Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. (ALR) entered into a partnership agreement with Real Estate Portfolio Management, LLC (REPM) to purchase, rehabilitate, and sell properties, splitting profits equally. ALR alleged that REPM breached the agreement by failing to pay over $800,000 in profits and also breached its fiduciary duties. ALR further claimed that Steve George, REPM’s sole member, was the alter ego of REPM. After REPM failed to pay the judgment, ALR conducted a debtor’s examination and asserted that postjudgment actions by George fraudulently drained REPM’s assets to avoid payment.The Superior Court of Sacramento County held a bench trial and found in favor of ALR on the breach of partnership and fiduciary duty claims, awarding nearly $1 million in damages and interest against REPM. However, the court found that ALR had not proven George was REPM’s alter ego and entered judgment accordingly. When ALR later moved to amend the judgment to add George as a judgment debtor based on alleged postjudgment fraudulent conduct, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the alter ego issue since it had already been decided.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel without considering whether new facts or changed circumstances had arisen since the prior decision. The appellate court clarified that collateral estoppel does not bar reconsideration of an issue if material facts have changed after the original judgment. The order denying ALR’s motion to amend the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to determine whether postjudgment events warrant a different outcome on the alter ego issue. View "Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. v. George" on Justia Law

A business operating a strip club featuring nude dancing and alcohol sales entered into a settlement agreement with DeKalb County, Georgia, in 2001, which was later amended in 2007. The amended agreement granted the club non-conforming status, allowing it to continue its business model for fifteen years, with the possibility of renewal, and required annual licensing fees. In 2013, the City of Chamblee annexed the area containing the club and subsequently adopted ordinances restricting adult entertainment establishments, including bans on alcohol sales, stricter food sales requirements for alcohol licenses, and earlier closing times. The City initially issued alcohol licenses to the club but later denied renewal, citing failure to meet new requirements and the club’s status as an adult establishment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed some of the club’s claims for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims. The district court found that the club lacked standing to challenge certain ordinances as it was not an alcohol licensee, and that the City’s ordinances regulating adult entertainment and alcohol sales were constitutional under the secondary-effects doctrine, applying intermediate scrutiny. The court also determined there was no valid contract between the club and the City, rejecting the Contract Clause claims, and found no equal protection violation, as the club failed to identify a similarly situated comparator.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the club lacked standing for equitable relief due to its permanent closure, but had standing for damages for a limited period. The court upheld the application of intermediate scrutiny to the ordinances, found no impairment of contract, and agreed that the club failed to establish an equal protection violation. The district court’s judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, Georgia" on Justia Law

A North Carolina police officer, Clarence Belton, was shot multiple times by fellow officer Heather Loveridge during the execution of a search warrant. The incident, which resulted in serious injuries to Belton and ended his law enforcement career, was captured on video and body camera footage. Belton sued Loveridge and the City of Charlotte, alleging excessive force and other claims. During the litigation, both parties moved to seal the video exhibits related to the shooting, and the district court granted these motions, placing the footage under seal.After the district court denied Loveridge’s motion for summary judgment, which was later vacated and remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a local television station, WBTV, sought to intervene in the case to unseal the video footage. Belton supported WBTV’s motion, but Loveridge opposed it, arguing that unsealing would jeopardize her right to a fair trial. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied WBTV’s motion to intervene, citing lack of jurisdiction due to the pending appeal, and also denied the motion to unseal, finding no right of access under the common law or the First Amendment and concluding that Loveridge’s fair trial rights outweighed any public interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of WBTV’s motion to intervene, agreeing that the district court lacked jurisdiction at that stage. However, the appellate court treated WBTV’s appeal regarding the sealing order as a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court’s order sealing the video exhibits violated the First Amendment right of access to judicial records. The court vacated the sealing order and remanded with instructions to unseal the video footage, finding that Loveridge had not met her burden to justify continued sealing. View "Gray Media Group, Inc. v. Loveridge" on Justia Law

