Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case were previously connected by family ties but became estranged following personal conflicts. The petitioner and respondent had known each other for decades and attended the same church. Their relationship deteriorated after the respondent began an affair with the petitioner’s wife. This led to repeated confrontations, including provocative behavior at child exchanges, an incident where the respondent revved his motorcycle outside the petitioner’s home, and a public encounter in which insults were exchanged. The petitioner also retaliated by making accusatory statements about the respondent both in person and online.After these ongoing disputes, the petitioner sought and obtained an ex parte civil sexually-oriented-offense protection order against the respondent, covering himself and his children. Following a full hearing in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, the magistrate granted a civil stalking protection order only for the petitioner, finding insufficient evidence to include the children. The magistrate interpreted the relevant statute as requiring only that the petitioner believe the respondent intended to cause mental distress. The trial court adopted this interpretation and overruled most of the respondent’s objections, except for modifying the order to permit the respondent to attend church when the petitioner was not present.The respondent appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court relied on its previous decision that a petitioner need only believe that the offender will cause physical harm or mental distress, not that actual mental distress occurred. This interpretation conflicted with rulings from other Ohio appellate districts, which require proof of actual mental distress.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the certified conflict and held that, under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), it is sufficient for a petitioner to believe that the offender will cause mental distress in order to obtain a civil stalking protection order. The court affirmed the Fifth District’s judgment. View "Z.J. v. R.M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by defendant and, as a condition of employment, electronically signed both an offer letter containing an arbitration provision and a separate nondisclosure agreement (NDIAA) on the same day. The offer letter required arbitration for most employment-related disputes, while the NDIAA included terms such as a waiver of bond for injunctive relief and a heightened burden of proof for public domain information. Plaintiff’s employment ended in March 2023, after which she sued defendant in Alameda County Superior Court for disability discrimination, retaliation, and related claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, as well as wrongful termination. None of her claims involved confidential information or sought injunctive relief.Defendant moved to compel arbitration, asserting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed and that plaintiff’s claims fell within the arbitration agreement’s scope. The trial court found the arbitration agreement and NDIAA should be read together under California Civil Code section 1642, determined that certain NDIAA provisions were unconscionable, and concluded that unconscionability permeated the arbitration agreement. The court declined to sever the NDIAA’s unconscionable provisions and denied the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, disagreed with the trial court’s refusal to sever. The appellate court held that the FAA does not preempt section 1642, and even assuming the NDIAA’s challenged provisions were unconscionable and properly considered alongside the arbitration agreement, those provisions were collateral to the arbitration agreement’s central purpose and did not affect the claims at issue. Applying Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc., the appellate court determined that the unconscionable terms should have been severed and the arbitration agreement enforced. Consequently, the order denying arbitration was reversed. View "Wise v. Tesla Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2017, the plaintiff was involved in a low-speed collision when the defendant, driving a car, struck the plaintiff riding a motorcycle. The plaintiff did not fall or receive immediate medical attention and reported pain only in his hip, leg, and foot the following day. He later claimed the accident caused severe and lasting neck and groin injuries. The defense contested the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries, noting his continued participation in physical activities after the accident. As trial approached, the plaintiff, who had previously designated numerous expert witnesses, visited a new doctor—Dr. Gravori—just days before trial. Dr. Gravori recommended spine surgery, introducing a new theory of injury not previously disclosed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County allowed Dr. Gravori to testify as an expert, provided he was immediately made available for a deposition at the plaintiff’s expense. The defense objected, arguing the late disclosure of this expert was prejudicial and violated procedural rules. The deposition took place during jury selection, and the court maintained its ruling, permitting Gravori’s testimony. The jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff substantial damages, including future medical expenses and pain and suffering.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the late expert witness. The appellate court found that the plaintiff offered no reasonable justification for the delayed designation of Dr. Gravori and failed to follow statutory requirements for augmenting the expert witness list. The court held that this was an abuse of discretion and that the error was prejudicial, likely affecting the outcome. Accordingly, the judgment and costs order were vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Costs were awarded to the appellants. View "Fancourt v. Zargaryan" on Justia Law

