Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff purchased a vehicle in 2017 and later alleged it was defective, suing the manufacturer in 2021. The parties eventually settled, with the plaintiff surrendering the vehicle and dismissing the suit, and the manufacturer agreeing to pay $100,000. The settlement specified the plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, and the manufacturer would pay the amount determined by the trial court upon noticed motion. After the settlement was reported to the Superior Court of San Diego County, the court ordered dismissal within 45 days. When no dismissal was filed, the clerk issued notice that the case would be deemed dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023, unless a party showed good cause otherwise. No such cause was shown, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees.The motion for attorney fees was opposed by the manufacturer, arguing it was untimely under California Rules of Court, as it was not served within 180 days of the dismissal date. The plaintiff countered that the 180-day deadline did not apply, claiming the case had not been formally dismissed and no judgment had been entered. The Superior Court of San Diego County disagreed, finding the case had been dismissed on August 15, 2023, per the clerk’s notice and court rules, and denied the motion as untimely. The plaintiff appealed the denial, and a signed minute order dismissing the complaint was later entered, but the court maintained that the earlier date controlled.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter de novo. It held that a voluntary dismissal, even if not appealable, starts the clock for filing a motion for attorney fees when it concludes the litigation. The court found the case was dismissed on August 15, 2023, and the plaintiff failed to timely serve the fee motion. The order denying attorney fees was affirmed. View "Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

While incarcerated in the general population at Central Prison in North Carolina, an individual was violently attacked by a “safekeeper”—a pre-trial detainee designated as requiring strict separation due to risk of violence. On the day in question, prison correctional officers responsible for enforcing separation between safekeepers and the general population failed to keep key security doors closed, contrary to prison policy. This lapse allowed the safekeeper to encounter and assault the plaintiff, resulting in severe facial injuries and lasting pain.The plaintiff brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three correctional officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that the record did not support a jury finding of Eighth Amendment liability and concluding that, even if it did, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also allowed the officers, over the plaintiff’s objection, to file a late response to a summary judgment motion without applying the “excusable neglect” standard required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding both the officers’ liability for deliberate indifference and the applicability of qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit further found that the district court had abused its discretion by failing to consider the correct standard when granting an extension of time for the officers’ late filing. The court vacated the district court’s summary judgment and extension orders, and remanded the case for further proceedings with instructions to apply the proper legal standards. View "Case v. Beasley" on Justia Law

After an adult son sent text messages threatening a mass shooting at a local high school and referenced access to thousands of rounds of ammunition, the city police investigated the home he shared with his father. The father owned multiple firearms and large quantities of ammunition. Evidence showed the son had a history of mental health crises, including involuntary holds, and was subject to a lifetime ban from possessing firearms. Despite this prohibition, the son had access to firearms through his father, participated in shooting competitions, and had knowledge of how to access gun safes in the home. The father failed to turn in all firearms and ammunition as required by a temporary restraining order, and some safes were not adequately secured.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing, where both the father and a police investigator testified. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father’s failure to adequately secure his firearms and ammunition, combined with his son’s mental health history and credible threat of mass violence, posed a significant danger to others. The court concluded the father’s conduct enabled his son’s access to firearms and found no adequate, less restrictive alternatives to a Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO). A three-year GVRO was issued against the father.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings and that the GVRO statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court concluded the trial court reasonably interpreted statutory causation and properly considered alternatives. The father’s Second Amendment and hearsay objections were deemed forfeited for not being raised below. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the GVRO. View "Anaheim Police Dept. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

