Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2014, several homeowners' associations sued Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC (BCSS), alleging that a rate increase violated a 1991 agreement between a real-estate developer and BCSS. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and specific performance of the agreement. The case has been brought before the Supreme Court of Alabama multiple times, with BCSS repeatedly questioning whether the plaintiffs are successors in interest to the original contract party.The Baldwin Circuit Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of BCSS, stating that the plaintiffs lacked standing. However, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed this decision in 2016, clarifying that the issue was not one of standing but whether the plaintiffs were real parties in interest. On remand, BCSS continued to challenge the plaintiffs' status, leading to multiple nonfinal rulings and additional appellate proceedings. The circuit court denied BCSS's summary judgment motions on this issue multiple times, including in August 2023.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed BCSS's petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to compel the circuit court to grant summary judgment in its favor. The Court clarified that the real-party-in-interest question does not implicate the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction and is not appropriate for mandamus review. The Court emphasized that such issues should be resolved through a final judgment by the trial court. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied BCSS's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC" on Justia Law

Two students receiving special education services filed a class action lawsuit against the Kanawha County Board of Education, alleging that the Board denied them and other similarly situated students a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The lawsuit also claimed violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court certified a class of all Kanawha County Schools students with disabilities who need behavior supports and have experienced disciplinary removals from any classroom.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, reasoning that the plaintiffs had presented expert evidence of disproportionate rates of suspension for students with disabilities and a detailed qualitative analysis of student records. The court found that these factors revealed a cohesive pattern indicating the absence of an effective system for developing and implementing behavioral supports for students with disabilities. The Board appealed, arguing that the certification of the plaintiff class was inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s certification order. The Fourth Circuit held that the certified class failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality prerequisite. The court found that the plaintiffs did not identify a common contention central to the validity of all class members’ claims. The court noted that the claims were highly diverse and individualized, involving different practices at different stages of the special education process. The absence of a common contention foreclosed class treatment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "G.T. v. The Board of Education of the County of Kanawha" on Justia Law

Levi Werley was seriously injured while riding an uninsured dirt bike. After the insurance of the driver who struck him did not fully compensate for his injuries, Levi’s parents sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under their own automobile insurance policies. Their insurer, Mid-Century Insurance Company, paid $250,000 under one policy but denied an additional $250,000 under another policy, citing a household vehicle exclusion. The Werleys argued that this exclusion was invalid and unenforceable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with the Werleys, ruling that the household vehicle exclusion was invalid under Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). The court held that the exclusion acted as a de facto waiver of stacking, which is not permissible under the MVFRL. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Werleys, entitling them to the additional UIM benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the District Court’s order. The Third Circuit held that the household vehicle exclusion in the Multi-Vehicle Policy was valid and enforceable. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnification Co. and Donovan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., noting that the Werleys had never paid premiums for UIM coverage on the dirt bike. The court emphasized that exclusions limiting UIM coverage are generally enforceable unless they act as impermissible de facto waivers of stacking, which was not the case here. The Third Circuit remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Mid-Century. View "Mid-Century Insurance Co v. Werley" on Justia Law

In two separate class actions, Kenneth Hasson and Jordan Schnur alleged that FullStory, Inc. and Papa John’s International, Inc. unlawfully wiretapped their online communications using FullStory’s Session Replay Code. This code intercepts detailed user interactions on websites without user consent. Hasson, a Pennsylvania resident, claimed FullStory wiretapped him while he browsed Mattress Firm’s website. Schnur, also from Pennsylvania, alleged similar wiretapping by Papa John’s website.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed both cases for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Hasson’s case, the court found that FullStory, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not have sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania. The court denied Hasson’s request for jurisdictional discovery. In Schnur’s case, the court ruled that Papa John’s, also a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not expressly aim its conduct at Pennsylvania, despite operating numerous restaurants in the state.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed these dismissals. The court affirmed the dismissal in Schnur’s case, agreeing that Schnur failed to show that Papa John’s expressly aimed its conduct at Pennsylvania under the Calder “effects” test. The court noted that merely operating a website accessible in Pennsylvania does not establish personal jurisdiction.However, the court vacated the dismissal in Hasson’s case and remanded it for further consideration. The court held that the District Court should have also considered whether personal jurisdiction was proper under the traditional test as articulated in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court. This test examines whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum and whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. The court instructed the District Court to reassess FullStory’s contacts with Pennsylvania under this framework. View "Hasson v. Fullstory Inc" on Justia Law

