Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

An employee at a meatpacking plant in Texas died after contracting COVID-19, allegedly from a coworker who continued working after testing positive. The decedent’s family sued the plant manager, the safety manager, and the coworker in Texas state court, claiming negligence and gross negligence due to unsafe working conditions and inadequate precautions against COVID-19. The complaint alleged that the employer, Tyson Foods, failed to protect employees, and that the managers were responsible for workplace safety. The coworker was accused of coming to work and failing to take precautions after testing positive.The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing that the Texas-based managers were improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court agreed, dismissed the claims against the managers with prejudice, and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Tyson Foods was later added as a defendant. The district court then dismissed the claims against Tyson on the grounds that they were preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), and dismissed the claims against the coworker for failure to state a claim, finding no individual duty to prevent the spread of disease under Texas law. The court denied leave to amend the complaint as futile and entered final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to remand and the dismissal of the coworker, holding that the managers were improperly joined and that Texas law does not impose an individual duty on coworkers to prevent the spread of disease. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims against Tyson, holding that the PPIA does not preempt state law negligence claims based on workplace safety unrelated to food adulteration. The court vacated the denial of leave to amend and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Wingrove" on Justia Law

A sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court applied to be appointed as the San Diego County Public Defender in 2023. The County informed him that he was ineligible for the position, citing Government Code section 27701, which requires that a person must have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the State for at least the year preceding the date of election or appointment. The judge, acting in his individual capacity, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial determination that the statute only required one year of prior practice at any time before appointment, not necessarily the year immediately preceding.The case was initially filed in the San Diego County Superior Court but was reassigned to the Orange County Superior Court due to the nature of the parties. The parties agreed to resolve the statutory interpretation issue through a motion. The plaintiff argued that his interpretation avoided absurd results and constitutional issues, while the County maintained that the statute’s plain language required the one year of practice to be immediately before appointment. The Orange County Superior Court ruled in favor of the County, finding the statutory language unambiguous and declining to rewrite the statute.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The appellate court held that the language of section 27701 is unambiguous: eligibility for the office of public defender requires that the candidate has been a practicing attorney in all courts of the State for at least the one year immediately preceding election or appointment. The court rejected arguments regarding ambiguity, absurdity, and constitutional avoidance, finding no basis to depart from the statute’s plain meaning. The judgment of the Orange County Superior Court was affirmed. View "Washington v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Several groups of plaintiffs sought to access approximately $3.5 billion in assets held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the name of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), the central bank of Afghanistan. The first group, the Pre-Judgment Plaintiffs, sought to confirm a pre-judgment attachment order on these funds to secure potential future judgments against the Taliban for its alleged role in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa. The second group, the Judgment Plaintiffs, who already held judgments against the Taliban for its role in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, sought turnover of the same funds to satisfy their judgments. The assets in question were blocked by the U.S. government after the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in August 2021, but the United States has not recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Judge Valerie E. Caproni denied the Pre-Judgment Plaintiffs’ motion to confirm the attachment, finding that DAB’s funds were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Judge George B. Daniels denied the Judgment Plaintiffs’ turnover motions, concluding that the FSIA and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) did not permit turnover of the funds, and that DAB was not an agency or instrumentality of the Taliban for TRIA purposes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed both district court orders. The court held that DAB, as the central bank of Afghanistan, is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state recognized by the Executive Branch, and thus its assets are immune from attachment and execution under the FSIA. The court further held that while the TRIA abrogates FSIA immunity and provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, DAB was not an agency or instrumentality of the Taliban at the time the assets were blocked. Therefore, the TRIA did not apply, and the plaintiffs could not access the funds. View "Havlish v. Taliban" on Justia Law

