Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Adidas America, Inc. brought a lawsuit against Thom Browne, Inc., alleging trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition, based on Thom Browne’s use of certain stripe motifs on its apparel. Adidas’s claims focused on Thom Browne’s Four-Bar Signature and Grosgrain designs, which adidas argued infringed on its well-known Three-Stripe Mark, particularly in a new line of activewear. At trial, the jury heard extensive evidence, including testimony from sixteen witnesses and more than four hundred exhibits, and ultimately found Thom Browne not liable on all counts.Subsequently, during related litigation in the United Kingdom, adidas discovered that Thom Browne had failed to disclose several relevant emails during discovery in the U.S. action. These emails contained internal discussions among Thom Browne employees acknowledging the potential for confusion between Thom Browne’s stripe designs and adidas’s mark. Adidas moved in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for relief from the final judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and 60(b)(3) (misconduct), arguing that the emails warranted a new trial. The district court denied the motion, finding that the emails probably would not have changed the verdict and that Thom Browne’s discovery violation was, at most, negligent rather than intentional misconduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Second Circuit held that adidas failed to demonstrate that the newly discovered emails probably would have altered the outcome at trial, as required under Rule 60(b)(2). The court further held that “misconduct” under Rule 60(b)(3) does not include merely negligent discovery violations; only intentional or reckless conduct could justify such relief. Therefore, adidas was not entitled to a new trial. View "Adidas America, Inc. v. Thom Browne, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves an attorney who, after being voluntarily dismissed as a defendant in a legal malpractice and fraud lawsuit brought by his former client, later sued that client for malicious prosecution. The client, who speaks and reads only Japanese, had previously alleged that the attorney’s actions led her to accept an unfavorable settlement in an estate dispute. After receiving a letter from the attorney’s counsel asserting that the malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitations and warning of potential malicious prosecution liability, the client dismissed her lawsuit with prejudice.When the attorney sued for malicious prosecution, the client moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. In support, she submitted a declaration stating her main motivation for dismissal was concern about the statute of limitations, and her counsel offered a similar declaration. The attorney objected, arguing that the client’s declaration was incompetent because she could not read or write English, and no interpreter’s attestation was provided. The Superior Court overruled this objection, finding no such attestation was required for written declarations, and granted summary judgment for the client on the basis that the dismissal was procedural and thus not a favorable termination for malicious prosecution.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the client’s declaration as competent evidence. The appellate court held that, since the client could not read or speak English, her declaration required a proper foundation, including an interpreter’s attestation regarding the translation’s accuracy and the interpreter’s qualifications. Without this foundation, the declaration could not establish the client’s reasons for dismissal, and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. The appellate court reversed the judgment and ordered the lower court to deny the summary judgment motion. View "Detrick v. Shimada" on Justia Law

Elizabeth and Cale Putnam, residents of Massachusetts, traveled to the Hotel Valcartier in Québec, Canada, with their five-year-old son, Anthony. While staying at the hotel, an unsecured Murphy bed fell on Anthony, causing fatal injuries. The Putnams had booked their stay at the hotel and its associated Ice Hotel through the hotel’s website, received receipts and marketing communications at their Massachusetts address, and noticed other Massachusetts vehicles at the hotel during their visit.Following Anthony’s death, the Putnams filed a wrongful death lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Premier Parks, LLC, which they believed operated the hotel, and EPR Properties, which they believed owned it. Both Premier and EPR moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, submitting affidavits asserting they neither owned nor operated the hotel, nor marketed or contracted with Massachusetts residents regarding the hotel. The Putnams submitted documentary evidence suggesting connections between Premier, EPR, and the hotel, but the district court dismissed the case with prejudice and denied their request for jurisdictional discovery.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court found that, as to Premier Parks, the Putnams presented enough documentary evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding Premier’s involvement in the hotel’s operations, marketing, and staffing. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying jurisdictional discovery with respect to Premier and reversed the dismissal as to Premier, remanding for discovery. Regarding EPR, the court concluded that the Putnams failed to contradict EPR’s affidavit that it did not own or operate the hotel or market it to Massachusetts residents. The court affirmed the dismissal as to EPR but modified the judgment to be without prejudice. View "Putnam v. EPR Properties" on Justia Law

