Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

John Cassimus, Jason T. Carrick, and Ryan McAllister were members of several limited-liability companies operating retail-liquidation stores, which have since closed. Carrick and McAllister alleged that Cassimus misused corporate assets for personal gain, while Cassimus claimed that Carrick and McAllister enriched their own company, Xcess Limited, at the expense of the stores. Carrick and McAllister sued Cassimus and his associates in the Shelby Circuit Court, asserting various claims including breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.The Shelby Circuit Court denied the Cassimus defendants' motion to dismiss the derivative claims, appointed a special master to oversee discovery, and dismissed claims against East Hampton Advisors, LLC, based on the abatement statute. The Cassimus defendants and Carrick and McAllister sought mandamus review of these orders in the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the petitions. In case no. SC-2024-0284, the court denied the Cassimus defendants' petition, holding that the question of whether Carrick and McAllister could fairly and adequately represent the companies was a fact-intensive inquiry not suitable for mandamus review at the pleading stage. In case no. SC-2024-0318, the court dismissed the Cassimus defendants' petition as untimely because it was filed outside the presumptively reasonable time without a statement of good cause. In case no. SC-2024-0349, the court denied Carrick and McAllister's petition, holding that they had another adequate remedy through a Rule 54(b) appeal, which they did not pursue.The court lifted the stay previously entered and directed the trial court to resume proceedings. View "Ex parte Cassimus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Melissa Mandell-Brown filed a complaint against Novo Nordisk, Inc. and Zamaneh Zamanian, asserting 16 causes of action, including claims for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code, as well as common law claims for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a separate statement of 161 undisputed facts, attorney declarations, and witness declarations. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion or a separate statement.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after plaintiff failed to file the required opposition or separate statement, despite being granted two continuances. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and concluded that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her causes of action. Plaintiff appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), by granting the motion based on the plaintiff’s failure to file the requisite separate statement. The appellate court noted that the trial court had the discretion to grant the motion for summary judgment when the opposing party fails to comply with the requirement of a separate statement. Given the complexity of the case and the plaintiff's failure to submit any opposition or appear at the hearing, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk Inc." on Justia Law

Vicor Corporation supplied power converter modules to Foxconn for years. Vicor alleged that Foxconn switched to manufacturing and importing knock-off modules that infringed Vicor's patents. In July 2023, Vicor filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging patent infringement by Foxconn. Simultaneously, Vicor sued Foxconn for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which stayed the case pending the ITC's resolution. Foxconn then initiated arbitration in China, claiming Vicor had agreed to arbitrate disputes based on terms in purchase orders. Vicor filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking to enjoin the arbitration and declare it was not bound by the arbitration or license terms.The district court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary injunction against the arbitration, despite Foxconn's request for a stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659. The court acknowledged that Section 1659 applied but concluded it could still grant preliminary relief based on the All Writs Act and its inherent authority to preserve its jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Section 1659 required the district court to stay proceedings because Vicor's claims involved issues also present in the ITC proceeding. The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting the preliminary injunction despite Foxconn's request for a stay. Consequently, the First Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Vicor Corp. v. FII USA Inc." on Justia Law

Angalia B., the legal guardian and Educational Decision Maker (EDM) for J.B., a student at a Clark County School District (CCSD) elementary school, requested J.B.'s education records under FERPA and NRS 392.029(1). After receiving the records, Angalia suspected that certain emails were missing and requested all communications, including emails stored in CCSD's Google Vault. When CCSD did not respond, Angalia filed a motion to join CCSD to J.B.'s ongoing dependency case and to compel the production of the emails. CCSD opposed, arguing that the emails were not education records under FERPA and NRS 392.029(1) as they were not in J.B.'s permanent file. The district court ruled that the emails were education records and ordered CCSD to produce them.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. The court determined that the emails stored in CCSD's Google Vault were maintained by CCSD, satisfying the second prong of the FERPA definition of education records. However, the court found that the district court erred in determining that the emails were directly related to J.B. without first reviewing their content. The Supreme Court of Nevada granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its order compelling CCSD to produce the emails.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court must perform an in camera review of the emails to determine if they are directly related to J.B. If the emails are found to be directly related, they will qualify as education records under FERPA. The court emphasized that records are maintained when stored in a secure database, such as Google Vault, and that the definition of "maintained" should be interpreted broadly to accommodate future technological advancements. View "Clark County School District v. District Court" on Justia Law

Farmers Direct Property and Casualty Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action against Dennis Perez, seeking a declaration that it no longer had a duty to defend or indemnify Perez under an auto insurance policy in connection with an automobile accident involving Victor Montez. Perez had been uncooperative in his defense in the underlying state court tort action filed by the Montezes, leading Farmers Direct to claim that Perez breached the policy's cooperation clause. The Montezes intervened and moved to set aside the default judgment entered against Perez, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not meet the statutory requirement.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the Montezes' motion, vacating the default judgment on the grounds that the amount in controversy was limited to the policy's $25,000 face amount, which did not satisfy the jurisdictional threshold of over $75,000. Farmers Direct appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The appellate court held that the district court erred in determining that the value of the declaratory judgment action was limited to the policy's $25,000 maximum liability. The Ninth Circuit found that there was at least an arguable basis that the amount in controversy was satisfied by considering either the potential excess liability of the underlying tort claim or Farmers Direct's anticipated future defense fees and costs, or both. The appellate court concluded that the judgment was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "FARMERS DIRECT PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY V. MONTEZ" on Justia Law