During a night of civil unrest in Des Moines, Iowa, police and Polk County deputies arrested 14 individuals. The arrestees claimed their Fourth Amendment rights were violated and sued 53 defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court issued a comprehensive opinion with around 800 rulings on various motions for summary judgment and qualified immunity, leading to multiple appeals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied qualified immunity to several officers and granted summary judgment to some plaintiffs. The Des Moines defendants appealed these decisions, arguing they had probable cause to arrest anyone in the vicinity of the protests for misdemeanors such as participation in a riot, unlawful assembly, and failure to disperse. The district court found that the officers lacked probable cause or arguable probable cause for these arrests, as they did not provide specific evidence linking the plaintiffs to violent behavior or failure to disperse.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions de novo. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Officers Herman, Holtan, and McCarthy on Klingenberg's unlawful arrest claim, and dismissed Officer Lawler's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court also dismissed appeals from Captain Hardy and other officers regarding Lard's and DeBrossard's unlawful arrest claims and Lard's excessive force claim. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the Patton group on their unlawful arrest claims and denied qualified immunity to the Des Moines defendants on the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims. Additionally, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their phone seizure claims against Officer Youngblut and denied him qualified immunity.The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Deputy Smith on Timberlake's unlawful arrest claim, finding no clearly established duty for Smith to ensure the lawfulness of the arrest before taking custody. Finally, the court affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to Officer Holtan and Deputy Callahan on Dunn's and Fugate's unlawful arrest claims, concluding they had arguable probable cause under Iowa's failure to disperse statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Dunn v. Does" on Justia Law

Farnsworth Coleman, the sole member of Coleman Consulting, LLC (CC), entered into a written Confidentiality Agreement with Domtar A.W. LLC (Domtar A.W.) in November 2016 to provide consulting services for a pulp mill in Ashdown, Arkansas. CC was compensated for its services and expenses at an agreed hourly rate. CC later claimed that an oral agreement was made with Domtar A.W. for additional compensation based on a percentage of increased profits from CC's recommendations, which Domtar A.W. denied. CC filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and unjust enrichment after Domtar A.W. terminated the consulting services in May 2017.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of Domtar A.W., concluding that the Arkansas statute of frauds barred CC's breach of contract claim because the alleged oral agreement could not be performed within one year. The court also found that CC failed to prove its unjust enrichment claim, as CC had been fully compensated for its services under the written agreement. CC's motion for reconsideration, based on newly discovered evidence, was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the oral agreement was subject to the statute of frauds and could not be performed within one year. The court also found that the part performance and detrimental reliance exceptions to the statute of frauds did not apply. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, noting that CC had been paid for its services and could not use unjust enrichment to enforce an unenforceable oral contract. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was also affirmed, as CC failed to demonstrate due diligence in obtaining the new evidence. View "Coleman Consulting, LLC v. Domtar Corporation" on Justia Law

A fire damaged a malt beverage store owned by A Maxon Company, LLC (AMC). Acuity Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment to determine coverage under an insurance policy listing Greg and Tammy Weatherspoon as additional loss payees. The Weatherspoons counterclaimed for breach of contract. The circuit court granted Acuity’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Weatherspoons’ counterclaim, determining that the insurance policy terms prevented the Weatherspoons from recovering damages unless AMC successfully asserted a claim. The jury found that AMC principal, Russel Maxon, had intentionally started the fire, excluding coverage under AMC’s policy. The Weatherspoons appealed.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Corson County, South Dakota, initially denied the Weatherspoons’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the insurance contract was unambiguous and that the Weatherspoons’ claim was dependent on AMC’s claim. The court also denied Acuity’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there were factual disputes suitable for a jury. At trial, the court granted Acuity’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the Weatherspoons could not recover under the policy because AMC’s claim was excluded due to Russel’s intentional act.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the insurance policy’s Loss Payable Clause only allowed the Weatherspoons to collect if AMC could collect, and since the jury found that Russel intentionally started the fire, AMC was precluded from recovering. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony from Special Agent Derek Hill and allowing the impeachment of Tracy Maxon with prior inconsistent statements. The court concluded that the Weatherspoons’ arguments regarding ambiguity and third-party beneficiary status were unavailing. View "Acuity Insurance V. A Maxon Company" on Justia Law

