Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
In the Matter of the Estate of Lake v. Chesnutt
Chester “Chet” Lake contested the probate of his mother’s will, which his sister Mary Chesnutt had filed. Lake doubted the will’s validity, claiming undue influence, and requested a jury trial to determine the issue of devisavit vel non. The Madison County Chancery Court entered a scheduling order but did not specify whether the trial would be a bench or jury trial. After the discovery and motions deadlines passed, Lake filed a Notice of Jury Trial. Chesnutt moved to strike the notice, arguing that Lake had waived his right to a jury trial by participating in pretrial proceedings and that the notice was untimely.The Madison County Chancery Court granted Chesnutt’s motion to strike, finding that Lake had waived his right to a jury trial by agreeing to the scheduling order and that his notice was untimely. Lake appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and held that Lake had not waived his right to a jury trial. The court found that under Mississippi Code Section 91-7-19, Lake was entitled to a jury trial upon request before any hearing on the issue of devisavit vel non. The court determined that the entry of the scheduling order did not constitute a hearing on the matter and that Lake’s notice, filed thirty-two days before the trial date, was timely. The court reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Lake v. Chesnutt" on Justia Law
WALKER VS. WALKER
Laura Latimer and Egan Walker divorced in 2002 after 13 years of marriage. During their marriage, Walker earned 8.54 years of PERS credits. The divorce decree included a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that awarded Latimer half of Walker's PERS retirement benefits, secured by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) allowing Latimer to elect Option 2. Walker later remarried, reentered public employment as a judge, and transferred his PERS credits to JRS, designating his current wife as the beneficiary. Walker sought judicial confirmation to designate both Latimer and his current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries.The Second Judicial District Court found that Walker could designate two different Option 2 beneficiaries for his PERS and JRS accounts. The court ordered that Latimer was entitled to 4.25 years of PERS credits but not to any of Walker's JRS account. Latimer filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. She then appealed, arguing that Nevada law permits only one Option 2 beneficiary and that her community interest in Walker's retirement benefits should not be defeated by his transfer to JRS.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that NRS 1A.450(1)(a) allows a JRS member to designate more than one Option 2 beneficiary. The court held that both Latimer and Walker's current wife could be designated as Option 2 beneficiaries, with each receiving their respective portion of the benefits if Walker predeceases them. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow two beneficiaries but reversed and remanded the order regarding Latimer's entitlement to service credits from Walker's JRS account, ensuring her protected interest in the retirement benefits is maintained. View "WALKER VS. WALKER" on Justia Law
Gierek v. Anonymous 1
In late 2019, a hospital sent letters to over a thousand patients, including Linda Gierek, informing them of potential exposure to infectious diseases due to a technician's failure to fully sterilize surgical instruments. Gierek filed a class-action complaint against the hospital, asserting claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and medical malpractice. She sought class certification for similarly situated patients and their spouses. The trial court consolidated Gierek’s action with a similar class-action claim filed by Cheyanne Bennett.The Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund intervened, arguing that the claims sounded in ordinary negligence and thus the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) did not apply. The hospital argued the opposite. The trial court ruled in favor of the hospital, stating the MMA applied, and denied the motion for class certification, citing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction while a proposed complaint was pending before a medical-review panel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the MMA’s applicability but reversed the trial court’s decision on class certification jurisdiction.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the MMA covers all claims for medical malpractice, not limited to bodily injury or death. The court also held that class certification is a proper preliminary determination under the MMA. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. View "Gierek v. Anonymous 1" on Justia Law
Hull v. North Lincoln Hospital District
Nicholas Hull sued North Lincoln Hospital District and several medical professionals for negligence in the death of his newborn son, Eli Hull. Canessa Hull, Nicholas's wife, went into labor on August 9, 2021, and was admitted to Star Valley Health. Due to complications during labor, Eli was born with a double-knotted nuchal cord and did not survive. The Hulls were initially informed by the attending doctors that the nuchal cord was the sole cause of Eli's death. However, in April 2023, Dr. Burk, an anesthesiologist, revealed that Eli's death was preventable and due to the failure to follow safety protocols during labor.The District Court of Lincoln County dismissed Mr. Hull’s complaint, ruling that his notice of governmental claim was untimely. The court found that the two-year period for filing the notice expired in September 2023, and Mr. Hull’s notice, submitted in July 2023, was defective. Mr. Hull argued that the period should be equitably extended due to the defendants' fraudulent concealment of the true cause of Eli’s death.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Mr. Hull’s complaint did not adequately allege the elements required for equitable estoppel or equitable tolling. Specifically, the complaint failed to show that the delay in filing the notice was induced by the defendants' misinformation and that Mr. Hull acted on this misinformation in good faith, resulting in his failure to file a timely notice. Additionally, the complaint did not establish that the fraudulent concealment prevented Mr. Hull from complying with the statutory deadline, as he had over four months remaining to file a proper notice after discovering the concealment. Therefore, the court concluded that neither equitable estoppel nor equitable tolling applied, and the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "Hull v. North Lincoln Hospital District" on Justia Law
Collins v. Diamond Generating Corp.