A lender initiated a foreclosure action against a homeowner after the homeowner defaulted on a mortgage loan originally obtained in 2007. The mortgage was assigned several times before the foreclosure action began, and the lender’s predecessor filed suit in 2015. After a trial in 2018, the Vermont Superior Court, Civil Division, found in favor of the lender, concluding that the lender held the original note and mortgage at the time of filing and at trial, and that the homeowner had defaulted. The court issued a judgment of foreclosure by judicial sale, setting a redemption period for the homeowner.Following the expiration of the redemption period, the case was temporarily dismissed due to the homeowner’s bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy discharge, the lender successfully moved to reopen the case. The parties attempted mediation, which was unsuccessful. The lender then sought to substitute a new party as plaintiff due to post-judgment assignments of the mortgage, but later withdrew this request after issues arose regarding the validity of the assignments and the status of the note. The court vacated the substitution and ordered the lender to prove who the real party in interest was, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal for lack of prosecution. After a hearing, the court found the lender failed to establish the real party in interest, dismissed the case with prejudice, and vacated the foreclosure judgment.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. The Supreme Court found no evidence of undue delay or failure to pursue the case by the lender, and concluded that the action could continue in the name of the original plaintiff under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, reinstated the foreclosure judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ditech Financial LLC v. Brisson" on Justia Law

An employee brought a civil action against his former employer, alleging wrongful termination and retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act. The employee claimed he was fired for discussing his compensation with his supervisor and requesting a higher annual bonus, which he argued was protected conduct under state law. The employer denied retaliatory intent, asserting instead that the employee either resigned voluntarily or was terminated for performance reasons. The employer did not plead any statutory exceptions as affirmative defenses in its answer.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the District Court for Douglas County. After both sides presented their evidence, the employer moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the employee’s discussion about compensation occurred during working hours and thus fell within a statutory exception that prohibits such discussions during working hours. The court took the motion under advisement and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the employee, awarding substantial damages. However, the court did not enter judgment on the verdict. Instead, it later granted the employer’s motion for directed verdict, reasoning that the employee failed to disprove the applicability of the statutory exception, and dismissed the action.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the statutory exception regarding discussions of compensation during working hours constitutes an affirmative defense. The Court clarified that the employer bears the burden to plead and prove this defense, and failure to do so results in waiver. Because the employer did not plead the exception as an affirmative defense, the district court erred in granting a directed verdict on that basis. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with directions to enter judgment in conformity with the jury’s verdict. View "Khaitov v. Greater Omaha Packing Co." on Justia Law

The case concerns an automobile accident that occurred in rural Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, on January 3, 2024. James Godwin, a resident of Dallas County and employee of Talton Communications, Inc., was driving a company vehicle when he was rear-ended by Desi Bernard Peoples, a resident of Fayette County. Godwin subsequently filed suit in the Dallas Circuit Court against Peoples, his employer Talton, and Penn National Security Insurance Company, which provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Godwin’s claims included negligence and wantonness, a claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits, and a workers’ compensation claim against Talton. Godwin received all medical treatment for his injuries in Dallas County, where he and his wife reside and work.After the complaint was filed, Penn National moved to sever the workers’ compensation claim and to transfer the remaining claims to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, arguing that transfer was warranted for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice under Alabama’s forum non conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1. The Dallas Circuit Court denied the motion to sever but ordered the workers’ compensation claim to be tried separately. The court also denied the motion to transfer, finding insufficient evidence that Tuscaloosa County was a significantly more convenient forum or that Dallas County had only a weak connection to the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed Penn National’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel transfer. The Court denied the petition, holding that Penn National failed to meet its burden of showing that Tuscaloosa County was significantly more convenient or that Dallas County’s connection to the case was weak. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is entitled to deference when both venues are proper and that the evidence presented did not justify overriding that choice. View "Ex parte Penn National Security Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the ownership of a 2021 Mercedes-Benz G63. Phoenix Motor Company (PMC), operating as Mercedes-Benz of Scottsdale, purchased the vehicle through a wholesaler, but the intermediary, Fredrick Aljundi, diverted the car to another dealership instead of delivering it to PMC. Subsequently, Zakia J. Rajabian and Dulceria La Bonita Wholesale (collectively, Dulceria) acquired the car from the second dealership and took steps to conceal its location. PMC, with assistance from Mercedes-Benz USA, located the car using tracking technology.Litigation began in the Maricopa County Superior Court, where PMC sued Dulceria and others for breach of contract and related claims, and Dulceria counterclaimed. The state court initially granted PMC possession of the car and, after further proceedings, found PMC to be the rightful owner. While the state case was ongoing, Dulceria filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, asserting claims including invasion of privacy and violations of federal and state statutes. PMC moved to dismiss or stay the federal case under the Colorado River doctrine, which allows federal courts to stay proceedings in favor of parallel state litigation. The district court granted a stay in November 2023 and formalized it in a minute order in December 2023. Dulceria later moved to lift the stay, but the district court denied the motion in April 2024.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the December 2023 minute order constituted a final, appealable order, starting the 30-day appeal period. Because Dulceria did not appeal the initial stay within that period, the court dismissed that portion of the appeal as untimely. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to lift the stay, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in maintaining the stay under the Colorado River doctrine, as there were no material changes in law or fact to warrant lifting it. View "RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC" on Justia Law

