Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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Chenault-Vaughan Family Partnership ("Chenault"), a royalty interest holder in a Texas mineral estate, sued Centennial Resources Operating, LLC ("Centennial"), the site operator, for wrongly withholding royalties. The Bankruptcy Court awarded summary judgment to Centennial. Chenault appealed to the District Court, where the parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment, and Chenault appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit first addressed whether the Magistrate Judge had jurisdiction to enter final judgment in the bankruptcy appeal. The court concluded that, with the consent of the parties and a referral by the district court, a magistrate judge may enter final judgment in a bankruptcy appeal. This conclusion was supported by the broad consent authority granted to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the repeal of the statutory provision that previously prohibited such referrals, and the supervisory authority retained by Article III judges.On the merits, the Third Circuit reviewed the Bankruptcy Court’s summary judgment on two claims: trespass to try title and royalties under the Texas Natural Resources Code ("TNRC"). The court affirmed the summary judgment for Centennial on the trespass-to-try-title claim, finding that Centennial did not unlawfully enter the land and dispossess Chenault, as Luxe, a cotenant, had the right to extract minerals and permit Centennial to operate.However, the court vacated the summary judgment on the TNRC claim. The court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Centennial was obligated to pay Unit B royalties to Chenault, particularly concerning the Division Order and Centennial’s knowledge of MDC’s non-signature on the Unit B JOA. The case was remanded to the Magistrate Judge with instructions to remand to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings on the TNRC claim. View "In re: MTE Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

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Incyte Corporation appealed a post-grant review (PGR) final written decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) which held that Incyte failed to prove claims 1–7 and 9–21 of U.S. Patent No. 10,561,659 were unpatentable. The '659 patent, owned by Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc., discloses a method of treating hair-loss disorders using deuterium-modified ruxolitinib. Incyte petitioned for PGR, arguing the claims were obvious, but the Board found Incyte's arguments unpersuasive and upheld the claims. Incyte's request for rehearing was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Sun argued that Incyte lacked Article III standing to appeal. The court noted that standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that must be addressed before reaching the merits of an appeal. To establish standing, Incyte needed to demonstrate an injury in fact, which it attempted to do by claiming potential infringement liability and invoking the competitor standing doctrine.The court found that Incyte's plans to develop a deuterated ruxolitinib product were too speculative to establish concrete plans for future activity that would create a substantial risk of future infringement. The court also determined that Incyte's reliance on the competitor standing doctrine was insufficient because Incyte did not show it was currently engaging in or had nonspeculative plans to engage in conduct covered by the claims of the '659 patent.Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Incyte failed to establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. View "INCYTE CORPORATION v. SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, INC. " on Justia Law

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A Turkish graduate student, Rümeysa Öztürk, was lawfully residing in Massachusetts on a student visa when she was arrested by plainclothes officers without warning on March 25, 2025. She was transported across state lines and eventually detained in Louisiana. Her counsel, unaware of her location, filed a habeas petition in the District of Massachusetts, alleging her arrest was based on an op-ed she co-authored. The petition was transferred to the District of Vermont after it was revealed she had been in Vermont during transit.The District of Vermont set a schedule for a bail hearing and to resolve the constitutional claims in the habeas petition. The court ordered the government to transfer Öztürk from Louisiana to Vermont to aid in these proceedings. The government appealed this order, seeking an emergency stay of the transfer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the government failed to justify a stay. It determined that the District of Vermont was the proper venue for the habeas petition since Öztürk was in Vermont when the petition was filed. The court also found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction over Öztürk’s detention challenge. Additionally, the court held that the government did not demonstrate irreparable injury absent a stay and that the balance of equities favored Öztürk.The Second Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay, denied the request for a writ of mandamus, and vacated the administrative stay. The court ordered the government to comply with the district court’s transfer order within one week. View "Öztürk v. Hyde" on Justia Law

