Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, the families of Michael Jackson, Carl Wiley, Jr., and Rashad Henderson, who were killed during high-speed police chases in Houston, Texas, sued the City of Houston. They alleged that the Houston Police Department (HPD) has a policy of racial profiling that leads to more high-speed chases in predominantly black neighborhoods, resulting in the deaths of their loved ones. The plaintiffs brought several federal municipal liability claims, including violations of equal protection, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and substantive due process, as well as state tort claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part and denied in part Houston's motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed all claims except the equal protection claims and Jackson’s state law claims. Houston then filed an interlocutory appeal, raising issues regarding standing, failure to state federal claims, capacity to sue, and governmental immunity for Jackson’s state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final district court orders except under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court found that it could only review whether the plaintiffs had standing to assert their equal protection claims. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries did not stem from unequal treatment based on race. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order regarding standing for the equal protection claims and vacated the district court’s decision on governmental immunity for Jackson’s negligence claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

In November 2023, Media Matters for America, a nonprofit organization, published articles critical of X Corp. and its CEO, Elon Musk, alleging that advertisements from popular brands were placed next to harmful content on the X platform. This led to significant losses for X as advertisers withdrew. X sued Media Matters and its employees in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging interference with contract, business disparagement, and interference with prospective economic advantage. Media Matters moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim, but the district court denied the motion. Media Matters then sought to certify the personal jurisdiction question for immediate appeal, which was also denied.The district court denied Media Matters' subsequent motion to transfer venue to the Northern District of California, citing untimeliness and a pattern of gamesmanship. Media Matters then filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeking a venue transfer based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the petition and found that the district court had not properly considered the eight public- and private-interest factors required for a venue transfer analysis. The appellate court granted Media Matters' petition in part, vacated the district court's order denying the transfer, and remanded the case for a proper venue analysis. The court also held Media Matters' interlocutory appeal in abeyance pending the resolution of the remand. View "In Re: Media Matters for America" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin prisoner, Armin Wand III, developed appendicitis in February 2018. He was seen by Nurse Beckey Kramer on February 13, 2018, but she did not diagnose appendicitis at that time. The next day, February 14, she recognized the symptoms and sent him to the hospital for emergency surgery. Wand sued Kramer and other officials, claiming inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment and state law negligence for not recognizing his need for emergency care on February 13.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied summary judgment for Kramer and another defendant, allowing the case to proceed to trial. The court recruited an experienced lawyer for Wand, but only for settlement purposes. After settlement efforts failed, the lawyer withdrew, and Wand's subsequent motion for recruitment of another lawyer was denied. The court noted Wand's legal blindness and severe stutter but believed he could represent himself with the court's assistance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Wand's trial testimony contradicted his earlier claims, stating he did not report lower right quadrant pain to Kramer on February 13, which was crucial for diagnosing appendicitis. The court concluded that Wand's case was substantively weak and that he had not shown prejudice from the lack of recruited counsel. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Kramer, holding that Wand did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have changed the trial's outcome. View "Wand v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Jonathan Egelston, a youth correctional officer, was dismissed from his position by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation after he allegedly assaulted and harassed his girlfriend, J.G., and subsequently lied about the incident. The State Personnel Board (SPB) upheld his dismissal following an evidentiary hearing. Egelston then petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse the SPB's decision, but the trial court denied his petition.The family law court had previously dismissed J.G.'s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Egelston without prejudice. Egelston argued that this dismissal should bar the findings of assault and dishonesty under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. However, the trial court found that the SPB's credibility determinations, which favored J.G.'s testimony over Egelston's, were entitled to great weight.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Egelston's contention regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel was forfeited because it was not raised in the lower court. Additionally, the court found that the claim lacked merit. The family law court's dismissal of the DVRO without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the merits, and thus had no preclusive effect. The causes of action in the DVRO proceeding and the SPB proceedings were different, and the parties were not in privity.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding Egelston's dismissal from his position. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Egelston v. State Personnel Board" on Justia Law

E.H. Turf Supply Company, Inc. filed a small-claims action against Roger Tavares, alleging that Tavares stopped payment on a check for services performed on his tractor. Tavares denied the allegations and counterclaimed for $2,500, asserting that the services were not rendered. The District Court ruled in favor of E.H. Turf Supply, awarding $1,500 plus costs. Tavares appealed to the Superior Court, arguing procedural errors and bias.The Superior Court held a de novo bench trial. E.H. Turf Supply presented testimony from its president, Erik Hagenstein, who detailed the company's repair process and confirmed that Tavares had approved and paid for the services before stopping payment. Tavares cross-examined Hagenstein and attempted to introduce invoices from other repair shops to show that the repairs were not properly done. The trial justice excluded these invoices as hearsay but allowed Tavares to testify about his experience.The Superior Court found in favor of E.H. Turf Supply, awarding $1,703.71. Tavares appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that the Superior Court erred in allowing E.H. Turf Supply to present its case first, excluding his evidence, and not considering his status as a self-represented litigant.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no merit in Tavares's arguments. The Court held that E.H. Turf Supply, as the plaintiff, was correctly allowed to present its case first. The exclusion of the invoices was proper as they were hearsay, and the trial justice provided Tavares with ample opportunity to present his case. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "E.H. Turf Supply Co. v. Tavares" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approved over 4,000 permits for oil and gas wells on public land in New Mexico and Wyoming from January 2021 to August 2022. Environmental organizations challenged these permits, alleging that BLM failed to adequately consider the climate and environmental justice impacts of the wells. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing.The plaintiffs appealed, asserting standing based on affidavits from their members who live, work, and recreate near the drilling sites, claiming injuries to their health, safety, and recreational and aesthetic interests. They also claimed standing based on the wells' overall contribution to global climate change and an organizational injury from the government's failure to publicize information about climate change.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently link their alleged harms to the specific agency actions they sought to reverse. The court emphasized that plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each challenged permit by showing a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. The court found that the plaintiffs' generalized claims about the harms of oil and gas development were insufficient to establish standing for the specific permits at issue.The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims of organizational standing, finding that the alleged injuries were limited to issue advocacy and did not demonstrate a concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

