Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jeffery Krueger died following a traffic stop in Oklahoma initiated by Wagoner County Sheriff’s Office deputies. The stop began when deputies suspected Mr. Krueger of minor traffic violations and possible intoxication. After Mr. Krueger stopped his car in a turn lane, deputies forcibly removed him from his vehicle, allegedly pulling him by his hair, slamming his head on the pavement, and repeatedly using tasers as they attempted to handcuff him. Additional law enforcement officers arrived and, according to the plaintiffs, either participated directly or failed to intervene as Mr. Krueger, now handcuffed and prone, was further restrained with leg shackles and a hobble tie. Mr. Krueger stopped breathing at the scene and was later pronounced dead at a hospital.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma reviewed the case after the plaintiffs, Mr. Krueger’s parents and estate representatives, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants, including deputies and police officers, moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment for most defendants, finding that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there were sufficient grounds to show clearly established constitutional violations. The court found material disputes regarding the amount and duration of force used, including the number of taser applications and the nature of the prone restraint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the defendants used excessive force both in the initial removal and restraint of Mr. Krueger and in the prolonged prone restraint after he was subdued. The court also held that the failure to intervene in the use of excessive force was clearly established as a constitutional violation. The district court’s orders denying summary judgment were affirmed. View "Krueger v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Westside Community School District was entitled to receive payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT funds) from the Douglas County treasurer, as required by the Nebraska Constitution and statutes. In 2021, the Nebraska Auditor of Public Accounts found that the treasurer had erroneously distributed PILOT funds, resulting in Westside being underpaid by millions of dollars, while other entities, including Omaha Public Schools (OPS), Douglas County, and the city of Omaha, were overpaid. The parties did not dispute the existence of these errors. Westside filed suit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the treasurer to correct the underpayment.After litigation began, Westside, the treasurer, and the city of Omaha entered into a settlement agreement to rectify the payment errors from 2019 to 2021, agreeing to prospective repayments over six years. OPS declined to participate. Pursuant to the agreement, Westside and the treasurer jointly moved for a peremptory writ of mandamus, which the District Court for Douglas County initially granted. OPS then intervened, arguing the writ was improper and that the statutory provisions did not authorize the proposed remedy. The district court vacated the writ, finding no statutory duty to correct the underpayment in the manner outlined, and left the case pending.Westside renewed its motion for a writ, seeking only correction of the underpayment without specifying the remedy’s form. The treasurer moved to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing the court’s vacation of the writ was equivalent to a denial, requiring dismissal. The district court denied Westside’s renewed motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, enforcing the settlement agreement.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the treasurer has a ministerial duty to properly distribute PILOT funds according to the statutory formula, and that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel correction of erroneous distributions. The court affirmed the vacation of the initial writ but reversed the denial of the renewed motion and the dismissal, remanding with direction to issue an alternative writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Ewing" on Justia Law

AZG Limited Partnership obtained a judgment against a client of Dickinson Wright PLLC, a law firm. To enforce the judgment, AZG served Dickinson Wright with garnishment interrogatories under Nevada law, specifically asking whether the firm had any “choses in action” (rights to bring legal claims) belonging to its client under its control. Dickinson Wright answered “no.” AZG challenged this response, arguing that the attorney-client relationship itself gave the law firm control over the client’s chose in action, and that the firm likely held unearned client funds that could be garnished. Dickinson Wright requested an in camera review of certain documents, citing attorney-client privilege, to support its response. The district court reviewed the documents and found that a third party, not the client, paid the legal bills, and that Dickinson Wright did not hold any retainer or unearned funds.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County denied AZG’s motion to traverse Dickinson Wright’s interrogatory responses, finding that the law firm did not possess or control the client’s chose in action as contemplated by the relevant statute. The court also ordered Dickinson Wright to disclose the identity of the third-party financer but did not require disclosure of the in camera documents, suggesting that discovery procedures would be the proper avenue for further requests.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order. The court held that attorneys and law firms do not possess or control a client’s chose in action for purposes of NRS 31.290(1) merely by representing the client. The type of control attorneys exercise in litigation is distinct from the possessory or property-based control required by the statute for garnishment. Therefore, Dickinson Wright’s negative response to the interrogatory was proper, and the district court’s denial of AZG’s motion to traverse was correct. View "AZG Limited Partnership v. Dickinson Wright PLLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from a complex series of shareholder derivative actions involving a mineral rights holding company. The litigation began in March 2014, alleging self-dealing by the company’s corporate counsel and majority shareholder. Over the years, multiple complaints and counterclaims were filed, and the cases were consolidated. The original defendant, Paul, was dismissed from the case in 2016 but was later named as a counterdefendant in an amended counterclaim filed in 2020, after control of the company shifted. During Paul’s absence from the litigation, the remaining parties agreed to waive the five-year rule for bringing a case to trial under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B).The Second Judicial District Court, after considering Paul’s 2024 motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B), denied the motion. The district court reasoned that the 2020 amended counterclaim constituted a new action, thereby restarting the five-year period, and that the parties’ earlier waiver of the five-year rule applied to Paul as well.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the five-year period for bringing an action to trial under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B) begins with the filing of the initial complaint, regardless of subsequent procedural developments. The court further clarified that a waiver of the five-year rule by some parties does not bind parties who did not join in the waiver. The court also determined that the amended counterclaim did not constitute a new action for purposes of the rule. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada granted the petition and directed the district court to dismiss the action against Paul, with the district court to determine whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. View "Paul v. District Court" on Justia Law