In February 2016, Kevin Frost kidnapped his estranged wife, Sherri Frost, during a contentious divorce. He lured her into a situation where he could seize her, forced her into his vehicle, and held her for several hours in a barn owned by a family associate. During captivity, Kevin made Sherri severely intoxicated and later delivered her to the emergency room before turning himself in. Kevin pleaded guilty to assault and kidnapping and served a prison sentence. Sherri subsequently filed a civil suit against Kevin, Frost Ranching Corporation (the Ranch), and other parties, seeking damages for injuries and emotional distress resulting from the kidnapping. She alleged that Kevin acted, at least in part, to prevent her from obtaining an interest in the Ranch during the divorce.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, dismissed claims against some defendants and granted summary judgment to Frost Limited Partnership. The court denied summary judgment to the Ranch on vicarious liability, allowing that issue to proceed to trial. At trial, Sherri presented evidence of medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other damages. The jury found Kevin liable for several torts but awarded only $20,000 in damages, which matched the lower end of medical expenses and did not account for pain and suffering. The District Court granted Sherri’s motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s award unsupported by substantial evidence, as it disregarded uncontradicted, credible evidence of pain and suffering. The court also granted the Ranch’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the Ranch could not ratify Kevin’s conduct absent acceptance of any benefit from the kidnapping.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed both rulings. It held that the jury’s damages award was not supported by substantial evidence and that a new trial on damages was warranted. The court also held that, under Montana law, ratification requires acceptance of a benefit, which was absent here, so the Ranch could not be held liable for Kevin’s actions. View "Frost v. Frost" on Justia Law

A group of former employees, most of whom are Black, brought claims against their former employer, an IT company, and its parent corporation. They alleged race discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation for opposing discrimination, citing actions such as terminations, denials of promotions, and workplace policies they believed targeted Black employees. The plaintiffs described being subjected to stricter rules, surveillance, and less favorable treatment compared to non-Black employees. One plaintiff, who is white, also alleged retaliation for supporting his Black colleagues.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment to the employer on all hostile work environment claims and on certain discrimination and retaliation claims, finding insufficient evidence of an “ultimate employment decision” as required by then-controlling precedent. The court also excluded some witness testimony. At trial, a jury found for nine plaintiffs on discrimination and retaliation claims, awarding substantial damages. However, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) to the employer on most claims, finding insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts, and to the parent company, concluding it was not an “integrated enterprise” with the employer. The court also granted a new trial on two retaliation claims, finding the verdicts contrary to the weight of the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It vacated the summary judgment on certain discrimination and retaliation claims, remanding those for further proceedings in light of new precedent that broadened the definition of adverse employment actions. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings in all other respects, including the grants of JMOL, the new trial orders, the exclusion of witness testimony, and the finding that the parent company was not liable as an integrated enterprise. View "Yarbrough v. SlashSupport" on Justia Law

A group of local residents and an environmental organization alleged that a nonprofit entity operating a large compound in Deerpark, New York, was discharging stormwater and wastewater containing fecal coliform bacteria into nearby surface waters in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The plaintiffs claimed that these discharges, which they supported with water testing data, exceeded legal limits and were the result of ongoing construction and improper maintenance of the defendant’s wastewater treatment plant. The affected waters are used by the plaintiffs for recreational purposes and are part of a larger watershed.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ initial complaint, finding that their pre-suit notice of intent to sue was deficient and thus failed to satisfy the CWA’s notice requirement. The court treated this requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the case without prejudice. After the plaintiffs sent a new, more detailed notice and refiled their claims, the district court again dismissed the case, this time with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the revised notice still lacked sufficient information to enable the defendant to identify the alleged violations and the specific location of the discharges.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the CWA’s pre-suit notice requirement is jurisdictional and whether the plaintiffs’ notice was adequate. The Second Circuit held that the notice requirement under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) is not jurisdictional but is instead a mandatory condition precedent to suit. The court further found that the plaintiffs’ notice provided sufficient information to inform the defendant of the alleged violations, including the pollutant, the standards allegedly violated, and the location of the discharges. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mid-New York Environ. v. Dragon Springs" on Justia Law