Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Barrie Myers was seriously injured in an automobile crash shortly after midnight on November 30, 2018. Nasar Khan, who had been drinking at Cadot Restaurant in Dallas, rear-ended Myers’s vehicle. Khan’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.139, well above the legal limit. The record, however, leaves many facts about the evening unclear, including how much alcohol Khan consumed and how long he was at the restaurant and Jones’s home before the crash.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cadot Restaurant, concluding that Myers produced no evidence to establish that it was apparent to Cadot that Khan was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger when served. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed, holding that a fact issue existed based on Khan’s deposition concessions about his appearance and demeanor at Cadot.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the trial court. The court held that the evidence presented by Myers required impermissible inferences upon inferences to establish how Khan may have appeared when served. The court emphasized that the Texas Dram Shop Act requires proof that it was apparent to the provider that the customer was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger. The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including Khan’s BAC and expert testimony, was insufficient to establish this fact. The court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Myers’s motion for continuance. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Cadot. View "Raoger Corp. v. Myers" on Justia Law

Scott Hampe was employed by Charles Gabus Motors, Inc. (Gabus) from 2008 until December 2019. Gabus conducted an unannounced drug test on December 5, 2019, assisted by Mid-Iowa Occupational Testing (Mid-Iowa). Hampe was selected as an alternate for testing and was ultimately tested. During the test, Hampe provided two insufficient urine samples and decided to leave the testing area to care for his sick child, despite being warned by his manager that leaving would result in termination. Hampe was subsequently fired.Hampe filed a lawsuit against Gabus and Mid-Iowa in May 2020, alleging violations of Iowa Code section 730.5, which governs employer drug testing, and asserting common law claims. The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted summary judgment in favor of Gabus and Mid-Iowa, dismissing all of Hampe’s claims. Hampe appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims against Mid-Iowa and most claims against Gabus but reversed the dismissal of claims related to testing pool requirements, supervisor training, and uniform disciplinary policy, finding genuine issues of material fact.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on Hampe’s claim that Gabus violated section 730.5’s requirements for the composition of testing pools. The court concluded that Gabus failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements for the testing pool, as the pool included employees who were not scheduled to work at the time of testing. The court also found that Hampe was aggrieved by this failure, as his selection for testing and subsequent termination were based on a non-compliant process. The court reversed the district court’s judgment in part, affirmed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate relief for Hampe. The court also deemed Hampe’s claims concerning supervisor training and uniform disciplinary policy moot in light of the resolution of the pooling claim. View "Hampe v. Charles Gabus Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Boone River, LLC purchased a tax certificate and later obtained a tax deed for property owned by Nancy J. Miles, Cheryl L. Bettin, and Robert R. Moninger. Boone River transferred the property to 11T NE, LLC, which then sued to quiet title. The court voided the tax deed and quieted title in favor of Miles, Bettin, and Moninger. Boone River and 11T subsequently filed a complaint for unjust enrichment, seeking compensation for taxes paid and maintenance costs. Miles and Bettin counterclaimed, citing an offer of judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-901, which Boone River and 11T did not accept.The district court initially ruled in favor of Boone River and 11T, awarding them $16,918.68. Miles and Bettin appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the judgment against them, affirming it only against Moninger. Following the mandate, the district court entered judgment in favor of Miles and Bettin. Miles and Bettin then filed a motion for costs under § 25-901, which Boone River and 11T opposed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the district court erred in dismissing Miles and Bettin’s motion for costs. The Supreme Court clarified that the obligation under § 25-901 for the plaintiff to pay costs applies when the plaintiff fails to obtain a judgment for more than the offer, including when judgment is entered against the plaintiff. The court also held that an offer of judgment under § 25-901 retains its cost-shifting effect throughout the case, including on remand.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with directions to determine the costs to which Miles and Bettin are entitled under § 25-901, explicitly stating that "cost" under § 25-901 does not include attorney fees. View "Boone River, LLC v. Miles" on Justia Law

Several college volleyball players accused their coach of physical, verbal, psychological, and sexual abuse. The players alleged that the coach engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment and abuse, including inappropriate touching and forcing players to engage in uncomfortable physical interactions. They also claimed that the coach's misconduct was reported to various university administrators and assistant coaches, who either witnessed or were informed of the abuse.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama dismissed the players' Title IX and § 1983 claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that the players had abandoned their breach-of-contract claims and dismissed those with prejudice. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the players failed to state a Title IX claim because only certain university administrators were "appropriate persons" to receive notice of the misconduct, and the players did not provide sufficient actual notice of sexual harassment to those individuals. The court also found that the university did not act with deliberate indifference upon receiving the notice.Regarding the § 1983 claims, the court held that the players did not show that the university employees' conduct violated clearly established substantive-due-process principles. The court concluded that the employees were entitled to qualified immunity because the players did not provide case law with indistinguishable facts, a broad statement of principle, or conduct so egregious that it clearly violated constitutional rights.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing the players' Title IX and § 1983 claims. View "DeMarcus v. University of South Alabama" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the possession of Touro Synagogue, the oldest active synagogue in the United States, located in Newport, Rhode Island. Congregation Shearith Israel (Shearith Israel) sought to evict Congregation Jeshuat Israel (Jeshuat Israel) from the synagogue. Shearith Israel sent a notice of termination to Jeshuat Israel, demanding they vacate the premises by February 1, 2023. Jeshuat Israel did not vacate, leading Shearith Israel to file an action for trespass and repossession by ejectment.The Rhode Island Superior Court ruled in favor of Shearith Israel, granting them the right to immediate possession of the property. Jeshuat Israel appealed, raising four arguments: the validity of the termination notice, the existence of a condition precedent in a 1945 agreement, the modification of a 1908 lease by the 1945 agreement, and the waiver of a defense by Shearith Israel.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the termination notice was valid and that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also determined that the 1945 agreement did not modify the lease to include a condition precedent requiring consultation before eviction. The agreement's requirement for consultation pertained only to matters of historical preservation and not to eviction actions. The court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, granting Shearith Israel the right to take immediate possession of Touro Synagogue. View "Congregation Shearith Israel v. Congregation Jeshuat Israel" on Justia Law

