Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A child was born in Connecticut in July 2024 to parents who both resided in Connecticut at the time of the birth. The mother, who had previously lived in Massachusetts and had a long history with the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF), moved to Connecticut several months before the birth, enrolling in a Connecticut healthcare program and living in a domestic violence shelter there. The father had also been living in Connecticut. The Massachusetts DCF, concerned about the child’s welfare due to the mother’s history and a recent domestic violence incident involving the father, arranged to take emergency custody of the child at the Connecticut hospital immediately after birth.Two days after the child’s birth, the Massachusetts DCF filed a care and protection petition in the Hampden County Division of the Juvenile Court Department, seeking temporary custody. The Juvenile Court granted temporary custody to the department without determining the basis for jurisdiction. Later, after hearings, a Juvenile Court judge found that Massachusetts had default jurisdiction under the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (MCCJA), and subsequently, after joint conferences with a Connecticut judge, concluded that Massachusetts was the appropriate forum because Connecticut had declined jurisdiction. The parents and the child sought interlocutory appeal, and the Appeals Court allowed it. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts then transferred the case on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction under the MCCJA because Connecticut was the child’s “home state,” as the child lived there from birth with the parents. The Court found that Massachusetts did not have default, emergency, or appropriate forum jurisdiction, as Connecticut had not declined jurisdiction before the Massachusetts court issued custody orders. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Care and Protection of Faraj" on Justia Law

Adriana Ramirez and her family were involved in litigation with third parties, including Harvey Miller and Stockdale Villa Mobile Home Park, where Ramirez was a property manager. After settling employment and unlawful detainer claims, Ramirez alleged that opposing counsel, attorney Sandra McCormack and her law firm, interfered with the settlement by, among other things, disputing the mailing address for settlement checks and failing to ensure the dismissal and sealing of the unlawful detainer action as required by the settlement. Ramirez claimed these actions caused her significant damages and brought several tort and contract-related claims against McCormack and other attorneys involved.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied McCormack’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court relied on precedents involving non-attorney defendants and found that the alleged conduct did not constitute protected petitioning activity under the statute. The court did not address the applicability of Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, which specifically addressed claims against attorneys for litigation-related conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that McCormack’s actions as opposing counsel—such as negotiating settlements, communicating with other attorneys, and advising clients—were protected petitioning activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that Ramirez’s claims arose from McCormack’s representation of her clients in litigation, fitting squarely within the statute’s protections as articulated in Thayer. Furthermore, Ramirez failed to present evidence of minimal merit for her claims on appeal, effectively forfeiting the issue. The appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to grant the anti-SLAPP motion and determine the fees and costs Ramirez must pay. View "Ramirez v. McCormack" on Justia Law

