Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a dispute over the operation of Line 5, a petroleum pipeline owned and operated by Enbridge, which traverses the Straits of Mackinac in Michigan under a 1953 easement granted by the State. In June 2019, the Michigan Attorney General filed a lawsuit in state court seeking to stop Enbridge from operating the pipeline, arguing that the easement was void and that continued operation violated state law due to environmental risks. Enbridge was served with the complaint in July 2019 but did not remove the case to federal court within the statutory 30-day deadline. Instead, Enbridge litigated in state court for over a year.Subsequently, in November 2020, the Michigan Governor revoked the easement and initiated a separate state lawsuit with similar claims. Enbridge timely removed the Governor’s case to federal court, where the parties agreed to pause the Attorney General’s case pending resolution. After the District Court in the Governor’s case denied remand, finding federal-question jurisdiction, the Governor dismissed her suit. Thereafter, 887 days after the Attorney General’s complaint was served, Enbridge removed the original state lawsuit to federal court. The Attorney General moved to remand, arguing removal was untimely. The U.S. District Court denied the motion, excusing Enbridge’s late removal on equitable grounds and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that although the 30-day removal deadline in 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)(1) is nonjurisdictional, it is not subject to equitable tolling due to the statute’s text, structure, and context. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision, holding that §1446(b)(1)’s 30-day removal deadline cannot be equitably tolled. As a result, Enbridge’s removal was untimely, and the case must be remanded to Michigan state court. View "Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel" on Justia Law

A commercial fisherman from Erie County, Ohio, who owned a fisheries business, challenged a state rule that amended commercial fishing regulations to exclude seine fishers from receiving yellow perch quotas. The rule, promulgated by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR), Division of Wildlife, allocated quotas exclusively to trap net fishers and prohibited the transfer of quotas to seine licenses. The fisherman alleged that this rule deprived him of economic value and constituted a taking without compensation, and further brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy against both state and federal defendants.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The district court dismissed with prejudice all claims against Ohio and the state officials, holding that there was no protected property interest in the value of a fishing license or uncaught fish under the Takings Clause. The court also found that sovereign immunity barred all claims against the state and its officials, even if the claims otherwise had merit, and determined the state law claims were insufficiently pled. Claims against the federal defendants were dismissed without prejudice for defective service of process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that sovereign immunity barred the takings and state law claims against Ohio and the state officials, rejecting the appellant’s arguments that these defendants had waived immunity or that recent Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court decisions required judicial review of the state rule. However, the appellate court held that because the dismissal was based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the claims against the state defendants should have been dismissed without prejudice. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the federal defendants. The judgment was thus affirmed in part and reversed in part, with instructions to dismiss the state claims without prejudice. View "White's Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Nat. Res. Div. of Wildlife" on Justia Law

After purchasing a used car in Oklahoma with his then-wife, Alexander Ross divorced and relocated to Michigan, while his ex-wife kept the car in Oklahoma. The couple fell behind on payments, leading their creditor to repossess and sell the vehicle. The creditor retained an Oklahoma law firm, Robinson, Hoover & Fudge, PLLC (“RHF”), to sue both parties for the outstanding balance in Oklahoma state court. After unsuccessful attempts to serve Ross personally, including publishing notice in an Oklahoma newspaper, the court entered a default judgment against him. RHF later learned that Ross was residing and working in Michigan and proceeded to use the Oklahoma judgment to garnish Ross’s wages from his Michigan-based employer, Detroit Diesel.Ross filed suit against RHF in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Michigan’s Regulation of Collection Practices Act (MRCPA). He claimed that RHF unlawfully garnished his Michigan wages without first domesticating the Oklahoma judgment as required by Michigan law. RHF moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, holding that RHF did not have sufficient contacts with Michigan to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that RHF had purposefully directed its actions at Ross in Michigan with knowledge of his residence and employment there, and that its actions caused harm in Michigan. The court found that both Michigan’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause permitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over RHF. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ross v. Robinson, Hoover & Fudge, PLLC" on Justia Law

