Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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The case involves a dispute between Vermont’s Auditor of Accounts and the Attorney General. The Auditor sued the Attorney General, alleging non-compliance with the statutory obligation to provide legal advice. The Auditor sought a declaratory judgment affirming his right to retain counsel to sue the Attorney General and mandamus to compel the Attorney General to answer specific legal questions. The trial court dismissed the Auditor’s claims and denied his request for attorneys’ fees.The dispute arose from the Auditor’s audit of a Burlington tax increment financing (TIF) district. The Auditor encountered a perceived gap in TIF statutes and sought advice from the Attorney General, who answered one question but directed the Auditor to other entities for the remaining questions. The Auditor claimed this was a violation of the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159 and threatened to sue. The Attorney General responded, explaining her statutory obligations and asserting that the Auditor lacked authority to sue.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claims for mandamus and declaratory judgment related to the specific TIF questions, concluding that the Attorney General had provided legal advice as required by 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the broader declaratory judgment claim, finding no live controversy as the Attorney General had provided legal advice and there was no policy of refusing to do so.However, the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding his right to retain counsel and sue for mandamus. The court held that the Auditor has implied statutory authorization to seek mandamus to enforce the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees, finding Rule 54 inapplicable for the relief sought by the Auditor. View "Office of the Auditor of Accounts v. Office of the Attorney General" on Justia Law

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Petitioner James Fredrick filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement in Vermont on a governor’s warrant pending extradition to New York for a second-degree murder charge. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that the extradition process requirements were met. On appeal, Fredrick argued that the governor’s warrant and New York’s extradition application lacked an authenticated copy of the indictment as required by Vermont law.The Caledonia Superior Court, Civil Division, held a hearing and denied Fredrick’s request, reasoning that the governor’s warrant was prima facie evidence that the extradition requirements were satisfied. The court found that the documents showed Fredrick was lawfully charged by indictment. Fredrick appealed the decision on January 9, 2025.During the appeal, Governor Scott recalled the original governor’s warrant and issued a new one, including a copy of the indictment signed by the grand jury foreperson. Fredrick filed another habeas corpus petition challenging the new warrant, which was also denied, and an appeal is pending.The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the original governor’s warrant was withdrawn and Fredrick’s confinement is now based on a new warrant. The court found no applicable exceptions to mootness, as Fredrick did not demonstrate that the issue was capable of repetition yet evading review, nor did he show negative collateral consequences. The court concluded that there was no longer an actual controversy, and the appeal was dismissed. View "In re James Fredrick" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Aleksandra Veljovic, filed a lawsuit against TD Bank, N.A. and its former employee, Zlata Cavka, alleging negligence, negligent supervision, and respondeat superior. Veljovic claimed that Cavka negligently notarized a fraudulent document used by her ex-husband to secure a divorce order in Serbia, which resulted in the loss of her marital property. Veljovic argued that TD Bank should be held liable for Cavka's actions. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed Veljovic's complaint with prejudice, concluding that she could not recover for purely economic losses and failed to demonstrate a special relationship between the parties. The court also denied her post-judgment request to amend her complaint.TD Bank moved to dismiss the complaint under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Veljovic's claims were barred by the economic-loss rule, that neither TD Bank nor Cavka owed her an independent duty of care, and that she failed to plead facts establishing necessary causation. The court granted the motion, finding that Veljovic sought compensation solely for economic losses and did not establish a special relationship with the defendants. The court also dismissed the claims against Cavka after Veljovic failed to respond to a show-cause order.Veljovic appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint and denying her motion to amend. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Veljovic did not allege sufficient facts to show a special relationship with the defendants and that her claims were barred by the economic-loss rule. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying her motion to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have established a special relationship or overcome the economic-loss rule. View "Veljovic v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Hexagon US Federal, Inc. ("HexFed") leased a portion of a building, which was later sold to CBS Holdings, LLC. A dispute arose regarding the lease's renewal, leading HexFed to file a lawsuit against CBS Holdings for breach of lease. CBS Holdings counterclaimed. The Madison Circuit Court ruled in favor of HexFed on all claims and awarded costs and attorney fees to be determined later. CBS Holdings appealed, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's judgment, including the award of costs and attorney fees.After an evidentiary hearing, the Madison Circuit Court awarded HexFed $174,987.45 in costs and attorney fees. CBS Holdings appealed, arguing that HexFed's application for attorney fees was inadequately supported due to redacted descriptions of legal work and that the trial court's order lacked sufficient detail for meaningful appellate review.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and agreed with CBS Holdings. The court found that HexFed's heavily redacted invoices did not provide enough information to determine the reasonableness and necessity of the attorney fees. The court emphasized that a trial court's order must allow for meaningful appellate review by articulating the decisions made, the reasons supporting those decisions, and how the attorney fee was calculated, considering all the Peebles factors.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for HexFed to provide adequate support for its application for costs and attorney fees. The trial court was instructed to accept any necessary information or evidence to confirm the requested attorney fees and to enter a detailed order showing how it calculated the amount awarded and how it considered the Peebles factors. View "CBS Holdings, LLC v. Hexagon US Federal, Inc." on Justia Law

