Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Joel Aaron Burrell, a prisoner, filed a lawsuit against several correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Burrell sought to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows indigent prisoners to file lawsuits without prepaying filing fees. The district court denied his request, citing the three-strike rule under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which prevents prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three prior lawsuits dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. The district court identified three such dismissals in Burrell's case history and dismissed his current action when he did not pay the filing fee.Burrell appealed, arguing that two of the prior dismissals should not count as strikes. The first case was dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with ongoing state proceedings. The second case was dismissed after Burrell failed to amend his complaint following a court order that found his initial complaint failed to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that a dismissal under Younger abstention does not count as a strike because it does not assess the merits of the complaint. Regarding the second case, the court determined that while a failure to amend following a finding of failure to state a claim can count as a strike, it should not be counted if the dismissal occurred after the current lawsuit was filed.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the three-strike rule to Burrell's case. Since Burrell had only one valid strike at the time he filed the current lawsuit, the district court's dismissal was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Burrell v. Shirley" on Justia Law

Amanda Watts received two vaccines, Pneumovax 23 and Boostrix, at a CVS Pharmacy in 2017. She claimed that both vaccines were negligently administered in the same improper location on her arm, leading to a chronic pain condition. However, CVS is immune from suit for the administration of Boostrix under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. Consequently, Watts's complaint focused solely on the alleged negligence in administering Pneumovax.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to CVS, finding that Watts presented no evidence from which a jury could determine that her injury was caused by the Pneumovax vaccine rather than the Boostrix vaccine. The court also struck an errata sheet submitted by Watts's expert, Dr. Akhil Chhatre, which attempted to amend his deposition testimony to suggest that both vaccines contributed to Watts's injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that Watts failed to provide evidence to establish that her injury was caused by the Pneumovax shot, as required to overcome CVS's immunity for the Boostrix shot. The court noted that both of Watts's experts could not definitively attribute her injury to the Pneumovax vaccine alone. The court also upheld the district court's decision to strike Dr. Chhatre's errata sheet, which materially altered his original testimony.The Fourth Circuit concluded that without evidence to separate the effects of the two vaccines, a jury could only speculate on the cause of Watts's injury. Therefore, Watts could not satisfy the causation element of her negligence claim, and the summary judgment in favor of CVS was affirmed. View "Watts v. Maryland CVS Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law

A married couple, with three young children, filed for divorce. The mother requested primary custody, pendente lite child support, and alimony, while the father requested primary custody and child support. A family magistrate found both parents capable of earning significant income and denied the mother's request for pendente lite child support and alimony, recommending shared custody and shared payment of the mortgage and utilities for the marital home.The Circuit Court for Howard County adopted the magistrate's recommendations and denied the mother's exceptions to the magistrate's report. The mother appealed, citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-303(3)(v), which allows appeals from interlocutory orders for the payment of money.The Appellate Court of Maryland dismissed the appeal, holding that an interlocutory order denying pendente lite child support and alimony is not appealable under CJ § 12-303(3)(v) because it does not direct the payment of money. The mother then petitioned the Supreme Court of Maryland for a writ of certiorari.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment, holding that CJ § 12-303(3)(v) authorizes appeals only from interlocutory orders that direct the payment of money, not from orders denying such requests. The Court concluded that the legislative history and case law support this interpretation, emphasizing that the statute's plain language does not permit appeals from orders denying the payment of money. View "Adelakun v. Adelakun" on Justia Law

A group of current and former employees of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. alleged that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regarding wages for tipped workers. They sought preliminary certification for a collective action to include all servers in states where Cracker Barrel attempts to take a tip credit over the last three years. Cracker Barrel objected, arguing that notice should not be sent to employees who are subject to arbitration agreements or to out-of-state employees with no ties to Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary certification and approved notice to the proposed group, including employees who might have entered into arbitration agreements and out-of-state employees. The court decided to reserve judgment on the arbitration issue until the second stage of proceedings and concluded that nationwide notice was permissible based on the participation of one Arizona-based plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in following the two-step procedure for preliminary certification. It also held that where the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement are in dispute, the district court is not required to determine the arbitrability of absent employees' claims before authorizing notice. However, the Ninth Circuit joined other circuits in holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California applies to FLSA collective actions in federal court. This means that for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court must assess whether each opt-in plaintiff's claim is sufficiently connected to the defendant's activities in the forum state. The court vacated the district court's order authorizing nationwide notice and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HARRINGTON V. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC." on Justia Law

