Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

McKenzie County, North Dakota, sued the United States and the Department of the Interior, claiming ownership of mineral royalties under certain lands. The County argued that previous litigation had settled the matter in its favor. The United States contended that the prior litigation involved different lands and that the County’s claim was untimely. The district court ruled in favor of the County, and the United States appealed.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota had previously granted judgment for the County, concluding that the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments and a 1991 Judgment quieted title to the disputed minerals in favor of the County. The district court held that the County’s claim was not barred by the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations and that the All Writs Act and Rule 70 empowered it to enforce its prior judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the All Writs Act could not be used to circumvent the Quiet Title Act’s requirements. The court determined that the 1991 Judgment did not include the tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint and that the County’s claim under the Quiet Title Act was untimely. The court concluded that the County knew or should have known of the United States’ adverse claim to the mineral royalties by December 2003, thus triggering the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. The Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the United States. View "McKenzie County, ND v. United States" on Justia Law

Mr. Dourdounas, a high school math teacher, was assigned to the Absent Teacher Reserve (ATR) in 2012. The ATR is a pool of teachers whose positions were eliminated but who were not terminated. In 2017, the DOE and UFT created a voluntary severance package for ATR teachers. Mr. Dourdounas, believing he was still in the ATR pool, applied for the severance package but was denied because the DOE claimed he had been permanently hired at Bronx International High School.Mr. Dourdounas followed the grievance process outlined in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the DOE and UFT. After exhausting the grievance process, including an internal appeal within the UFT, he commenced an article 78 proceeding against the City, alleging breach of contract for denying him the retirement incentive. The DOE moved to dismiss the petition on several grounds, including timeliness and failure to state a cause of action.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the statute of limitations began when Mr. Dourdounas was informed of the denial in July 2017. The Appellate Division held that pursuing the grievance process did not toll the statute of limitations.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds. The court held that under the precedent set in Ambach, an employee cannot seek judicial review of a claim arising under a CBA without alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. Since Mr. Dourdounas did not allege such a breach, his claim was dismissed. The court also clarified that claims arising solely from a CBA must be brought as a breach of contract action, not through an article 78 proceeding. View "Matter of Dourdounas v City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, tenants of a building in Queens, alleged that the defendant engaged in a fraudulent scheme to inflate rents unlawfully. The building participated in the Real Property Tax Law § 421-a program, which required compliance with rent stabilization laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the previous owner registered both a preferential rent and a higher legal regulated rent, allowing for illegal rent increases. This scheme allegedly continued for years, affecting many tenants. Plaintiffs also accused the defendant of concealing this conduct by registering a legal regulated rent that matched the preferential rent.The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient indicia of fraud to invoke the fraud exception to the four-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred because they could not have reasonably relied on the inflated rent figures, which were disclosed in the registration statements and leases.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and clarified that to invoke the fraud exception, a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate each element of common-law fraud, including reliance. Instead, the complaint must allege sufficient indicia of fraud. The Court modified the Appellate Division's order and remitted the case for further proceedings to determine if the plaintiffs' complaint met the established standard for alleging a fraudulent scheme. The Court affirmed the dismissal of one plaintiff's overcharge claim based on a rent concession, as the defendant's evidence refuted the allegations. View "Burrows v. 75-25 153rd St., LLC" on Justia Law

Several young Utah residents filed a lawsuit challenging statutory provisions and government actions related to fossil fuel development. They claimed that these provisions and actions were designed to maximize fossil fuel development in Utah, which they argued endangered their health and shortened their lifespans by exacerbating climate change. They sought a declaration from the district court that these provisions and actions violated their rights under the Utah Constitution.The government defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the requested relief would not redress the alleged injuries. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, agreed and dismissed the claims with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their claims were not redressable.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the challenge to the energy policy provision was moot because the legislature had significantly amended the statute since the complaint was filed. The plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the remaining statutory provisions because success on those challenges would not provide relief likely to redress their injuries. The court noted that the challenged provisions did not limit the government defendants' discretion in making decisions about fossil fuel development, and thus, striking these provisions would not necessarily lead to less fossil fuel development.The court also held that the challenges to the government defendants' conduct were not justiciable because they were not supported by a concrete set of facts. The plaintiffs had identified general categories of conduct without tying their claims to any specific government actions. The court instructed the district court to modify its ruling to reflect that the dismissal was without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs the opportunity to refile their claims if they could address the jurisdictional deficiencies. View "Roussel v. State" on Justia Law

Irma Jordan filed a negligence complaint against Esmerelda Macedo in the circuit court of Cook County following a car accident. The case was referred to mandatory arbitration, where the arbitrator awarded Jordan $13,070. Neither party rejected the award, and Jordan submitted it to the circuit court for judgment. Jordan then filed a motion seeking prejudgment interest and statutory costs, which the circuit court denied, stating the arbitration award included the full amount to be reduced to judgment.The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's denial of statutory costs but reversed the denial of prejudgment interest. The appellate court held that Jordan should have requested costs during arbitration, referencing the Cruz v. Northwestern Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc. decision. However, it agreed that prejudgment interest could be requested in the circuit court as it is not considered damages.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and held that, according to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 92(e), statutory costs can be sought during arbitration, but failure to do so does not waive the right to seek them in the trial court upon entry of judgment. The court found that Rule 92(e) allows for statutory costs to be requested in the trial court even if not addressed by the arbitrator. The court reversed the appellate court's judgment regarding statutory costs and affirmed the judgment regarding prejudgment interest. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Jordan v. Macedo" on Justia Law

