Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A woman, Susan, was one of three beneficiaries of her father Warren’s trust. She believed the trust’s terms were unfair to her compared to her brothers, David and Michael, as her share was subject to restrictive terms and higher taxes. Warren allegedly wanted to amend the trust to make distributions equal among his children, and had consulted an attorney about this. Susan claimed that David and Michael undertook several actions in 2021 to prevent Warren from making this amendment, including interfering with his lawyer, making accusations against Susan, and isolating Warren.Previously, Susan filed a probate petition in Alameda County Superior Court, seeking to remove David as trustee and as Warren’s agent, and alleging elder isolation and similar misconduct by her brothers. The probate petition raised many of the same factual allegations later made in this civil case. After Warren’s death, Susan dismissed her probate petition without prejudice. She then filed a civil complaint, asserting claims for intentional interference with expected inheritance (IIEI) and elder financial abuse. The elder abuse claim was later dismissed, and the IIEI claim proceeded. David filed a demurrer, arguing Susan had an adequate remedy in probate, among other defenses.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case after the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Susan’s complaint. The appellate court held that Susan’s IIEI claim could not proceed because she had an adequate remedy in probate. The court reasoned that the tort of IIEI is only available when probate does not provide a remedy, and Susan, as a beneficiary, had standing and the ability to seek relief in probate but chose to dismiss her petition. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed. View "Halperin v. Halperin" on Justia Law

A political action committee comprised of residents and registered voters in Richland, Washington, submitted a valid petition in October 2024 to amend the city charter. The proposed amendment would change the composition of the city council to be partly elected by district and partly at large. The Benton County Auditor, upon receiving the petition, scheduled the proposed amendment for the November 2025 general election ballot. The committee, however, sought to have the measure placed on a special election ballot in either February or April 2025.The committee filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in Benton County Superior Court, seeking an order to compel the auditor to place the amendment on the special election ballot. The superior court judge denied the writ, ruling that the amendment would appear on the November 2025 general election ballot instead. The committee obtained direct review of this decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington unanimously concluded that the case was moot because the relevant special election dates had passed. Nonetheless, the court exercised its discretion to address the issue as one of continuing and substantial public interest. The majority of justices held that the phrase “next regular municipal election” in RCW 35.22.120 includes both special and general elections. However, a majority also agreed that mandamus was not appropriate in this case because the petitioner did not establish a nondiscretionary duty requiring the auditor to call a special election. The court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the writ of mandamus. View "A Better Richland v. Chilton" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after a citizen, Sanderson, served a summons and complaint on Kelley Cole, the Walsh County State’s Attorney, alleging that Cole failed to investigate crimes as required by law and deprived him of constitutional rights. Sanderson later claimed the complaint was mistakenly served and was only a draft, not intended for court filing. Cole, upon being served, filed the summons and complaint with the district court, moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and sought attorney’s fees, arguing the action was frivolous and barred by prosecutorial immunity.The District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, reviewed the matter. Cole’s motion to dismiss was based on North Dakota’s procedural rules, which allow an action to commence upon service of summons, and permit a defendant to file the complaint. Sanderson responded by agreeing to dismiss but contested the court’s jurisdiction and objected to the lack of a hearing. The district court determined it had jurisdiction, found Sanderson had commenced the action, and concluded the complaint lacked factual allegations and was barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court dismissed the action, denied Sanderson’s subsequent motions, and awarded Cole attorney’s fees, finding the claims frivolous.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that jurisdiction was proper since Sanderson initiated the action by serving process, and procedural irregularities in filing did not affect substantial rights or deprive the court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed that the complaint failed to state a claim and that absolute prosecutorial immunity applied. It further upheld the finding of frivolousness and the award of attorney’s fees, determining there was no abuse of discretion or violation of procedural rights. View "Sanderson v. Cole" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit against the operator of an assisted living facility, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and wrongful death after a facility employee moved the decedent, allegedly causing her health to deteriorate and leading to her death eight days later. The Superior Court of Sacramento County granted summary adjudication in favor of the defendant on the negligence and wrongful death claims but denied it as to the breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the entire action without prejudice rather than proceed to trial on the remaining claim.After the voluntary dismissal, plaintiffs appealed, but the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, dismissed the appeal, holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice was not an appealable final judgment. Plaintiffs then moved in the trial court to set aside their voluntary dismissal; when this was denied, they again appealed, and the Court of Appeal again dismissed, reiterating that there was no appealable final judgment.Subsequently, the trial court entered a judgment of costs in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from this costs judgment, arguing that it constituted a final judgment that permitted them to challenge all prior orders in the case, including the summary adjudication. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, rejected this argument, holding that the costs judgment, entered after a nonappealable voluntary dismissal without prejudice, was not itself an appealable final judgment for the purposes of raising the underlying claims. The court explained that plaintiffs were not challenging the costs order itself, but were seeking review of prior nonappealable orders, which is not permitted. The appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves an individual, B.K., who has schizophrenia and has been under a conservatorship pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act since 2019. The conservatorship was initially established after B.K. was found to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, and it has been renewed annually following court hearings. In several renewal proceedings, B.K. expressed her desire to contest the conservatorship, at times requesting either a court or jury trial. At the most recent renewal proceeding, B.K. initially requested a jury trial but later, after consulting with her attorney, chose to proceed with a court trial instead. B.K. confirmed this choice in open court.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted the court trial, during which expert testimony and B.K.’s own statements supported a finding that she remained gravely disabled and unable to care for herself due to her mental illness. The court renewed the conservatorship for another year. B.K. appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to adequately advise her of her right to a jury trial or to ensure that her waiver of that right was knowing and intelligent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review to statutory claims and substantial evidence review to the trial court’s implied finding, the Court of Appeal concluded that B.K. was aware of her right to a jury trial and that, under the totality of the circumstances, her waiver—made through counsel and confirmed in court—was knowing and intelligent. The appellate court held that direct advisement or a personal waiver was not required under the LPS Act when counsel confers with the conservatee and there is no indication of lack of authority or client understanding. The court affirmed the ruling, finding no reversible error. View "Conservatorship of B.K." on Justia Law

