Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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In this dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that K.L.W. ("Father") waived his statutory right to a jury trial by failing to appear for the trial in 2021. The court then incorrectly adjudicated Father's five children as dependent or neglected by default. In 2023, the juvenile court vacated the default judgment and scheduled a new adjudicatory trial, again finding that Father had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to appear in 2021. Father did not demand a jury trial during the twenty days before the bench trial and acknowledged the bench trial in a pretrial pleading. On the morning of the 2023 trial, Father objected to the waiver finding, but the court proceeded with the bench trial and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's adjudicatory judgment, concluding that Father's 2021 waiver of a jury trial did not extend to the 2023 proceeding. The appellate court held that the 2023 trial was a new trial, and since Father appeared, he did not waive his right to a jury trial for the 2023 proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that even if the 2021 waiver was not binding for the 2023 trial, Father failed to demand a jury trial as required by statute and rule. The court found that Father's objection on the morning of the 2023 trial was not a valid or timely demand for a jury trial. The court emphasized that granting Father's objection would have delayed the proceedings, contrary to the children's best interests and the orderly administration of justice. Therefore, the juvenile court correctly conducted a bench trial, and the appellate court erred in reversing the adjudicatory judgment. View "People ex rel. Kay. W. v. K.L.W." on Justia Law

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Salvatore Ziccarelli, a former employee of the Cook County Sheriff's Office, used intermittent FMLA leave to manage his PTSD. In 2016, after his condition worsened, he discussed taking block leave with the FMLA coordinator, Wylola Shinnawi, who allegedly warned him against using more FMLA leave. Ziccarelli took one more day of leave and then resigned. He filed a lawsuit alleging FMLA interference and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff's Office on both claims, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the interference claim for trial.At trial, the jury awarded Ziccarelli $240,000. The Sheriff's Office moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), arguing that Ziccarelli could not show prejudice from the alleged interference since he took an additional day of FMLA leave after the phone call. The district court granted the motion and conditionally granted a new trial, reasoning that Ziccarelli's post-call leave negated any reasonable inference of prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law, finding that the grounds for the Rule 50(b) motion were not properly presented before the verdict. However, the court affirmed the district court's alternative decision to grant a new trial, agreeing that the evidence did not support a finding of prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Ziccarelli v Dart" on Justia Law

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In January 2024, seventeen-year-old B.H. was held at Logansport Juvenile Correctional Facility. After being informed of a minor sanction, B.H. allegedly threatened and struck an officer, causing a lacerated nose. B.H. later explained he was upset due to news about his parents. Three months later, after B.H. turned eighteen, the State sought approval to file a juvenile delinquency petition for battery on a public safety officer. The trial court denied the request, citing "LACK OF JURISDICTION." The State filed a motion to correct error, arguing the court had jurisdiction since B.H. was under twenty-one and the act occurred before he turned eighteen. The court denied the motion, stating the case was filed after B.H. turned eighteen.The State then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. The Indiana Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and reversed the trial court's decision, treating the order as a final judgment. The State missed the thirty-day deadline for filing its notice of appeal, but the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the appeal. B.H. petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which was granted, vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction but focused on whether the State had the authority to appeal the order and whether the appeal was timely. The court concluded that the State forfeited its right to appeal by filing an untimely notice of appeal and failed to present extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate that right. Consequently, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "State of Indiana v. BH" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a Belgian company, agreed to ship car parts made in Mexico to a Mexican plant operated by the defendants, a Delaware LLC and a Delaware corporation. The initial contract documents included a forum-selection clause pointing to a Mexican venue. However, the plaintiff later sued in Michigan, alleging that the parties had switched to a Michigan forum-selection clause during their transactions. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the forum non conveniens doctrine, arguing that the Mexican forum-selection clause applied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the suit without conducting a forum non conveniens analysis. The court found that the forum-selection clause in the initial contract documents, which pointed to a Mexican venue, was controlling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the complaint plausibly alleged that the parties had switched to a Michigan forum-selection clause. The court noted that a factual dispute existed over which forum-selection clause applied to the plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claims. The court held that this venue issue could not be resolved on the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6) or under the forum non conveniens doctrine without factual findings. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve the factual disputes regarding the applicable forum-selection clause. View "VCST Int'l B.V. v. BorgWarner Noblesville, LLC" on Justia Law

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Power Rental Op Co, LLC ("Power Rental") is a Florida-based company providing water and energy services. The Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority ("WAPA") is a municipal corporation in the U.S. Virgin Islands. In 2012, WAPA entered into a rental agreement with General Electric International, which Power Rental later acquired. By 2019, WAPA owed Power Rental over $14 million, which was reduced to approximately $9.3 million through a promissory note governed by New York law. WAPA defaulted on the note in 2020, leading Power Rental to sue in Florida state court for breach of the note and other claims.The case was removed to the Middle District of Florida, which dissolved pre-judgment writs of garnishment issued by the state court, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Power Rental, and ordered WAPA to complete a fact information sheet. The court found that WAPA waived its sovereign immunity defenses under the terms of the note. WAPA's appeal to the Eleventh Circuit was voluntarily dismissed.Power Rental registered the judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which issued a writ of execution served on WAPA's account at FirstBank in Puerto Rico. WAPA filed an emergency motion to quash the writ, arguing that the funds were exempt under Virgin Islands law and that the Puerto Rico court lacked jurisdiction. The District of Puerto Rico denied the motion, finding that the separate entity rule did not apply and that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District of Puerto Rico's order. The court held that the separate entity rule was outdated and did not apply, allowing the Puerto Rico court to have jurisdiction over the writ. The court also upheld the lower court's finding that WAPA had waived its statutory immunity defenses. View "Power Rental OP CO, LLC v. Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority" on Justia Law