M.H. is the mother of two children, M.S. and G.H. In 2022, Erie County Department of Social Services initiated abuse proceedings against M.H. and her former boyfriend, D.K., after videos surfaced appearing to show D.K. sexually abusing M.S. The videos, dated from 2019, were not found in the family home but rather on the computer of B.W., an individual in Syracuse who claimed to have hacked into the family's security cameras and who was under investigation for trading child pornography. The FBI recovered the videos, which depicted incidents in the family’s living room. Neither child disclosed abuse during interviews; M.S. denied any sexual contact, and G.H. was unaware of any abuse. The police collected photographs of the home that matched details in the videos, and M.H. identified the people in screenshots as D.K. and M.S.Erie County Family Court admitted the videos into evidence over objection, relying on testimony from the FBI agent who recovered the videos and a police investigator who confirmed the setting matched the family home. The court found that M.H. had abused M.S. by failing to protect her from D.K. and derivatively abused G.H. Both children were placed in foster care, and M.H.’s contact was limited to supervised visits. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that any uncertainty regarding the videos’ authenticity went to their weight and not their admissibility.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The Court held that the videos were not properly authenticated because Erie County failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing their reliability. Unlike in prior cases where authentication was found lacking, here the videos’ chain of custody was more tenuous and the testimony presented did not meet the threshold required for authentication. As a result, the Court reversed the orders of the Appellate Division and dismissed the petitions against M.H. View "Matter of M.S." on Justia Law

Edward and Linda Diaz purchased a motorhome from a California dealer, receiving warranties from the manufacturer that included a clause requiring any legal disputes related to the warranties to be litigated exclusively in Indiana, where the motorhome was manufactured. The warranties also contained a choice-of-law provision favoring Indiana law and a waiver of jury trial. After experiencing issues with the vehicle that were not remedied under warranty, the Diazes sued the manufacturer, dealer, and lender in California under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging failure to repair defects and refusal to replace or refund the vehicle.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants’ motion to stay the California action, enforcing the forum selection clause. The manufacturer had offered to stipulate that it would not oppose application of California’s Song-Beverly Act or a jury trial if the Diazes pursued their claims in Indiana. The court ordered the manufacturer to sign such a stipulation, holding that the Diazes could seek to lift the stay if Indiana courts declined to apply California law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, concluded that the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The court held that the warranty’s terms, including the forum selection and choice-of-law provisions, violated California public policy by purporting to waive unwaivable statutory rights under the Song-Beverly Act. The court determined that the manufacturer’s post hoc offer to stipulate to California law did not cure the unconscionability present at contract formation and that severance of the unlawful terms would not further the interests of justice. As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order staying the California action and directed entry of a new order denying the stay. View "Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc." on Justia Law

Three employees at different Illinois schools declined to receive the COVID-19 vaccine, citing religious beliefs, after the Illinois Governor issued an Executive Order requiring school employees to either vaccinate or undergo weekly testing. The schools, in compliance with the Executive Order and state agency guidance, offered weekly testing as an accommodation for those claiming a religious exemption to vaccination. The employees refused the testing, asserting that submitting to it violated their moral consciences, and were either placed on unpaid leave or terminated.The employees filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Emergency Use Authorization Act, and the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act. Each employer moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court dismissed the Title VII claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to identify a religious belief that was violated by the testing requirement. The court also dismissed the Emergency Use Authorization Act claim, holding there was no private right of action, and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. The employees appealed only the dismissal of their Title VII claim and, for the first time on appeal, raised a claim under the Illinois Public Health Code.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Title VII because they did not allege a religious objection to testing; their objections were based on personal moral conscience, not religious belief. The court further held that Title VII does not require an employer to accommodate religious beliefs when doing so would cause the employer to violate the law. The court also found that any argument under the Illinois Public Health Code was waived. View "Bowlin v. Board of Directors, Judah Christian School" on Justia Law

A group of nine professional models brought suit against a nightclub in Greenville, South Carolina, alleging that the club took images from the models’ social media pages and used them in its promotional materials without their knowledge, consent, or compensation. The models claimed the advertising falsely implied their association, employment, or endorsement of the club. They asserted two claims under the Lanham Act as well as seven state law claims, including misappropriation of likeness.The defendant responded with a motion to dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), but did not challenge the sufficiency of the misappropriation of likeness claim. The plaintiffs did not respond to the motion within the time set by the District of South Carolina’s local rules. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted the motion to dismiss as unopposed, dismissing the federal and most state law claims with prejudice and dismissing the misappropriation of likeness claim without prejudice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The plaintiffs’ postjudgment motions for relief were denied by the district court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a court may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion solely because it is unopposed. The court emphasized that Rule 12(b)(6) requires an independent determination of whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief, regardless of the parties’ failure to respond. Finding that the district court had not made such a determination, the Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not reach the merits of the parties’ other arguments or the postjudgment orders. View "Guzman v. Acuarius Night Club LLC" on Justia Law