Roger Contreras and Nancy Bourke were involved in a marriage dissolution proceeding in Cochise County, Arizona, with a decree entered in 2011. The case saw extensive post-decree litigation. In February 2020, all Cochise County Superior Court judges, including Judge Timothy Dickerson, recused themselves from the matter without providing reasons on the record, and the case was reassigned to a Pima County judge. In 2021, Judge Dickerson became the presiding judge of Cochise County Superior Court and subsequently appointed Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore. In December 2022, Contreras moved to have Bourke declared a vexatious litigant, and Judge Dickerson, despite his prior recusal, ruled on the motion without explaining his re-entry or giving the parties an opportunity to object.Judge Dickerson designated Bourke a vexatious litigant. Bourke appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bourke had waived any challenge to Judge Dickerson’s participation by failing to timely seek disqualification under relevant statutes and rules. The appellate majority did not address Bourke’s argument regarding Judge Dickerson’s appointment of Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore as a potential conflict, while the dissent argued that waiver should not apply under the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that once a judge recuses from a case, the judge remains disqualified from further participation unless the judge articulates the reasons why recusal is no longer required and allows the parties an opportunity to object. The court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s order declaring Bourke a vexatious litigant, and remanded for a different judge to rule on Contreras’ motion. View "CONTRERAS v BOURKE" on Justia Law

A waste hauling company operating in Kansas City brought suit against a mobile waste compaction business and its franchisor. The waste hauler owns containers that are leased to customers, who sometimes contract separately with the compaction company to compress waste inside those containers. The hauler alleged that the compaction company’s activities damaged its containers and interfered with its business relationships. The hauler sought various forms of relief, including damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and nominal damages, but ultimately disavowed any claim for actual monetary damages, citing a lack of evidence to support such damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the hauler’s request for a temporary restraining order, finding no irreparable harm. During discovery, the hauler admitted it could not identify or quantify any actual damages and stipulated it was not seeking damages outside Kansas City. The district court granted the compaction company’s motion to strike the hauler’s jury demand, holding that the hauler had not presented evidence of compensatory damages, that nominal damages were unavailable under Missouri law for the claims asserted, and that the remaining claims were equitable in nature. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the compaction company and its franchisor, finding the hauler failed to prove essential elements of its claims, including actual damages and direct benefit conferred for unjust enrichment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the hauler was not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because it failed to present evidence of compensatory damages and nominal damages were not available for its claims under Missouri law. The court also affirmed judgment for the compaction company on the trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment claims, finding the hauler failed to prove dispossession, damages, or a direct benefit conferred. View "Allied Services v. Smash My Trash, LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiffs attempted to serve the defendant with a summons and complaint at an address where he no longer resided. The plaintiffs had previously been informed, during an earlier related lawsuit, that the defendant had moved to a new address. Despite this knowledge, they directed service to the defendant’s former residence, which was then occupied by unrelated tenants. The certified mail was accepted by one of the tenants, who eventually forwarded the documents to the defendant’s father, and the father then delivered them to the defendant. The defendant received the summons only days before his answer was due.After the complaint was refiled, the defendant raised the defense of insufficient service of process in his answer. Nearly two years later, he moved for summary judgment, arguing that service had not been perfected within the required one-year period under Ohio Civil Rule 3(A), since the summons was sent to an outdated address. The Summit County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that although the plaintiffs’ service attempt complied with the procedural requirements of Civil Rule 4.1(A)(1)(a), it did not meet the due process standard of being reasonably calculated to provide notice. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that for service of process to be sufficient, it must not only comply with the procedural rules but also be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the lawsuit, as required by due process. Service to the defendant’s former residence, when the plaintiffs were aware of his current address, was not reasonably calculated to provide notice and was therefore insufficient. The court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. View "Hunt v. Alderman" on Justia Law