Ripple Analytics Inc. operated a software platform for human resources functions and originally owned the federal trademark for the word “RIPPLE®” in connection with its software. In April 2018, Ripple assigned all rights, title, and interest in its intellectual property, including the trademark, to its Chairman and CEO, Noah Pusey. Meanwhile, People Center, Inc. began using the name “RIPPLING” for similar software, though it abandoned its own trademark registration effort. Ripple later sued People Center for trademark infringement and unfair competition, claiming ownership of the RIPPLE® mark.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the case. During discovery, Ripple produced the assignment agreement showing that Pusey, not Ripple, owned the trademark. People Center moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, arguing Ripple was not the real party in interest. The district court dismissed Ripple’s trademark infringement claim with prejudice, dismissed its unfair competition claims without prejudice for lack of standing, and denied Ripple’s motion to amend its complaint, finding the proposed amendment futile because it did not resolve the standing issue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Ripple was not the real party in interest for the trademark infringement claim, as ownership had been assigned to Pusey, who failed to ratify or join the action. The court also held that Ripple lacked standing to pursue unfair competition claims under federal and state law, as it no longer had a commercial interest in the trademark. The denial of Ripple’s motion to amend was upheld because the amendment would not cure the standing defect. The court further found that the district court’s interlocutory order allowing People Center to amend its answer was not properly before it on appeal. View "Ripple Analytics Inc. v. People Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The petitioner, a taxpayer, received a notice of deficiency from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regarding her 2022 tax return. The IRS determined that she was not entitled to certain tax credits and imposed penalties. The notice, dated May 30, 2023, was sent to her former address, and she did not become aware of it until after the deadline to contest the deficiency had passed. She filed a petition for redetermination with the United States Tax Court on November 1, 2023, well after the ninety-day deadline specified in the Internal Revenue Code. In her petition, she argued that she was entitled to the disputed credits and status, and requested equitable tolling of the filing deadline due to her lack of timely notice.The United States Tax Court dismissed her petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the ninety-day deadline in I.R.C. § 6213(a) was a strict jurisdictional requirement that could not be extended or tolled, regardless of the circumstances. The court relied on prior Sixth Circuit precedent that had characterized the deadline as jurisdictional and rejected the petitioner’s arguments for equitable tolling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s dismissal de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that, in light of recent Supreme Court guidance, the ninety-day deadline in § 6213(a) is not a jurisdictional rule but rather a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. As such, it is presumptively subject to equitable tolling. The court reversed the Tax Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for the Tax Court to consider, in the first instance, whether the petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline based on the specific facts of her case. View "Oquendo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

A former dancer at two adult entertainment clubs in Manhattan filed a class charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging pervasive sexual harassment and a hostile work environment affecting herself and other female dancers. She claimed that the clubs’ policies and practices fostered this environment, including being forced to change in open areas monitored by video and being pressured to engage in sexual acts with customers. After receiving the charge, the EEOC requested information from the clubs, including employee “pedigree” data such as names, demographics, and employment details. The clubs objected, arguing the requests were irrelevant and burdensome, but the EEOC issued subpoenas for the information.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the EEOC’s petition to enforce the subpoenas, finding the requested information relevant to the investigation and not unduly burdensome for the clubs to produce. The clubs appealed and, while the appeal was pending, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to the charging party, who then filed a class action lawsuit in the same district court. The clubs argued that the EEOC lost its authority to investigate and enforce subpoenas once the right-to-sue letter was issued and the lawsuit commenced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the EEOC retains its statutory authority to investigate charges and enforce subpoenas even after issuing a right-to-sue letter and after the charging party files a lawsuit. The court also found that the employee information sought was relevant to the underlying charge and that the clubs had not shown compliance would be unduly burdensome. The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s order enforcing the subpoenas. View "EEOC v. AAM Holding Corp." on Justia Law

