Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A man passed away, and his wife made a claim on his estate for half of the money he had removed from their joint bank account before his death. The wife argued that the couple owned the account as joint tenants, and her husband had withdrawn funds exceeding his interest. The district court dismissed her claim, concluding that she was making a claim for conversion sounding in tort and had not met the legal standard.The wife appealed, arguing that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and that a standard from caselaw on joint tenancies should apply. The Iowa Court of Appeals agreed with her, reversed the district court's decision, and remanded the case. The estate sought further review from the Iowa Supreme Court.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard. The correct standard, as established in Anderson v. Iowa Department of Human Services, involves determining the respective rights of joint tenants based on their agreement and the presumption that each joint tenant is entitled to half of the joint account, which can be rebutted. The court remanded the case for a new trial to allow for proper fact-finding regarding whether the husband removed funds in excess of his interest in the joint account. View "In re Estate of Johnston" on Justia Law

Lizette Aguilar petitioned for a domestic abuse protection order against Ana Valdez-Mendoza, her daughter's stepmother, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924. Aguilar alleged that Valdez-Mendoza physically assaulted her during a visit to drop off her daughter at the home of her ex-husband, Fernando Mendoza, who is married to Valdez-Mendoza. The district court issued an ex parte protection order, which was affirmed after a hearing. Valdez-Mendoza appealed, arguing that the court erred in concluding that she and Aguilar were related by "affinity" under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903.The district court for Madison County found that Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza had a relationship by "affinity" because Aguilar is related to her daughter, and the daughter's father is married to Valdez-Mendoza. The court overruled Valdez-Mendoza's motion to dismiss and affirmed the protection order, reasoning that the statutory phrase "related by affinity" was broad enough to include their relationship.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of "affinity." The court defined "affinity" as the relationship arising from the marriage contract between one spouse and the blood relations of the other, not extending to Aguilar herself, who is not related by consanguinity to Mendoza. Therefore, Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza were not related by affinity under § 42-903. The court reversed the district court's decision and vacated the protection order. View "Aguilar v. Valdez-Mendoza" on Justia Law

Richard Muller filed a claim against the estate of John Weeder, deceased, under the Nebraska Probate Code. Muller’s claim was based on a modified judgment entered in his favor against Weeder in a separate fence dispute action before Weeder's death. The county court appointed Margene Cork as the personal representative of Weeder’s estate in October 2017. Muller filed a "Statement of Claim" in December 2017 and a "Petition for Allowance of Claim" in September 2023. Cork, as the personal representative, resisted the claim and moved to strike it. The county court held a hearing and allowed Muller’s claim against the estate.The county court for Boyd County granted Muller’s petition and allowed his claim. The Estate appealed the decision, arguing that the county court lacked jurisdiction and that the law-of-the-case doctrine should apply based on a prior appeal in the fence dispute action. The appeal was initially directed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals but was moved to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the county court had subject matter jurisdiction over Muller’s claim against the estate. The court noted that the county court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters relating to decedents’ estates. The court also rejected the Estate’s argument that the law-of-the-case doctrine applied, as the prior decision was made in a different action and not in the current probate case. The Supreme Court affirmed the county court’s judgment allowing Muller’s claim against the estate. View "In re Estate of Weeder" on Justia Law

Armando Guevara worked as a domestic service employee for Robert and Maria Zamora for over a decade, performing various tasks such as cleaning, car maintenance, and grocery shopping. Occasionally, he also provided services for the Zamoras' businesses, Lafise Corporation and Latin American Financial Services, Inc. (LAFS). Guevara was paid $1,365.88 biweekly, but there was no written employment agreement, and the parties disagreed on whether this amount represented a salary or an hourly wage. The Zamoras claimed they paid him an hourly rate with overtime, while Guevara asserted he was paid a salary without proper overtime compensation.Guevara filed a putative class action against the Zamoras, Lafise, and LAFS for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Guevara was not covered by the FLSA through either "enterprise coverage" or "individual coverage." The court also found that Guevara was fully compensated for all his overtime work hours based on the Zamoras' testimony and calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding Guevara's regular hourly rate and, therefore, his overtime rate. The court noted that the Zamoras did not maintain accurate records, and the evidence presented created a genuine issue of fact that should be determined by a jury. The appellate court also vacated the district court's ruling on whether Lafise was a joint employer, as the lower court failed to provide sufficient reasoning and did not address the relevant factors. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Guevara v. Lafise Corp." on Justia Law