A church in Washington, Cedar Park Assembly of God, challenged the state's Reproductive Parity Act (Parity Act), which mandates insurance carriers to cover all federally approved contraceptives and, if maternity care is included, abortions. The church argued that this law violated its First Amendment rights and religious autonomy because it could not find a comparable health plan that excluded abortion coverage after its insurer, Kaiser Permanente, stopped offering such a plan.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, Myron Kreidler and Jay Inslee, who were sued in their official capacities. The district court found that the church did not have standing to challenge the Parity Act because it could not demonstrate that its inability to obtain a suitable health plan was directly caused by the Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and vacated the district court's summary judgment, remanding with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of standing. The Ninth Circuit held that Cedar Park Assembly of God failed to establish that its injury was traceable to the Parity Act or that invalidating the Act would redress its injury. The court noted that Washington's conscientious-objection statute allows insurers to accommodate religious objections, and nothing in the Parity Act prevents insurers from offering plans that exclude abortion coverage. The court concluded that the church's injury was due to the independent decisions of insurers, not the Parity Act, and thus, the church lacked standing to sue. View "CEDAR PARK ASSEMBLY OF GOD OF KIRKLAND, WASHINGTON V. KREIDLER" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute arising from a 2016 real estate transaction in which the Bauers sold residential property in Crawford County to the Beamons. The Beamons filed a complaint with two claims under the theory of fraud and deceit, seeking both monetary damages and equitable rescission of the contract. Before trial, the Beamons elected remedies associated with their equitable claim, leading to a bench trial. The circuit court rejected the rescission claim but awarded damages for breach of contract and granted the Beamons' motion for attorney’s fees.The Bauers appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that the circuit court erred in awarding damages for breach of contract and attorney’s fees. The Beamons cross-appealed, arguing the court erred in denying their rescission request. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s award of damages for breach of contract, affirmed the denial of rescission, and noted it lacked jurisdiction to review the attorney’s fees award due to the Bauers' failure to file an amended notice of appeal.Following the mandate, the Bauers filed motions for their own attorney’s fees and to set aside the Beamons' attorney’s-fee judgment. The circuit court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider these motions. The Bauers appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction. The court clarified that the mandate did not foreclose the circuit court from ruling on new motions for attorney’s fees, which are collateral matters, or on a motion to set aside a judgment for fraud under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4). Consequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the Bauers' motions. View "BAUER v. BEAMON" on Justia Law

Odyssey Logistics & Technology Corp. filed a patent application for a web service interface for transit time calculation in 2007. The application was rejected by a patent examiner in 2015, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) affirmed the rejection in 2018. Odyssey appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the PTAB's decision in 2020. Odyssey did not raise an Appointments Clause challenge during this appeal.After the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc. in 2021, which held that PTAB administrative judges' unreviewable authority violated the Appointments Clause, Odyssey requested Director review of the PTAB's 2018 decision. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied this request, stating that it did not accept requests for Director review of ex parte appeal decisions. Odyssey then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to compel the Director to consider its request. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal, but on different grounds. The Federal Circuit concluded that the PTO did not abuse its discretion in denying Odyssey's request for Director review, noting that Odyssey had forfeited its Appointments Clause challenge by not raising it during the initial appeal. The court held that the PTO's decision to deny the request for review was reasonable given the significant delay and lack of justification for Odyssey's failure to raise the issue earlier. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). View "ODYSSEY LOGISTICS & TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. STEWART" on Justia Law

Kaufman Lynn Construction was hired to build a corporate campus for JM Family Enterprises in South Florida. Kaufman obtained a commercial general liability policy from Liberty Surplus Insurance to cover itself and its subcontractors. After completing several buildings, Tropical Storm Eta caused significant water damage to the completed structures. Kaufman sought indemnification from Liberty, which denied the claim based on the policy's Course of Construction Exclusion (COCE), stating that coverage did not apply until the entire project was completed. Kaufman disputed this and filed a lawsuit against its subcontractors and initiated a claims process with Liberty.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted Liberty's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the COCE excluded coverage for the water damage because the entire project was not completed. The court also dismissed Kaufman's counterclaim for declaratory relief as duplicative and ruled that Kaufman's breach of contract counterclaim was moot. Additionally, the court dismissed Kaufman's reformation counterclaim for lack of standing, reasoning that Kaufman had not demonstrated a cognizable injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Kaufman had Article III standing to seek reformation of the policy, as it suffered a cognizable injury by receiving a policy different from what was bargained for. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the COCE precluded coverage for the water damage, as the entire project was not completed. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Liberty's motion for attorney's fees, as Liberty's settlement proposal did not comply with the requirements of Florida's offer of judgment statute and Rule 1.442(c)(2)(B). The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reformation counterclaim. View "Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp. v. Kaufman Lynn Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael and Elizabeth Dailey filed an appeal with the Environmental Court of the First Circuit in July 2022, challenging a 2022 decision by the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). The decision involved a seawall allegedly constructed within the conservation district. The BLNR raised jurisdictional issues, citing Act 48 of 2016, which mandates that such appeals be filed directly with the Supreme Court of Hawaii. The Daileys argued that their case involved shoreline setback issues under HRS Chapter 205A, which would allow the environmental court to have jurisdiction.The environmental court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating it did not have the authority to transfer the case to the Supreme Court. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the appeal arose under HRS Chapter 183C and not HRS Chapter 205A Part III, and thus should have been filed directly with the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Hawaii reviewed the case and determined that the Daileys' appeal did not involve the HRS Chapter 205A shoreline setback exception. Therefore, the Supreme Court had exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The court also held that the environmental court had the inherent and statutory power to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ordered the environmental court to transfer the appeal nunc pro tunc to the date it was originally filed, allowing the appeal to proceed in the Supreme Court under the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Dailey v. Department of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law