Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Craig Reichel, a businessperson from Rochester, Minnesota, and his companies, including Reichel Foods, Inc., filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against the law firm Wendland Utz, LTD, and its former lawyer, Jerrie Hayes. Reichel alleged that despite an ultimately favorable outcome in prior litigation, the law firm’s negligence caused him to incur substantial attorney fees and costs. The underlying litigation involved a lawsuit filed by Craig’s brother, Bryan Reichel, claiming an equity interest in one of Craig’s companies. The district court issued several adverse rulings against Craig and his companies, leading to significant legal expenses. Eventually, the bankruptcy court confirmed Craig’s sole ownership of the companies, and the district court granted summary judgment in Craig’s favor.The Olmsted County District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Wendland Utz, dismissing Reichel Foods’ professional negligence claim on the grounds that Reichel Foods could not demonstrate that, but for the law firm’s conduct, it would have been successful in the underlying litigation. The district court did not address Reichel Foods’ other claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, nor did it resolve the claims brought by Craig Reichel and his other companies.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to decide claims still pending in the district court. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ rulings on those claims. Regarding the professional negligence claim of Reichel Foods, the Supreme Court held that a successful outcome in the underlying litigation does not categorically bar a legal malpractice claim. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming summary judgment on Reichel Foods’ professional negligence claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reichel vs. Wendland Utz, LTD" on Justia Law

The case involves the National Infusion Center Association (NICA) and other plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of the Drug Price Negotiation Program established by the Inflation Reduction Act. This program requires the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to negotiate drug prices with manufacturers, setting a "maximum fair price" between 40% and 75% of the market price. Manufacturers who do not comply face significant fines or must withdraw from Medicare coverage entirely.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed NICA's lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court reasoned that NICA's claims had to be "channeled" through HHS as required by 42 U.S.C. § 405, which mandates that claims arising under the Medicare Act be decided by the relevant agency before being brought to federal court. The district court also dismissed the remaining plaintiffs due to improper venue without NICA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that NICA had standing based on both economic and procedural injuries. The court determined that NICA's claims did not arise under the Medicare Act but rather under the Inflation Reduction Act, and thus did not require channeling through HHS. The court held that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over NICA's claims and reversed the lower court's dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Natl Infusion Center v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Three nonprofit organizations challenged two Arizona election law amendments: one allowing the cancellation of a voter’s registration if they move to another county (the “Cancellation Provision”) and another making it a felony to provide a voting mechanism to someone registered in another state (the “Felony Provision”). The plaintiffs argued these laws would jeopardize voting rights in Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of both provisions, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the laws could harm voters and were likely unconstitutional. The defendants, including the Arizona Attorney General and the Yuma County Republican Committee, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they only alleged a frustrated mission and diverted resources, failing to show direct harm to their core activities. The court emphasized that organizational standing requires more than just a diversion of resources; it requires a direct impact on the organization’s core activities.Regarding the Felony Provision, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they faced a realistic possibility of prosecution, which could chill their voter outreach activities. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their vagueness challenge. The court interpreted the phrase “mechanism for voting” narrowly, determining it referred only to unlawful acts of voting, not voter outreach or registration.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Absolute Essence LLC sought to enter the medical marijuana market in Arkansas but was unable to secure a license. The company invested over a million dollars in the application process, including finding a location and addressing zoning issues. The Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission outsourced the review process to Public Consulting Group, Inc., which scored 197 applications in two weeks. Absolute Essence received a low score and alleged that the scoring process was manipulated, with conflicts of interest among the scorers favoring larger, established players and resulting in racial disparities in license awards.The case was initially filed in state court, alleging tortious interference, fraud, racial discrimination, and civil conspiracy. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, which dismissed the case for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court found that Absolute Essence's tortious interference claim failed because it did not establish a precise business expectancy with a specific third party. The fraud claim was dismissed due to a lack of justifiable reliance, as the company’s actions predated the involvement of the outside scorers. The race-discrimination claims were dismissed for failing to allege intentional discrimination, as the complaint only suggested a disparate impact without sufficient factual support. Finally, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed because it could not stand without an underlying tort.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Absolute Essence did not plead enough facts to support any of its claims. View "Absolute Essence LLC v. Public Consulting Group LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, Universal Development Corporation ("Universal"), Hatti Group RE, LLC ("Hatti Group"), and Harsha Hatti separately appealed judgments entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Robbie Dellinger following a jury trial. The trial involved consolidated cases with claims asserted by Hatti, the Hatti Group, and Dellinger.The Jefferson Circuit Court had previously dismissed Universal from Dellinger's initial action against Hatti and the Hatti Group. However, Universal was later brought back into the litigation when Hatti and the Hatti Group filed a separate action against Dellinger, Universal, and others. The cases were consolidated, and Dellinger asserted a breach-of-contract cross-claim against Universal. The jury found in favor of Dellinger on his claims against Universal and Hatti, awarding him compensatory and punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the appeals. It dismissed the appeals of Hatti Group and Hatti, noting that Hatti's appeal in Hatti v. Universal was invalid because no adverse judgment was entered against Hatti in that case. Hatti's appeal in Dellinger v. Hatti was dismissed as untimely because it was filed more than 42 days after the final judgment.Regarding Universal's appeal, the court reversed the judgment against Universal and rendered a judgment in its favor. The court held that Dellinger's breach-of-contract claim against Universal was void because it was based on work performed without a general contractor's license, violating Alabama's licensure statutes. The court concluded that Dellinger acted as a general contractor under the Personal Services Agreement with Hatti, and since Dellinger was unlicensed, the contract was void as a matter of public policy. Consequently, Universal had no legal obligation to support Dellinger in seeking payments under an unenforceable contract. View "Universal Development Corporation v. Dellinger" on Justia Law

