Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Gina Burt filed a lawsuit against Playtika, Ltd. and Playtika Holding Corporation in Tennessee state court, seeking to recover alleged gambling losses incurred by Tennessee residents who played Playtika’s online games. Burt's claim was based on Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105, which allows recovery of gambling losses. Playtika removed the case to federal court, invoking jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and traditional diversity jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee remanded the case to state court. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because Burt’s suit was not a “class action” under CAFA, and the losses of the Tennessee players could not be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement for traditional diversity jurisdiction. Playtika appealed the remand order under CAFA’s expedited removal appeal provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s remand order. The appellate court held that Burt lacked Article III standing to proceed in federal court because she did not allege that she personally suffered any gambling loss. The court found that Burt’s claim to recover losses on behalf of other Tennessee residents did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. Additionally, the court rejected Burt’s argument that she had standing under a qui tam theory, concluding that Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105 is not a qui tam statute. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the case to state court. View "Burt v. Playtika, Ltd." on Justia Law

Kevin Brooks, an inmate at a federal prison camp, suffered from appendicitis, which was misdiagnosed by medical personnel as constipation and COVID-19. Despite his worsening condition, he was not sent to a hospital for over ten days, resulting in a ruptured appendix and peritonitis. Brooks eventually recovered but experienced severe pain during the ordeal. He filed a lawsuit seeking damages from five federal employees, three of whom treated him and two who were supervisors.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Brooks's suit, ruling that it presented a new context to which the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics does not extend. The court reasoned that Brooks's case differed from previous Bivens cases, particularly Carlson v. Green, due to the duration of his medical issue and the involvement of supervisory personnel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's reasoning. The Seventh Circuit held that Brooks's claim did not present a new context, as it was similar to Carlson v. Green, where a prisoner alleged constitutionally inadequate medical care. The court found that the distinctions made by the district court regarding the duration of the medical issue and the involvement of supervisors were not sufficient to create a new context. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against the two supervisors but vacated the dismissal of claims against the three treating personnel, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Brooks v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

Paul Grosz was injured while helping his friend Gregory Kisling hang a crucifix in Kisling’s home. Grosz fell from a homemade scaffolding when the wire holding the crucifix broke, resulting in significant injuries including broken ribs, a spinal fracture, and a traumatic brain injury. Grosz sued Kisling for negligence, and the jury awarded Grosz $1.2 million in noneconomic damages but found Kisling only 25% at fault, attributing 75% of the fault to Grosz.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, presided over by Judge Josie Garton, handled the case. After the jury's verdict, Grosz requested the court to determine if his injuries qualified for a higher statutory cap on noneconomic damages due to severe permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement. The court denied this request, stating it was a jury issue that Grosz had not properly raised during the trial. The court then applied the comparative fault percentages, reducing the $1.2 million award to $300,000 (25% of $1.2 million). The court found this amount was below the $400,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages and did not reduce it further.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the superior court should have first applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages before apportioning fault. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the correct sequence is to first allocate fault and then apply the statutory cap if necessary. The court reasoned that this approach respects the jury’s role in determining the actual loss and aligns with legislative intent to cap a defendant’s exposure without further reducing an already capped amount. Thus, Grosz’s recovery of $300,000 was upheld, as it was below the statutory cap. View "Kisling v. Grosz" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Herrera filed a pro se complaint alleging that he was detained for several months beyond his maximum release date, which he claimed violated the Eighth Amendment. Herrera was arrested in September 2012, sentenced in March 2013 to 36 to 72 months’ imprisonment, and released on parole in December 2014. After violating parole, his sentence was reduced in January 2017 to 30 to 66 months, with credit for time served. Despite this, Herrera claimed he was detained until October 2019, seven months past his maximum release date of March 2019.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed Herrera’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), reasoning that his claim must be brought as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and that his claim for damages was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The court also found that any amendment to the complaint would be futile. Herrera’s motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment were denied, with the court maintaining that his claim was barred by Heck and the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Heck does not apply to Herrera’s overdetention claim because it does not imply that his conviction or sentence were invalid. The court found that Herrera plausibly pleaded an Eighth Amendment overdetention claim, as he alleged that prison officials were aware of his overdetention and failed to act, resulting in his prolonged detention. However, the court noted that the claim might be time-barred under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations but remanded the case to allow Herrera to amend his complaint to address potential tolling of the statute of limitations. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Herrera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Perez, a former employee of Rose Hills Company, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, alleging violations of California wage-and-hour laws. The complaint did not specify the amount in controversy or the frequency of the alleged violations. Rose Hills removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows removal if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case to state court, stating that Rose Hills did not meet CAFA’s $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement. The district court found that Rose Hills failed to provide evidence justifying its assumed violation rate, which was used to calculate the amount in controversy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a removing defendant under CAFA is permitted to rely on reasonable assumptions based on the plaintiff’s complaint to calculate the amount in controversy. The court found that Rose Hills’ approach, which included assumptions about the violation rate tethered to the language of the complaint, was reasonable. The district court erred by requiring Rose Hills to provide evidence supporting its assumed violation rate.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to evaluate whether Rose Hills’ violation-rate assumption was a reasonable interpretation of the complaint. The court emphasized that assumptions need not be proven with evidence if they are reasonable interpretations of the complaint’s allegations. View "Perez v. Rose Hills Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Alexandria Kazarian, filed a negligence lawsuit against New London County Mutual Insurance Company after a trip-and-fall accident near property owned by the defendant’s insured, Irene Swiney. Kazarian alleged that Swiney allowed a vehicle to be parked in a manner that obstructed the sidewalk, causing her to walk into the street and trip over an unsecured gas cap, resulting in injury. After Swiney passed away, New London was substituted as the defendant.In the Superior Court, a jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of New London. Kazarian’s motion for a new trial was denied. She argued that Swiney was negligent for allowing the vehicle to obstruct the sidewalk and that a master-servant relationship existed between Swiney and the vehicle owner, making Swiney liable. The trial justice denied the motion, stating it was within the jury’s purview to evaluate the evidence and witness credibility.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. Kazarian contended that the trial justice erred in denying her motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. She also argued that the trial justice’s use of the word “redacted” in response to a jury question was prejudicial. The Supreme Court found that reasonable minds could differ on whether the vehicle obstructed the sidewalk and whether it was a reasonable and necessary use of the sidewalk. The Court also noted that Kazarian failed to object contemporaneously to the alleged golden rule violation and the grass-growth argument during the trial, thus waiving those issues.The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, concluding that the trial justice conducted an appropriate analysis and did not err in his decisions. The case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "Kazarian v. New London County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition in September 2022 for temporary orders requiring the parents to participate in state-provided services for their child's safety. The trial court granted these temporary orders. In August 2023, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights and obtain conservatorship of the child. The parents responded with motions for sanctions, claiming the Department's actions were frivolous. The Department then moved to nonsuit its claims. The trial court expressed frustration but granted the nonsuit and planned a separate hearing for the sanctions motions.The trial court signed an order on August 21, 2023, dismissing the Department's claims and removing the case from the docket. However, the court later consolidated the cases and held a hearing on the sanctions motions, ultimately granting them and ordering the Department to pay the parents' attorney's fees. The Department appealed the sanctions order. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas vacated the sanctions order, deeming it void because the trial court's dismissal order was considered final, thus ending the court's plenary power before the sanctions order was issued.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's dismissal order was not a final judgment as it did not clearly and unequivocally dispose of all claims and parties. Therefore, the trial court retained its plenary power when it issued the sanctions order. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment vacating the sanctions order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re C.K.M." on Justia Law