A Singapore-based company that supplies offshore vessels entered into a charter agreement with a Mexico-based marine oil and gas company. The agreement allowed the Mexican company to charter a vessel for eighteen months, with provisions for termination if payments were not made and an obligation to redeliver the vessel at the end of the term. After the charter expired, the Singaporean company alleged that the Mexican company failed to pay required fees and did not return the vessel, leading to arbitration in Singapore. The arbitrator awarded the Singaporean company damages and ordered the vessel’s return, but the Mexican company did not comply. Meanwhile, an email revealed that the Mexican company was set to receive a large refund from a third party, to be sent to a U.S. bank account in the name of a related U.S. entity.The Singaporean company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking to attach the funds in the U.S. account as security for the arbitration award under federal maritime law and, later, Texas state law. The district court initially granted the writ of garnishment, but after limited discovery, vacated the writ, finding no evidence that the Mexican company owned the funds in the U.S. account. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend its complaint to assert an alter ego theory, which would have permitted attachment based on state law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider relevant evidence and legal standards regarding ownership and control of the funds. The appellate court also determined that the district court erred in denying leave to amend without adequate explanation. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case, instructing the district court to allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint. View "CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean" on Justia Law

A community group challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Regents of the University of California for UC Berkeley’s 2021 long range development plan and a specific student housing project at People’s Park. The plaintiffs alleged that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze certain environmental impacts, including noise from student parties and the consideration of alternative sites for the housing project, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the group’s petition and entered judgment for the Regents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially agreed with the plaintiffs on two issues: the EIR should have evaluated noise impacts from student parties and considered alternative locations for the housing project. Both parties sought review in the California Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition on one issue, it granted the Regents’ petition on the two issues where the plaintiffs had prevailed. During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature enacted new statutes specifically addressing and abrogating the appellate court’s holdings on noise and site alternatives for residential projects. The California Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court’s decision on those two issues, holding that the legislative changes rendered the EIR adequate and directed judgment in favor of the Regents.After remand, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, arguing they had been a “successful party” by securing important legal precedent. The trial court denied the motion, finding the plaintiffs did not achieve their litigation objectives. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five affirmed, holding that because the Supreme Court reversed the rulings on which the plaintiffs claimed success, those opinions were no longer citable precedent and the plaintiffs did not qualify as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

A public hospital in New York contracted with a new parking management company to provide valet services, replacing a previous vendor whose employees were represented by a union and were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After winning the contract, the new company considered retaining the existing unionized valet attendants but ultimately did not hire any of them, despite initially recruiting them. Instead, the company posted job listings for the same roles and hired other workers, leaving the former unionized employees without jobs. Evidence suggested that the new company’s refusal to hire was motivated by the employees’ union affiliation.After the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) filed a petition with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking a temporary injunction under § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. The requested injunction would have required the company to reinstate the discharged employees, recognize the union, and bargain in good faith. The district court denied the petition in a brief text order, finding no cognizable irreparable harm and noting the delay in seeking relief. Meanwhile, an Administrative Law Judge found that the company violated the Act by refusing to hire the unionized employees and failing to recognize and bargain with the union.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The Second Circuit held that the district court’s order violated Rule 52(a)(2) by failing to provide adequate findings and conclusions. The Second Circuit further found that the Regional Director had met all four prongs required for a § 10(j) injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for entry of the requested injunction. View "Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc." on Justia Law

A Florida resident who worked as an independent contractor driver for an Indiana-based transportation company initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, alleging violations of Iowa’s business opportunity promotions statutes. The Indiana company, registered to do business in Iowa as a foreign corporation and having appointed an agent for service of process as required by Iowa law, argued that it had no substantial presence or employees in Iowa. The plaintiff asserted that the company’s registration and agent appointment constituted consent to personal jurisdiction, among other arguments.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the Indiana company’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It concluded that, under Iowa law, a foreign corporation consents to personal jurisdiction by registering to do business in Iowa and designating an agent for service. However, recognizing the absence of controlling Iowa precedent on this issue, the federal court certified a question of state law to the Iowa Supreme Court for resolution.The Iowa Supreme Court answered the certified question and held that, under Iowa law, a foreign corporation does not consent to personal jurisdiction merely by registering to do business in Iowa, appointing an agent for service of process, or receiving service through that agent. The court determined that Iowa Code chapter 490 does not require foreign corporations to consent to personal jurisdiction as a condition of registration or agent appointment, and declined to interpret the statute as implicitly imposing such consent. The Iowa Supreme Court’s answer was in the negative, clarifying that registration and agent appointment do not constitute consent to personal jurisdiction in Iowa. View "Kelchner v. CRST Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

