Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against GateHouse Media in Ohio state court, alleging claims that met the requirements for federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). GateHouse timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, where the parties litigated for several years. The district court eventually denied class certification and, based on that denial, remanded the case to state court, concluding it could no longer exercise jurisdiction and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims.After the case returned to state court, it remained inactive until plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification. GateHouse then removed the case to federal court a second time, asserting that this renewed motion provided a new basis for removal under CAFA. Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing the removal was untimely. The district court denied the remand motion, finding that its earlier remand order had created ambiguity about federal jurisdiction and, under principles of equity, tolled the 30-day removal deadline. Plaintiffs sought and were granted interlocutory review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 30-day deadline for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) is strict and cannot be equitably tolled, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan. The Sixth Circuit concluded that GateHouse’s second removal was untimely because the original complaint had already triggered the removal clock, and subsequent events, including renewed class certification efforts, did not restart it. The appellate court reversed the district court’s order and instructed that the case be remanded to state court. View "Ewalt v. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services initiated abuse and neglect proceedings against two parents, alleging that they subjected their teenage children to domestic violence and failed to provide safe housing. At an adjudicatory hearing, both parents stipulated to the allegations and were adjudicated as abusive and neglectful. Ahead of disposition, the Department sought termination of parental rights, while the parents requested improvement periods. After the court denied improvement periods, the parents voluntarily relinquished custodial (but not parental) rights, leading to a subsidized legal guardianship arrangement. The court dismissed the parents as parties and relieved their attorneys. Subsequently, due to the guardian’s change in circumstances, the Department moved to modify the disposition and terminate parental rights.Following their dismissal, the parents were not served notice of subsequent hearings. They filed a pro se motion to restore custody, but were absent from a permanency hearing where the court reinstated them as parties and reappointed counsel. At a later hearing, neither parent appeared, but their attorneys did. The court denied the parents’ motion to restore custody and granted the Department’s motion to modify disposition and terminate parental rights, focusing on changed circumstances and the children’s best interests without making statutory findings required for termination.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court committed significant procedural errors by dismissing the parents while they retained parental rights and by failing to follow statutory and rule-based requirements for terminating those rights. The Court held that parents cannot be dismissed as parties if they retain parental rights and that all procedural requirements for disposition, including evidentiary hearings and specific findings, must be met when modifying disposition. The Court vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with these requirements. View "In re P.F. and M.F.-1" on Justia Law

A company, Dravo, had for decades operated in heavy industry and faced numerous asbestos-related claims based on alleged exposure during its operations from the 1940s to the 1980s. In 1998, Carmeuse Lime, Inc. (CLI), a Belgian-based company, acquired Dravo through a reverse-triangular merger. After the acquisition, Dravo had no employees and was managed entirely by personnel from CLI or its affiliates. Dravo eventually converted to a limited liability company (LLC) and, in 2018, initiated dissolution proceedings under the Pennsylvania Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of 2016. Dravo published the required notice of dissolution, setting a July 13, 2020, bar date for claims. The company settled its insurance coverage for asbestos claims, and the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County found that all timely claims had been resolved or adequately provided for.After the bar date, multiple plaintiffs brought asbestos-related actions against CLI and Dravo, asserting that CLI should be liable for Dravo’s obligations by piercing the LLC’s corporate veil. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CLI, finding insufficient evidence to pierce the veil. The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, concluding there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether CLI and Dravo operated as a single entity and whether adherence to the corporate form would promote injustice.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that plaintiffs could not pursue veil piercing to recover from CLI for claims against Dravo that were time-barred under the LLC Act. The court emphasized that veil piercing is not an independent cause of action but an equitable remedy available only when there is a viable underlying claim against the entity. Because the plaintiffs’ claims against Dravo were barred by statute, they could not invoke veil piercing to reach CLI. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "In Re: Dravo LLC" on Justia Law

After obtaining a judgment in the amount of $109,250 plus interest and costs against a defendant, the plaintiff sought to collect the judgment by garnishing the defendant’s wages from her employer, a corporation. The employer was served with a writ of attachment but failed to timely file legally valid affidavits regarding the defendant’s wages, as required by statute. The plaintiff then moved to hold the employer liable for the full amount of the judgment, arguing that the statutory requirements for affidavits had not been satisfied. During the course of proceedings, the defendant passed away, and the employer ultimately provided affidavits with valid notarization and tendered the garnished wages to the plaintiff.A justice of the Providence County Superior Court initially granted the plaintiff’s first motion to charge the employer the full amount of the judgment, but, after the employer moved to vacate, that order was set aside. The plaintiff filed a second motion to charge the employer, again asserting that the statutory requirements had not been met. At hearings on the second motion, the plaintiff conceded that the employer had not refused or neglected to supply the required account of wages. The hearing justice found that the employer had provided the necessary information and that the plaintiff had received all wages withheld before the defendant’s death, resulting in no injury to the plaintiff. The court denied the second motion to charge.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Court held that, under the relevant statute, a garnishee can only be held liable for the full judgment if it “refuses or neglects” to provide the required sworn account. Because the plaintiff conceded there was no such refusal or neglect, and the plaintiff received all garnished wages, the statutory prerequisites for liability were not met. The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s motion to charge the employer. View "Strassman v. Howe" on Justia Law