Sentinel Energy Center, LLC owns a power plant in North Palm Springs and hired DGC Operations, LLC (OPS) to manage and operate the plant. In 2017, during annual maintenance, five OPS employees failed to follow the new depressurization protocol for the fuel filter skid, leading to an explosion that killed Daniel Collins. Collins's family sued Diamond Generating Corporation (DGC), which has a 50% indirect ownership in Sentinel and is the parent company of OPS, claiming DGC's negligence in safety oversight led to Collins's death.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied DGC's request to instruct the jury on the Privette doctrine, which generally shields a hirer from liability for injuries to an independent contractor's employees. The jury found DGC 97% at fault and awarded the plaintiffs over $150 million. DGC's motions for nonsuit and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, based on the Privette doctrine, were also denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court declined to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict to DGC, citing unresolved factual questions about whether DGC retained control over the plant and negligently exercised that control. However, the court found that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the Privette doctrine and its exceptions, which could have led to a more favorable outcome for DGC. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial with instructions to include the Privette doctrine and its exceptions. View "Collins v. Diamond Generating Corp." on Justia Law
Pollock v. Kelso
Pamela Pollock sued her supervisor, Michael Kelso, in 2018 for sexual harassment and racial discrimination, alleging that Kelso asked her for sexual intercourse in 2016 and, after she rejected him, promoted less qualified individuals of other races to positions she sought. The trial court initially ruled that Pollock’s suit was time-barred, a decision which was affirmed by the appellate court. However, in 2021, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the statute of limitations begins when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the adverse promotion decision, that the defense bears the burden on this issue, and that costs or fees on appeal cannot be awarded to a prevailing defendant without determining the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.Following the Supreme Court’s directions, the appellate court remanded the case and ordered costs for Pollock. Pollock then moved for attorney fees in the trial court, which awarded her $493,577.10. Kelso appealed this award. Before the trial date, Kelso and Pollock settled the bulk of their case, with Pollock moving to dismiss her underlying case with prejudice except for the attorney fee award, which Kelso was appealing. The trial court retained jurisdiction regarding the fee award.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court denied Pollock’s motion to dismiss Kelso’s appeal, affirming that Kelso was appealing from a final collateral order. On the merits, the court affirmed the fee award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Pollock as the prevailing party and in the amount awarded. The court found that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the fee award, including the use of a 1.8 multiplier, was reasonable. View "Pollock v. Kelso" on Justia Law
Cohen v. Cohen
A woman sued her father, alleging childhood sexual abuse, and supported her claims with expert testimony on the accuracy of "recovered" memories. The abuse allegedly began when she was three years old and stopped in 1992. By 1995, she no longer recalled the abuse but began to develop confusing memories eighteen years later. These memories eventually led to her filing a lawsuit against her father for human trafficking, sexual abuse, assault, emotional distress, false imprisonment, and incest under federal and state law. She claimed her lawsuit was timely because she had repressed the memories of the abuse.In the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the court allowed Dr. James Hopper to testify as an expert on repressed and recovered memories, despite objections from the defendant, Ronald A. Cohen. The court aimed to balance the testimony of Dr. Hopper with that of Dr. Deryn Strange, who testified that there is no scientific support for the theory that trauma victims can repress and later recover memories with clarity. The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding for the plaintiff on five state law counts and awarding her $1.5 million in damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to properly analyze Dr. Hopper's qualifications and the reliability and fit of his testimony. The appellate court concluded that Dr. Hopper's testimony lacked the necessary scientific support and relevance to the case. The court determined that the admission of this testimony was prejudicial and affected the jury's verdict. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Cohen v. Cohen" on Justia Law