This case arose from a fire at a call center in Davao City, Philippines, in which twenty-nine people died. The plaintiffs, representing the estates of the deceased and other individuals, filed suit in Connecticut against a Connecticut company and two of its officers, alleging wrongful death and related claims. The decedents were employees of a Philippine company providing services for the defendant Connecticut company. The defendants argued that the Philippines was the proper forum for the dispute, stipulating that they would submit to Philippine jurisdiction, accept service, and waive certain defenses, including the statute of limitations, for a period of time.The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, finding that the Philippines was an adequate alternative forum. The trial court’s dismissal was conditional: if the Philippine courts declined jurisdiction, the plaintiffs could refile in Connecticut. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the Philippine courts would sua sponte dismiss the case as time-barred, and thus the Philippines was not an adequate alternative forum. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court applied the correct legal standard and properly considered the adequacy of the alternative forum.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case, focusing on whether the trial court had properly assessed the adequacy of the Philippine forum. The court held that the trial court had applied the correct standard from Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., meaningfully evaluating competing expert affidavits on Philippine law and the effect of the defendants’ stipulations. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not rely solely on the defendants’ consent, but conducted the required assessment. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed, upholding dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, contingent on the defendants’ stipulation and the plaintiffs’ ability to reinstate the action if necessary. View "DeCicco v. Dynata, LLC" on Justia Law

After a ranch was divided into two parcels, the owners of each parcel continued to share irrigation ditches and granted each other easements for water conveyance. In recent years, cooperation between the parties deteriorated, leading to disputes over water usage. The plaintiffs, who own one parcel, alleged that the defendant, owner of the other parcel, had diverted more water than entitled, causing excess runoff and flooding on their land. The plaintiffs claimed violations of Colorado statutes relating to waste of water, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and asserted trespass and nuisance claims. The parties also disputed the scope of the plaintiffs' easement in one of the ditches.The District Court for Water Division 5 found in favor of the plaintiffs on their statutory, trespass, and nuisance claims, concluding that the defendant had diverted excess water, wasted water in violation of statutes, and caused flooding. The court awarded nominal damages, attorney fees under section 37-84-125, and issued an injunction restricting the defendant's ability to divert water in excess of its decreed rights. The court also recognized plaintiffs' easement rights but declined to specify the extent of the easement in the Lower Gaskill Ditch, since that issue was not properly raised at trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim for a declaration of waste, that section 37-84-108 does not create a private right of action, and that sections 37-84-124 and -125 do not apply to injuries from excess irrigation runoff or flooding. The court ruled the water court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the related trespass and nuisance claims and that the injunction must be vacated. The court affirmed the water court's refusal to address the scope of the Lower Gaskill Ditch easement, reversed the judgment on all waste, flooding, trespass, nuisance, and related injunctive claims, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Byers Peak Properties v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC" on Justia Law

