Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

John McKnight filed a lawsuit against Anthony Love seeking damages from a vehicular accident. On November 13, 2019, both parties were driving on I-20 in DeKalb County when traffic slowed, and McKnight stopped his vehicle. Love, driving behind McKnight, failed to stop in time and collided with McKnight's vehicle. McKnight sustained injuries and his truck was damaged. Love was cited for following too closely and pleaded guilty to the offense. McKnight sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11, alleging that Love acted in bad faith by being distracted, possibly using his cell phone at the time of the accident.The trial court denied Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the claim for litigation expenses, finding sufficient evidence to create a jury question regarding bad faith. The evidence included Love's cell phone records and McKnight's testimony suggesting Love was distracted. The trial court also denied Love's motion for summary judgment on claims of negligence per se but granted it on claims for punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness. Love did not challenge the negligence per se rulings, and McKnight's appeal on punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness was rejected by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis. The Court held that mere violations of traffic laws do not constitute bad faith under OCGA § 13-6-11. Bad faith requires intentional wrongdoing or reckless disregard of known harmful consequences, which is more than mere negligence. The Court found insufficient evidence of bad faith to support a claim for litigation expenses and reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's denial of Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of bad faith litigation expenses. View "LOVE v. MCKNIGHT" on Justia Law

In 2020, Georgia ratified an amendment to its Constitution waiving sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from unlawful acts by the State or local governments. This amendment included a procedural requirement that such actions must be brought against and in the name of only the State or the relevant local government, or they would be dismissed. The case at hand questions whether a complaint that does not comply with this naming requirement can be cured by dropping or adding parties to avoid dismissal.Warbler Investments, LLC sued the City of Social Circle, its mayor, and three City Council members in their individual capacities, alleging unlawful rezoning of Warbler's property and violations of the Open Records Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the complaint violated the naming requirement of the Georgia Constitution. Warbler then moved to amend the complaint to drop the individual defendants, which the trial court allowed. However, after the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State v. SASS Group, LLC, which mandated dismissal of cases not complying with the naming requirement, the City renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case despite the amendment.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the procedural defect of not complying with the naming requirement could be cured by amending the complaint to drop or add parties. The court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not affected by the initial failure to comply with the naming requirement, and the amended complaint, which complied with the requirement, should not be dismissed. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded. View "WARBLER INVESTMENTS, LLC v. CITY OF SOCIAL CIRCLE" on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barbara Politsch obtained a default judgment of approximately $175,000 against Metroplaza Partners, LLC in a premises liability case. However, Metroplaza had sold the property in 2005, over a year before Politsch's injury, and was not served with the summons and complaint. Metroplaza learned of the default judgment in January 2014 but did not act on it based on their counsel's advice. In February 2022, Politsch, with new counsel, renewed the judgment and sought to enforce it. Metroplaza then moved to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court granted under its equitable powers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Metroplaza's motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that Metroplaza had a meritorious defense, was never properly served, and had an excuse for not acting sooner due to reliance on their attorney's lack of advice. The court also noted the strong preference for cases to be decided on their merits and concerns about potential injustice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. It agreed that Metroplaza demonstrated a meritorious defense, a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense initially, and due diligence in seeking to set aside the default judgment once it was discovered. The appellate court emphasized the policy favoring decisions on the merits and the exceptional circumstances of the case, including the fact that Metroplaza was not the correct party to be sued. View "Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

50 Exchange Terrace LLC sought to collect under a property insurance policy with Mount Vernon Specialty Insurance Company for damage to its property in Rhode Island. The insurance policy required an appraisal if the parties disagreed on the amount of loss. After frozen pipes caused water damage, Mount Vernon paid its estimated value but demanded an appraisal. 50 Exchange filed a lawsuit in California state court, alleging wrongful withholding of compensation by Mount Vernon while awaiting the appraisal outcome.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, where Mount Vernon moved to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. The district court requested supplemental briefing on ripeness and Article III standing and subsequently dismissed the action for lack of both. 50 Exchange appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the injuries asserted by 50 Exchange were not actual or imminent because the extent of any loss could not be determined until the appraisal process was completed. The court concluded that any alleged injury before the appraisal was too speculative to create an actionable claim, thus failing to meet the requirements for ripeness and Article III standing. The court did not address the parties' arguments under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. View "50 EXCHANGE TERRACE LLC V. MOUNT VERNON SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO." on Justia Law

Julene and William Dodd sued their attorney, Rory Jones, for legal malpractice after he missed the statute of limitations deadline for filing their medical malpractice lawsuit. The Dodds needed to prove that their original medical malpractice case had merit and that they would have won if Jones had filed on time. However, the district court struck the testimony of the Dodds’ experts, which was key to establishing the viability of their medical malpractice claim. The court found that the disclosures were untimely and that the experts failed to properly establish knowledge of the local standard of care, a foundational requirement of Idaho law. As a result, the Dodds’ legal malpractice claim was dismissed, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of Jones.The Dodds appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, arguing that the district court erred by ruling that Jones was not judicially estopped from arguing that no medical malpractice occurred and by excluding their expert testimony. They also raised claims of judicial bias. The Supreme Court of Idaho found that Jones could not be judicially estopped from claiming that no medical malpractice occurred because he was not a party in the original medical malpractice case but was representing the Dodds. The court also upheld the district court’s exclusion of the Dodds’ expert testimony, finding that the experts did not demonstrate familiarity with the local standard of care in Nampa, Idaho, at the time of the alleged malpractice.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the Dodds failed to establish an essential element of their legal malpractice case. The court also awarded attorney fees to Jones under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, finding that the appeal was pursued frivolously and without foundation, and sanctioned the Dodds’ attorney, Angelo Rosa, for his conduct during the appeal. View "Dodd v. Jones" on Justia Law