Two business partners, Anthony Bertucci and Eugene Watkins, developed low-income housing projects through various entities. Bertucci provided funding, while Watkins managed the projects. Watkins managed the entities' funds through a separate account, which led to concerns about mismanagement and personal use of funds. After Bertucci's health declined, his son Christopher, acting under power of attorney, discovered potential mismanagement and removed Watkins from his roles. This led to a legal dispute involving claims of breach of fiduciary duty and other violations.The probate court granted summary judgment in favor of Watkins on all claims. Bertucci, represented by his son Christopher as executor of his estate, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas reversed the summary judgment on some claims, finding fact issues regarding fiduciary duties and limitations, but affirmed the judgment on the derivative claims, concluding that Bertucci failed to adequately brief those claims.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Bertucci waived his appeal on the derivative claims due to inadequate briefing. The Supreme Court also found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Bertucci's individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Watkins's limitations defense and correctly resolved disputes regarding an expert report and the Dead Man's Rule. The Supreme Court reinstated the probate court's summary judgment on the individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the derivative claims. View "Bertucci v. Watkins" on Justia Law

In the 1950s, Bert and Donna Miller sought fertility treatment at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. Dr. John H. Randall, the head of the department, assisted them, resulting in the birth of three children. Decades later, DNA testing revealed that Dr. Randall, not Bert Miller, was the biological father of two of the children. The plaintiffs, Bert Miller and Nancy Duffner, sued the State of Iowa under the Fraud in Assisted Reproduction Act (FARA), alleging that Dr. Randall used his own sperm without their parents' knowledge or consent.The Iowa District Court for Johnson County dismissed the case, ruling that FARA, enacted in 2022, does not apply retroactively to actions taken decades earlier. The court found that FARA lacks any express language indicating legislative intent for retrospective application, and thus, it operates only prospectively. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that FARA's provision allowing children to sue "at any time" implies retroactive application.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that FARA does not apply to fertility fraud committed before the statute was enacted. The court emphasized that without an express retroactivity provision, statutes creating new substantive liabilities are presumed to operate only prospectively. The court found no language in FARA that rebuts this presumption and concluded that the statute's provision allowing actions to be brought "at any time" pertains only to future violations. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed with prejudice. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law