Thompson v Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Linda Thompson filed a putative class action against the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (the "Exchange") in Illinois state court, alleging that the Exchange printed her credit card’s expiration date on purchase receipts, violating the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). The Exchange removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which allows federal agencies to remove cases to federal court. Thompson moved to remand the case to state court, arguing lack of Article III standing, while the Exchange moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied Thompson’s motion to remand and granted the Exchange’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the Exchange, as a federal entity, could remove the case without asserting a colorable federal defense and had an absolute right to litigate in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the Exchange did not need to present a federal defense to remove the case. However, it found that the district court erred in dismissing the suit. The Seventh Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), when a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand the case to state court. The court noted that Thompson’s lack of Article III standing did not preclude state court jurisdiction, as state courts are not bound by Article III constraints. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to remand it to state court. View "Thompson v Army and Air Force Exchange Service" on Justia Law
Whitfield v. Schimpf
Jeane Whitfield filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dennis Schimpf and Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC, alleging negligence in performing breast augmentation-mastopexy surgery and in post-operative care. Whitfield experienced complications post-surgery, including severe pain and wound issues, leading her to seek further medical attention and additional surgeries. She claimed Schimpf's negligence caused her injuries and inadequate post-operative care exacerbated her condition.The jury in the Circuit Court of Charleston County found in favor of Schimpf and Sweetgrass, determining that Whitfield did not prove the defendants deviated from the standard of care. Whitfield appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Whitfield then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, challenging two evidentiary rulings: the exclusion of evidence to show bias of Sweetgrass' office manager, Vicky Tolbert, and the admission of testimony from Schimpf's expert witnesses based on their Rule 35 examinations of Whitfield.The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the admission of the expert testimony but erred in affirming the exclusion of evidence of Tolbert's bias. The Supreme Court held that evidence of Tolbert's sexual relationship with Schimpf, her salary, and the free cosmetic procedures she received was relevant to show potential bias and should have been admitted. The Court determined that excluding this evidence was prejudicial to Whitfield's case, as it impacted the jury's ability to assess Tolbert's credibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Whitfield v. Schimpf" on Justia Law
John Doe 2 v. North Carolina State University
John Doe 2, a student athlete at North Carolina State University, alleged that he was sexually abused by Robert Murphy, the university’s Director of Sports Medicine, under the guise of medical treatment. Doe claimed that the university was deliberately indifferent to prior complaints of Murphy’s sexual misconduct. The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, finding that he failed to plead facts supporting an inference that the university had actual notice of Murphy’s sexual harassment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court concluded that a report of “sexual grooming” could not provide actual notice to the university of sexual harassment. The district court assumed without deciding that the report was made to an official with the requisite authority for Title IX purposes but found that the report did not describe an incident of sexual harassment and thus could not support a plausible inference of actual notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that a report of “sexual grooming” can objectively be construed as alleging sexual harassment, thus providing actual notice to the university. The court found that the district court erred in its conclusion and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the report was made to an appropriate official with the authority to address complaints of sexual harassment and to institute corrective measures on behalf of the university. View "John Doe 2 v. North Carolina State University" on Justia Law