Linda Ager Coyle, the personal representative of Fred Ager's estate, filed a motion for confirmation of a specific devise related to the proceeds from the sale of storage units Fred had owned. Fred's will directed that the units be given in equal shares to his children, Linda and Jeff, with a life estate interest in half of the net rental income to his wife, Arlene Ager. Arlene filed a petition for supervised administration of the estate, which the circuit court granted. Subsequently, the court denied Linda's motion for confirmation of the specific devise.Linda appealed the circuit court's denial of her motion, and Arlene filed a notice of review seeking to challenge the court's earlier decision denying her motion to remove Linda as the personal representative. The Supreme Court of South Dakota issued an order to show cause, directing the parties to address whether the order denying the motion to confirm a specific devise was appealable. Linda argued that the order was appealable based on the precedent set in In re Estate of Geier, which held that each proceeding in an unsupervised administration is a final order. Arlene contended that the order was not final and not subject to review.The Supreme Court of South Dakota dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a decision made prior to a final order terminating a supervised probate action is not governed by the Geier final order rule. The court emphasized that supervised administration is a single in rem proceeding under SDCL 29A-3-501, which contrasts with the multiple, independent proceedings allowed under SDCL 29A-3-107 for unsupervised administration. Since the order for supervised administration was signed before the denial of Linda's motion, the action had become a supervised administration, and the individual-proceeding rule of finality did not apply. Consequently, the court also dismissed Arlene's notice of review. View "Estate Of Ager" on Justia Law

The case involves a medical negligence claim brought by Janet Hild, the administrator of Scott Boldman's estate, against several medical professionals and entities, including Samaritan Health Partners and Good Samaritan Hospital. Boldman, who had multiple health issues, underwent an emergency appendectomy at Good Samaritan Hospital. Post-surgery, he became combative and removed his breathing tube, after which he soon died. Hild claimed that the anesthesia was improperly handled, causing Boldman's aggressive behavior and subsequent death. The hospital argued that Boldman self-extubated and suffered a cardiac arrest unrelated to the anesthesia.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The jury found that Sandra Ward, the Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, was negligent in her care of Boldman. However, only the six jurors who found negligence were allowed to vote on whether Ward's negligence proximately caused Boldman's death. They concluded it did not. Hild filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that all jurors should have been allowed to vote on proximate cause. The trial court denied the motion.The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part, holding that the trial court erred by not allowing all jurors to vote on proximate cause, and remanded the case for a new trial on specific issues. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the same-juror rule applies in all negligence cases where the jury answers sequential interrogatories that separate the elements of negligence. This means the same three-fourths of jurors must concur on all elements for a valid verdict. The court reversed the Second District's decision to the extent it ordered a new trial and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of the hospital. View "Hild v. Samaritan Health Partner" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of professional models, alleged that the defendant, an adult entertainment nightclub, used their images in social media posts without consent to promote the club between August 2013 and November 2015. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in 2021 in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming defamation and related torts. This filing was outside the three-year statute of limitations specified by Massachusetts law. To avoid dismissal, the plaintiffs argued for the application of the "discovery rule," which would delay the start of the limitations period until they knew or reasonably should have known about the harm.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts noted that the application of the discovery rule to social media posts was a novel issue in Massachusetts law. The court certified a question to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, asking under what circumstances material posted on social media platforms could be considered "inherently unknowable" for the purposes of applying the discovery rule in defamation and related tort claims.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that claims arising from social media posts accrue when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know they have been harmed by the publication. The court emphasized that the vastness of social media and the variability in access and searchability require a fact-specific inquiry. The court concluded that whether the plaintiffs knew or should have known about the harm must often be determined by the finder of fact. However, if the social media material is widely distributed and readily accessible and searchable, a judge may determine as a matter of law that the discovery rule does not apply. View "Davalos v. Bay Watch, Inc." on Justia Law