Leanne Nester and Cody Gamble divorced in 2022, with custody arrangements for their two minor children outlined in the divorce decree. Gamble later moved to modify custody, and during the proceedings, a press organization requested media access, which the district court granted. Nester moved for reconsideration, seeking to close the hearing to protect sensitive information about the children, including medical and Child Protective Services records. The district court denied her motion, interpreting a previous case, Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, as precluding closure of family law proceedings.The district court concluded it lacked discretion to close the hearing, stating there was no statute or rule allowing it. Nester then sought writ relief from the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that the district court misinterpreted Falconi and failed to consider her privacy interests and those of her children.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its interpretation of Falconi. The court clarified that Falconi does not prohibit the closure of family law proceedings but requires a case-by-case analysis to determine if closure is warranted. The court outlined that closure is permissible if it serves a compelling interest, there is a substantial probability that the interest could be harmed without closure, and no alternatives to closure would adequately protect the interest.The Supreme Court of Nevada granted Nester's petition, directing the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to close the hearing and to reconsider the motion using the test outlined in Falconi. The court emphasized the need for the district court to properly apply the factors to determine whether closure is justified. View "NESTER VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

The State of Wyoming filed a petition against MF (Mother) and JF (Father) on June 22, 2020, alleging neglect of their minor children, JF and TF. Following a shelter care hearing, the juvenile court removed the children from the home and placed them in foster care. After a disposition hearing, the children remained in the custody of the Department of Family Services (the Department), with a permanency plan of family reunification. On January 19, 2024, after an evidentiary permanency hearing, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption.The juvenile court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The court noted that Mother had made some progress but ultimately failed to consistently address the children's needs and safety concerns. The court also found that the children's best interests were served by changing the permanency plan to adoption, given their progress in foster care and the lack of stability and safety in Mother's care.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan to adoption, as the Department had made reasonable efforts at reunification, which were unsuccessful. The court also found that the juvenile court's decision to cease reunification efforts with Mother was supported by Wyoming law, which allows for discontinuation of such efforts when they are inconsistent with the permanency plan.Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Mother's due process rights were not violated by the denial of a continuance of the permanency hearing or by the juvenile court's evidentiary rulings. The court found that Mother had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and the juvenile court's decisions were within the bounds of reason. The court also declined to adopt Mother's request for a change in procedures to require compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Evidence in evidentiary permanency hearings. View "In the Interest of: JF v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Former Spokane police officer Jeffery Thurman was the subject of a June 13, 2019 article in the Spokesman-Review, owned by Cowles Co., which alleged he was fired for racial slurs, sexual harassment, and talk of killing black people. On June 14, 2021, Thurman filed a defamation lawsuit against Cowles Co. Shortly after, on July 25, 2021, the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) took effect. Thurman amended his complaint on December 3, 2021, adding new factual allegations and a claim under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).The trial court partially granted Cowles' special motion for expedited relief under the UPEPA, dismissing Thurman’s CPA claim but denying the motion to dismiss the defamation claim, reasoning that the defamation claim was part of the original complaint. Cowles appealed the denial of expedited relief for the defamation claim, and Thurman cross-appealed the dismissal of his CPA claim.The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the UPEPA applied to both Thurman’s defamation and CPA claims. The majority reasoned that the defamation claim was "asserted" on a continuing basis on the UPEPA’s effective date. The dissent argued that the defamation claim was not "asserted" on or after July 25, 2021, and thus the UPEPA did not apply.The Washington Supreme Court held that Thurman’s amended defamation claim relates back to the original complaint filed on June 14, 2021, and is not subject to the UPEPA. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, deciding the case on statutory grounds and declining to address the constitutional arguments. View "Thurman v. Cowles Co." on Justia Law