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Zayn Al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, also known as Abu Zubaydah, was captured in Pakistan in March 2002, suspected of being an Al Qaeda leader. He was transferred to a CIA-operated secret prison where he was subjected to "enhanced interrogation techniques" by James Mitchell and John Jessen, psychologists contracted by the CIA. These techniques included waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and confinement in small boxes, which Zubaydah alleges amounted to torture. He was later transferred to Guantanamo Bay, where he remains detained as an enemy combatant.Zubaydah filed a lawsuit under the Alien Tort Statute seeking damages for the injuries he suffered during his detention and interrogations. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, which denies federal courts jurisdiction over certain actions relating to the detention and treatment of enemy combatants by the United States and its agents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the MCA deprived the district court of jurisdiction because Zubaydah's claims related to his detention and treatment by the defendants, who were considered agents of the United States. The court found that the CIA had authorized, controlled, and ratified the defendants' actions, thereby establishing an agency relationship. Consequently, the MCA barred the court from hearing Zubaydah's claims. The decision was affirmed. View "HUSAYN V. MITCHELL" on Justia Law

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South Hill Meat Lockers Incorporated (South Hill) alleged that the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) caused damage to its building during a road construction project on U.S. Highway 95 in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. South Hill claimed ITD was liable under seven different causes of action, including negligence and constitutional violations. ITD moved for summary judgment, asserting "plan or design immunity" under Idaho Code section 6-904(7). The district court initially denied ITD's first motion for summary judgment but later granted ITD's second motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing four of South Hill's claims. After a change in judges, the new judge granted ITD's motion for reconsideration, dismissing South Hill's complaint with prejudice.The district court's rulings were mixed. Judge Buchanan initially denied ITD's first motion for summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact. However, she later granted ITD's second motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing several of South Hill's claims. Upon Judge Buchanan's retirement, Judge Berecz reconsidered and granted ITD's first motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of South Hill's claims.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the district court's judgment. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's summary judgment rulings. The Supreme Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether ITD's change orders and the gas line relocation were meaningfully reviewed, which precluded summary judgment on the basis of plan or design immunity. The court also reversed the dismissal of South Hill's nuisance claim, holding that a nuisance claim for damages can persist even after the nuisance has abated. The court affirmed the district court's rulings on other claims, including the determination that Idaho Code section 55-310 does not impose strict liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "South Hill Meat Lockers Incorp. v. Idaho Transportation Dept." on Justia Law

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Mary Ann Arnold worked for United Airlines from 1994 to 2020. She alleged age discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge after experiencing changes in her job responsibilities and being placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Arnold claimed these actions were due to her age and previous complaints about discrimination and harassment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of United Airlines on Arnold's claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The court dismissed her constructive discharge claim without prejudice, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Arnold did not provide sufficient evidence to show that she suffered adverse employment actions due to age discrimination. The court also found that her retaliation claim failed because the actions taken by United were not materially adverse and were not shown to be causally connected to her complaints. Additionally, the court held that Arnold did not demonstrate a hostile work environment based on age, as the incidents she described were not severe or pervasive enough to meet the legal standard. The court also upheld the dismissal of her constructive discharge claim due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

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Sheila Prato, the plaintiff, and her company, Prato Properties, LLC, filed a civil complaint against Thomas John Gioia and Lee & Associates Commercial Real Estate Services, Inc. (the Lee Firm) for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with contract. The case was dismissed without prejudice due to the plaintiffs' failure to appear at trial. At the time of the trial, Prato's attorney, Timothy McFarlin, had been rendered inactive and ineligible to practice law by the State Bar of California due to pending disciplinary proceedings. Prato was unaware of her attorney's status, but the defendants and their counsel were aware and did not inform her or the court.The Superior Court of Orange County dismissed the case without prejudice and subsequently awarded over $70,000 in attorney fees against Prato and her company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for attorney fees despite Prato's opposition, which argued that the defendants failed to provide the required notice under section 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which mandates that a party whose attorney has been removed or suspended must be given written notice to appoint another attorney or appear in person before further proceedings can be taken against them.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the defendants' counsel failed to provide the required notice under section 286 before the trial, which prejudiced Prato. The court held that an attorney who has been rendered inactive and ineligible to practice law meets the definition of an attorney who has been "removed or suspended" for purposes of section 286. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the defendants without considering the lack of notice and the circumstances surrounding Prato's unrepresented status.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the defendants' motions for attorney fees in light of section 286. View "Prato v. Gioia" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, employees and independent contractors of White Oak Radiator Service, Inc., were injured while performing work at Enable Midstream Partners, LP's natural gas processing plant. The work involved removing and replacing amine and glycol coolers. During the work, a glycol surge tank ruptured, causing injuries. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking damages for their injuries.The trial court found that the claims of Joey Miller and Davy Dowdy against Enable sounded in tort rather than workers' compensation. The court awarded damages to Mr. Dowdy for injuries to his cervical spine and hearing loss, but found that White Oak bore a greater percentage of fault than assigned by the trial court. The trial court assigned 90 percent fault to Enable and 10 percent to White Oak. Enable appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was under the Louisiana workers' compensation laws and challenging the allocation of fault and damages.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and held that the manual labor exception under La. R.S. 23:1021 (7) does not apply to the employees and independent contractors of an independent contractor. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims against Enable sound in tort. The court found no manifest error in the trial court's award of damages to Mr. Dowdy for his cervical spine injuries and hearing loss. However, the court found that the trial court erred in the apportionment of fault and amended the judgment to assign 70 percent fault to Enable and 30 percent fault to White Oak. The trial court's judgment was affirmed as amended. View "McBride v. Old Republic Insurance Co." on Justia Law