Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

David and Bonnie Faulk, residents of Alaska, purchased over one hundred windows from Spenard Builders Supply for their custom-built home and alleged that the windows, manufactured by JELD-WEN, were defective in breach of an oral warranty. They filed a class action in Alaska state court against Spenard Builders Supply, an Alaska corporation, and JELD-WEN, a Delaware corporation, asserting state-law claims. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows federal jurisdiction based on minimal diversity in class actions.After removal, the Faulks amended their complaint to remove all class action allegations and sought to remand the case to state court. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska denied their motion to remand, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent that held federal jurisdiction under CAFA is determined at the time of removal and is not affected by post-removal amendments. The district court allowed the amendment to eliminate class allegations but ultimately dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice, finding most claims time-barred and one insufficiently pled.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, which held that federal jurisdiction depends on the operative complaint, including post-removal amendments. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, after the Faulks removed their class action allegations, the sole basis for federal jurisdiction under CAFA was eliminated, and complete diversity was lacking. The court vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded with instructions to remand the case to state court unless another basis for federal jurisdiction is established. View "FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC." on Justia Law

A cannabis cultivation business was licensed to operate in Vermont but became the subject of regulatory action after laboratory testing detected myclobutanil, a prohibited pesticide, in its products. The business had previously entered into a corrective action plan with the regulatory board following similar violations in 2023, agreeing to remediation, penalties, and compliance measures. In 2024, after further detections of myclobutanil in both retail and on-site samples, the regulatory board issued a notice of violation with immediate effect, including a stop-sale order for all of the business’s products, a recall requirement, and a proposed license revocation.The business contested the notice and requested a hearing before the Cannabis Control Board. At the hearing, it raised several arguments, including challenges to the Board’s authority under the Vermont Constitution, claims of bias by the Board chair, and alleged due process violations. The Board chair denied a motion for recusal, and after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, the Board found that the business had violated its corrective action plan and used unauthorized pesticides. The Board dismissed one violation as duplicative but upheld others, ultimately revoking the business’s license. The business appealed to an appellate officer, who affirmed the Board’s decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, applying a standard that precludes reweighing factual findings unless clearly erroneous or affected by legal error. The Court held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in issuing a stop-sale order for all products, that the Board’s interpretation of its regulations was reasonable, and that the business failed to preserve or adequately brief its constitutional and evidentiary arguments. The Court also found no due process violation regarding the impartiality of the Board chair, as the business did not make an evidentiary record to support its claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of the business’s license. View "In re Holland Cannabis, LLC" on Justia Law

A Maryland real estate investment trust with over 12,000 shareholders entered into an advisory agreement with UMTH General Services, L.P. and its affiliates to manage the trust’s investments and operations. The agreement stated that the advisor was in a fiduciary relationship with the trust and its shareholders, but individual shareholders were not parties to the agreement. After allegations of mismanagement and improper advancement of legal fees surfaced, a shareholder, Nexpoint Diversified Real Estate Trust, sued derivatively in Maryland. The Maryland court dismissed the claims for lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Nexpoint then transferred its shares to a subsidiary, which, along with Nexpoint, sued the advisors directly in Texas, alleging corporate waste and mismanagement, and claimed the advisory agreement created a duty to individual shareholders.In the 191st District Court of Dallas County, the advisors filed a plea to the jurisdiction, a verified plea in abatement, and special exceptions, arguing that the claims were derivative and belonged to the trust, so the shareholders lacked standing and capacity to sue directly. The trial court denied these motions. The advisors sought mandamus relief from the Fifth Court of Appeals, which was denied, and then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that while the shareholders alleged a financial injury sufficient for constitutional standing, they lacked the capacity to sue individually because the advisory agreement did not create a duty to individual shareholders, nor did it confer third-party beneficiary status. The agreement benefited shareholders collectively through the trust, not individually. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its order and dismiss the case with prejudice, holding that shareholders must pursue such claims derivatively and in the proper forum as specified by the trust’s governing documents. View "IN RE UMTH GENERAL SERVICES, L.P." on Justia Law

