Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A Texas law, Senate Bill 12, regulates sexually oriented performances on public property and in the presence of minors. The law defines such performances as visual acts featuring nudity or sexual conduct that appeal to the prurient interest in sex. Several organizations and individuals involved in drag performances brought a pre-enforcement challenge, arguing that the law facially violates the First Amendment. The plaintiffs included groups that host pride festivals and drag events, as well as individual performers and entertainment companies.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a two-day bench trial. After reviewing the evidence, the district court found that the law was a facially unconstitutional restriction on speech and issued a permanent injunction preventing the Attorney General of Texas, certain district attorneys, counties, and a city from enforcing the law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether each plaintiff had standing to seek injunctive relief against each defendant. The Fifth Circuit found that most plaintiffs did not intend to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by the law and therefore lacked standing. Only one plaintiff, 360 Queen Entertainment, LLC, demonstrated standing to seek an injunction against the Attorney General, as its performances arguably included conduct regulated by the statute and minors were sometimes present.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded the case. The court instructed the district court to dismiss claims against all defendants except the Attorney General and to reconsider the facial challenge to Section One of the law under the framework set forth in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. The court emphasized that a facial challenge requires showing that a substantial number of the law’s applications are unconstitutional in relation to its legitimate sweep. View "Woodlands Pride v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Roger Cunningham opened an IRA during his marriage to Sheila, naming her as the sole beneficiary. The couple, long-time Tennessee residents, later divorced in 2015. Their Marital Dissolution Agreement, incorporated into a Tennessee court’s final divorce decree, awarded Sheila a specific sum from the IRA and required her to relinquish any further claim to the account. Roger moved to South Dakota before the divorce was finalized but did not update the IRA’s beneficiary designation. After Roger’s death in South Dakota, his daughter Susan, as personal representative of his estate, discovered that the IRA had been transferred to Sheila, still listed as the beneficiary.Following Roger’s death, Susan initiated informal probate proceedings in South Dakota and sought a declaration from the Second Judicial Circuit Court that, under South Dakota’s revocation-on-divorce statute (SDCL 29A-2-804), Sheila’s beneficiary status had been automatically revoked by the divorce, making the IRA part of the estate. Sheila, a Tennessee resident, appeared specially to contest jurisdiction and the procedural propriety of the Estate’s motion, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and that the matter should have been brought as a separate action. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Estate, finding it had jurisdiction and that the statute revoked Sheila’s beneficiary designation, thus including the IRA in the estate.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Sheila. The Supreme Court found that Sheila’s only connection to South Dakota was her receipt of the IRA funds, which resulted from Roger’s unilateral actions, not from any purposeful availment by Sheila of South Dakota’s laws. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded with instructions to grant Sheila’s motion to dismiss, declining to address the procedural issue. View "Estate Of Cunningham" on Justia Law

A train operated by Norfolk Southern carrying hazardous materials derailed near East Palestine, Ohio, in February 2023. The cleanup released toxic chemicals into the surrounding area, prompting affected residents and businesses to file suit against the railroad and other parties in federal court. These cases were consolidated into a master class action, and after extensive discovery and mediation, Norfolk Southern agreed to a $600 million settlement for the class. The district court for the Northern District of Ohio approved the settlement in September 2024. Five class members objected and appealed, but the district court required them to post an $850,000 appeal bond by January 30, 2025, to cover administrative and taxable costs. The objectors did not pay the bond or offer a lesser amount.After the bond order, the objectors filed a motion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to eliminate or reduce the bond, but did not seek a stay. The Sixth Circuit motions panel explained that, absent a separate notice of appeal, it could only address the bond on a motion to stay, which the objectors expressly disclaimed. The objectors then moved in the district court to extend the time to appeal the bond order, but did so one day after the deadline set by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A). The district court denied the motion as untimely, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the deadlines for appealing and requesting extensions are jurisdictional and cannot be equitably extended. The court dismissed the objectors’ appeal of the motion to extend for lack of jurisdiction and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the objectors’ appeals of the settlement for failure to pay the required bond. View "In re E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