A general contractor was hired to oversee the construction of a hotel in Vermont and subcontracted with a firm to install metal siding panels manufactured by a third party. The subcontractor relied on installation instructions available on the manufacturer’s website, which did not specify the use of a splice plate to connect the panels. The panels were installed without splice plates, and after construction, the panels began to detach from the building, causing some to fall and damage nearby property. The contractor later discovered that the manufacturer had created an instruction sheet in 2006 recommending splice plates, but this information was not publicly available at the time of installation.The contractor initially sued the installer for breach of contract, warranty, and negligence in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division. The complaint was later amended to add a product liability claim against the manufacturer. After further discovery, the contractor sought to amend the complaint a third time to add new claims against the manufacturer, arguing that new evidence justified the amendment. The trial court denied this motion, citing undue delay and prejudice to the manufacturer, and granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on the product liability claim and on a crossclaim for implied indemnity brought by the installer, finding both barred by the economic-loss rule.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the third motion to amend due to undue delay and prejudice. It also held that the economic-loss rule barred the contractor’s product liability claim, as neither the “other-property” nor “special-relationship” exceptions applied. Finally, the Court found the contractor lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment on the installer’s implied indemnity claim. View "PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant were business associates who sought to purchase three restaurants known as Jib Jab. Plaintiff, with a background in investing, initiated negotiations and sought a partner with restaurant experience, leading to an oral agreement with defendant. Plaintiff was to handle acquisition terms and financing, while defendant would manage operations. No written partnership agreement was executed. Both parties made several unsuccessful attempts to secure financing, including SBA loans, but neither was willing to personally guarantee the loan, and plaintiff refused to pay off defendant’s unrelated SBA debts. Eventually, defendant proceeded alone, secured financing, and purchased Jib Jab through an entity he formed, without plaintiff’s involvement.Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, alleging the formation of a common law partnership and asserting direct and derivative claims against defendant and the purchasing entity, including breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, misappropriation of business opportunity, and requests for judicial dissolution and accounting. Defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, resulting in dismissal of all derivative claims, certain direct claims, and claims for constructive trust. The remaining claims were plaintiff’s direct claims for breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and claims for judicial dissolution and accounting.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the Business Court’s orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of derivative claims, holding that North Carolina law does not permit derivative actions by a general partner on behalf of a general partnership. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of conclusory tortious interference claims and upheld the Business Court’s decision to strike portions of plaintiff’s affidavit and disregard an unsworn expert report. Finally, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed summary judgment for defendants, holding that no partnership existed due to lack of agreement on material terms, and that plaintiff failed to show he could have completed the purchase but for defendant’s actions. View "Cutter v. Vojnovic" on Justia Law

William Plott suffered severe, lifelong disabilities as a result of a vaccine administered in infancy. His family sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, filing a petition in the United States Court of Federal Claims. A special master determined that Plott’s parents were entitled to monetary relief for his care and ordered the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to pay a lump sum and to purchase an annuity from Wilcac Life Insurance Company, with annual payments to be made to Plott’s estate. After Plott’s death, his estate sought a final annuity payment, which Wilcac refused to pay, prompting the estate to sue both HHS and Wilcac.The estate initially filed suit in the Hamilton County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas. Wilcac removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. HHS moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted this motion, dismissing HHS from the case. Wilcac then argued that HHS was a necessary and indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and the district court agreed, dismissing the entire case without prejudice because HHS could not be joined without defeating subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of Rule 19. The appellate court held that the district court erred by applying a bright-line rule that all parties to a contract are necessary and indispensable under Rule 19. Instead, the court emphasized that Rule 19 requires a pragmatic, case-specific analysis. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to conduct a proper Rule 19 analysis based on the specific facts of the case. View "Estate of William Plott v. Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Jeffery Krueger died following a traffic stop in Oklahoma initiated by Wagoner County Sheriff’s Office deputies. The stop began when deputies suspected Mr. Krueger of minor traffic violations and possible intoxication. After Mr. Krueger stopped his car in a turn lane, deputies forcibly removed him from his vehicle, allegedly pulling him by his hair, slamming his head on the pavement, and repeatedly using tasers as they attempted to handcuff him. Additional law enforcement officers arrived and, according to the plaintiffs, either participated directly or failed to intervene as Mr. Krueger, now handcuffed and prone, was further restrained with leg shackles and a hobble tie. Mr. Krueger stopped breathing at the scene and was later pronounced dead at a hospital.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma reviewed the case after the plaintiffs, Mr. Krueger’s parents and estate representatives, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants, including deputies and police officers, moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment for most defendants, finding that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there were sufficient grounds to show clearly established constitutional violations. The court found material disputes regarding the amount and duration of force used, including the number of taser applications and the nature of the prone restraint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the defendants used excessive force both in the initial removal and restraint of Mr. Krueger and in the prolonged prone restraint after he was subdued. The court also held that the failure to intervene in the use of excessive force was clearly established as a constitutional violation. The district court’s orders denying summary judgment were affirmed. View "Krueger v. Phillips" on Justia Law