Monika McCallion, Brandan McCallion, and Old Bears, LLC (collectively, the McCallions) appealed a judgment affirming the Bar Harbor Board of Appeals' decision to uphold the issuance of a 2023 short-term rental registration to W.A.R.M. Management, LLC. The Town of Bar Harbor requires annual registration of short-term rental properties, classifying them as either VR-1 or VR-2. W.A.R.M. Management, LLC owns two VR-2 properties, one of which is central to this dispute. The property in question is in a district where VR-2s are generally prohibited unless they were registered before December 2, 2021. W.A.R.M. submitted renewal applications and fees for both properties in January 2023, but due to a malfunction in the Town's online portal, one application was lost, and the registration was not renewed by the May 31 deadline. The Town's code enforcement officer (CEO) later issued a registration for the property in October 2023 after determining that W.A.R.M. had timely submitted its renewal application.The McCallions filed an administrative appeal with the Bar Harbor Board of Appeals, arguing that the CEO could not renew the registration after the deadline. The Board upheld the CEO's actions after a de novo hearing. The McCallions then filed a Rule 80B complaint in the Superior Court, which affirmed the Board's decision without addressing the Town's mootness argument. While the case was pending, W.A.R.M. received a 2024 registration for the property, which the McCallions did not contest.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was moot because the 2023 registration had been superseded by the 2024 registration, which was not appealed. The court concluded that even if it ruled in favor of the McCallions regarding the 2023 registration, it would have no practical effect since the 2024 registration was final and not subject to review. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied in this case. View "McCallion v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Kimberly-Clark Corporation, alleging that the company falsely advertised its bathroom wipes as flushable, leading consumers to pay a premium and causing plumbing damage. The parties reached a settlement where Kimberly-Clark agreed to pay up to $20 million in compensation to the class and up to $4 million in attorney’s fees. However, class members claimed less than $1 million. The district court approved the settlement under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and adequate. Objector Theodore H. Frank appealed, arguing that the settlement disproportionately benefited class counsel, who received most of the monetary recovery. Frank contended that the district court failed to properly assess the allocation of recovery between the class and class counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Frank that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in its Rule 23(e) analysis. The appellate court clarified that Rule 23(e) requires courts to compare the proportion of total recovery allocated to the class with the proportion allocated to class counsel. The court vacated the district court’s order and judgment approving the settlement and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The appellate court did not reach a conclusion on whether the settlement was fair but emphasized the need for a proper proportionality analysis. View "Kurtz v. Kimberly-Clark Corp." on Justia Law

Dr. John Doe, a federal public servant with a security clearance, was convicted of two felonies in Ohio in the early 1990s. He received a pardon from the Ohio governor in 2009, and his felony convictions were sealed by an Ohio court. In 2022, Dr. Doe applied for a position at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but his application was denied due to a statutory bar against hiring individuals with felony convictions. Dr. Doe then filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of this hiring prohibition and sought to proceed under a pseudonym to avoid public association with his sealed convictions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. The court acknowledged Dr. Doe's privacy concerns and the lack of unfairness to the government but concluded that the privacy interest in felony convictions does not warrant pseudonymity. The court emphasized the importance of transparency in judicial proceedings, especially in cases involving constitutional challenges against the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Dr. Doe's privacy interest in his sealed felony convictions was insufficient to overcome the presumption against pseudonymous litigation. The court highlighted the public's significant interest in open judicial proceedings, particularly when the case involves a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the relevant factors and denying Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. McKernan" on Justia Law

In this dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that K.L.W. ("Father") waived his statutory right to a jury trial by failing to appear for the trial in 2021. The court then incorrectly adjudicated Father's five children as dependent or neglected by default. In 2023, the juvenile court vacated the default judgment and scheduled a new adjudicatory trial, again finding that Father had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to appear in 2021. Father did not demand a jury trial during the twenty days before the bench trial and acknowledged the bench trial in a pretrial pleading. On the morning of the 2023 trial, Father objected to the waiver finding, but the court proceeded with the bench trial and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's adjudicatory judgment, concluding that Father's 2021 waiver of a jury trial did not extend to the 2023 proceeding. The appellate court held that the 2023 trial was a new trial, and since Father appeared, he did not waive his right to a jury trial for the 2023 proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that even if the 2021 waiver was not binding for the 2023 trial, Father failed to demand a jury trial as required by statute and rule. The court found that Father's objection on the morning of the 2023 trial was not a valid or timely demand for a jury trial. The court emphasized that granting Father's objection would have delayed the proceedings, contrary to the children's best interests and the orderly administration of justice. Therefore, the juvenile court correctly conducted a bench trial, and the appellate court erred in reversing the adjudicatory judgment. View "People ex rel. Kay. W. v. K.L.W." on Justia Law

Salvatore Ziccarelli, a former employee of the Cook County Sheriff's Office, used intermittent FMLA leave to manage his PTSD. In 2016, after his condition worsened, he discussed taking block leave with the FMLA coordinator, Wylola Shinnawi, who allegedly warned him against using more FMLA leave. Ziccarelli took one more day of leave and then resigned. He filed a lawsuit alleging FMLA interference and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff's Office on both claims, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the interference claim for trial.At trial, the jury awarded Ziccarelli $240,000. The Sheriff's Office moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), arguing that Ziccarelli could not show prejudice from the alleged interference since he took an additional day of FMLA leave after the phone call. The district court granted the motion and conditionally granted a new trial, reasoning that Ziccarelli's post-call leave negated any reasonable inference of prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law, finding that the grounds for the Rule 50(b) motion were not properly presented before the verdict. However, the court affirmed the district court's alternative decision to grant a new trial, agreeing that the evidence did not support a finding of prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Ziccarelli v Dart" on Justia Law

In January 2024, seventeen-year-old B.H. was held at Logansport Juvenile Correctional Facility. After being informed of a minor sanction, B.H. allegedly threatened and struck an officer, causing a lacerated nose. B.H. later explained he was upset due to news about his parents. Three months later, after B.H. turned eighteen, the State sought approval to file a juvenile delinquency petition for battery on a public safety officer. The trial court denied the request, citing "LACK OF JURISDICTION." The State filed a motion to correct error, arguing the court had jurisdiction since B.H. was under twenty-one and the act occurred before he turned eighteen. The court denied the motion, stating the case was filed after B.H. turned eighteen.The State then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. The Indiana Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and reversed the trial court's decision, treating the order as a final judgment. The State missed the thirty-day deadline for filing its notice of appeal, but the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the appeal. B.H. petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which was granted, vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction but focused on whether the State had the authority to appeal the order and whether the appeal was timely. The court concluded that the State forfeited its right to appeal by filing an untimely notice of appeal and failed to present extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate that right. Consequently, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "State of Indiana v. BH" on Justia Law