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William Navarre purchased a house that had been damaged by two hurricanes in 2020. The previous owners, Bal and Rita Sareen, had received insurance payments from AIG Property Casualty Company but had not assigned their post-loss insurance rights to Navarre at the time of the sale. Navarre filed a lawsuit against AIG, claiming he had been assigned these rights as of the purchase date. However, the formal assignment document was not executed until January 2023, well after the lawsuit was filed and after the prescriptive period for the claims had expired.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of AIG, concluding that Navarre lacked standing to file the lawsuit because the assignment of rights had not been executed at the time he filed the suit. The court also noted that the prescriptive period for the claims had expired by the time the assignment was executed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the documents Navarre relied on (Addendum A and the Side Letter) did not constitute a present assignment of rights but rather contemplated a future assignment. Since the formal assignment was not executed until January 2023, Navarre did not have standing to sue when he filed the lawsuit in June 2022. Additionally, the court held that the prescriptive period for the claims had expired by the time the assignment was executed, and thus, Navarre could not retroactively cure the deficiency in his original petition. View "Navarre v. AIG Prop Cslty" on Justia Law

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James King sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and individual government employees under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, alleging physical abuse by U.S. officials. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. King appealed only the Bivens claim, making the FTCA judgment final. The individual defendants argued that the FTCA's "judgment bar" precluded the Bivens claim. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the FTCA judgment barred the Bivens claim.King then filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court to reopen the FTCA judgment to withdraw his FTCA claim and avoid the judgment bar. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that attorney error or strategic miscalculation is not a valid basis for reopening under Rule 60. King appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as attorney error or strategic miscalculation does not justify reopening a final judgment under Rule 60. The court emphasized the public policy favoring the finality of judgments and noted that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only available in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, which were not present in this case. View "King v. United States" on Justia Law

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Dr. Alan Braid, a Texas OB/GYN, admitted in a Washington Post editorial to performing an abortion in violation of the Texas Heartbeat Act (S.B. 8). This led to three individuals from different states filing lawsuits against him under the Act's citizen-suit enforcement provision, seeking at least $10,000 in statutory damages. Facing potential duplicative liability, Dr. Braid filed a federal interpleader action in Illinois, seeking to join the claimants in a single suit and also sought declaratory relief to declare S.B. 8 unconstitutional.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Dr. Braid’s suit, citing the Wilton-Brillhart abstention doctrine due to the existence of parallel state-court proceedings. The court reasoned that the Texas state courts were better suited to resolve the issues, particularly given the unique enforcement mechanism of S.B. 8. The district court also questioned whether Dr. Braid had a reasonable fear of double liability but ultimately found that it had jurisdiction before deciding to abstain.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the district court had jurisdiction over the interpleader action but concluded that abstention was appropriate under the Colorado River doctrine, which allows federal courts to defer to parallel state-court proceedings in exceptional cases. The court emphasized that the Texas courts were better positioned to resolve the complex state-law issues and that abstention would avoid piecemeal litigation and conflicting judgments. The court also noted that the Texas courts could adequately protect Dr. Braid’s rights and that the federal suit appeared to be an attempt to avoid the state-court system. View "Braid v. Stilley" on Justia Law