The case involves Orlonzo Hedrington, who underwent heart surgery and subsequent rehabilitation at a Veterans Administration medical center in California. Hedrington alleged that, during his discharge, he was sexually assaulted by nursing staff and administered drugs to disguise the assault. He filed a timely administrative claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs, which was denied. Hedrington then filed a timely lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claiming negligence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California first reviewed Hedrington’s timely FTCA action (“Hedrington I”). The United States moved for summary judgment, raising issues related to judicial estoppel and standing due to Hedrington’s bankruptcy proceedings. After the bankruptcy trustee was substituted as plaintiff, the district court denied the United States’s summary judgment motion. Later, Hedrington filed a second, untimely pro se lawsuit (“Hedrington II”), which was removed to the same district court. The court dismissed Hedrington II as time-barred under the FTCA. Subsequently, the United States moved for summary judgment in Hedrington I, asserting claim preclusion based on the judgment in Hedrington II. The district court granted summary judgment on both claim preclusion and insufficient evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Hedrington I was not barred by claim preclusion. Following Filice v. United States, the Ninth Circuit applied California claim preclusion law, under which a dismissal for untimeliness does not have claim preclusive effect. Additionally, the court found that applying claim preclusion here would result in manifest injustice, triggering California’s public policy exception. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment on claim preclusion and remanded for further proceedings. View "HEDRINGTON V. USA" on Justia Law

A holding company and its North Carolina insurance agency subsidiary, which function as intermediaries between clients and insurance carriers, experienced significant employee dissatisfaction after a shift in commission structure and a pay freeze in early 2020. This led to multiple employees, including both producers and account managers, leaving over several months to join a direct competitor, a new agency formed by a former employee. The departing employees had signed agreements with non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses. During their departures, some employees forwarded company documents to personal accounts, and, after litigation began, engaged in extensive deletion of electronic evidence.Previously, in Guilford County Superior Court, the plaintiffs had sued a former producer, with most claims dismissed except for breach of employment agreement, and that suit was later settled. In the current litigation, after discovery, both sides sought partial summary judgment in the North Carolina Business Court (Superior Court for Complex Business Cases). The Business Court granted summary judgment in part for both parties, including a grant of adverse inference against defendants for spoliation of evidence, but did not specify how that inference would apply to each claim.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the adverse inference ruling but remanded for the Business Court to clarify its specific application. The Court reversed the Business Court’s summary judgment that two client lists could not be trade secrets, holding there were genuine issues of fact. It clarified the standard for misappropriation of trade secrets under state law, requiring evidence of a specific opportunity to acquire trade secrets without authorization. The Court remanded claims related to trade secrets, enforcement of non-solicitation provisions (pending factual findings on the scope of the employer and affiliates), and certain computer fraud claims for further proceedings. Summary judgment for defendants on unjust enrichment was affirmed, and the Business Court was directed to issue a written opinion for claims it disposed of in a summary order. The disposition was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after the City approved a light rail project and formed a corporation, Austin Transit Partnership (ATP), to implement it. Voters approved a tax increase to fund the endeavor, and ATP—not the City—planned to issue municipal bonds. Taxpayers challenged ATP’s authority to issue these bonds, leading the City and ATP to seek a declaratory judgment confirming their power to assess taxes and issue bonds. The Attorney General, participating as permitted by statute, filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending neither the City nor ATP qualified as an “issuer” under the statute governing expedited declaratory judgment actions.In the District Court, the City and ATP sought a quick resolution so the project could proceed, while the taxpayers and Attorney General desired delay. ATP’s counsel advised the court not to rule on the Attorney General’s plea to the jurisdiction, thus avoiding an interlocutory appeal and the associated automatic stay. The court accepted this suggestion, explicitly refusing to rule on the plea and moving forward toward trial. The Attorney General then filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, arguing the court’s actions amounted to an implicit denial. The trial court reiterated it had not ruled, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District dismissed the appeal, finding no order granting or denying the plea and therefore no appellate jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case, holding that a trial court must rule on jurisdictional challenges before proceeding to the merits and cannot strategically avoid issuing a ruling to frustrate the government’s appellate rights. Because the absence of a ruling deprived the State of its statutory right to interlocutory appeal, and no adequate remedy by appeal existed, the Court treated the Attorney General’s petition as a request for mandamus and conditionally granted relief, directing the trial court to rule on the plea to the jurisdiction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was left undisturbed. View "PAXTON v. THE CITY OF AUSTIN" on Justia Law