Mark and Jane Thompson, residents of Aiken County and the City of Aiken, paid road maintenance fees levied by both the county and city for several years. After the City of Aiken rescinded its fee in 2021 and agreed to reimburse fees paid after that date, the Thompsons filed suit against various city and county officials and entities. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinances imposing the fees were invalid, reimbursement of unlawfully collected fees, damages under section 8-21-30 of the South Carolina Code, and relief for alleged violations of their constitutional rights.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court for Aiken County. The Thompsons voluntarily dismissed some claims and parties before and during the hearing. The trial court ultimately dismissed the remaining claims, finding that the South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act (RPA) deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction, that section 12-60-80(C) barred class actions against political subdivisions, that section 8-21-30 did not apply to the road maintenance fees or the actions of the county treasurer, and that sovereign immunity barred the unjust enrichment claim. The constitutional claim was dismissed by stipulation. The Thompsons appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina certified the appeal before the Court of Appeals could rule.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the road maintenance fees at issue were not “taxes” under the RPA, so the RPA did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the individual or class claims. The catchall provision of section 12-60-80(C) does not bar class actions against political subdivisions unless the claim concerns value-based property taxes. The court affirmed the dismissal of the unjust enrichment, section 8-21-30, and constitutional claims, but reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim, both individually and as a class. View "Thompson v. Killian" on Justia Law

Ramona Craig applied for Social Security disability benefits and, after her application was denied, she filed suit challenging that denial. The key issue in her case was whether she had properly exhausted her administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. The magistrate judge specifically warned Craig that she needed to present sufficient evidence of exhaustion prior to proceeding with her lawsuit. Despite these warnings, Craig did not provide the necessary evidence before the district court entered final judgment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed Craig’s case and dismissed it without prejudice, finding that she had failed to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies. After the district court entered its final judgment, Craig submitted an additional document intended to establish exhaustion, but this filing occurred after the judgment was entered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether it could review Craig’s post-judgment filing. The Fifth Circuit held that, under Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the record on appeal does not include documents filed in the district court after the entry of final judgment. The court further declined to exercise its discretion to take judicial notice of the post-judgment filing. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal without prejudice, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Craig failed to establish exhaustion of administrative remedies based on the filings made before final judgment. The court clarified that Craig may file a new case or seek to reopen the existing case if she wishes to pursue her claims. View "Craig v. Bisignano" on Justia Law

The plaintiff resided at an apartment complex with his son, who was arrested for aggravated armed robbery by the local police department. After the arrest, the police informed the apartment management, which then evicted both the plaintiff and his son based on a lease provision prohibiting criminal conduct. The plaintiff sought information about his son’s arrest from the city and police department under the Texas Public Information Act, but his request was denied after the city consulted the Texas Attorney General and invoked a law-enforcement exception.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the plaintiff filed suit against the city, the police department, the apartment complex, a debt collection agency, and the Texas Attorney General, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and Texas law. All defendants either appeared, filed answers, or moved to dismiss. The plaintiff moved for default judgment against each defendant, but the district court denied those motions and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff only challenged the denial of default judgment, as he did not brief arguments regarding the dismissals and thus forfeited them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the denial of default judgment for abuse of discretion. The court held that default judgment was not warranted because the city, police department, and debt collector had all appeared or answered, and the Attorney General had not been properly served. The court also found that arguments regarding attorney conflict and judicial bias were either forfeited or unsupported. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of default judgment. View "Clark v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Deepali Tukaye, an Indian cardiologist, was employed by Jack Stephens Heart Institute, which contracted with Conway Regional Medical Center to provide cardiologists. While working at Conway Regional, Tukaye raised concerns about the quality of care provided by a white cardiologist. Following her complaint, the CEO of Conway Regional, Matt Troup, threatened to terminate Jack Stephens’s contract unless Tukaye was reassigned. Jack Stephens did not reassign her, and Tukaye subsequently gave notice to leave her employment. After her notice, Conway Regional renewed its contract with Jack Stephens.Tukaye filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central Division against Troup, the City of Conway, the Health Facilities Board, and John Doe #1, alleging tortious interference with contract, due process violations, and employment discrimination. The district court dismissed her amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and denied her motion to alter or amend the judgment and to file a second amended complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. The appellate court limited its review to Tukaye’s tortious interference claim against Troup, as she did not challenge the dismissal of other claims or defendants. The court held that Tukaye’s own action of providing notice to leave constituted a resignation, which was a superseding cause of her harm and defeated the proximate cause element required for tortious interference under Arkansas law. The court also found no manifest error or newly discovered evidence to justify post-judgment relief. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Tukaye v. Troup" on Justia Law

