to the Foundation, which allegedly misrepresented the amount due, impacting Moosehead's efforts to sell a ski resort.The Superior Court (Piscataquis County) denied Moosehead’s motion for summary judgment and the Foundation’s motion for relief under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), ordering a judicial settlement conference. The parties reached a settlement, agreeing to dismiss the case with prejudice. However, no docket entries were filed within the court's deadline, leading to the case's dismissal with prejudice. Moosehead then filed a motion for reconsideration and to vacate the settlement agreement, which the court denied. The Foundation's motion to enforce the settlement agreement was granted.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of Moosehead’s motion for reconsideration, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it vacated the judgment enforcing the settlement agreement, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce it after the case was dismissed with prejudice. The court noted that the parties failed to take necessary steps to preserve the court's jurisdiction over the settlement agreement before the dismissal. The case was remanded for an order dismissing the motion to enforce the settlement agreement for want of jurisdiction. View "Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc. v. Carmen Rebozo Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

Bankers Standard Insurance Company (Bankers) filed a lawsuit against JTEC, Inc. (JTEC), a professional engineering firm, alleging that JTEC negligently designed a water mechanical system for a housing development in Jackson, Wyoming. The design flaw allegedly caused a water filter housing to fail, resulting in significant water damage to a home insured by Bankers. The design plans, which included the alleged defect, were revised multiple times, with the final set submitted on May 31, 2018.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and certified a question to the Wyoming Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107. The district court had granted summary judgment in favor of JTEC, determining that the statute of limitations barred Bankers' claim. The district court concluded that the relevant date for the statute of limitations was May 31, 2018, the last day JTEC provided professional services.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the certified question to determine when a professional’s act, error, or omission occurred under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107. The Court held that the absence of contractual privity is not relevant in determining when the statute of limitations attaches in a tort action. The statute of limitations attaches to the design that was the legal cause of the alleged injuries, meaning the act, error, or omission that was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs’ injuries.The Court concluded that the statute of limitations in § 1-3-107 attaches to the design that was used by the plumber to install the water entry detail at the Grossmans’ residence. However, the Court could not determine which set of engineering plans were used based on the facts presented. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings to establish which design was the legal cause of the alleged injuries. View "Bankers Standard Insurance Company v. JTEC, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Detrina Solomon, a subscriber to a digital video streaming service operated by Flipps Media, Inc. (doing business as FITE), alleged that her rights under the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) were violated when FITE disclosed her streaming history to Facebook (now Meta Platforms, Inc.). The disclosed information included the titles and URLs of the videos she watched and her Facebook ID (FID), which is linked to her Facebook profile.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Solomon's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that she failed to plausibly allege that FITE disclosed her personally identifiable information as defined by the VPPA. The district court also denied her leave to amend the complaint, noting that she had multiple opportunities to propose amendments but did not do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court adopted the "ordinary person" standard, which holds that personally identifiable information under the VPPA includes information that would allow an ordinary person to identify a consumer's video-watching habits. The court concluded that the information disclosed by FITE, consisting of video titles and FIDs, did not meet this standard because an ordinary person would not be able to use this information to identify Solomon's video-watching habits without additional effort or technological expertise.The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend, as Solomon's request was made only in a footnote and lacked any proposed amendments to address the deficiencies in her complaint. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Solomon v. Flipps Media, Inc." on Justia Law

George and Maria Dernis borrowed money from Premier Bank, which was involved in fraudulent lending practices. The loans were secured by mortgages on their personal real estate. After Premier Bank collapsed, the FDIC was appointed as receiver and sold some of the bank's loans, including the Dernises' loans, to Amos Financial in 2014. The Dernises claimed that the FDIC was aware of the fraudulent nature of the loans and failed to take remedial action. They filed a lawsuit against the FDIC, which was dismissed by the district court. They then filed an amended complaint against the United States under the FTCA, alleging various torts based on the FDIC's conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the amended complaint, determining that most of the claims were not timely exhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court also found that the sole timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The court dismissed the action with prejudice and entered final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Dernises failed to timely exhaust their administrative remedies for most of their claims. The court also held that the only timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception, as it involved misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights. The court rejected the Dernises' argument that the FDIC’s "sue-and-be-sued" clause provided a broader waiver of sovereign immunity, noting that the United States was the sole defendant and the FTCA provided the exclusive remedy for tort claims against the United States. View "Dernis v United States" on Justia Law

Thomas R. McDonald filed a petition contesting amendments to the Declaration of Trust of Judith E. Stratos 2000 Trust, which named William Goebner as successor trustee. McDonald alleged the amendments, which removed him and his sister as beneficiaries, were due to undue influence, fraud, and financial elder abuse. He sought various remedies under the Probate Code. Two days before a scheduled hearing, Goebner filed a demurrer to dismiss McDonald’s claims, which the trial court overruled as untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.40, requiring demurrers to be filed within 30 days after service of the complaint.The trial court overruled Goebner’s demurrer as untimely, leading Goebner to petition for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order. He argued that the Probate Code, specifically section 1043, which allows an interested person to make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing, should govern the timing for filing a demurrer in probate proceedings, not the Code of Civil Procedure.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Goebner, holding that section 1043 of the Probate Code governs the timing for filing a demurrer in probate proceedings, allowing it to be filed at or before the hearing. The court concluded that Goebner’s demurrer, filed two days before the hearing, was timely. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer as untimely and to consider the demurrer on its merits. Goebner was entitled to recover his costs in the writ proceeding. View "Goebner v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Percy Brown, alleged that he was framed by University of Louisville Police Officer Jeffrey Jewell and several Louisville Metro Police Department officers for various crimes, including kidnapping, murder, rape, sodomy, and wanton endangerment, after he refused to cooperate in a check-forging investigation. Over more than ten years, the Commonwealth of Kentucky brought and dismissed numerous charges against Brown, resulting in his spending over seven years in prison. After the final indictment was dismissed, Brown filed a lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky dismissed Brown's malicious-prosecution claim related to the murder charge as barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that the claim accrued when the murder charge was dismissed on February 24, 2015, and thus was time-barred. The court also granted Jewell’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Brown’s fabrication-of-evidence claim, finding it insufficiently pleaded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the malicious-prosecution claim, agreeing that it was time-barred. The court held that the murder charge was separable from the other charges against Brown, which were dismissed later, and thus the statute of limitations for the malicious-prosecution claim related to the murder charge began to run when that charge was dismissed. The court also found that the continuing-violation doctrine did not apply, as the last alleged unlawful act occurred more than a year before Brown filed his lawsuit. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Brown v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, separated in April 2023, and have a daughter born in August 2019. A.M. filed for divorce in April 2023, and the parties signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into an uncontested judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised weekend visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled a hearing for a permanent DVRO but did not grant a temporary order pending the hearing. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings in the trial court, which was denied. The court set the permanent DVRO request for an evidentiary hearing in August 2024, later continued to August 2025.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and accompanying evidence. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO without proper reasons. The appellate court held that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending the noticed hearing. The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the matter for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances. View "Marriage of A.M. and R.Y." on Justia Law