Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

George Merithew, a former police officer with the City of Omaha Police Department (OPD), sued the City of Omaha under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA) for retaliation. Merithew, who began his employment with OPD in 1996 and was promoted to lieutenant in 2009, reported a violation of the Palmer Consent Decree in May 2018 and subsequently claimed retaliation by the police chief. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission (NEOC) in April 2020 after receiving a 20-day suspension. In June 2020, he received a termination letter, was suspended with pay, and later retired in February 2021 under an "Early Delayed Retirement Option."The District Court for Douglas County granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that any alleged discriminatory actions before June 25, 2019, were time-barred and that Merithew failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The court determined that Merithew did not suffer an adverse employment action and lacked evidence of a causal connection between his protected conduct and the alleged retaliation. Additionally, the court found that the City provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, which Merithew failed to prove were pretextual.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's enforcement of the statute of limitations, barring claims for actions before June 25, 2019. However, the Supreme Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Merithew was subjected to an adverse employment action, whether there was a causal connection between his protected conduct and the adverse action, and whether the City's reasons were pretextual. The court reversed the summary judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Merithew v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank filed a complaint against Astra Genstar Partnership, LLP, seeking a declaratory judgment related to a property purchased at a foreclosure sale. Wells Fargo requested a declaration that all previously held interests in the property, including Astra's interest, were terminated. Astra filed an answer opposing Wells Fargo's request. The district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that any interest Astra had in the property was terminated by the foreclosure sale and the redemption period's expiration. The court administrator failed to notify the parties of the judgment immediately.The district court entered judgment on December 28, 2023, but the parties did not receive notice until March 15, 2024, after the appeal deadline had passed. Astra appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals on May 13, 2024. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, stating it was late under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104 and that Rule 14.01(c)(2) of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the District Courts did not apply to appellate courts.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that Rule 14.01(c)(2) does not authorize appellate courts to reinstate a late appeal. However, the court determined that the interests of justice warranted reinstating the appeal because the court administrator failed to transmit notice of the judgment as required by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 77.04. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and reinstated Astra's appeal, emphasizing the need to avoid setting a trap for the unwary and to preserve the right to appeal. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. True Gravity Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

Mary Bennett owns a farm on the U.S.–Mexico border. In 2008, the United States built a segment of the border wall on a portion of her property where it had an easement. In 2020, the government initiated a condemnation action to take that portion of the land and surrounding areas to further build the wall and make related improvements. Bennett argued that the government exceeded the scope of its easement when it built the wall, claiming ownership of the wall and seeking just compensation for its value. She attempted to present expert testimony on the wall's value, which the district court excluded.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas excluded Bennett's expert testimony, concluding that she was not entitled to just compensation for the wall's value. The court interpreted the common-law rule from Searl v. School-Dist. No. 2, which states that fixtures built by a trespasser become part of the estate, to include an exception for trespassers with an objective, good-faith belief in their right to build. The court found that the government had such a belief and thus precluded Bennett from recovering the wall's value. Bennett appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government acted under its power of eminent domain, which cannot be limited by state trespass laws. The court affirmed that Bennett is entitled to compensation for the land taken but not for the value of the wall, as the government built it at its own expense for a public purpose. The court affirmed the district court's exclusion of the expert testimony and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Bennett" on Justia Law

In January 2021, Gregory Steshenko was declared a vexatious litigant in a prior civil action and was subject to a prefiling order requiring him to obtain permission from the presiding judge before filing any new litigation. Despite this, in November 2021, while his appeal in the prior action was pending, Steshenko filed a new civil action against the Foothill-De Anza Community College District and others. The College District filed a notice regarding the prefiling order, and Steshenko objected, claiming the order was stayed pending his appeal. The College District and others moved to have Steshenko declared a vexatious litigant again and to require him to furnish security.The trial court determined that the prefiling order was not stayed on appeal and that Steshenko was required to request leave before filing the new action, which he failed to do. Consequently, the court dismissed the action. Alternatively, the court found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant again, issued a new prefiling order, required him to furnish security, and dismissed the action when he refused to provide the security.On appeal, Steshenko argued that the judgment of dismissal should be reversed. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the January 2021 prefiling order remained in effect while on appeal and that the trial court properly dismissed the action based on Steshenko’s failure to obtain permission before filing the action and the denial of permission after the action was filed. The appellate court struck the June 2024 orders that again found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant and required him to obtain leave before filing new litigation. However, Steshenko continues to be designated as a vexatious litigant and subject to the January 2021 prefiling order. View "Steshenko v. Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

Lidia Gomez-Gabriel, a Guatemalan native and citizen, along with her son, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Gomez-Gabriel testified that Guatemalan gang members harassed her for money on multiple occasions and threatened her with a weapon once. After this incident, she avoided the area and had no further interactions with the gang. Fearing for their safety, she and her son fled to the United States in November 2015. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and after being detained for twelve days, they were informed about the one-year deadline to file an asylum application. They filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in August 2017.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their application, determining that the asylum application was time-barred and that the asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT applications were without merit. The Petitioners appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's decision without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the government that the Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies regarding their asylum and CAT claims, as they did not raise these issues before the BIA. However, the court found that the Petitioners adequately challenged their withholding of removal claim.On the merits, the court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's determination that Gomez-Gabriel's membership in a protected group was not a central reason for her persecution. The court found that the gang's motivation was financial gain rather than animus towards her group membership. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "A. G.-G. v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) sued two landowners, the Schoubroek and Sexton families, alleging that their farms were pumping groundwater originating from the Gila River, infringing on GRIC’s water rights. GRIC sought to stop the pumping and have the wells sealed. The San Carlos Apache Tribe intervened in support of GRIC.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 and § 1331, rejecting the defendants' argument that the Arizona state court's Gila River Adjudication had exclusive jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment for GRIC, concluding that the defendants' wells were pumping subflow from the Gila River and ordered the wells to be shut down. The court also denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion grounds, despite a 2007 dismissal with prejudice of a similar complaint by GRIC.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction but not exclusive jurisdiction. It held that the Decree did not provide the district court with prior exclusive jurisdiction over non-parties to the Decree. The court also found that the Arizona state court did not have prior exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion, recognizing that the 2007 dismissal did not preclude GRIC’s current claims due to the specific context of the settlement agreement. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for GRIC, finding that GRIC had not provided clear and convincing evidence that the wells were pumping subflow or were within the subflow zone. The court vacated the district court's remedy of shutting down the wells and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gila River Indian Community v. Schoubroek" on Justia Law