Rachel Moniz and Paola Correa filed separate lawsuits against Adecco USA, Inc. under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging violations of the Labor Code. Moniz and Adecco settled their case, but Correa challenged the fairness of the settlement. The trial court approved the revised settlement over Correa's objections and awarded attorney’s fees to Moniz’s counsel. Correa's request for a service award and attorney’s fees for her own work was largely denied. Correa appealed, arguing the trial court's analysis of the revised settlement was flawed and that her request for attorney’s fees and a service award should have been granted.The San Mateo County Superior Court overruled Adecco's demurrer in Moniz's case, while the San Francisco Superior Court sustained Adecco's demurrer in Correa's case. Correa's motion to intervene in Moniz's suit was denied, and her subsequent appeal was also denied. The trial court approved Moniz's settlement with Adecco, awarding Moniz a service award and attorney’s fees, but denied Correa’s requests. Correa's motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment were denied, leading to her appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., which disapproved of the reasoning in Moniz II regarding Correa’s standing. The Court of Appeal concluded that Correa and her counsel lacked standing to challenge the judgment based on the Supreme Court's decision in Turrieta. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. View "Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA) and certain anonymous City of Santa Ana police officers (Doe Officers) sued the City of Santa Ana, alleging wrongful disclosure of confidential personnel records, failure to investigate a complaint about the disclosure, and denial of a request for related communications. The first amended complaint included four causes of action: violation of Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, negligence, failure to investigate under Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7, and violation of the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (MMBA).The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found that the Doe Officers could not proceed anonymously without statutory authority or court authorization. It also concluded that the SAPOA lacked standing and that there was no private right of action for the alleged violations of the Penal Code and Evidence Code sections cited.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment as to the Doe Officers, agreeing they lacked authorization to proceed anonymously. It also affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the first, second, and fourth causes of action, finding no private right of action for damages under the cited statutes and that the SAPOA failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the MMBA claim. However, the appellate court reversed the judgment concerning the third cause of action, holding that the SAPOA had standing to seek mandamus relief to compel the City to investigate the complaint and notify the SAPOA of the disposition, as required by Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this cause of action. View "Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana" on Justia Law

Hollydale Land LLC (Hollydale) owned a golf course in Hennepin County, Minnesota, which was taxed under the Minnesota Open Space Property Tax Law. This law allows for reduced tax assessments on properties used for recreational purposes, with deferred taxes calculated based on the difference between the market value and the reduced value. When Hollydale sold the golf course, Hennepin County assessed seven years of deferred taxes totaling $2,622,720.41. Hollydale paid the amount but contested the calculation, arguing that the County failed to cap the market value at the bona fide sale price.Hollydale filed a petition in district court, later transferred to the tax court, challenging the County's assessment. Hennepin County moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was untimely because Hollydale should have challenged the valuations annually. The tax court denied the motion, holding that the petition was timely as it was filed within 60 days of the notice of deferred taxes, thus the tax court had jurisdiction.Hennepin County sought certiorari review of the tax court's order. The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether the tax court's order denying the motion to dismiss was a "final order" under Minn. Stat. § 271.10, subd. 1, which would allow for immediate appeal. The court reaffirmed its decision in Beuning Family LP v. County of Stearns, which held that such orders are not final and thus not immediately appealable. The court also declined to exercise discretionary review under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 105.1, finding no compelling reason for immediate appeal and determining that judicial economy would be better served by allowing the tax court to resolve the merits of the case.The Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari, concluding that the tax court's order was not a final order and that the interests of justice did not warrant discretionary review. View "County of Hennepin v. Hollydale Land LLC" on Justia Law

Deidre Parker, a black woman, was employed as a Program Management Assistant by the Risk Management Agency (RMA) of the USDA starting in March 2011. She filed an EEOC complaint in 2013, which was settled in 2015. Parker alleged that after the settlement, she experienced race and gender discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and a hostile work environment. Her duties diminished after a change in the timekeeping system, and she was tasked with cleaning out file cabinets. She requested additional work and development opportunities but did not act on them. Parker received two letters of counseling for disruptive conduct and filed EEOC complaints in 2017 and 2018, alleging discrimination and retaliation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the USDA on all counts. The court limited its review to events occurring after the 2015 settlement agreement, finding that Parker had waived claims arising before that date. The court found that Parker failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas framework, as most of the conduct did not constitute an adverse employment action, and there was no evidence supporting an inference of discrimination. Her hostile work environment claims failed due to a lack of causal link between the USDA’s conduct and her race or gender, and her constructive discharge claim failed because she did not prove that her workplace was intolerable or that the USDA intended for her to quit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of Parker’s claims to conduct occurring after the settlement agreement. The court also found that Parker failed to demonstrate a causal nexus between the alleged adverse actions and her race or gender, and that her claims of hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation were unsupported by sufficient evidence. View "Parker v. United States" on Justia Law