A New Mexico insurance company initiated a lawsuit in Nebraska against two insurance companies, asserting claims for contribution and indemnity. One defendant, a New York insurance company, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, while the other defendant, a surplus insurance company, challenged a default judgment and sought to file a responsive pleading. The district court in Douglas County issued separate orders: it dismissed the New York insurer with prejudice and set aside the default judgment against the other defendant, allowing additional proceedings.After the dismissal order concerning the New York insurer, the plaintiff appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The case returned to the district court, where the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims against the remaining defendant without prejudice. This second dismissal order did not reference the prior dismissal of the New York insurer. The plaintiff then filed another appeal, again challenging the earlier dismissal order. The Court of Appeals dismissed this second appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the absence of a single judgment resolving all claims against all parties as required by Nebraska statutes and referencing the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in Elbert v. Keating, O’Gara. The plaintiff petitioned for further review.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, because the district court had not entered a single written judgment adjudicating all claims and all parties, nor certified any order as final under the applicable statute, there was no final, appealable order. Therefore, the Supreme Court determined it lacked appellate jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals. The court emphasized that jurisdiction cannot be created by voluntary dismissal without prejudice of unresolved claims or parties in the absence of a final judgment. View "Continental Indem. Co. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co." on Justia Law

The underlying dispute arose after an individual was convicted of a crime in Louisiana, served part of his sentence, and later had his conviction reversed or vacated. Claiming factual innocence, he sought compensation under Louisiana’s wrongful conviction statute, which provides monetary awards to qualifying persons. Prior to filing this petition in state court, he had also initiated a separate federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights stemming from the same prosecution and conviction.In the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, the State requested a stay of the wrongful conviction compensation proceedings, citing Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 532. This provision allows a court to stay proceedings when there is a related action in another jurisdiction involving the same parties and occurrence. The State argued that the federal suit should proceed first. The district court denied the motion to stay in open court on March 27, 2025. The State then sought supervisory review from the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which also denied relief on April 30, 2025.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the district court’s denial of the stay. The court examined the statutory differences between the state law compensation claim, which requires proof of factual innocence, and the federal civil rights action, which focuses on constitutional violations by individual actors. Concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to stay the state court proceedings—especially in light of the legislative instruction to decide wrongful conviction claims expeditiously—the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that denial of the State’s motion to stay the wrongful conviction compensation proceedings was proper under the circumstances. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

A motorcyclist attending the Sturgis Motorcycle Rally in South Dakota was injured in a 2017 collision when another driver allegedly pulled out in front of him. The injured party, a resident of Canada, filed a negligence lawsuit against the driver in July 2020. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff’s counsel granted the defendant’s insurance carrier an open-ended extension to file an answer, due to ongoing medical treatment and uncertainty about the extent of injuries. The parties operated under this informal agreement while the plaintiff continued treatment and sought additional information related to his injuries and damages.Over the next several years, the Meade County clerk of courts issued three notices of intent to dismiss the case for inactivity, to which the plaintiff timely objected, citing the ongoing extension and the need to collect further information. In August 2024, the defendant retained counsel, who acknowledged and reaffirmed the open-ended extension agreement. However, two months later, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, granted the dismissal with prejudice under SDCL 15-11-11 and SDCL 15-6-41(b) (Rule 41(b)), concluding there was unreasonable and unexplained delay.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that dismissal was improper. The Court found that the mutual open-ended extension agreement between the parties constituted good cause for delay under SDCL 15-11-11. Additionally, the Court determined that the plaintiff’s conduct did not rise to the level of egregiousness required for dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b), especially given the reaffirmed extension and lack of prejudice to the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Arrowsmith v. Odle" on Justia Law