A group of individuals in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) filed a lawsuit in 2007, alleging inadequate mental healthcare. The case developed into a class action, and in 2016, the parties reached a settlement agreement that required IDOC to meet specific mental-health treatment benchmarks. The agreement included a provision for $1.9 million in attorney’s fees to be paid to plaintiffs’ counsel if the court granted relief for violations of the agreement. In 2018, the district court found IDOC in breach and issued an injunction, triggering the fee provision. While the defendants appealed, the parties entered into further agreements, resulting in the $1.9 million being paid to plaintiffs’ counsel.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois later extended its enforcement jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, but after the expiration of that jurisdiction, the court returned the case to its active docket. The parties continued to litigate, with plaintiffs filing amended complaints and defendants moving to dismiss. More than a year after resuming active litigation, the district court raised concerns about its subject-matter jurisdiction, ultimately concluding that its jurisdiction over the underlying claims ended when its enforcement jurisdiction over the settlement agreement expired. The court dismissed all claims and denied the defendants’ motion to recover the $1.9 million in attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that, under the parties’ agreements, the payment of $1.9 million in attorney’s fees to plaintiffs’ counsel was proper and did not need to be returned, even after the district court’s injunction was vacated. The court also vacated the district court’s dismissal of the underlying claims, remanding for the district court to determine whether the settlement agreement moots those claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motion to recover the attorney’s fees. View "Daniels v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff brought a defamation claim against Donald J. Trump, based on statements he made in June 2019 during his first term as President. The suit was initially filed in New York state court. In September 2020, the Department of Justice, acting under the Westfall Act, certified that Trump was acting within the scope of his employment and removed the case to federal court, seeking to substitute the United States as the defendant. The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied substitution, finding Trump was not acting within the scope of his employment. Trump appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and certified a question to the D.C. Court of Appeals regarding the scope of employment under D.C. law. The D.C. Court of Appeals clarified the law but did not resolve whether Trump’s conduct was within the scope of employment. The Second Circuit remanded for the District Court to apply the clarified law.On remand, the Department of Justice declined to certify that Trump was acting within the scope of his employment, and neither Trump nor the government sought substitution before trial. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages. Trump appealed. After the appeal was fully briefed, and after Trump began his second term as President, Trump and the government jointly moved in the Second Circuit to substitute the United States as a party under the Westfall Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the motion to substitute. The court held that the motion was statutorily barred by the Westfall Act because it was not made before trial, that both Trump and the government had waived any right to seek substitution by failing to timely petition the District Court, and that equitable considerations also warranted denial of the belated motion. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged the tax assessment of its facility in Salisbury, Vermont, for the 2023-2024 tax year. After a grievance hearing attended by both the property owner and its attorney, the town listers denied the grievance and mailed the decision by certified mail to the property owner’s address of record. The property owner received the notice twelve days before the deadline to appeal but did not forward it to its attorney until after the appeal period had expired. The attorney then filed an appeal to the Board of Civil Authority (BCA), which was rejected as untimely.The property owner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, arguing that the town violated its procedural due process rights by failing to send notice of the listers’ decision to both the property owner and its attorney. The Superior Court allowed the property owner to amend its complaint and ultimately granted summary judgment in its favor, relying on Perry v. Department of Employment & Training, which required notice to both a claimant and their attorney in the context of unemployment benefits. The court ordered the BCA to hear the untimely appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, in the context of property tax grievances, procedural due process does not require notice to be mailed to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s counsel. The Court distinguished Perry as limited to unemployment-benefit proceedings and found that the statutory scheme for property tax appeals only requires notice to the taxpayer. Because the property owner received actual notice and had sufficient time to appeal, the Court concluded that due process was satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and instructed that summary judgment be entered for the Town of Salisbury. View "Salisbury AD 1, LLC v. Town of Salisbury" on Justia Law

A woman, acting individually and as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice lawsuit against a hospital and an emergency room physician. She alleged that the physician negligently failed to diagnose and treat her husband’s condition after he presented to the emergency room with head and neck pain following a blow to the head. The physician diagnosed abrasions and a closed head injury, but did not order cardiac tests. The patient was discharged and died that night from an apparent heart attack.The case was filed in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska. Over several years, the parties engaged in discovery, and the court issued multiple progression orders setting deadlines for, among other things, the disclosure of expert witnesses. The plaintiff did not disclose a medical expert by the required deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not prove her malpractice claim. Shortly before the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiff disclosed a new medical expert. The district court excluded the expert’s affidavit, both as a discovery sanction and under its inherent authority to enforce its progression orders, and granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the case with prejudice.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert’s affidavit as a discovery sanction and remanded for further proceedings. On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the late-disclosed expert under its inherent authority to enforce progression orders. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with directions to affirm the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Ricker v. Nebraska Methodist Health System" on Justia Law

Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation and Venequip Machinery Sales Corporation Miami entered into an inventory loan agreement governed by Tennessee law, under which Venequip Miami could borrow funds by executing promissory notes. Venequip Miami executed six such notes, totaling approximately $4.77 million. The agreement specified that default would occur if Venequip Miami failed to repay principal or interest when due, or if there was a material adverse change in its financial condition. After a related affiliate defaulted on a separate loan in Curaçao, Caterpillar Financial declared an event of default under the inventory loan agreement, accelerated the debt, and demanded repayment. Venequip Miami did not repay, and Caterpillar Financial alleged that the outstanding amount exceeded $10 million.Caterpillar Financial filed a breach of contract suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Venequip Miami moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Caterpillar Financial failed to specify which provision of the inventory loan agreement was breached. The district court agreed, finding the complaint insufficient because it did not identify the specific provision breached among several possible events of default, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Caterpillar Financial’s subsequent motion to amend the judgment and file an amended complaint was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that under federal pleading standards, a breach of contract plaintiff is not required to identify the specific contractual provision breached, but must plausibly allege nonperformance. The court found that Caterpillar Financial’s complaint sufficiently alleged the existence of a contract, nonperformance by Venequip Miami, and resulting damages. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Caterpillar Financial Services Corp. v. Venequip Machinery Sales Corp." on Justia Law