Late one night in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Jason Roybal led police officers on a low-speed chase in a stolen car. After stopping, Roybal leaned out of his vehicle and fired a BB gun at the officers. The officers responded by firing their guns. Roybal then exited his car, dropped the BB gun, and fled on foot toward a civilian-occupied vehicle. The officers shot and killed Roybal as he was running away. The personal representative of Roybal’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, specifically claiming that Roybal was unarmed and fleeing when he was shot.The case was initially filed in New Mexico state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting qualified immunity and arguing that the complaint omitted key facts, such as Roybal firing a BB gun and running toward an occupied car. They also asked the district court to consider dash- and body-camera footage. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that it could not consider the videos at this stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly refused to consider the video evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a violation of Roybal’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the officers’ conduct was not justified by the circumstances described, and the right at issue was clearly established by precedent. View "Fuqua v. Santa Fe County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Several former students and their parents challenged a school district’s policy restricting the length of male students’ hair, alleging that the policy constituted race and sex discrimination and violated constitutional and statutory rights. The school district amended its hair policy during the 2019–2020 school year, removing language that previously allowed certain hairstyles, such as cornrows or locs, if they complied with other requirements. The plaintiffs argued that the enforcement of this policy infringed upon their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, Title VI, Title IX, and Texas law.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. During discovery, the plaintiffs sought to depose the superintendent and a former board president. The school district moved for a protective order, asserting legislative privilege to prevent inquiries into the subjective motivations of board members regarding the hair policy. The district court partially denied the motion, establishing a procedure where deponents could assert the privilege but would still be required to answer, with disputed portions of testimony marked confidential for later review. The district court declined to rule on the privilege’s applicability until specific questions were asked during depositions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in its handling of the legislative privilege and the protective order. The Fifth Circuit held that none of the appellants—including the school district, the board of trustees, and the individual former officials—had standing to appeal the district court’s order because the privilege holders had not personally invoked the privilege or participated adequately in the proceedings. As a result, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and also dismissed the pending motion to stay as moot. View "Arnold v. Barbers Hill Independent School District" on Justia Law

Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC is the developer of a mixed-use condominium project in San Francisco known as GS Heritage Place, which includes both timeshare and whole residential units. Stephen Schneider owns a timeshare interest in one of the fractional units and has voting rights in the homeowners association. In 2018, Schneider filed a class action lawsuit against Cocoa and others, alleging improper management practices, including the use of fractional units as hotel rooms and misallocation of expenses. The parties settled that lawsuit in 2020, with Schneider agreeing not to disparage Cocoa or solicit further claims against it, and to cooperate constructively in future dealings.In 2022, Schneider initiated another lawsuit against Cocoa. In response, Cocoa filed a cross-complaint against Schneider, alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract (the settlement agreement), unjust enrichment, and defamation. Cocoa claimed Schneider engaged in a campaign to prevent the sale of unsold units as whole units, formed unofficial owner groups, made disparaging statements, and threatened litigation, all of which allegedly violated the prior settlement agreement and harmed Cocoa’s economic interests.Schneider moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that Cocoa’s claims arose from his protected activities—namely, petitioning the courts and speaking on matters of public interest related to association management. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted Schneider’s motion, finding that all claims in the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Cocoa failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Cocoa’s claims were based on Schneider’s protected litigation and association management activities, and that Cocoa did not establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims. View "Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law