Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Burke McCarthy died in October 2018 after receiving medical treatment from Dr. Wesley Hiser at Wyoming Medical Center. Dianna Ellis, McCarthy’s daughter and wrongful death representative, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Dr. Hiser and the hospital in February 2021, within the two-year statute of limitations. However, Dr. Hiser was never served with the original complaint. Nearly two years later, Ellis voluntarily dismissed her suit against Dr. Hiser. In December 2023, she refiled her complaint, relying on Wyoming’s savings statute to argue she had an additional year to commence a new action. Dr. Hiser was served for the first time in February 2024, more than five years after McCarthy’s death.The District Court of Natrona County granted Dr. Hiser’s motion to dismiss the refiled complaint. The court found that it had never obtained jurisdiction over Dr. Hiser in the original action because he was not served, and therefore the savings statute could not apply to extend the time for refiling. Ellis appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Wyoming’s savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118, does not apply to actions that are voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff. The court overruled its prior decision in Hugus v. Reeder, 2022 WY 13, which had held that a voluntary dismissal qualified as a “failure otherwise than upon the merits” under the savings statute. The court reasoned that a voluntary dismissal is not a “failure” within the meaning of the statute, as it is a matter of choice rather than an unsuccessful attempt to proceed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ellis’s refiled complaint. View "Ellis v. Hiser" on Justia Law

Dorothy Seabrook, a black woman, was the Family Programs Manager for the U.S. Army Reserve Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 2013, she was involved in disciplinary actions against an employee, Scott Hamilton. Subsequently, the Army investigated Seabrook for creating a toxic work environment and making inappropriate comments and physical contact. In 2014, she was suspended for two weeks and reassigned to another division. Seabrook filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint in January 2015, alleging discrimination based on race, color, and sex. She received a poor performance evaluation in February 2015, which she believed was retaliatory, leading her to file a second EEO complaint.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigated and found no discrimination. Seabrook then filed a pro se complaint in federal court, which was construed as alleging disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim and denied her motion to alter or amend the judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Seabrook failed to plausibly allege that the Army's actions were motivated by discriminatory bias. The court found that Seabrook's allegations did not support claims of disparate treatment, as her comparators were not similarly situated. Her hostile work environment claim failed because the alleged actions were not objectively abusive or severe. Lastly, her retaliation claim was dismissed due to a lack of causal connection between her EEO activity and the adverse employment actions. The court concluded that Seabrook's complaint did not meet the pleading standards required to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Seabrook v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Latonia Lister, the first African-American female firefighter in Las Vegas, sued the City of Las Vegas for employment discrimination under Title VII, alleging sex- and race-based discrimination and retaliation. The case stemmed from an incident on April 7, 2019, where her supervisor, Captain Michael Benneman, made offensive comments while feeding a dog. Lister reported the incident and later experienced additional incidents she considered discriminatory and retaliatory. She eventually requested a transfer out of her station.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada presided over the case. At trial, the jury found that the April 7 incident was severe or pervasive and objectively and subjectively offensive but was not motivated by race or gender. The jury concluded that the City did not discriminate against Lister or retaliate against her in violation of Title VII. Despite finding no liability, the jury awarded Lister $150,000 in damages. The district court reconciled the verdict by setting aside the damages award and entered judgment for the City. Lister's motion for a new trial was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the jury instructions were not erroneous and did not contain prejudicial errors. The court found no conflict between the instructions and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not resubmitting the verdict to the jury. The court determined that the district court acted within its discretion by polling the jury to clarify the verdict and reconciling the verdict on its own. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment for the City and the denial of Lister's motion for a new trial. View "LISTER V. CITY OF LAS VEGAS" on Justia Law

Three registered Texas voters alleged that three local officials—a justice of the peace, a sheriff, and a constable—conspired to punish them for political reasons. The plaintiffs were arrested after reporting for jury duty, accused of falsely claiming residency in Loving County. The officials argued they were enforcing voter-eligibility rules, while the plaintiffs claimed it was retaliation to silence dissent. The plaintiffs sued under § 1983, alleging constitutional violations.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted judicial and quasi-judicial immunity to the officials for some claims but denied judicial immunity for actions related to the jury proceeding. The officials appealed the denial of judicial immunity, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the grant of immunity on other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that presiding over the jury proceeding was a judicial act protected by absolute judicial immunity. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's denial of judicial immunity for the jury proceeding. Regarding the plaintiffs' cross-appeal, the court found it lacked jurisdiction to review those claims at this interlocutory stage and dismissed the cross-appeal.The court's main holding was that the actions of the justice of the peace in presiding over the jury proceeding were judicial in nature and thus protected by absolute judicial immunity. The court reversed the district court's decision in part and dismissed the cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jones v. King" on Justia Law

In a suburban shopping center parking lot on July 1, 2016, Michael Cokes, Isaiah Stevenson, and Ronald Arrington waited in a car while Jimmie Malone robbed a restaurant manager. After the robbery, the men drove away with Malone, who later took over as the driver. When Illinois state troopers stopped the car, the men refused to exit, and Malone sped off, leading to a high-speed chase. During the chase, Chicago Police Officer Dean Ewing, driving an unmarked car, collided with the Pontiac, resulting in serious injuries to Cokes, Stevenson, and the officers in Ewing’s car, and the deaths of Malone and Arrington.The plaintiffs, including Arrington’s estate, sued the City of Chicago and Officer Ewing, alleging various torts related to the collision. After a nine-day trial, a jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs then moved for a new trial, challenging the district court’s decisions on affirmative defenses, jury instructions, and the admissibility of evidence. The district court denied these motions, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court found no legal error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of the affirmative defenses, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings. Specifically, the court upheld the district court’s decisions to allow the defendants to plead a joint enterprise theory of contributory negligence, to admit testimony about Arrington’s conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 601 rather than the Illinois Dead Man’s Act, and to exclude the COPA report under Rule 403. The appellate court concluded that any potential errors did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict. View "Arrington v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