Suzanne Wolf suffered multiple pelvic fractures in a car accident caused by an underinsured motorist. After receiving $100,000 from the at-fault driver’s insurance, she filed claims for underinsured motorist benefits with her personal automobile insurer and her employer’s general commercial liability insurer, Riverport Insurance Company. Wolf settled with her personal insurer for $150,000 and eventually settled with Riverport after four years of negotiations and arbitration, which awarded her $905,000. Riverport paid the award, less the amounts received from the other insurers.Wolf filed a lawsuit against Riverport in the Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging unreasonable delay in payment under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. Riverport removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted Riverport’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that Wolf lacked a viable legal theory to support her claim. The court also denied Wolf’s discovery request.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the insurance policy did not impose a duty on Riverport to investigate and settle Wolf’s claim in good faith. The court found that the policy’s provision granting Riverport discretion to investigate and settle claims applied only to defending insureds against third-party claims, not to first-party claims by insureds against Riverport. Consequently, Wolf’s breach-of-contract theory failed, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s discovery decision, as Wolf could not show actual and substantial prejudice from the denial of additional discovery. View "Wolf v. Riverport Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a student at Stony Brook University, challenged the University's determination that he violated the University's Code of Student Responsibility by committing sexual misconduct against another student, S.G. The University conducted an investigation after receiving a report of the incident, during which S.G. provided a written statement detailing the encounter. P.C. declined to meet with the investigator. He was charged with sexual harassment, nonconsensual sexual contact, and nonconsensual sexual intercourse. A hearing was held, and the Review Panel found P.C. responsible for the charges, leading to his suspension.P.C. appealed the decision, arguing that the evidence did not support the findings and that the Review Panel improperly considered his decision to remain silent. The Appeals Committee upheld the Review Panel's determination and the disciplinary penalty. P.C. then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding, asserting that the determination lacked substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious.The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Appellate Division, which granted the petition, annulled the Appeals Committee's determination, dismissed the charges, and directed the University to expunge the matter from P.C.'s academic record. The Appellate Division majority found that substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that S.G. did not consent to the sexual activity and that the Review Panel improperly relied on P.C.'s decision not to answer questions.The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate Division's order, holding that substantial evidence supported the University's determination that P.C. violated the Code of Student Responsibility. The Court found that S.G.'s testimony and P.C.'s text messages provided sufficient evidence of nonconsensual sexual activity. The Court also rejected P.C.'s argument that the University's determination was arbitrary and capricious, concluding that the University followed its rules and procedures. The petition was dismissed. View "Matter of P.C. v Stony Brook Univ." on Justia Law

Claimant Chi Bartram Wright filed a claim under the Child Victims Act (CVA) alleging that he was sexually abused by numerous men at a state-owned performing arts center in Albany, New York, between 1986 and 1990. Wright sought seventy-five million dollars in damages, asserting various theories of negligence by the State, including negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and direction. The claim described the abuse in general terms but did not provide specific details about the abusers or the exact dates of the incidents.The Court of Claims dismissed Wright's claim, finding that it did not meet the specificity requirements of section 11 (b) of the Court of Claims Act, which mandates that claims against the State must include specific details to enable prompt investigation and ascertainment of liability. The court concluded that the CVA did not relax these requirements. Wright appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the four-year period alleged in Wright's claim was sufficiently specific given the decades that had passed since the abuse occurred.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the CVA did not alter the substantive pleading requirements of section 11 (b) of the Court of Claims Act. The court found that Wright's claim lacked the necessary specificity to enable the State to promptly investigate and determine its liability. The claim did not provide sufficient details about the abusers, the context of the abuse, or the State's potential responsibility. As a result, the court granted the State's motion to dismiss the claim and answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Wright v State of New York" on Justia Law

Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP sought to recover legal fees from Be In, Inc., a New York corporation, and its investors, including George Koukis. After Be In failed to pay, Gibson Dunn obtained a judgment in California and domesticated it in New York. Unable to recover from Be In, Gibson Dunn filed a lawsuit in New York Supreme Court against the D'Annas and Mr. Koukis, asserting fraudulent conveyance and alter ego claims. The defendants, represented by attorney Gil Santamarina, entered a stipulation waiving personal jurisdiction defenses.The New York Supreme Court initially denied Gibson Dunn's motion for default judgment but later granted it upon reargument. Mr. Koukis then moved to strike Mr. Santamarina's appearance, vacate the default judgment, and dismiss the complaint, claiming lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service. The Supreme Court vacated the waiver of personal jurisdiction but found jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (2) and set a traverse hearing to determine proper service.The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order, vacating the default judgment and dismissing the complaint against Mr. Koukis for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Mr. Santamarina was not authorized to waive jurisdictional defenses. Two Justices dissented, arguing for a hearing to determine the validity of Mr. Santamarina's representation.The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that there is a material factual dispute regarding whether Mr. Koukis authorized or ratified the waiver of personal jurisdiction. The court emphasized the need for a factual hearing to resolve this issue, citing emails and filings suggesting potential authorization or ratification by Mr. Koukis. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings to determine the validity of the waiver. View "Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v Koukis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting claims for negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, alleged that Dr. Panguluri’s mishandling of a syringe containing an HIV patient’s blood caused the blood to splash into his face and eye. The complaint did not claim that Glenn contracted HIV but stated that both plaintiffs suffered harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the plaintiffs' claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The plaintiffs did not amend their complaint but instead filed a voluntary dismissal of their entire action with prejudice, intending to expedite an appeal of the trial court’s adverse rulings.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ appeal. The court held that a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs' request, without a final judicial determination of their claims, is not an appealable order. The court emphasized that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law