A national news reporter employed by a prominent newspaper sued her employer and six of its editors in Superior Court, alleging violations of the D.C. Human Rights Act and the common law tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. She claimed that the defendants discriminated against her based on her status as a sexual assault victim and her gender, took adverse employment actions against her, subjected her to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against her for protesting their discriminatory actions.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and filed a special motion to dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, arguing that the claims arose from acts in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest. The Superior Court denied the special motion to dismiss, finding that the claims did not arise from speech protected by the Anti-SLAPP Act, but granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, concluding that the complaint failed to plausibly allege unlawful discrimination or retaliation.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the denial of the special motion to dismiss, agreeing that the Anti-SLAPP Act did not apply. The court reversed the dismissal of the counts alleging adverse action discrimination, finding that the complaint plausibly alleged that the defendants took certain adverse employment actions against the reporter in violation of the Human Rights Act. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the hostile work environment and retaliation claims, concluding that the allegations did not meet the necessary legal standards. The court also noted that it was premature to decide whether the defendants' actions were protected by the First Amendment, leaving that issue open for further proceedings. View "Sonmez v. WP Company, LLC" on Justia Law

In April 2009, Doneyn Bourke and William Hayward, Sr. defaulted on their $950,000 mortgage for a property in Nantucket, Massachusetts. The mortgage holder, Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc., foreclosed on the property, but Bourke and Hayward refused to vacate. Emigrant Mortgage Company and Retained Realty, Inc., the foreclosure sale purchaser, filed a lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to seek remedies. The federal district court rejected Bourke and Hayward's arguments against federal jurisdiction and their counterclaims, ruling in favor of the plaintiffs. The court declared that Retained Realty, Inc. was entitled to possession of the property and that Bourke and Hayward owed $6,500 per month in use and occupancy payments from March 21, 2011, until they vacated the property.Previously, the Massachusetts Land Court had issued a certificate of title to Bourke and Hayward in 2006. After defaulting on their loan, Emigrant foreclosed by conducting a foreclosure sale and making an entry onto the property. The Land Court registered the foreclosure deed to Retained Realty, Inc. in 2012. Retained Realty, Inc. then filed a summary process action in the Nantucket District Court, which initially ruled in their favor. However, the Massachusetts Appellate Division found the foreclosure notice inadequate but upheld the foreclosure by entry. The Nantucket District Court later entered judgment for Bourke and Hayward for possession due to the premature summary process action.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling, rejecting Bourke and Hayward's arguments that the Massachusetts Land Court statute deprived the federal court of jurisdiction. The court held that the federal district court had proper diversity jurisdiction and that there was no ongoing state in rem proceeding to invoke the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction. The court also upheld the district court's findings on the merits, including the foreclosure by entry and possession and the application of estoppel by deed. View "Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Bourke" on Justia Law

Lamont Heard, a Michigan prisoner, claimed that prison officials retaliated against him for his litigation activities by transferring him to a different housing unit. He sought to sue the officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights. Heard was transferred on January 10, 2017, and filed a grievance the next day. After exhausting his administrative remedies, he filed a lawsuit on January 19, 2021, four years and nine days after the transfer.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed Heard's claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Heard then exhausted his remedies and refiled his lawsuit. The district court dismissed the refiled claim as untimely, reasoning that Michigan's tolling provision, which pauses the statute of limitations while a claim is pending in court, conflicted with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Michigan's tolling provision does not conflict with the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a federal lawsuit but does not address tolling. The court emphasized that federal courts have historically borrowed state statutes of limitations and tolling provisions for § 1983 suits. The court found that Michigan's tolling rule, which pauses the statute of limitations during a prior suit, is consistent with the PLRA and does not undermine its purposes. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, allowing Heard's claim to proceed. View "Heard v. Strange" on Justia Law