A local air quality management district initiated legal action against an engineering company, its chief executive officer, and a related business, alleging they committed statutory and regulatory violations connected to their agricultural service operations. The district claimed that the defendants failed to correct their conduct after being issued several notices of violation for operating equipment without proper permits and failing to comply with emission controls. The defendants, in response, asserted that the notices were based on an internal district policy that had not been properly adopted through the required public rulemaking procedures.The defendants filed a cross-complaint in the Superior Court of Yolo County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that the district relied on a “secret” policy (Policy 24) not properly promulgated under statutory procedures, which unfairly deprived them of certain agricultural exemptions. The district responded with an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion under section 425.16, asserting that the cross-complaint targeted protected regulatory and legal activities, including the investigation, issuance of notices, and initiation of litigation. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the cross-complaint was a challenge to the validity of the underlying policy, not to the enforcement actions themselves.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the cross-complaint arose from activities protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that the causes of action in the cross-complaint were directed at the validity of the district’s internal policy rather than at the district’s protected enforcement activities. Therefore, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded costs on appeal to the defendants. View "People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management Dist." on Justia Law

In this case, Texas enacted Senate Bill 4 (S.B. 4) in 2023 to address a significant increase in illegal immigration across its southern border. The law criminalizes certain acts of unlawful entry and reentry, tracking federal immigration statutes, and allows for state judges to order the return of individuals found in violation. Before the law took effect, two nonprofit organizations that provide legal services to immigrants and El Paso County filed suit, seeking to have S.B. 4 declared unlawful and its enforcement enjoined. The nonprofits claimed the law would frustrate their missions and require them to divert resources, while El Paso County alleged it would incur increased costs and suffer a loss of public trust.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction, finding that S.B. 4 was likely preempted by federal law and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, based on the alleged frustration of their missions, resource diversion, and reputational harm. Texas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A divided panel initially affirmed the injunction, heavily relying on Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman to find organizational standing. However, the Supreme Court subsequently decided FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, which narrowed the circumstances under which organizations can claim standing based on resource diversion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that voluntarily incurring costs, merely adjusting to new laws, or alleging reputational harm do not constitute cognizable injuries. As a result, the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, declining to address the merits of the preemption claim. View "USA v. State of Texas" on Justia Law

An employee brought a lawsuit against her former employer and related entities, alleging wrongful termination, unfair business practices, and Labor Code violations stemming from her work as a massage therapist. The plaintiff later sought to amend her complaint to add several new defendants, including the national franchisor associated with her workplace, after obtaining new information through discovery and depositions. The franchisor, Massage Envy, was added after the plaintiff learned it may have influenced employment practices and the sale of the business. However, the initial amended complaint lacked specific factual allegations against Massage Envy.After the plaintiff conceded the factual deficiencies regarding Massage Envy, she sought leave to amend her complaint again. Massage Envy filed a demurrer, arguing not only that the complaint was deficient but also that there was no viable legal basis for liability. The parties disagreed over the adequacy of their meet-and-confer efforts. The Superior Court of San Diego County sustained the demurrer but granted leave to amend, conditioning this leave on the plaintiff’s payment of $25,000 in attorney fees to Massage Envy, relying on section 473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter. It held that section 473 does not authorize a trial court to condition leave to amend a pleading on payment of attorney fees to the opposing party, absent a statutory provision or party agreement. The appellate court clarified that section 473 only allows for the shifting of costs, not attorney fees, and that attorney fee awards as sanctions require specific statutory authority and procedural compliance. The appellate court granted a writ of mandate directing the trial court to strike the payment condition for attorney fees and awarded costs to the petitioner. View "Amezcua v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Town of Pine Hill sued several corporations and individuals in the Wilcox Circuit Court, claiming that chemical contamination from upstream industrial facilities, including per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), polluted the Town’s drinking water supply from the Alabama River. The Town alleged that these chemicals, released via wastewater, air, and stormwater emissions, exceeded federal health guidelines, could not be removed by current treatment processes, and caused harm. The Town sought damages for remediation, future filtration costs, and injunctive relief. The complaint stated that no federal cause of action was asserted and noted that most defendants were out-of-state corporations.After the suit was filed, 3M Company, Inc. removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, citing federal-officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and diversity jurisdiction. The district court remanded the case to state court, but 3M appealed the remand order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The district court stayed its remand order pending appeal, even after transmitting it to the state court. The Town argued that jurisdiction returned to the circuit court upon remand, and the Wilcox Circuit Court agreed, ordering litigation to proceed.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that because the removal was under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the remand order was appealable and the federal district court retained jurisdiction to stay or reconsider its remand order, even after transmitting it to the state court. The circuit court acted without jurisdiction by proceeding while the remand order was stayed. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama issued a writ of prohibition, requiring the circuit court to vacate its order asserting jurisdiction and to stay proceedings until the federal appeal is resolved. View "Town of Pine Hill v. 3M Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Barbara Tanzer, an elderly woman, and her husband moved through several states, ultimately leasing an apartment in Alabama to allow her husband to receive medical treatment. Shortly after their arrival, the Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR) petitioned for protective services, alleging Barbara was unable to care for herself and at risk of exploitation. DHR cited Barbara’s physical and cognitive limitations and alleged suspicious financial activity by a third party using a power of attorney. Barbara was evaluated twice by medical professionals, who found she did not suffer from significant cognitive impairment and retained capacity for medical decision-making, though she required physical assistance. Barbara asserted that her presence in Alabama was temporary and that she remained domiciled elsewhere.After DHR’s petition, the Jefferson Probate Court issued emergency protective orders, froze Barbara’s assets, and ultimately appointed a permanent conservator for her estate. Throughout the proceedings, Barbara maintained that the court lacked personal jurisdiction, as she did not reside in Alabama, had no family or assets there, and was only temporarily present for her husband’s medical care. She sold her Georgia property, purchased a condominium in Massachusetts, and notified the probate court of her permanent move out of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the probate court lacked personal jurisdiction under the Alabama Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act. The Court found that Alabama was neither Barbara’s home state nor a significant-connection state at the time the petition was filed, and none of the statutory bases for jurisdiction applied. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the probate court’s order appointing a conservator and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tanzer v. Alabama Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law