Sanchez Energy Corporation, a gas producer, underwent Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2019 due to significant debt, with its reorganization plan confirmed in April 2020. The company, later renamed Mesquite Energy, Inc., owned valuable fossil fuel reserves in the Comanche Field, Texas, and had several high-cost contracts for gathering, processing, transporting, and marketing natural gas and natural gas liquids. Carnero G&P, L.L.C., a midstream services provider, had a contract with Sanchez to serve as a backup provider. After Sanchez’s reorganization, Mesquite entered into new agreements with other parties to lower its midstream costs, which Carnero claimed breached its surviving contract.Following the bankruptcy, Carnero filed a state court lawsuit against Mesquite and other parties, asserting state law claims based on the new agreements. The suit was removed to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, which denied Carnero’s request to remand and ultimately dismissed the case on the pleadings, finding it had “related-to” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. The bankruptcy court reasoned that the dispute pertained to the implementation of the reorganization plan and that Carnero was barred from challenging the new agreements due to its failure to object during the bankruptcy proceedings. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the jurisdictional question de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court lacked post-confirmation “related-to” jurisdiction over Carnero’s state law contract claims, as the dispute did not pertain to the implementation or execution of the reorganization plan. The court found that the new agreements were not executory contracts under the plan and that Carnero was not barred from pursuing its claims. The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower courts’ judgments and remanded the case with instructions to remand to state court. View "Carnero G&P v. SN EF Maverick" on Justia Law

RTI, LLC and RTI Holdings, LLC sought to construct a specialized clinical research facility in Brookings, South Dakota, designed for animal health research trials with stringent air filtration and ventilation requirements. Acting as the general contractor, RTI hired designArc Group, Inc. as architect and several contractors, including Pro Engineering, Inc., Ekern Home Equipment Company, FM Acoustical Tile, Inc., and Trane U.S. Inc., to design and build the facility. After completion in April 2016, RTI experienced significant issues with air pressure, ventilation, and ceiling integrity, leading to contamination problems that disrupted research and resulted in financial losses.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Brookings County, reviewed RTI’s claims for breach of contract and breach of implied warranties against the architect and contractors. All defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that RTI’s claims were based on professional negligence and required expert testimony, which RTI failed to provide. The circuit court agreed, finding RTI’s CEO unqualified as an expert, and granted summary judgment to all defendants. The court also denied RTI’s motion to amend its complaint to add negligence claims, deeming the amendment untimely and futile due to the lack of expert testimony.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the summary judgment for designArc, Pro Engineering, and FM Acoustical, holding that expert testimony was required for claims involving specialized design and construction issues, and that RTI’s CEO was not qualified to provide such testimony. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for Trane and Ekern, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding Trane’s alleged faulty installation and Ekern’s potential vicarious liability. The court also reversed the denial of RTI’s motion to amend the complaint, concluding the proposed amendments were not futile and would not prejudice Trane or Ekern. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "RTI, LLC v. Pro Engineering" on Justia Law

Jeremy and Abbey Coyle brought a civil trespass action against Kenneth and Kelli McFarland, alleging that a portion of the McFarlands’ driveway and vehicles encroached on the Coyles’ property, Lot Q1, in Belle Fourche, South Dakota. The dispute centered on whether a public right-of-way (Walworth Street) extended along the entire southeastern boundary of the McFarlands’ Lot 25A, which would affect the property boundaries and the alleged trespass. The Coyles claimed the right-of-way ended at a certain point, while the McFarlands argued it continued along the full boundary, relying on subdivision plats, improvement agreements, and city ordinances.After the Coyles filed their complaint, the McFarlands answered and asserted their defense based on the Subdivision Improvements Agreement and city records. The Coyles then moved for partial summary judgment before any discovery had occurred. The McFarlands failed to respond within the statutory deadline and subsequently moved for a continuance under SDCL 15-6-56(f), submitting affidavits explaining the need for additional discovery and citing personal circumstances for the delay. The Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Butte County, denied the continuance and granted partial summary judgment to the Coyles, finding the right-of-way ended as the Coyles claimed and ordering the McFarlands to remove their assets from Lot Q1. The court later denied the McFarlands’ motion for reconsideration and motion for relief from judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the McFarlands’ motion for a continuance. The Supreme Court found that the McFarlands’ affidavits met the requirements for additional time under Rule 56(f), that excusable neglect was present due to counsel’s personal circumstances, and that no prejudice to the Coyles was shown. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Coyle v. Mcfarland" on Justia Law

