Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Orlonzo Hedrington, who underwent heart surgery and subsequent rehabilitation at a Veterans Administration medical center in California. Hedrington alleged that, during his discharge, he was sexually assaulted by nursing staff and administered drugs to disguise the assault. He filed a timely administrative claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs, which was denied. Hedrington then filed a timely lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claiming negligence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California first reviewed Hedrington’s timely FTCA action (“Hedrington I”). The United States moved for summary judgment, raising issues related to judicial estoppel and standing due to Hedrington’s bankruptcy proceedings. After the bankruptcy trustee was substituted as plaintiff, the district court denied the United States’s summary judgment motion. Later, Hedrington filed a second, untimely pro se lawsuit (“Hedrington II”), which was removed to the same district court. The court dismissed Hedrington II as time-barred under the FTCA. Subsequently, the United States moved for summary judgment in Hedrington I, asserting claim preclusion based on the judgment in Hedrington II. The district court granted summary judgment on both claim preclusion and insufficient evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Hedrington I was not barred by claim preclusion. Following Filice v. United States, the Ninth Circuit applied California claim preclusion law, under which a dismissal for untimeliness does not have claim preclusive effect. Additionally, the court found that applying claim preclusion here would result in manifest injustice, triggering California’s public policy exception. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment on claim preclusion and remanded for further proceedings. View "HEDRINGTON V. USA" on Justia Law

A holding company and its North Carolina insurance agency subsidiary, which function as intermediaries between clients and insurance carriers, experienced significant employee dissatisfaction after a shift in commission structure and a pay freeze in early 2020. This led to multiple employees, including both producers and account managers, leaving over several months to join a direct competitor, a new agency formed by a former employee. The departing employees had signed agreements with non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses. During their departures, some employees forwarded company documents to personal accounts, and, after litigation began, engaged in extensive deletion of electronic evidence.Previously, in Guilford County Superior Court, the plaintiffs had sued a former producer, with most claims dismissed except for breach of employment agreement, and that suit was later settled. In the current litigation, after discovery, both sides sought partial summary judgment in the North Carolina Business Court (Superior Court for Complex Business Cases). The Business Court granted summary judgment in part for both parties, including a grant of adverse inference against defendants for spoliation of evidence, but did not specify how that inference would apply to each claim.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the adverse inference ruling but remanded for the Business Court to clarify its specific application. The Court reversed the Business Court’s summary judgment that two client lists could not be trade secrets, holding there were genuine issues of fact. It clarified the standard for misappropriation of trade secrets under state law, requiring evidence of a specific opportunity to acquire trade secrets without authorization. The Court remanded claims related to trade secrets, enforcement of non-solicitation provisions (pending factual findings on the scope of the employer and affiliates), and certain computer fraud claims for further proceedings. Summary judgment for defendants on unjust enrichment was affirmed, and the Business Court was directed to issue a written opinion for claims it disposed of in a summary order. The disposition was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after the City approved a light rail project and formed a corporation, Austin Transit Partnership (ATP), to implement it. Voters approved a tax increase to fund the endeavor, and ATP—not the City—planned to issue municipal bonds. Taxpayers challenged ATP’s authority to issue these bonds, leading the City and ATP to seek a declaratory judgment confirming their power to assess taxes and issue bonds. The Attorney General, participating as permitted by statute, filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending neither the City nor ATP qualified as an “issuer” under the statute governing expedited declaratory judgment actions.In the District Court, the City and ATP sought a quick resolution so the project could proceed, while the taxpayers and Attorney General desired delay. ATP’s counsel advised the court not to rule on the Attorney General’s plea to the jurisdiction, thus avoiding an interlocutory appeal and the associated automatic stay. The court accepted this suggestion, explicitly refusing to rule on the plea and moving forward toward trial. The Attorney General then filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, arguing the court’s actions amounted to an implicit denial. The trial court reiterated it had not ruled, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District dismissed the appeal, finding no order granting or denying the plea and therefore no appellate jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case, holding that a trial court must rule on jurisdictional challenges before proceeding to the merits and cannot strategically avoid issuing a ruling to frustrate the government’s appellate rights. Because the absence of a ruling deprived the State of its statutory right to interlocutory appeal, and no adequate remedy by appeal existed, the Court treated the Attorney General’s petition as a request for mandamus and conditionally granted relief, directing the trial court to rule on the plea to the jurisdiction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was left undisturbed. View "PAXTON v. THE CITY OF AUSTIN" on Justia Law