Jonathan and Melissa Brizendine applied to become foster parents in January 2022. After completing their application, a DHS employee conducted a home visit and asked various questions, including about their religious affiliation. The Brizendines, who are non-religious, were also asked to provide additional information on Melissa’s PTSD and medical-marijuana use. On May 19, 2022, DHS denied their foster-parent application. The Brizendines filed a complaint on June 8, 2023, alleging that their application was denied due to their atheism and medical-marijuana use, claiming violations of the Arkansas Constitution, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment.The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted the State appellees' motion to dismiss, concluding that the Brizendines' complaint failed to state a claim under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and that the State appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity. The court found that the Brizendines did not plead sufficient facts to show that the State’s actions were illegal or unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the Brizendines' complaint was speculative and did not meet the fact-pleading requirements necessary to overcome sovereign immunity. The court noted that the complaint lacked specific facts to support the claim that DHS denied the application based on religious preferences and medical-marijuana use. Additionally, the complaint did not establish any involvement of Governor Sanders or the Child Welfare Agency Review Board in the application process. Therefore, the State appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity, and the dismissal was affirmed. View "Brizendine v. Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Kenneth Tilley sought financing from Malvern National Bank (MNB) for a real estate development project in 2009 and 2010, totaling $350,000. Tilley claimed MNB engaged in unfair dealings and sued for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), tortious interference, negligence, and fraud. The case has been appealed multiple times, with the Arkansas Supreme Court previously reversing decisions related to Tilley's right to a jury trial.Initially, the Garland County Circuit Court struck Tilley's jury demand, which was reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. After remand, the circuit court reinstated a bench trial verdict, citing Act 13 of 2018, which was again reversed by the Supreme Court. On the third remand, MNB moved for summary judgment on all claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment, citing Tilley's reduction of collateral as a material alteration of the agreement, a rationale not argued by MNB. Tilley appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court did not violate the mandate by considering summary judgment. However, it was reversible error for the circuit court to grant summary judgment based on an unargued rationale. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment on Tilley's ADTPA, tortious interference, and negligence claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact. However, it reversed and remanded the summary judgment on Tilley's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud claims, determining that there were disputed material facts that required a jury trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Tilley v. Malvern National Bank" on Justia Law

Jeremy Kennedy filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to seek a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus regarding a decision by the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board (Board). The Board had denied his request for transfer to the Arkansas Division of Community Correction (DCC) and his subsequent request for a six-month reconsideration hearing. Kennedy argued that he was eligible for transfer under Arkansas law and that the Board acted outside its statutory authority by denying his transfer eligibility.The Izard County Circuit Court denied Kennedy’s IFP petition, finding that his claim was a duplicate of a previous lawsuit (case number 33CV-23-123) that was on appeal and another case (33CV-23-57) that he had voluntarily dismissed. The circuit court concluded that Kennedy’s petition did not state a colorable cause of action.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s IFP petition. The Supreme Court found that Kennedy’s latest filing did not present a legitimate claim that could be reasonably asserted based on the facts and current law. Therefore, the denial of Kennedy’s IFP petition was upheld. View "Kennedy v. Felts" on Justia Law

Hamilton Reserve Bank, the beneficial owner of $250,490,000 in Sri Lankan government bonds, sued the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York after Sri Lanka defaulted on the bonds. Over a year later, Jesse Guzman, Ultimate Concrete LLC, and Intercoastal Finance Ltd. sought to intervene, claiming Hamilton defrauded them by using their deposited funds to purchase the bonds and then refusing to allow them to withdraw their money.The district court denied the motion to intervene, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the intervenors' claims. The court found that the claims did not derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact" with Hamilton's breach of contract claim against Sri Lanka, as required for supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court applied the correct "common nucleus of operative fact" standard for evaluating supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367(a). The court concluded that the intervenors' claims, which involved a banking dispute with Hamilton, did not share substantial factual overlap with Hamilton's breach of contract claim against Sri Lanka. Therefore, the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction over the intervenors' claims and denied their motion to intervene. View "Hamilton Reserve Bank v. Sri Lanka" on Justia Law

Asegedech Kelecha rented a room in her house to Sara Menghesha starting in 2019. On May 1, 2020, Kelecha changed the locks without giving Menghesha a key, leaving her homeless during the COVID-19 pandemic. Menghesha sued Kelecha for unlawful eviction and obtained injunctive relief to regain access to the property. She then won a partial motion for summary judgment on liability for unlawful eviction. At a jury trial on damages, Menghesha was awarded $7,500 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.After the trial, a juror emailed stating disagreement with the decisions made during deliberations. Kelecha filed a motion for a new trial based on this email. The Superior Court initially ordered an evidentiary hearing but later reconsidered and denied the motion, concluding that such an inquiry would impermissibly intrude into the jury’s deliberative process.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Kelecha argued that the Superior Court should have held a hearing before denying her new trial motion and that the punitive damages were unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of malice and were unconstitutionally excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, stating that jurors generally cannot impeach their own verdicts under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). The court found that any inquiry into the juror’s email would fall under the no-impeachment rule and that no exceptions applied. Additionally, Kelecha’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence for punitive damages and the excessiveness of the award were deemed forfeited because they were not raised in the trial court. Thus, the Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s verdict and the Superior Court’s rulings. View "Kelecha v. Menghesha" on Justia Law