Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a group of hospice service providers in Oklahoma, sued Defendant Axxess Technology Solutions, Inc. for breach of contract, alleging that Axxess failed to properly process claims, resulting in non-payment for services. Axxess was served but mistakenly believed it had not been due to an employee error. Consequently, Axxess did not respond to the complaint, leading the district court to enter a default judgment against it. Axxess moved to set aside the default judgment, arguing the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to a contractual mediation requirement. The district court denied this motion, and Axxess did not appeal.Over six months later, Axxess filed a second motion to set aside the default judgment, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (4), and (6). The district court denied this motion on claim preclusion grounds, and Axxess timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision but not on claim preclusion grounds. Instead, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the second motion because the arguments raised could have been presented in the first motion. The court noted that Axxess's delay in raising these arguments was sufficient reason to deny relief under Rule 60(b). The court also granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to properly allege diversity jurisdiction, concluding that there was complete diversity between the parties. View "Choice Hospice v. Axxess Technology Solutions" on Justia Law

Wayne Brown, a Tulsa police officer, was terminated after a private citizen, Marq Lewis, brought several of Brown's old Facebook posts to the attention of the City of Tulsa and the Tulsa Police Department. The posts included images and messages that were deemed offensive and in violation of the department's social media policy. Brown filed a lawsuit claiming his termination violated his First Amendment rights and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also brought a wrongful discharge claim under Oklahoma law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma dismissed Brown's federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim. The court concluded that the City's interest in maintaining public confidence in the police force outweighed Brown's free speech rights and that Chief Jordan was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also dismissed Brown's Equal Protection claim, determining it was a "class-of-one" theory foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the dismissal of Brown's First Amendment claim, finding that the district court erred in conducting the Pickering balancing test at the motion to dismiss stage and in granting qualified immunity to Chief Jordan. The court affirmed the dismissal of Brown's Equal Protection claim, agreeing that it was a non-cognizable "class-of-one" claim in the public employment context. The court also reversed the district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Brown's state law claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brown v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

In 1960, the Cuban government seized Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, two privately held Cuban banks, and absorbed their assets into Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC). Decades later, in 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which allows U.S. nationals to sue any person trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban regime. The plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the assets of Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, brought a Helms-Burton action against Société Générale and BNP Paribas, alleging that the banks trafficked in their confiscated property by providing financial services to BNC.The plaintiffs initially filed their suits in the Southern District of Florida and the Southern District of New York. The district courts dismissed the complaints, holding that most of the allegations were time-barred under 22 U.S.C. § 6084, which they construed as a statute of repose. The courts also found that the remaining allegations failed to plausibly allege trafficking as defined by the Helms-Burton Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their claims. However, it affirmed the district courts' rulings that 22 U.S.C. § 6084 is a statute of repose, not subject to equitable tolling, and that the presidential suspensions of the right to bring an action under the Act did not toll the time bar. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of conduct after 2010 were insufficient to state a plausible claim of trafficking under the Helms-Burton Act. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts, dismissing the plaintiffs' actions. View "Moreira v. Société Générale,S.A." on Justia Law

Silverthorne Seismic, L.L.C. licensed seismic data to Casillas Petroleum Resource Partners II, L.L.C. and sent the data to Sterling Seismic Services, Ltd. for processing. Silverthorne alleged that Sterling sent unlicensed data to Casillas, which Casillas then showed to potential investors. Silverthorne sued Sterling for trade-secret misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, seeking a reasonable royalty as a remedy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas set the standard for calculating a reasonable royalty, adopting a definition from a previous case, University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp. The district court certified this order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), concluding that the reasonable-royalty standard was a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation. The district court stayed the proceedings pending the appeal, and an administrative panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that granting leave to appeal was an error. The court found that the district court's order did not involve a controlling question of law and that the appeal would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The court emphasized that the parties had not yet gone to trial, and Silverthorne had not proven liability, making the damages issue premature. The court vacated the order granting leave to appeal, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Silverthorne v. Sterling Seismic" on Justia Law

Beata Zarzecki, a Polish national, entered the United States on a six-month tourist visa in 1989 and remained in the country illegally. In 1998, she married a U.S. citizen, and they have a daughter who is also a U.S. citizen. In 2013, removal proceedings were initiated against her, and she applied for adjustment of status based on her marriage. Her application was complicated by a 2005 conviction for felony aggravated driving under the influence, resulting in a fatal accident. She was sentenced to nine years in prison and served over eight years. Additional incidents included a 2003 arrest for aggravated assault and a 2004 charge for driving without insurance.The immigration judge denied her application for adjustment of status, citing the severity of her criminal record and insufficient evidence of addressing her mental health issues. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) reviewed the case de novo and upheld the immigration judge's decision, emphasizing the egregious nature of her offense and finding that her mitigating factors did not outweigh the adverse factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Zarzecki's petition, focusing on whether the Board committed legal or constitutional errors. Zarzecki argued that the Board failed to properly consider her mental health evidence and did not apply the correct standard of review. The court found that the Board did consider her mental health evidence and applied the appropriate standard of review. The court concluded that the Board did not commit any legal or constitutional errors and dismissed Zarzecki's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as discretionary decisions regarding adjustment of status are not subject to judicial review. View "Zarzecki v. Garland" on Justia Law