A woman was killed when a construction crane collapsed during a storm, striking her apartment building. Her parents, acting individually and on behalf of her estate, brought a negligence and gross negligence lawsuit against several defendants, primarily three related construction and development entities. Following a jury trial, the jury found these entities had engaged in a joint enterprise that caused the woman’s death and awarded over $360 million in compensatory damages, along with $500 million in exemplary damages (which the trial court later reduced under statutory caps). The court entered judgment holding the entities jointly and severally liable for the compensatory damages, with two entities also severally liable for exemplary damages.The defendants, collectively known as the Greystar Entities, filed a single $25 million joint supersedeas bond to suspend execution of the judgment during their appeal. The plaintiffs challenged the sufficiency of this joint bond in the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, arguing that Texas law capped the required bond at $25 million per debtor, not per judgment. The trial court agreed, ruling that each entity needed to post its own $25 million bond and that the joint bond could suspend execution for only one entity unless the defendants designated which one. The Greystar Entities appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals at Dallas, which affirmed the trial court’s order.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus. The Court held that, under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 52.006(b), the $25 million cap on supersedeas bonds applies per judgment debtor, not collectively to all debtors in a single judgment. The Court also held that the trial court abused its discretion by immediately invalidating the joint bond without allowing a reasonable time for compliance. The Supreme Court conditionally granted partial mandamus relief, directing the trial court to provide additional time for each entity to post an individual bond. View "IN RE GREYSTAR DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, L.P." on Justia Law

Cynthia Miles, a sixty-four-year-old woman suffering from acute psychosis and a history of suicidal ideation, experienced several psychiatric crises in 2021. After multiple hospitalizations and escapes from care facilities, she was admitted to Harbor Point, an unlocked mental health facility, where she again escaped on November 11, 2021. Despite a search, Miles was never found. Her family, having previously experienced her disappearances followed by safe returns, could not determine her fate. After extensive efforts to locate her failed, her family petitioned the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County for a judicial determination of death. Following a jury trial, the court issued a certificate of presumed death on August 29, 2022.Subsequently, Miles’s daughter, as administrator of her estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against several healthcare providers. The defendants asserted that the action was time-barred under Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death claims, arguing that the limitations period began either at Miles’s disappearance or when the family first sought a declaration of death. The Iowa District Court for Cass County rejected this argument, ruling that the statute of limitations began only upon the judicial declaration of death, not the earlier disappearance.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal to determine when the limitations period commenced. The court held that, in a case where there is no known physical injury and it is unclear whether the missing person is alive or dead, the statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim does not begin to run until there is a judicial determination of death. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, allowing the wrongful death action to proceed as timely filed. View "Schneide v. Holliday" on Justia Law

A patient suffered an injury during knee surgery in March 2022 and, together with his wife, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the operating surgeon and the orthopedic clinic in January 2023. Iowa law requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to serve a certificate of merit affidavit within sixty days after the defendant’s answer to the lawsuit. The plaintiffs served a certificate of merit within the deadline. However, the document was not sworn before an authorized officer and did not include the phrase “penalty of perjury” as required by Iowa statutes. Over a year later, the plaintiffs served an amended certificate that met the affidavit requirements, but it was well past the statutory deadline.After the defendants answered and discovery proceeded for more than a year, the defendants moved to dismiss in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, arguing that the timely certificate did not comply with statutory requirements. The district court found that the initial certificate was neither a true affidavit nor a permissible substitute under the relevant statutes. The court also concluded that the late-filed, proper affidavit could not cure the statutory violation because it was not filed within the required sixty days and there was no extension by agreement or motion. The district court dismissed the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that substantial compliance with the certificate of merit affidavit requirement means providing either a true affidavit executed before an authorized person or a statement under penalty of perjury within sixty days. The plaintiffs failed to do either within the deadline, and their later submission could not cure the defect. The court also rejected arguments that the defendants had waived the affidavit requirement or that the statutory scheme violated the Iowa Constitution. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Rarick v. Smidt" on Justia Law