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A former inmate at the Illinois River Correctional Center (IRCC) filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several prison officials, including Wardens Walter Nicholson and Gregory Gossett. The plaintiff alleged that the IRCC's failure to treat his chronic kidney disease, which progressed to acute renal failure, constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff claimed that the wardens were aware of the deficient medical practices that led to his injury.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted Warden Nicholson's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred and that he failed to state a claim. The court also granted Warden Gossett's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Gossett was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Additionally, the court excluded the plaintiff's expert witnesses, determining that their testimony would not assist the jury and might cause confusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim against Warden Nicholson, agreeing that the plaintiff's complaint contained only general allegations and did not provide specific deficiencies in the IRCC's health care system. The court also upheld the summary judgment in favor of Warden Gossett, concluding that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to show that Gossett was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony, as the experts lacked relevant expertise and their opinions would not assist the jury. View "Ollison v Gossett" on Justia Law

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The Borough of Englewood Cliffs filed a complaint and an amended complaint against its former attorneys and a builder, alleging professional malpractice, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. The Borough's actions followed a previous affordable housing litigation where the Borough did not prevail and subsequently settled with the builder. The Borough's new council, elected after a municipal election, pursued the litigation despite warnings from the defendants that the claims were frivolous.The trial court dismissed the Borough's complaints with prejudice, finding that the Borough acted in bad faith to harass, delay, and cause malicious injury. The court awarded the defendants attorney fees and costs under New Jersey’s Frivolous Litigation Statute (FLS), totaling $216,484.45. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that a public entity is not immune from sanctions under the FLS.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that municipalities and municipal corporations that engage in frivolous litigation are subject to sanctions under the FLS. The Court found that the FLS does not provide immunity to municipalities and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect municipalities from liability under the FLS. The Court emphasized that the FLS aims to deter frivolous litigation and compensate the victims of such actions. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed as modified, holding the Borough liable for the sanctions imposed. View "Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner" on Justia Law

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A former president of Panama, while residing in the United States, was extradited to Panama under a bilateral treaty. Panama initially charged him with specific crimes, but after his extradition, he was prosecuted for additional money laundering crimes not included in the original extradition request. He claimed these prosecutions violated the treaty's rule of specialty, which restricts prosecution to the crimes listed in the extradition request unless the extradited individual has had the opportunity to return to the extraditing country.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed his lawsuit for lack of standing. The court concluded that he failed to show that his injury was traceable to the defendants' actions or that a favorable ruling would redress his injuries. The court also determined that he lacked standing under the treaty's rule of specialty provision because the United States had waived its right to object to the additional prosecutions, and his rights under the treaty were derivative of the United States' rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to establish Article III standing because his injury was not fairly traceable to the defendants' actions, as the decision to prosecute him was made independently by Panamanian officials. Additionally, the court found that a favorable declaratory judgment would not redress his injury, as it would not bind the Panamanian officials to drop the prosecutions. The court also concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing under the rule of specialty because the United States had consented to the prosecutions, extinguishing his derivative rights under the treaty. View "Berrocal v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Ray Jr. died from asphyxiation due to an industrial accident involving nitrogen gas. His widow, Sharmel Culver, was awarded death benefits and subsequently applied for an additional award, alleging that Ray’s employer, TimkenSteel Corporation, violated specific safety requirements (VSSR). The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied the application, finding that the specific safety requirements did not apply because nitrogen gas is not considered "toxic" or a "poison."Culver sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which determined that the commission abused its discretion. The court issued a limited writ, directing the commission to reconsider the VSSR analysis, concluding that nitrogen gas, in the concentration present in the elevator-control room, was toxic and thus fell under the applicable safety regulations.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District’s judgment. The court held that the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the additional award. The court found that the commission’s decision was supported by some evidence, including expert testimony and industry literature indicating that nitrogen gas is not inherently toxic. The court emphasized that the regulations in effect at the time of Ray’s death defined "air contaminants" as including only "toxic" gases, and the evidence did not support a finding that nitrogen gas met this definition. The court concluded that the commission’s interpretation of the regulations was reasonable and that the Tenth District erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the commission. View "State ex rel. Culver v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