ADA Carbon Solutions (Red River), LLC ("ADA") filed a lawsuit against Atlas Carbon, LLC ("Atlas") in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Wyoming law. ADA claimed that Atlas breached their contract for the sale of activated carbon by improperly invoking the "Force Majeure" clause and failing to supply the agreed-upon quantity of carbon. ADA filed an amended complaint asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).The district court accepted jurisdiction and, after a bench trial, awarded ADA $76,000 in damages. ADA appealed the district court's judgment, dissatisfied with the method for calculating damages. During the appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals identified potential jurisdictional defects, specifically regarding the complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. The court ordered supplemental briefing to clarify the citizenship of Atlas's members, including trusts and limited partnerships involved.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that it lacked sufficient information to determine whether complete diversity of citizenship existed at the time of filing. The court noted that Atlas's identification of its members, including trusts and limited partnerships, was incomplete and did not provide adequate information about their citizenship. Consequently, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to make the necessary factual findings to determine whether it had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The district court was instructed to analyze the citizenship of all members of ADA and Atlas, tracing through all layers of ownership to ensure complete diversity. View "ADA Carbon Solutions (Red River) v. Atlas Carbon" on Justia Law

A federal immigration agent, Keith Slatowski, was injured when his Sig Sauer P320 pistol fired a bullet into his hip and out his thigh during a training session. Slatowski claimed he did not touch the trigger, only the grip, and argued that the gun's design, which lacks an external safety, made it prone to accidental discharge. He sued Sig Sauer, alleging that the gun was defectively designed and that a different safety design, such as a tabbed trigger, would have prevented the accident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania excluded the causation testimony of Slatowski's two experts, Dr. James Tertin and Dr. William Vigilante, because their conclusions were based on speculation rather than reliable testing. The court allowed their testimony on the gun's design defects but granted summary judgment for Sig Sauer, reasoning that without expert testimony on causation, the jury could not determine what caused the gun to fire.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's exclusion of the expert testimony on causation, agreeing that the experts' conclusions were speculative. However, the Third Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the jury could still determine causation based on the admissible evidence and lay testimony. The court found that the jury, with the help of expert explanations of the gun's design, could understand the remaining causation question without further expert testimony. The case was remanded for trial. View "Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc." on Justia Law

Chosen Consulting, LLC, doing business as Chosen Healthcare, and other related entities (collectively "Chosen") filed a lawsuit against the Town Council of Highland, Indiana, the Highland Municipal Plan Commission, and the Town of Highland, Indiana (collectively "the Town"). Chosen alleged that the Town discriminated against patients with addiction-related ailments by refusing to provide a letter stating that Chosen’s proposed use of its property complies with local zoning requirements. Chosen claimed this discrimination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, seeking compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the Town. The district court held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act was not ripe for adjudication because Chosen had not obtained a final decision from the local zoning authorities. The court indicated that Chosen needed to pursue its request for zoning approval through the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) and, if necessary, appeal any final decision entered by the BZA to the state courts before seeking an injunction in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief was not ripe because Chosen had not satisfied the finality requirement set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. The court emphasized that Chosen needed to follow the local zoning procedures, including applying for a use variance or seeking a declaratory judgment in state court, to obtain a final decision from the Town. Until Chosen completed these steps, the dispute was not ripe for federal court review. View "Chosen Consulting, LLC v Town Council of Highland" on Justia Law

John Baldwin sued Union Pacific Railroad Company under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging he was unlawfully removed from his position following a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Baldwin, who had degenerative arthritis and underwent a double hip replacement, experienced a bursitis flare-up while working, leading to a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Despite being cleared by his orthopedic surgeon and a physical exam, Union Pacific's Chief Medical Officer imposed work restrictions based on Baldwin's exercise tolerance test results, which showed low aerobic capacity and mild hypertension. Baldwin was ultimately prevented from returning to his job.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied both parties' summary judgment motions. Baldwin voluntarily dismissed his disparate impact and ADEA claims, proceeding to trial on the ADA claims for disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. The jury found that Union Pacific discriminated against Baldwin based on a perceived disability but concluded he posed a direct threat to himself. The district court entered judgment for Union Pacific and denied Baldwin’s motion for a new trial, which challenged the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Baldwin argued that the jury instructions misallocated the burden of proof and omitted essential elements of the direct threat defense. The court found that while the direct threat instruction was incomplete, it did not affect the trial's outcome. The business judgment instruction was deemed appropriate and did not mislead the jury. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the instructions, taken as a whole, did not mislead the jury or affect Baldwin's substantial rights. View "Baldwin v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

A plaintiff, Alin Pop, filed a putative class action against LuliFama.com LLC and other defendants, including several social media influencers, alleging a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). Pop claimed he purchased Luli Fama swimwear after seeing influencers endorse the products on Instagram without disclosing they were paid for their endorsements. Pop argued that this non-disclosure was deceptive and violated FDUTPA.The case was initially filed in Florida state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court held that because Pop's FDUTPA claim sounded in fraud, it was subject to the heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court found that Pop's complaint failed to meet this standard as it did not specify which posts led to his purchase, which defendants made those posts, when the posts were made, or which products he bought. The court also found that the complaint failed to state a claim under the ordinary pleading standards.Pop appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement applies to FDUTPA claims that sound in fraud. The court found that Pop's allegations closely tracked the elements of common law fraud and thus required particularity in pleading. The court also held that Pop failed to properly request leave to amend his complaint, and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. View "Pop v. LuliFama.com LLC" on Justia Law