After a woman was injured in a car accident and treated at a hospital, an X-ray suggested a lung nodule, and her medical records recommended a chest CT scan for further investigation. No CT scan was ordered or performed, and she was released. Almost two years later, after suffering a femur fracture, a CT scan at a different hospital revealed cancer, and she subsequently passed away. Her husband and children, representing themselves and her estate, brought a wrongful-death medical malpractice suit against the hospital and multiple providers, alleging failure to properly follow up on the lung nodule.In the Iowa District Court for Scott County, the plaintiffs timely served certificates of merit as required by Iowa Code section 147.140, but these certificates were neither notarized nor included a statement that they were signed under penalty of perjury. Following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp., the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the certificates did not satisfy statutory requirements. The plaintiffs resisted, providing new expert statements but maintaining these were not amendments. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. After the death of one of the original plaintiffs, his son was appointed as executor and administrator for the estates. Notices of appeal were filed, initially signed by the non-lawyer administrator.The Supreme Court of Iowa first determined that the estates’ appeal should not be dismissed due to the unauthorized practice of law in filing the notice of appeal, since counsel promptly appeared and continued representation. On the substantive issue, the court was evenly divided on whether the district court correctly dismissed the suit for noncompliance with section 147.140. As a result, the dismissal was affirmed by operation of law. The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied, but the district court judgment was affirmed. View "Willhoite v. Genesis Health System" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a member of the New Progressive Party and a former System Technician Coordinator for the Municipality of Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, alleged that after a new mayor from the Popular Democratic Party took office, he was subjected to politically motivated adverse employment actions. Specifically, he claimed his server access was revoked, he received a poor employment evaluation, and his work environment became intolerable, all of which led to his constructive resignation. He asserted that these actions were taken because of his political affiliation.Following discovery, several individual defendants moved for summary judgment on the claims against them in their individual capacities, arguing that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of political discrimination under the First Amendment and raising a qualified immunity defense. Importantly, they did not address the claims against them in their official capacities, the municipality, or the equal protection and Puerto Rico law claims. The plaintiff opposed the motion, but the district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, granted summary judgment for the individual defendants and sua sponte dismissed the entire case with prejudice, citing waiver and a lack of evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on waiver alone and in concluding there was no evidence supporting the plaintiff’s claims. The appellate court found that the plaintiff’s deposition testimony created genuine disputes of material fact regarding the involvement and knowledge of the defendants. The court also held that the district court improperly dismissed claims against parties who had not moved for summary judgment without giving the plaintiff notice. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Arocho-Rodriguez v. Roldan-Concepcion" on Justia Law

The appellant owned a condominium unit in Old Orchard Beach, Maine, subject to the Tidewater Loft Condominium Association’s declaration, which required payment of fees and assessments. After accruing tens of thousands of dollars in unpaid dues, expenses, and legal fees, she received notice of her right to cure the default, but did not do so. The Association initiated foreclosure proceedings. In response, the appellant filed a counterclaim, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, based on the Association’s alleged failure to accommodate her daughter’s disability in connection with snow removal and trash disposal.The Biddeford District Court held a bench trial, at which the appellant appeared pro se. Although pretrial proceedings had identified her counterclaim as an issue for trial, the court ultimately limited the trial to the foreclosure issues and expressly excluded the counterclaim, preventing the appellant from presenting evidence or cross-examining on matters related to her claim. The court then entered judgment of foreclosure and sale for the Association and also entered judgment against the appellant on her counterclaim, concluding she had presented no persuasive evidence, despite not allowing her to do so.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the procedural due process claim de novo. The court held that the trial court’s failure to permit the appellant to present evidence or be heard on her counterclaim constituted a violation of her procedural due process rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated both the foreclosure judgment and the judgment on the counterclaim, remanding for further proceedings to allow the appellant an opportunity to be heard on her counterclaim. View "Tidewater Loft Condominium Association v. Moskal-Kanz" on Justia Law

A state official sought review of a lower court decision concerning an inmate, Joseph Clifton Smith, who was involved in litigation against the Alabama Department of Corrections. The case reached the United States Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari, which is a request for the Supreme Court to review the decision of a lower court.Previously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had reviewed the case and issued a decision regarding Smith’s claims. The party dissatisfied with the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling—the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections—then sought review in the Supreme Court, prompting the granting of certiorari.Upon consideration, the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. This means that the Court concluded it should not have agreed to hear the case and, as a result, did not issue a decision on the merits. The effect of this order is that the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit remains in place, and the Supreme Court will not provide further review or guidance in this matter. View "Hamm v. Smith" on Justia Law