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In this case, Columbia Legal Services represented farmworkers in a class action against Stemilt AG Services, LLC, alleging forced labor and trafficking. During the litigation, the district court issued a protective order limiting Columbia's use of discovered information outside the case. The order required Columbia to seek court approval before using any discovery materials in other advocacy efforts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over the initial case. The court issued two protective orders during the discovery process. The first order protected sensitive employment data from the Washington State Employment Security Division. The second order, which is the subject of this appeal, restricted Columbia from using Stemilt's financial and employment records in other advocacy without prior court approval. The district court adopted this order to prevent Columbia from using discovered information outside the litigation, citing concerns about Columbia's intentions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Columbia had standing to appeal the protective order because it directly affected Columbia's ability to use discovered information in its advocacy work. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by issuing a broad and undifferentiated protective order without finding "good cause" or identifying specific harm that would result from public disclosure. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's protective order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized that discovery is presumptively public and that protective orders require a showing of specific prejudice or harm. View "COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES V. STEMILT AG SERVICES, LLC" on Justia Law

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Best Inn Midwest, LLC (Best Inn) owned and operated a hotel in Indianapolis, Indiana, which faced numerous issues, including health code violations and criminal activity. In 2017, Best Inn purchased a commercial property insurance policy from Ohio Security Insurance Company (Ohio Security). The policy excluded coverage for vandalism if the building was vacant for sixty consecutive days or more. Best Inn filed a claim for vandalism to air conditioning units on the hotel’s roof, which Ohio Security denied, citing vacancy. Ohio Security requested information about the hotel's occupancy, which Best Inn failed to provide, leading Ohio Security to file a suit seeking a declaration that the policy did not cover the claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted Ohio Security's motion for summary judgment on Best Inn's counterclaim for bad faith. The court found that Best Inn had failed to comply with discovery requests and court orders, leading to a sanction declaring the hotel vacant during the relevant period. This finding was based on Best Inn's repeated failure to provide requested documents and information, despite numerous attempts by Ohio Security to obtain them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions and declaring the hotel vacant. This declaration meant that the insurance policy did not cover the vandalism claim, and thus, Ohio Security was entitled to summary judgment on Best Inn's bad faith counterclaim. The appellate court concluded that the sanctions were appropriate and proportionate to Best Inn's conduct, and there were no remaining disputes as to any material fact. View "Ohio Security Insurance Company v Best Inn Midwest, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Idaho Legislature established the Community Partner Grant Program in 2021, using funds from the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on school-aged children. The funds were to be used exclusively for in-person educational and enrichment activities for children aged 5 to 13. In 2023, the Idaho Attorney General received information suggesting that some grant recipients had misused the funds to serve children under the age of five. Consequently, the Attorney General issued civil investigative demands (CIDs) to 34 grant recipients, requesting documentation related to the grant program. The recipients did not comply and instead sought a preliminary injunction in district court to set aside the CIDs.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied the preliminary injunction for 15 grant recipients, requiring them to respond to the CIDs, but granted it for 19 others, concluding that the Attorney General had not shown sufficient reason to believe these recipients had misused the funds. The court also reviewed two declarations in camera and provided redacted versions to the recipients' counsel.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that both the Idaho Charitable Assets Protection Act (ICAPA) and the Idaho Charitable Solicitation Act (ICSA) applied to the grant funds, giving the Attorney General authority to issue CIDs. The court determined that the "reason to believe" standard, not probable cause, was sufficient for issuing CIDs. The court found that the district court erred in granting the preliminary injunction to the 19 recipients and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court held that the CID issued to Elizabeth Oppenheimer was overly broad and violated her First Amendment right to freedom of association, requiring the district court to reconsider this CID. The court declined to award attorney fees to either party. View "Children's Home Society v. Labrador" on Justia Law