Several individuals challenged the validity of the District of Columbia’s Anti-SLAPP Act, which provides defendants in certain lawsuits—those deemed “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPPs)—with a special motion to dismiss and limits discovery in those cases. The challengers argued that the D.C. Council exceeded its authority under the Home Rule Act by enacting the Anti-SLAPP Act, claiming that its discovery-limiting provisions impermissibly intruded on the procedural rules governing the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which are set by Title 11 of the D.C. Code.A division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals previously agreed with the challengers, holding that the Anti-SLAPP Act’s discovery provisions violated the Home Rule Act by interfering with Title 11’s mandate that the Superior Court follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except as modified by the courts themselves. The division’s decision was subsequently vacated when the full court granted en banc review.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the division’s decision. The court held that the D.C. Council did not exceed its authority under the Home Rule Act by passing the Anti-SLAPP Act. The court reasoned that the Act does not amend Title 11, does not alter the organization or jurisdiction of the District’s courts, does not divest the courts of their rulemaking authority, and does not fundamentally change the court system. Instead, the Act supplements procedures for a limited subset of cases in a manner consistent with Title 11. The court concluded that the Council’s broad legislative authority includes the power to enact such laws, and that the Anti-SLAPP Act does not violate the Home Rule Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Banks v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

In August 2022, the appellants filed a complaint and petition in Rice County District Court, seeking to prevent the use of electronic voting machines with embedded modems in the upcoming November 2022 general election. They alleged that these machines were not properly certified or secure, in violation of Minnesota law, and requested an order restraining the county from using the modem functions during the election. The complaint named the Director of Rice County Property Tax and Elections as a defendant, and the Minnesota Secretary of State intervened as a party.The Rice County District Court dismissed the section 204B.44 claim in January 2023, citing several jurisdictional defects, including mootness because the 2022 election had already occurred, and insufficient service of process on all candidates as required by statute. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, focusing on the lack of service to all candidates as the basis for its decision and did not address the other grounds identified by the district court.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the appellants’ claim under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 was moot because the relief sought pertained solely to the 2022 general election, which had already taken place. The court rejected the argument that the claim could be redirected to future elections and clarified that section 204B.44 challenges must be specific to a single election. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, but did so on the alternative ground of mootness, without reaching the issue of service of process on all candidates. View "Benda for Common-sense vs. Anderson" on Justia Law

Skye Angel Anne Hennon filed a sworn petition in the Judith Basin Justice Court seeking a temporary order of protection against Matthew Weber for herself, her minor son N.G., and Brian Gonzalez. Hennon alleged that Weber had harassed and stalked her through threatening messages and uninvited visits, and referenced a separate legal dispute in Idaho. The Justice Court issued a temporary order of protection and scheduled a hearing, at which both parties appeared and testified. During the hearing, Weber attempted to cross-examine Hennon, but the court allowed Hennon to decline answering a relevant question and ended the cross-examination. Weber presented his own testimony and attempted to submit exhibits, which the court excluded as hearsay. The Justice Court extended the order of protection for Hennon and N.G. for one year.Weber appealed to the Montana Tenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the order of protection for Hennon and N.G., but dismissed it as to Gonzalez, noting that Gonzalez, as an adult, needed to seek his own order. The District Court acknowledged deficiencies in the record, including unclear admitted exhibits and unintelligible audio, but relied on the Justice Court’s position to observe the parties and testimony.Weber then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court abused its discretion and violated Weber’s procedural due process rights by denying him a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Hennon on central factual issues. The Court also found that the District Court abused its discretion by affirming the order of protection despite an incomplete and unclear record. The Supreme Court vacated both lower courts’ orders and remanded the case to the Justice Court for a new evidentiary hearing consistent with statutory and due process requirements. View "Hennon v. Weber" on Justia Law

A.H., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to grand theft and violating probation conditions, including disobeying his mother, leaving home without approval, and violating curfew. After further violations—failing to attend mentorship meetings and testing positive for THC—the probation department recommended out-of-home placement in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), citing A.H.’s mental health conditions and his mother’s unwillingness to house him due to safety concerns. The probation department did not submit a statutorily required case plan before the disposition hearing, although it later provided one after the court’s order.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County held several hearings, ultimately ordering A.H.’s placement in an STRTP without first reviewing a case plan as required by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 706.5 and 706.6, and relevant California Rules of Court. A.H.’s counsel objected to the lack of a case plan, but the court proceeded with the placement order and deferred consideration of certain recommendations pending receipt of the case plan. The case plan was provided at a subsequent hearing, but the court did not indicate it had reviewed it before proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. While the appeal became moot when the juvenile court vacated the placement order, the appellate court exercised its discretion to address the issue due to its public importance and likelihood of recurrence. The court held that the statutory scheme requires probation to submit, and the juvenile court to consider, a case plan before ordering foster care placement. The failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. After deciding the merits, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law