A service-disabled veteran and his company, MJL Enterprises, LLC, alleged that the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Section 8(a) Business Development Program discriminated against him based on race. The program uses a race-conscious presumption to determine social disadvantage, which the plaintiffs argued was unconstitutional. They sought a declaration that the program's racial classifications were unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case, ruling it moot due to changes in the 8(a) Program following an injunction in another case, Ultima Services Corp. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The district court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate economic disadvantage and could not establish social disadvantage without the presumption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s ruling on mootness, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the case was not moot because the changes to the 8(a) Program were not final and could be appealed. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal based on lack of standing. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact, as they did not show they were "able and ready" to bid on 8(a) Program contracts due to their inability to meet the program’s social and economic disadvantage requirements. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not establish causation or redressability, as their ineligibility for the program was not solely due to the race-conscious presumption.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Hierholzer v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when his truck was hit by a tractor-trailer driven by Yosniel Varela-Mojena, who was employed by motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC. The shipment was coordinated by C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a freight broker. Montgomery sued Varela-Mojena, Caribe, and Robinson, alleging that Robinson negligently hired Varela-Mojena and Caribe and was vicariously liable for their actions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted partial summary judgment in favor of Robinson on the vicarious liability claim, finding that Varela-Mojena and Caribe were independent contractors, not agents of Robinson. Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., which held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempts state law claims against freight brokers for negligent hiring, the district court also granted judgment for Robinson on the negligent hiring claims. Final judgment was entered in favor of Robinson to facilitate Montgomery's appeal, while his claims against Varela-Mojena and Caribe were stayed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Robinson did not exercise the necessary control over Caribe and Varela-Mojena to establish an agency relationship, thus negating vicarious liability. The court also declined to overrule its precedent in Ye, maintaining that the FAAAA preempts state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Robinson. View "Montgomery v. C.H. Robinson Company" on Justia Law

Jayson O’Neill requested to examine certain documents from the Office of the Governor of Montana, specifically 2021 Agency Bill Monitoring Forms (ABMs) and related emails. The Governor’s office denied the request, citing attorney-client privilege. O’Neill argued that the documents should be produced with redactions and a detailed privilege log. The Governor’s office maintained that the documents were entirely privileged but offered to provide a privilege log and documents for in camera review if directed by a court.O’Neill filed a complaint seeking an order to produce the requested documents under Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution. The Governor asserted executive and deliberative process privileges. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The First Judicial District Court partially granted O’Neill’s motion, holding that Montana law did not recognize executive or deliberative process privileges and required in camera review to determine the applicability of attorney-client privilege and privacy exceptions. The Governor’s subsequent motion for relief from judgment was deemed denied.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Montana law does recognize a form of gubernatorial privilege rooted in the state’s constitutional history, allowing the Governor to receive candid advice necessary for executing constitutional duties. However, this privilege is not absolute and must be assessed through in camera review to determine if the information is essential and if its disclosure would chill future candor. The court reversed the lower court’s ruling that no form of executive privilege is recognized in Montana but affirmed the need for in camera review to evaluate the claims of privilege. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "O'Neill v. Gianforte" on Justia Law

North American Sugar Industries, Inc. ("North American Sugar") filed a lawsuit against five defendants under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, alleging that the defendants unlawfully trafficked its property, which was confiscated by the Cuban government. The defendants include three East Asian corporations (Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd., Goldwind International Holdings (HK) Ltd., and BBC Chartering Singapore Pte Ltd.), and two U.S. corporations (DSV Air & Sea, Inc. and BBC Chartering USA, LLC). North American Sugar claimed that the defendants participated in a conspiracy involving trafficking from China, through Miami, Florida, and then to Puerto Carupano, Cuba.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, adopting a magistrate judge's recommendation. The magistrate judge found that the alleged trafficking occurred in Cuba, not Florida, and that none of the defendants engaged in any activity in Florida related to the shipments. North American Sugar objected, but the district court upheld the recommendation, concluding that the Helms-Burton Act violations occurred only in Cuba.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its narrow interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act. The Act broadly defines "traffics" to include various activities, and the court noted that trafficking can occur outside of Cuba. The appellate court also found that the district court improperly weighed conflicting evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing, as required under the prima facie standard.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider personal jurisdiction in light of the correct interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act and to address whether any defendants committed trafficking activities in Florida. The court also directed the district court to consider the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction if it finds jurisdiction over any defendant. View "North American Sugar Industries, Inc. v. Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

In January 2021, Bertrand Nedoss, an 87-year-old resident of an assisted-living facility in Morton Grove, Illinois, wandered out of the facility, developed hypothermia, and died of cardiac arrest. His estate filed a negligence and wrongful-death lawsuit against Welltower Tenant Group, the facility’s owner, and Frontier Management, its operator. Welltower and Frontier were insured under a "claims made" policy by Church Mutual Insurance Company, effective from July 1, 2020, to July 1, 2021. The estate filed the lawsuit in October 2021, after the policy expired. However, nine days after Bertrand’s death, an attorney for the Nedoss family sent a letter to the facility, claiming an attorney’s lien and demanding evidence preservation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the attorney’s letter qualified as a "claim" under the policy, triggering Church Mutual’s duty to defend. The court entered partial summary judgment for Welltower and Frontier and stayed the rest of the federal case pending the outcome of the state lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. On the eve of oral argument, Welltower and Frontier settled with the estate, and the state-court case was dismissed. This development mooted the appeal. The stay order was the only possible basis for appellate jurisdiction, and the partial summary judgment was not a final order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the dismissal of the state-court case removed the justification for the stay and rendered any appellate ruling on the stay irrelevant. View "Church Mutual Insurance Company v. Frontier Management, LLC" on Justia Law