The appellants, Meredith O'Neil, Jessica Svedine, Deanna Corby, and Roberto Silva, sued various officials from the Canton Police Department and the Town of Canton, Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of Massachusetts witness intimidation statutes, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268 §§ 13A and 13B. They claimed that these statutes violated their First Amendment rights, fearing prosecution for their actions during a November 5, 2023 protest and alleging that their speech would be chilled for a planned protest on November 12, 2023. The appellants moved for emergency relief to enjoin the enforcement of these statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the emergency motion on November 10, 2023. The court assumed the plaintiffs had standing but found they did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court held that the statutes served compelling interests in protecting the administration of justice and were narrowly tailored. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown they faced a risk of irreparable harm, noting that the plaintiffs had other public forums to express their views. The balance of harms and public interest considerations also weighed against granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal as moot. The court noted that the state court had dismissed the charges against the appellants for lack of probable cause, and no ongoing conduct remained for the court to enjoin. The court also found that the appellants' general allegations of future protests did not show a credible threat of prosecution, failing to establish standing for their pre-enforcement challenges. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings as appropriate. View "O'Neil v. Canton Police Department" on Justia Law

A school bus owned by First Student, Inc., and insured by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, collided with two underinsured vehicles in Rhode Island, injuring Tiffany Briere and her minor daughter. Briere submitted a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to National Union, which was denied on the grounds that First Student had rejected such coverage. Briere then sued National Union, arguing that Rhode Island law required the policy to offer underinsured motorist coverage.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted summary judgment to National Union and First Student. The court found that the Rhode Island statute requiring underinsured motorist coverage did not apply because the insurance policy was not "delivered or issued for delivery" in Rhode Island. The policy had been issued by a New York-based broker and delivered to FirstGroup's headquarters in Ohio. Consequently, the court ruled that the policy was exempt from the statutory requirement.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's summary judgment. The appellate court held that National Union had waived its defense based on the delivery requirement because it had not mentioned this ground in its initial denial letter to Briere. The court emphasized that insurers must notify their insureds of all grounds for denying coverage in their denial letters. Since National Union failed to do so, it could not later rely on the delivery requirement defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address other potential defenses and issues not considered by the district court. View "Briere v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA" on Justia Law