Robert Crawford was admitted to a hospital in August 2018 in critical condition. The next day, his daughter Carol obtained a general power of attorney (POA) allegedly signed by Robert and notarized by Lindsay, though Robert’s condition raised questions about the validity of the POA. Carol attempted to use the POA to access Robert’s bank accounts; one bank and a hospital refused to honor it, but First Security Bank (FSB) allowed significant withdrawals, despite having prior instructions from Robert to prohibit such transactions unless he appeared in person. Robert died intestate in September 2018, and Dasie Mae Richmond was appointed administratrix of his estate.Dasie filed suit in the Quitman County Chancery Court in August 2021 against FSB, Carol, and Lindsay, alleging improper procurement of the POA, conversion, conspiracy, negligence, and breach of contract. After initial discovery, proceedings were stayed due to Carol’s indictment and plea related to exploitation of a vulnerable person. Lindsay filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied. Later, Lindsay moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), with FSB and Carol joining. The chancery court granted dismissal as to Lindsay only, citing ongoing restitution by Carol and unresolved issues with FSB, but denied the motion as to FSB and Carol.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed only FSB’s appeal of the denial of dismissal. The Court held that the facts justifying dismissal for Lindsay applied equally to FSB and found no sound basis in the record for treating FSB differently. The Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that the chancery court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 41(b) dismissal as to FSB. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and rendered judgment dismissing the claims against FSB. View "First Security Bank v. Richmond" on Justia Law

In June 2023, Colorado enacted a law prohibiting the purchase, sale, transfer, and possession of unserialized firearms, frames, receivers, and firearm parts kits, as well as the manufacture of firearm frames or receivers by most people. Several individuals and two associations representing Colorado gun owners sued, alleging that the statute infringes their Second Amendment rights. The individual plaintiffs had previously purchased or owned firearm parts kits and intended to continue similar activities but for the new law. The associations represent gun owners in Colorado and were acting on behalf of similarly situated members.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It determined that one individual plaintiff had standing to challenge the possession prohibition, but found that the claims relating to future acquisition were not ripe due to an overlapping federal regulation, and that claims challenging the manufacturing prohibition lacked standing because the plaintiffs’ conduct was not covered by that provision. The court denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that the possession prohibition was a presumptively constitutional condition on the commercial sale of firearms that did not implicate the plain text of the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff had standing to challenge both the possession and acquisition prohibitions, but not the manufacturing prohibition. The court found that the district court erred in treating the possession prohibition as a condition on commercial sales, since the law regulated possession regardless of how the item was acquired. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to the possession prohibition, holding that this provision regulates possession, not just commercial sales. The court remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to address the merits of the acquisition prohibition claim in the first instance. View "National Association for Gun Rights v. Polis" on Justia Law