The State of Ohio brought a lawsuit in state court against several pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and related entities, alleging they conspired to artificially inflate prescription drug prices in violation of Ohio law. Ohio claimed that the PBMs, acting as intermediaries between drug manufacturers and health plans, negotiated rebates and fees in a manner that increased drug list prices and extracted payments from pharmacies, harming consumers and violating state antitrust and consumer protection statutes. The PBMs provided services to both private clients and federal health plans, including those for federal employees and military personnel.The defendants, Express Scripts and Prime Therapeutics, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that their negotiations on drug prices were conducted on behalf of both federal and non-federal clients in a unified process subject to federal oversight. Ohio moved to remand the case to state court, asserting that its claims did not target conduct directed by federal officers and disclaimed any challenge to the administration of federal health programs like FEHBA or TRICARE. The district court accepted Ohio’s disclaimer and determined that the complaint did not impose liability for acts under federal direction, granting Ohio’s motion to remand.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the matter de novo. The court held that the PBMs were “persons acting under” federal officers because their negotiations were performed under detailed federal supervision and regulation for federal health plans. The court further found that the complaint related to acts under color of federal office, as the alleged wrongful conduct was inseparable from federally directed negotiations. The court also determined that the PBMs raised colorable federal defenses based on federal preemption. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings in federal court. View "Ohio ex rel. Yost v. Ascent Health Services, LLC" on Justia Law

A Kentucky citizen who is subject to lifetime sex offender registration due to prior convictions challenged a new state law requiring certain sex offenders to display their full legal names on social media accounts they create or control. The law defines covered offenses as those committed against minors and applies to a wide range of social media platforms, with exceptions for services such as email and search engines. The plaintiff, who uses social media anonymously for personal and political expression, alleged that the law’s disclosure requirement would subject him and his family to harassment and would force him to stop using social media.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky reviewed the case. Initially, it found the plaintiff was likely to succeed on his claim that the law infringed his First Amendment right to post anonymously and was overbroad, granting a preliminary injunction that barred all Kentucky County Attorneys from enforcing the law. The court later denied class certification, concluding the plaintiff lacked standing to represent absent class members against other County Attorneys and failed to meet requirements for class actions. Consequently, the injunction was narrowed to apply only to the named defendant and protect only the plaintiff.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the district court erred in its facial overbreadth analysis. The Sixth Circuit held that a proper facial challenge under the First Amendment requires a comprehensive review of the law’s scope and its constitutional and unconstitutional applications, as described in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. The district court had failed to conduct this thorough analysis and focused too narrowly on the plaintiff’s own circumstances. The Sixth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the proper two-step facial overbreadth approach. View "Doe v. Burlew" on Justia Law

The case concerns Frederick Allen, a videographer, and his company, Nautilus Productions, who documented the excavation of the Queen Anne’s Revenge, the sunken pirate ship of Blackbeard, off the North Carolina coast. Allen registered copyrights for many years of video footage he recorded during the recovery project. The State of North Carolina and its Department of Natural and Cultural Resources entered into agreements related to the salvage operation. Allen alleged that state officials infringed his copyrights by using his footage online and in state publications without permission, and that the state passed a law, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121-25(b), which Allen argued authorized this infringement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially dismissed some claims but allowed Allen’s claims for declaratory judgment and copyright infringement to proceed, finding Congress had validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the CRCA did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Allen then voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims against the only non-governmental defendant, closing the case.Despite these rulings, the district court in 2021 allowed Allen to reopen the case, permitting him to amend his complaint based on a new constitutional theory stemming from United States v. Georgia, seeking as-applied, case-by-case abrogation of state sovereign immunity. In 2024, the district court denied sovereign immunity on this new claim, allowing it to proceed. The North Carolina defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in reopening the litigation under Rule 54(b) rather than Rule 60(b), where no extraordinary circumstances justified such relief. The appellate court reversed the order reopening the case, vacated the subsequent 2024 ruling as moot, and remanded with instructions to close the litigation and dismiss all claims against the North Carolina defendants with prejudice. View "Allen v. Stein" on Justia Law