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Thomas Clark, an inmate at Lebanon Correctional Institution (LCI), sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) to provide records under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. Clark also requested $6,000 in statutory damages for six public-records requests he claimed were either denied or ignored by DRC. The requests were made between October 2020 and March 2024, during his incarceration at North Central Correctional Complex (NCCC) and LCI.Clark alleged that he made multiple requests for records, including theft/loss reports and an inmate handbook from NCCC, and chow-hall menus and mail policies from LCI. He claimed that these requests were either ignored or denied. However, Clark did not provide copies of his 2020 and 2021 requests from NCCC, relying instead on a 2024 kite requesting copies of earlier kites. For the LCI requests, Clark provided evidence of his requests for chow-hall menus and mail policies.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court found that Clark failed to prove he sent the 2020 and 2021 requests to NCCC. Regarding the LCI requests, the court noted that Clark did not direct his requests to the appropriate public-information officer, Ellen Myers, as required by DRC’s protocol. The court held that it is not a violation of the Public Records Act when an employee not responsible for public-records requests directs the requester to the proper office or person responsible for the records.The court denied Clark’s writ of mandamus, as well as his requests for statutory damages and court costs, concluding that Clark did not show a violation of the Public Records Act by DRC. View "State ex rel. Clark v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law

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Amazon.com Services LLC appealed the "constructive denial" of its motion for injunctive relief from two administrative proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The case involves Amazon's fulfillment center in Staten Island, New York, where the Amazon Labor Union (ALU) won an election to represent over 8,000 employees. Amazon filed objections alleging interference by ALU and the NLRB's Regional Office, leading to two NLRB cases: one concerning the election and another regarding Amazon's refusal to bargain with ALU.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed Amazon's request for temporary, preliminary, and permanent declaratory and injunctive relief to avoid harm from the alleged unconstitutional proceedings. Amazon argued that the structure of the NLRB proceedings violated the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied Amazon's request for a temporary restraining order, finding that Amazon had not established a substantial threat of irreparable harm. The court also granted but stayed the NLRB's motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of New York.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court found that Amazon did not act diligently in seeking expedited relief and failed to establish a legitimate basis for urgency. The court noted that Amazon did not repeatedly request swift review or a ruling by a specific date until the day before its deadline to respond to the NLRB's summary judgment motion. The court concluded that the district court did not effectively deny Amazon's motion for injunctive relief by failing to rule by September 27, 2024. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Amazon.com v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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Broc Waltermeyer, an incarcerated federal inmate, alleged that he received inadequate medical treatment for his chronic knee pain while at the Federal Correctional Institute in Berlin, New Hampshire. He claimed that despite receiving various non-surgical treatments, including cortisone injections, pain medication, special shoes, knee braces, access to a low bunk, and a cane, he continued to experience pain. Waltermeyer argued that he should have been provided with knee replacement surgery, which was recommended to be deferred by an outside specialist until he was older.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire dismissed Waltermeyer's complaint, holding that his claims failed because he had an alternative administrative remedy. The district court also denied his motion for a preliminary injunction, as he had been transferred to a different facility, making the defendants no longer responsible for his care. Waltermeyer then amended his complaint to seek only money damages, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Waltermeyer's claims were meaningfully different from those in Carlson v. Green, where the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens-type Eighth Amendment claim against federal prison officials for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The court found that Waltermeyer received substantial treatment, albeit not the treatment he preferred, and that the medical procedures administered were in accordance with doctors' recommendations. The court concluded that the differences in the nature of the medical care provided and the absence of gross inadequacy or deliberate indifference made Waltermeyer's case distinct from Carlson, thus precluding the extension of a Bivens remedy. View "Waltermeyer v. Hazlewood" on Justia Law