A publicly traded reinsurance company experienced significant financial losses over a two-year period due to adverse developments with its largest client, which led to higher-than-expected claim payouts and a dramatic drop in its stock price. Investors, represented by a pension trust and a bank, alleged that the company committed securities fraud by making misleading statements about the adequacy of its reserve funds. Specifically, they claimed the company failed to disclose historical data indicating that its reserves were insufficient, even though it knew of this adverse information.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied the company’s motion to dismiss, allowing limited discovery focused on whether the company intentionally omitted the historical loss ratio information. The Magistrate Judge restricted discovery to a narrow scope, declining to require production of all underlying data, and the District Court affirmed this limitation. After this limited discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment for the company, holding that the reserve statements were not misleading as a matter of law because the company had considered the historical data and the omitted information did not “totally eclipse” other factors in the reserve calculations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the District Court erred in its application of the materiality standard and in denying further discovery. The Third Circuit found that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the omission of adverse historical data was material to investors, given the company’s dependence on its largest client and the significance of historical trends in its reserve-setting process. The court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for full discovery and further proceedings, clarifying that materiality is a context-specific inquiry and that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to proceed. View "Boilermaker Blacksmith National Pension Trust v. Maiden Holdings Ltd" on Justia Law

A tenured English professor at a public university objected to the administration’s decision to resume in-person instruction during the Covid-19 pandemic. The professor, who had health concerns and was partially vaccinated, communicated his opposition by emailing students about his forced return to the classroom, attaching correspondence with his department chair, and using an unconventional email signature. The university responded by reassigning his courses, placing him on paid leave, and proposing a five-day suspension without pay, along with requirements for improved email professionalism. The professor then filed a lawsuit alleging violations of his First Amendment and procedural due process rights.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed the complaint. The court found that the professor’s email did not constitute protected speech under the First Amendment, as it was gratuitous information in a logistical message sent in his professional capacity. The court also rejected the procedural due process claim for failure to exhaust state-law remedies. The court’s dismissal order allowed the professor until July 3 to amend his complaint, instructing the clerk to enter judgment if no amendment was filed. The professor did not amend, and the clerk did not immediately enter judgment. On July 14, the court issued another order directing entry of judgment, which the clerk entered that day. The professor filed his notice of appeal on August 10.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the appeal was timely. Applying its precedent from Schuurman v. Motor Vessel Betty K V, the court held that the thirty-day appeal period began on the last day set for amending the complaint, not the later date when judgment was entered. Because the notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the amendment deadline, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Burt v. President of University of Florida" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former police officer in Dermott, Arkansas, alleged that he was forced to resign in retaliation for reporting a fellow officer’s excessive use of force. The incident in question involved the other officer grabbing an arrestee by the neck while the arrestee was restrained. Subsequently, the officer accused the plaintiff of taking money from a parolee, which the parolee confirmed in a statement. The police chief referred the matter to a prosecutor, who initiated a state police investigation. During this period, the plaintiff’s employment status became unclear, with conflicting statements about whether he was fired or resigned. The plaintiff ultimately resigned after a job offer from another police department was rescinded due to the ongoing investigation. He was later charged with abuse of office and witness bribery, but the charges were dismissed when the parolee could not be located.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. The court found that the plaintiff had voluntarily resigned and had not suffered an adverse employment action, which was necessary for his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court also determined that the plaintiff was not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for his malicious prosecution claim, as a summons to appear in court did not constitute a seizure. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and found that they failed on the merits, including claims under the Arkansas Whistle Blower Act, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s voluntary resignation did not amount to an adverse employment action, and that he was not seized under the Fourth Amendment. The court also agreed that the state law claims failed as a matter of law. View "Brown v. City of Dermott Arkansas" on Justia Law