An Afghan infant was orphaned and injured during a joint U.S.-Afghan military operation and received emergency care at a U.S. military hospital. A U.S. Marine Corps Judge Advocate, Major Joshua Mast, and his wife, Stephanie Mast, initiated custody proceedings and ultimately obtained a Virginia adoption order for the child. Separately, the U.S. Embassy gave custody to a man claiming to be the child's uncle, and the infant was subsequently cared for by John and Jane Doe, who later evacuated from Afghanistan to the United States with the child during Operation Allies Refuge. After arriving in the U.S., the Masts took custody of the child. The Does then challenged the adoption in Virginia state court, but the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected their challenge.Following the state proceedings, the Does filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, seeking, among other things, a protective order to prevent the defendants from disclosing their identities. The district court granted the protective order, concluding that disclosing the Does’ identities would pose a substantial risk to their safety and that of their family in Afghanistan. The order prohibited the defendants and their representatives from revealing any information that could directly or indirectly identify the Does or their family members unless a non-disclosure agreement was executed. After the Does engaged with the media while maintaining anonymity, the Masts moved to vacate or modify the protective order, arguing it was an unconstitutional restraint on speech. The district court denied the motion and held Joshua Mast in contempt for violating the order.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Fourth Circuit held that the protective order, while a content-based prior restraint, fit within a narrow exception because it was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in national security—specifically, the protection of individuals perceived as U.S. collaborators. The court found the order survived strict scrutiny and was not unconstitutionally vague. View "Doe v. Mast" on Justia Law

A child attended the Ventura Unified School District from 2012 to 2021. During this time, the district performed several psychoeducational assessments, identifying the child as having a specific learning disability but failing to assess for autism. The child’s parents, aware of his persistent academic and behavioral struggles, repeatedly collaborated with the district, sought private assessments, and requested additional services, which were denied. The child was ultimately diagnosed with autism in 2021, after which the parents initiated legal action seeking remedies for allegedly inadequate education dating back to 2012.After the parents filed a due process complaint in 2021, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that claims for services before April 8, 2019, were time-barred under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (IDEA) two-year statute of limitations, finding the parents knew or should have known of the district’s failure to assess for autism and of the child’s inadequate education before that date. The ALJ awarded relief only for the period after April 8, 2019. The parents then sought further review in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which reversed the ALJ. The district court held that the statute of limitations did not begin until the autism diagnosis in 2021, reasoning the parents lacked the requisite knowledge to challenge the district’s actions earlier. The court also found both statutory exceptions to the limitations period applied and awarded remedies for the 2012–2019 period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that the IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations begins when parents knew or should have known both of the district’s action or inaction and that their child was being denied a free appropriate public education. It concluded that the parents’ claims for pre-2019 educational services were untimely. The appellate court vacated the district court’s remedial orders and remanded for further proceedings regarding attorneys’ fees. View "J. R. V. VENTURA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

A driver was stopped by a county deputy after allegedly committing traffic violations that led the officer to suspect impaired driving. The officer noted possible signs of intoxication and requested that the driver submit to alcohol testing, which the driver refused. Under Montana’s implied-consent law, the officer seized the driver’s license and issued a notice of automatic six-month suspension. The next day, the driver petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the officer lacked sufficient suspicion for the stop and the test requests.The Eighth Judicial District Court set an evidentiary hearing, but delays resulted from a combination of the petitioner’s request for a continuance due to jury duty and procedural orders requiring both parties to file briefs before a hearing could be held. The petitioner filed a brief, but the State did not, leaving the hearing vacated. Before the court ruled, the six-month suspension expired and the license was reinstated. When the petitioner moved to reset the hearing, the State moved to dismiss the case as moot, arguing that the only relief available was the return of the license, which had already occurred. The District Court agreed and dismissed the petition as moot.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the expiration of the suspension and reinstatement of the license rendered the case moot. The court held that the case was not moot because the petitioner’s timely challenge could still result in relief, such as removal of the suspension from his driving record and potential reimbursement of reinstatement fees. The court found that the statute contemplates judicial review even after the suspension period if the challenge was timely filed and pursued. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kalafat v. State" on Justia Law

A former CEO of a Delaware corporation, who also founded and controlled the company, entered into a series of employment agreements and amendments with the company’s board. These agreements provided him with substantial severance benefits, including a large special payment of restricted stock units and cash, under specific termination conditions—such as his removal from board leadership or a change in board composition. The agreements also included a forum selection clause requiring that disputes “arising out of or relating to” the contract be litigated exclusively in the Superior Court of California. After an activist hedge fund succeeded in electing new directors and the CEO lost control, he resigned and claimed entitlement to the severance and special payment. He initiated litigation in California to enforce his rights under the agreement.Meanwhile, the company’s newly reconstituted board deemed the CEO terminated for cause and filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The company sought to invalidate the employment agreements, alleging they were the product of the CEO’s breaches of fiduciary duty and that their terms improperly entrenched his control and penalized stockholders. The company argued Delaware was the proper forum based on its bylaws and the nature of the claims.The Delaware Court of Chancery reviewed the case. The court held that, because of the recently enacted Section 122(18) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, the forum selection clause in a governance agreement (such as this employment agreement with a controller/stockholder) is enforceable and can validly require internal affairs and fiduciary duty claims relating to the agreement to be litigated outside Delaware. The court found the agreement was covered by Section 122(18) and that all claims “arose out of or related to” the agreement. The court granted the CEO’s motion to dismiss, holding that venue was proper only in California. View "Masimo Corporation v. Kiani" on Justia Law