An inmate, Thomas Clark, filed a mandamus action against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) seeking copies of electronic kites he sent to prison staff while incarcerated at the North Central Correctional Complex (NCCC) and the Lebanon Correctional Institution (LCI). He also requested a copy of the chow-hall menu from LCI. Clark claimed that his requests were not fulfilled and sought $2,000 in statutory damages and court costs.The lower court proceedings involved Clark sending public-records requests to LCI staff. The LCI staff forwarded his request for NCCC kites to the appropriate person at NCCC, but Clark did not receive a response. For the chow-hall menu request, LCI staff directed Clark to obtain the menu from his unit manager, which Clark did not do. Clark then filed this mandamus action.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that Clark was entitled to a writ of mandamus for his request for the NCCC kites because LCI staff had forwarded his request to NCCC, and NCCC did not respond. The court held that DRC must provide Clark with the requested NCCC kites. However, the court denied the writ for the chow-hall menu request, as LCI staff had properly directed Clark to the appropriate person to obtain the menu. The court awarded Clark $1,000 in statutory damages for the NCCC kites request but denied his request for court costs. The court also denied Clark's motion for leave to file rebuttal evidence. View "State ex rel. Clark v. Department of Rehabilitation and Correction" on Justia Law

Michael Mogan, an attorney, sued Airbnb in California state court on behalf of a client in 2018. After the case went to arbitration, Mogan filed a separate lawsuit against Airbnb for abuse of process and unfair business practices, which was dismissed, and he was sanctioned for filing a frivolous lawsuit. When Mogan refused to pay the sanctions, the California State Bar filed disciplinary charges against him. Law360, a legal news website, published three articles detailing these legal battles between 2022 and 2023.Mogan then sued Portfolio Media, the owner of Law360, for defamation and false light in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Portfolio Media filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Law360’s coverage was protected by the fair report privilege. Mogan moved to amend his complaint to include additional statements from the first article, but the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and denied leave to amend, deeming it futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the fair report privilege protected Law360’s articles. The court found that Mogan failed to demonstrate how the articles were not a fair abridgment of official proceedings. The court concluded that the statements in the articles accurately recounted judicial proceedings and thus could not support a defamation or false light claim. Consequently, Mogan’s complaint and proposed amendments were deemed futile, and the dismissal was affirmed. View "Mogan v. Portfolio Media Inc." on Justia Law

Trevor Leon Moore pleaded guilty to misdemeanor battery, and the magistrate court entered an order withholding judgment, which included a requirement for Moore to complete a domestic violence evaluation. Moore objected to this requirement, arguing it was improper since he pleaded guilty to simple battery, not domestic battery. The magistrate court's order was file stamped on December 14, 2023, and Moore filed a notice of appeal to the district court on January 26, 2024, challenging only the evaluation requirement.The district court addressed the intermediate appeal and affirmed the magistrate court's order, including the disputed requirement. Moore then filed a timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Idaho.The State filed a motion to dismiss Moore's appeal, arguing that his notice of appeal from the magistrate court to the district court was untimely, rendering the district court's decision void. The Supreme Court of Idaho agreed that the district court's decision was void due to the untimely appeal but clarified that it still had jurisdiction to review the district court's decision. The court held that it could not grant Moore the relief he sought because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant any relief on intermediate appeal.The Supreme Court of Idaho vacated the district court's decision, dismissed the appeal to the Supreme Court, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Moore's intermediate appeal as untimely. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), challenged the University of Texas at Austin (UT) for its admissions policies, alleging they violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI by considering race as a factor. After the Supreme Court's decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, UT revised its admissions policy to exclude race as a factor but allowed admissions officers access to applicants' racial data. SFFA claimed this access still constituted a violation and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed all claims as moot, reasoning that UT's policy changes addressed the issues raised by SFFA. The district court concluded that the claims related to the old policy were moot and that the new policy did not violate the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that claims related to UT's pre-Harvard policy were moot because the policy had been repealed and could not reasonably be expected to recur. However, the court found that claims related to UT's post-Harvard policy were not moot. The court noted that admissions officers' access to racial data could still potentially allow for racial discrimination, thus maintaining a live controversy.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that SFFA's claims regarding the revised admissions policy remained live and required further examination to determine if the policy was a subterfuge for continued race discrimination. View "Students for Fair Admissions v. University of Texas Austin" on Justia Law