A website visitor in Pennsylvania interacted with a retail website that used session replay code provided by a third party to record her mouse movements, clicks, and keystrokes. The visitor did not enter any sensitive or personal information during her session. She later brought a putative class action against the website operator, alleging that the use of session replay code constituted intrusion upon seclusion and violated the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (WESCA).The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing because she did not allege a concrete injury. The court reasoned that the mere recording of her website activity, which did not include any personal or sensitive information, was not analogous to harms traditionally recognized at common law, such as disclosure of private information or intrusion upon seclusion. The court also found that amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and agreed that the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing. The Third Circuit held that the alleged harm was not closely related to the traditional privacy torts of disclosure of private information or intrusion upon seclusion, as the information recorded was neither sensitive nor publicly disclosed, and there was no intrusion into the plaintiff’s solitude or private affairs. The court also clarified that a statutory violation alone does not automatically confer standing without a concrete harm. However, the Third Circuit determined that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and modified the order to a dismissal without prejudice, affirming the order as modified. View "Cook v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

A citizen of the United Kingdom, who currently resides in Japan, underwent surgery in the United Kingdom to have a medical device implanted. The device was manufactured by a Minnesota-based company, which is a subsidiary of a New Jersey-based parent company. After the device allegedly failed, the plaintiff traveled to Colorado for removal and replacement of the device, but continued to experience problems. He later received additional medical care in Thailand. Dissatisfied with the device’s performance, he filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, asserting negligence and strict liability claims against both the manufacturer and its parent company.The defendants did not contest jurisdiction or venue in Minnesota, but moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens, arguing that the United Kingdom was a more appropriate forum. The district court agreed, reasoning that most relevant events and evidence were outside Minnesota, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court also denied the plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint to add more facts connecting the case to Minnesota, concluding that such an amendment would be futile. The plaintiff’s subsequent request to file a motion for reconsideration was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the district court failed to properly hold the defendants to their burden of persuasion on all elements of the forum non conveniens analysis and erred by automatically weighing all contacts outside Minnesota in favor of the United Kingdom, rather than considering contacts with the entire United States. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for a new forum non conveniens analysis, instructing the district court to apply the correct legal standards and properly weigh the relevant factors. View "Dibble v. Torax Medical, Inc." on Justia Law

In January 2020, Salve Chipola attended a high school basketball game where Sean Flannery made statements to a school official accusing Chipola of being a drug dealer and providing drugs and alcohol to students. As a result, Chipola was later banned from school grounds and questioned by a police officer about these allegations, which he denied. Flannery admitted to making the statements. Nearly two years after the incident, Chipola filed a lawsuit against Flannery for false light invasion of privacy, alleging that the false statements harmed his reputation and caused emotional distress.The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, granted Flannery’s motion to dismiss, finding that Chipola’s claim was time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations for defamation, as established in Swan v. Boardwalk Regency Corp. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, reasoning that false light claims are essentially akin to defamation and thus subject to the same one-year limitations period. The court relied on prior case law, including Rumbauskas v. Cantor, which recognized the similarities between false light and defamation claims.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to resolve whether the statute of limitations for false light invasion of privacy should be one year, as for defamation, or two years, as for personal injury. The Court held that the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims also applies to false light claims. The Court reasoned that the conduct and injuries underlying both torts are closely aligned, and applying a longer limitations period to false light would undermine legislative intent and free speech protections. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Chipola v. Flannery" on Justia Law