A woman was killed when a construction crane collapsed during a storm, striking her apartment building. Her parents, acting individually and on behalf of her estate, brought a negligence and gross negligence lawsuit against several defendants, primarily three related construction and development entities. Following a jury trial, the jury found these entities had engaged in a joint enterprise that caused the woman’s death and awarded over $360 million in compensatory damages, along with $500 million in exemplary damages (which the trial court later reduced under statutory caps). The court entered judgment holding the entities jointly and severally liable for the compensatory damages, with two entities also severally liable for exemplary damages.The defendants, collectively known as the Greystar Entities, filed a single $25 million joint supersedeas bond to suspend execution of the judgment during their appeal. The plaintiffs challenged the sufficiency of this joint bond in the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, arguing that Texas law capped the required bond at $25 million per debtor, not per judgment. The trial court agreed, ruling that each entity needed to post its own $25 million bond and that the joint bond could suspend execution for only one entity unless the defendants designated which one. The Greystar Entities appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals at Dallas, which affirmed the trial court’s order.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus. The Court held that, under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 52.006(b), the $25 million cap on supersedeas bonds applies per judgment debtor, not collectively to all debtors in a single judgment. The Court also held that the trial court abused its discretion by immediately invalidating the joint bond without allowing a reasonable time for compliance. The Supreme Court conditionally granted partial mandamus relief, directing the trial court to provide additional time for each entity to post an individual bond. View "IN RE GREYSTAR DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, L.P." on Justia Law

Cynthia Miles, a sixty-four-year-old woman suffering from acute psychosis and a history of suicidal ideation, experienced several psychiatric crises in 2021. After multiple hospitalizations and escapes from care facilities, she was admitted to Harbor Point, an unlocked mental health facility, where she again escaped on November 11, 2021. Despite a search, Miles was never found. Her family, having previously experienced her disappearances followed by safe returns, could not determine her fate. After extensive efforts to locate her failed, her family petitioned the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County for a judicial determination of death. Following a jury trial, the court issued a certificate of presumed death on August 29, 2022.Subsequently, Miles’s daughter, as administrator of her estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against several healthcare providers. The defendants asserted that the action was time-barred under Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death claims, arguing that the limitations period began either at Miles’s disappearance or when the family first sought a declaration of death. The Iowa District Court for Cass County rejected this argument, ruling that the statute of limitations began only upon the judicial declaration of death, not the earlier disappearance.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal to determine when the limitations period commenced. The court held that, in a case where there is no known physical injury and it is unclear whether the missing person is alive or dead, the statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim does not begin to run until there is a judicial determination of death. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, allowing the wrongful death action to proceed as timely filed. View "Schneide v. Holliday" on Justia Law

A patient suffered an injury during knee surgery in March 2022 and, together with his wife, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the operating surgeon and the orthopedic clinic in January 2023. Iowa law requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to serve a certificate of merit affidavit within sixty days after the defendant’s answer to the lawsuit. The plaintiffs served a certificate of merit within the deadline. However, the document was not sworn before an authorized officer and did not include the phrase “penalty of perjury” as required by Iowa statutes. Over a year later, the plaintiffs served an amended certificate that met the affidavit requirements, but it was well past the statutory deadline.After the defendants answered and discovery proceeded for more than a year, the defendants moved to dismiss in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, arguing that the timely certificate did not comply with statutory requirements. The district court found that the initial certificate was neither a true affidavit nor a permissible substitute under the relevant statutes. The court also concluded that the late-filed, proper affidavit could not cure the statutory violation because it was not filed within the required sixty days and there was no extension by agreement or motion. The district court dismissed the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that substantial compliance with the certificate of merit affidavit requirement means providing either a true affidavit executed before an authorized person or a statement under penalty of perjury within sixty days. The plaintiffs failed to do either within the deadline, and their later submission could not cure the defect. The court also rejected arguments that the defendants had waived the affidavit requirement or that the statutory scheme violated the Iowa Constitution. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Rarick v. Smidt" on Justia Law