In August 2021, a vehicle driven by Storm Griffith and owned by Isaias Luna-Cortez collided with a vehicle carrying Zoe Rivera and her daughter L.R. Rivera and L.R. filed a complaint against Griffith and Luna-Cortez, leading to court-annexed arbitration where Rivera and L.R. prevailed. Griffith and Luna-Cortez requested a trial de novo on October 25, 2022. The next day, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order amending the Nevada Short Trial Rules, increasing the maximum attorney fees a short trial judge could award from $3,000 to $15,000, effective January 1, 2023.The short trial was held on March 3, 2023, and Rivera and L.R. again prevailed. They filed for fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, and the short trial judge awarded $15,000 in attorney fees to each respondent, totaling $30,000. The district court entered a final judgment consistent with this award. Griffith and Luna-Cortez appealed, arguing that the pre-amendment $3,000 cap should apply since they requested the trial de novo before the rule change.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the amendment to NSTR 27(b)(4) was procedural, not substantive, as it did not create or remove any conditions under which fees could be awarded but merely increased the maximum amount. The court noted that procedural changes apply to pending cases unless they alter substantive rights. The court found that the parties had fair notice of the rule change, which was published 67 days before it took effect, and had ample opportunity to adjust their actions accordingly. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, applying the amended rule to the case. View "Griffith v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, Julia McCreight and Rebecca Wester, were long-term employees of AuburnBank, each with over twenty years of service. McCreight, a mortgage loan originator, and Wester, a loan closer, were both terminated by Michael King, the mortgage department manager. McCreight was fired for sending an unauthorized loan approval letter to a borrower who did not qualify, while Wester was terminated for failing to verify a borrower’s employment status before closing a loan. Both women, over sixty years old at the time of their termination, claimed they were fired due to age and sex discrimination and in retaliation for their complaints about King’s behavior.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of AuburnBank and King on all counts. The court found that neither McCreight nor Wester provided sufficient evidence to support their claims of age and sex discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that McCreight and Wester failed to present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that their terminations were due to illegal discrimination. The court clarified that mixed-motive theories of liability do not need to be explicitly pleaded in the complaint but must be raised by summary judgment. The court found that McCreight did not raise a mixed-motive theory at the district court level and failed to provide sufficient evidence for her single-motive theory. Similarly, Wester’s evidence was insufficient to support her claims. The court also held that both plaintiffs failed to show causation for their retaliation claims, as there was no evidence that the decision-makers knew about their discrimination complaints. View "McCreight v. AuburnBank" on Justia Law

In 1999, Marcus and Eunice Hollow Horn purchased a mobile home on a lot in Eagle Butte, South Dakota, and began paying rent to Oliver Leblanc, who claimed ownership. Later, Phyllis Miller claimed ownership and sold the lot to Eunice, providing a quit claim deed. Years later, Edward Hoffman, representing his deceased mother Theresa Hoffman's estate, claimed Theresa owned the lot and filed a quiet title action against the Hollow Horns. The Hollow Horns counterclaimed, asserting ownership by adverse possession.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Dewey County, South Dakota, denied Edward's claims and quieted title in favor of the Hollow Horns based on adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15 and SDCL 15-3-1. Edward appealed, challenging the court's findings on good faith and the admission of certain out-of-court statements.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision in part. The court held that Eunice had satisfied the elements of adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15, including good faith possession and payment of taxes for ten years. The court found no clear error in the circuit court's findings and concluded that Edward failed to rebut the presumption of Eunice's good faith. The court also determined that any error in admitting out-of-court statements was harmless and did not affect the outcome.However, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment on the alternative claim for adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-1, as it was rendered moot by the ruling on SDCL 15-3-15. The case was remanded for the circuit court to dismiss the alternative claim. View "Hoffman V. Hollow Horn" on Justia Law