A Jordanian business entity entered into an agreement with the Republic of Iraq in 1995 to settle Iraq’s unpaid debt for delivered goods by providing specified quantities of sulfur and urea, valued at $53 million. The agreement contemplated delivery at the Iraq-Jordan border, and although the supplier anticipated reselling these materials in the United States, this downstream transaction was not included in the written agreement. Iraq did not fulfill its obligations under the agreement, leading the supplier to pursue payment through interactions with Iraqi officials, who orally acknowledged the debt and suggested legal action might facilitate payment.After Iraq failed to deliver the goods, the supplier obtained a judgment in its favor from a Jordanian court in 2015 for the full amount. The Jordanian Court of Cassation affirmed the judgment. However, when the supplier sought to enforce the judgment in Jordan, the Jordanian Court of Appeal held that Iraq had not waived its sovereign immunity in the enforcement proceeding, preventing collection. Iraq has not satisfied any part of the judgment.The supplier then initiated an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking recognition of the Jordanian judgment. Iraq moved to dismiss, invoking sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court found that no FSIA exception applied and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that Iraq had not made an explicit waiver of immunity and that Iraq’s conduct did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Thus, the supplier’s claim is barred by Iraq’s sovereign immunity. View "Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

The case began when a limited liability company filed a breach of contract action against an individual, who responded by asserting a counterclaim for tortious interference with current and prospective business relationships, seeking damages, interest, and attorney fees. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual on that claim and denied the company’s motion. Subsequently, the company moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim, but the individual moved to dismiss his counterclaim without prejudice, which the district court granted. The company then filed a notice of appeal.On appeal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals considered whether it had jurisdiction, given that the case involved multiple claims and the district court had not certified a final judgment under the relevant Nebraska statute. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, although a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not usually create appellate jurisdiction, in this instance, the individual’s acknowledgment that any attempt to refile his counterclaim would be barred by the statute of limitations, and that he did not intend to refile, provided the finality needed for appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals then reversed the district court’s summary judgment order.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case to address appellate jurisdiction. It held that, because there was neither a judgment rendered nor a final order disposing of all claims as required by statute, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its bright-line rule that appellate jurisdiction cannot be created merely by voluntarily dismissing unresolved claims without prejudice, even if the claims are unlikely to be refiled. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the matter with directions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "WRK v. Wiegert" on Justia Law

The dispute stems from a series of lawsuits initiated by a borrower after a nonjudicial foreclosure was attempted on a Maui property he purchased in 2003. Following his default on the mortgage in 2008, the property was sold in a nonjudicial foreclosure in 2010 and title transferred to a bank. The bank, through its attorneys, sought to evict the borrower and later filed a judicial foreclosure counterclaim after the borrower challenged the foreclosure's validity. The borrower remained in possession of the property throughout, and subsequent litigation centered on the conduct of both the lender and its attorneys.After an initial summary judgment against the borrower in his wrongful foreclosure suit, the Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the parties settled most claims except those against certain attorneys. Separately, the borrower filed new claims against the bank’s law firm and its attorneys, alleging fraud, unfair and deceptive acts, wrongful foreclosure, and other torts related to their legal filings and conduct during the foreclosure process. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the attorneys and declared the borrower a vexatious litigant due to a pattern of abusive litigation.On appeal, the ICA affirmed most of the circuit court’s rulings but reinstated the borrower’s claim alleging fraud on the court. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the ICA erred by reinstating this claim, reasoning that even if the borrower’s allegations were true, they did not meet the high threshold required for an independent action for fraud on the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of all claims against the attorneys and the vexatious litigant order, and vacated the ICA’s ruling to the extent it had revived the fraud on the court claim. View "Greenspon v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company" on Justia Law