Two individuals purchased Florida prepaid college tuition savings plans for their daughters in 2004 and 2006. The plans promised to cover tuition at Florida public colleges or transfer an equivalent amount to non-Florida colleges if the beneficiary chose to attend elsewhere. In 2007, the Florida Legislature authorized a new “tuition differential” fee, exempting holders of existing plans from paying that fee at Florida colleges. The Florida Prepaid College Board amended the plan contracts to specify that this new fee was not covered for out-of-state schools. Over a decade later, when both daughters chose to attend out-of-state colleges, the Board declined to transfer an amount equivalent to the tuition differential fee.The purchasers filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against members of the Board, alleging that the Board’s refusal violated the Contracts and Takings Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Board from applying the statutory exemption and contract amendments to beneficiaries attending non-Florida schools. The Board moved to dismiss, arguing it was protected by sovereign immunity. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, reasoning the relief sought was prospective. However, the district court disagreed, ruling that the relief requested was essentially a demand for a refund, thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity because the relief sought would require specific performance of a contract with the state, which is not permitted under Ex parte Young and related Supreme Court precedent. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal with prejudice and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, as the dismissal was for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lavina v. Florida Prepaid College Board" on Justia Law

After his employment as a wet plant foreman was terminated in January 2022, the plaintiff sent a certified letter in April 2022 to his former employer, requesting a service letter as required by Missouri law. He did not receive a response. The plaintiff later filed suit against the company, alleging a violation of section 290.140 for failure to provide the service letter. He also initially included a claim for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but that claim was dismissed in federal court, and the remaining statutory claim was remanded to state court.The Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County granted summary judgment to the defendant company. The defendant had argued that the plaintiff’s service letter request and lawsuit were directed at the wrong corporate entity, asserting that another related company had actually employed the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to properly respond to the summary judgment motion as required by Rule 74.04(c)(2), instead making bulk admissions and denials without specific references to the record. Because of this failure, the court deemed the defendant’s factual statements admitted and found no genuine issue of material fact. The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals.The Supreme Court of Missouri held that summary judgment is not an “extreme or drastic remedy” and reaffirmed the requirements for summary judgment motions and responses under Missouri law. The Court concluded that, because the plaintiff did not properly preserve or raise any arguments demonstrating error by the circuit court, and failed to comply with procedural rules, there was no basis to overturn the grant of summary judgment. The judgment of the circuit court in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Wilkinson vs. Farmers Holding Companies" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after the Fort Sill Apache Tribe opened the Warm Springs Casino near Lawton, Oklahoma, in 2022. The Comanche Nation, which operates casinos in the same region, experienced increased competition and claimed that the Warm Springs Casino was opened in violation of federal law. The Comanche Nation sought injunctive relief to halt the casino’s operations and monetary damages against several officials of the Fort Sill Apache Tribe, both in their individual and official capacities.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma heard the officials’ motion to dismiss, in which the officials argued that tribal sovereign immunity barred the claims against them. The district court denied the officials' motion to dismiss, finding that the officials were not protected by tribal immunity on the claims at issue and that the Tribe was not a required party for the purposes of the lawsuit. The district court’s order also explicitly denied tribal immunity as a defense to the official-capacity Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and implicitly rejected tribal immunity for the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of tribal immunity under the collateral-order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit held that IGRA abrogates tribal sovereign immunity for claims brought by an Indian tribe to enjoin class III gaming conducted in violation of a tribal-state compact on Indian lands, allowing the Comanche Nation’s official-capacity IGRA claim to proceed. However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that tribal immunity barred the official-capacity RICO claims because the requirements of the Ex Parte Young exception were not met. The court further held that the officials were not entitled to tribal immunity on the individual-capacity RICO claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Comanche Nation v. Ware" on Justia Law