Kevin Rowe filed a lawsuit against his ex-wife, Dione Rowe, alleging tortious interference with a business relationship. Dione, with the help of her daughters, sent a letter to the Tribal Land Enterprise (TLE) making disparaging allegations against Kevin, who leased Tribal-owned land from the TLE. The letter requested the TLE to cancel Kevin’s leases and lease the land to her daughters instead. The TLE rescinded Kevin’s leases at their next board meeting, leading Kevin to file the lawsuit.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Tripp County, South Dakota, denied Dione’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that her letter was an absolutely privileged communication under SDCL 20-11-5(2). The court concluded that the TLE meeting was a quasi-judicial proceeding but held that the privilege did not apply because the TLE did not follow its own procedures, including providing notice to Kevin.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the absolute privilege under SDCL 20-11-5(2) applies to claims of tortious interference with a business relationship. The court found that the TLE board meeting was an official proceeding authorized by law and that Dione’s letter had a logical relation to the TLE’s proceedings. The court also determined that the lack of notice to Kevin did not negate the privilege. Additionally, the court concluded that Dione did not waive the privilege by failing to plead it in her answer, as the issue was tried by implied consent during the summary judgment proceedings. The Supreme Court directed the lower court to enter summary judgment in favor of Dione. View "Rowe v. Rowe" on Justia Law

Golden View Ready-Mix, LLC (Golden View) supplied concrete to Grangaard Construction, Inc. (Grangaard) for a bridge project. Golden View alleged that Grangaard failed to pay for the concrete, breached the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and committed fraud. A jury found in favor of Golden View on the breach of contract and good faith claims, awarding damages and punitive damages, but found no liability for fraud. Grangaard appealed the punitive damages award and the decision to submit the fraud issue to the jury.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, McCook County, South Dakota, presided over the case. Grangaard moved for partial summary judgment on the fraud claim, arguing there was no independent tort duty outside the contract. The court denied this motion, allowing the fraud claim to proceed. During the trial, the court permitted the jury to consider punitive damages based on the breach of the implied obligation of good faith, despite Grangaard's objections.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court determined that punitive damages are only recoverable for breaches of obligations not arising from a contract, as per SDCL 21-3-2. The court found that the implied obligation of good faith arises from the contract itself and does not constitute an independent tort that could support punitive damages. Consequently, the court vacated the punitive damages award. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment in all other respects, concluding that the error regarding punitive damages did not affect the jury's decision on the breach of contract and good faith claims. View "Goldenview Ready-Mix, LLC v. Grangaard Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Nelson Estate claimed an interest in a coin shop and alleged conversion of its property. Dr. Earl Nelson had provided funds for the business, resulting in a 50% ownership interest, which was confirmed by William Tinkcom. After Dr. Nelson's death in 2013, Tinkcom continued to operate the business and assured Nelson's heirs of their 50% interest. Tinkcom died in 2022, and the business was sold to Eddie Welch without including the Nelson Estate in the final agreement. The Nelson Estate sued the Tinkcom Estate, Welch, and Mere Coin Company, LLC, for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims, including conversion of valuable coins and collectibles.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the statute of limitations barred all claims. The Nelson Estate argued that the statute of limitations had not expired and that equitable estoppel or fraudulent concealment should prevent the statute of limitations defense.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's determination that the first six business interest claims accrued upon Dr. Nelson's death in 2013. However, the court reversed the dismissal of these claims because the circuit court did not address the Nelson Estate's defenses of equitable estoppel and fraudulent concealment. The court also reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims, as these claims arose from the 2022 sale of the business. Lastly, the court reversed the dismissal of the conversion claim, noting that the record did not establish when the conversion occurred or when the Nelson Estate became aware of it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Nelson v. Tinkcom" on Justia Law

Carol Cutting filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A., based on treatment she received in 2013. Cutting alleged that a doctor at Down East treated her shoulder improperly and failed to obtain informed consent, particularly regarding how her Tourette’s syndrome might affect the surgery. She also claimed the doctor falsified her medical records. A prelitigation screening panel found unanimously against Cutting, determining that the doctor’s conduct did not deviate from the standard of care.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) admitted the panel’s finding into evidence at trial. The jury found that Down East was not negligent. Cutting challenged the admission of the panel’s finding, arguing it was biased and violated her due process rights. She also contested the court’s judgment as a matter of law on her claim for punitive damages, arguing that the court erred in its decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the panel’s finding. The court noted that the panel’s offer to decide the case based on written records, if both parties agreed, did not demonstrate bias, especially since the offer was declined and a full hearing was held. The court also found that the trial court provided the jury with the necessary instructions to contextualize the panel’s finding, preserving Cutting’s right to a jury trial.Regarding punitive damages, the court held that any error in granting Down East’s motion for judgment as a matter of law was harmless. Since the jury found no negligence, they could not award any damages, including punitive damages. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A. View "Cutting v. Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A." on Justia Law