Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Four former employees of Litster Frost Injury Lawyers (LFIL) filed a lawsuit against LFIL and its former sole shareholder, Martha Frost, for unpaid wages and breach of an employment agreement. They claimed LFIL owed them compensation in the form of wages, bonuses, profit sharing, and other expenses incurred while employed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of LFIL, concluding that the employees' claims were time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 45-614 and that the employment agreement was an unenforceable "agreement to agree."The employees appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining that the provisions of the employment agreement were not severable or enforceable and that the court should have supplied a "reasonable time" for performance. LFIL cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their request for attorney fees following summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the employees' breach of contract claims because the employment agreement was unenforceable. The court found that the agreement's essential terms were too indefinite and subject to future negotiations. However, the court reversed the district court's decision regarding Sarah's reimbursement claim, finding that issues of material fact existed as to whether her claim fell within Idaho's Wage Claim Act. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all other claims.The Supreme Court also reversed the district court's decision on attorney fees, holding that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Attorney fees on appeal were awarded to LFIL for the time spent responding to certain claims, and costs were awarded to LFIL. View "Litster v. Litster Frost Injury Lawyers PLLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Noah Gabriel, owns an undeveloped parcel of real estate in Narragansett, Rhode Island. The Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) received a notification of potential wetland violations on the property and investigated, finding that the property had been altered by clearing vegetation, applying fill soil, installing a culvert, and expanding a driveway. CRMC issued a cease-and-desist order and later an order to restore the property. Gabriel disputed CRMC's jurisdiction and filed a complaint in Washington County Superior Court, asserting that CRMC lacked jurisdiction and had committed various illegal actions.The Superior Court granted CRMC's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ordering Gabriel to cease all activities on the property. Gabriel appealed, arguing that CRMC did not have the authority to enforce wetland regulations on his property and cited the Clean Water Act and the Supreme Court decision in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Court found that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Court determined that CRMC had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, as there was evidence of wetland violations. The Court also found that CRMC would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, as continued alterations to the property would harm the environment. The balance of equities favored CRMC, and the issuance of the injunction would preserve the status quo by protecting the wetland. View "Gabriel v. Willis" on Justia Law

Amanda Mitchell filed for a civil protection order against Nicholas Ramlow in October 2020, alleging that he was stalking her by tracking her movements and placing a tracking device on her car. The magistrate court issued a temporary ex parte protection order and scheduled a hearing. Due to COVID-19 mask mandates, Ramlow was denied entry to the courthouse for refusing to wear a mask, leading to the hearing being rescheduled. At the rescheduled hearing, Ramlow was again absent, and the magistrate court issued a one-year protection order requiring him to attend a 52-week domestic violence course and review hearings.Ramlow filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then appealed to the district court. The protection order was extended but expired before the district court heard the appeal. The district court requested supplemental briefing on mootness and ultimately dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no applicable exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Ramlow appealed the district court's decision, arguing that his appeal still presented justiciable issues and fell within exceptions to the mootness doctrine.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the appeal was moot because the protection order had expired, and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. The court found that the issues were too fact-specific to be capable of repetition yet evading review, there were no collateral legal consequences, and the case did not raise issues of substantial public interest. The court also declined to vacate the expired protection order and denied attorney fees to both parties, awarding costs to Mitchell as the prevailing party. View "Mitchell v. Ramlow" on Justia Law

Following heavy snowfall in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the roofs of several chicken houses at ten poultry farms collapsed. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which insured the farms, sued Rogers Manufacturing Corporation, the manufacturer of the roof trusses used in the chicken houses, claiming strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranties. Rogers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Norfolk’s claims were barred by the Arkansas statute of repose.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas agreed with Rogers and dismissed the complaint. Norfolk appealed the dismissal, arguing that the statute of repose did not apply to Rogers because the roof trusses were standardized goods, not custom-designed for the farms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Norfolk’s favor. The court found that Norfolk’s complaint plausibly supported an inference that the roof trusses were standardized goods, which would not be covered by the Arkansas statute of repose. The court emphasized that at this early stage, the complaint should not be dismissed if it allows for a reasonable inference of liability.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the facts and legal arguments could be further developed as the case progresses. View "Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Rogers Manufacturing Corporation" on Justia Law

Matthew Munoz, while held in the Mitchell County jail, attempted to invoke the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (MDDA) to address a pending theft charge in McPherson County. Munoz filed the request with the McPherson County District Court, but the Secretary of Corrections did not receive notice or issue a statutory certificate. The McPherson County Attorney, however, did have actual notice of the filing. The theft charge was not brought to trial within the 180-day period prescribed by the MDDA.The McPherson District Court ruled in favor of Munoz, finding that he had substantially complied with the MDDA and that the State was time-barred from prosecuting the theft charge. The State appealed this decision. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that there was insufficient evidence to show Munoz was in the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) when he filed his MDDA request and that actual notice to the McPherson County Attorney did not constitute substantial compliance.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals. The court held that Munoz did not substantially comply with the MDDA because the Secretary of Corrections never received his request, and thus, the statutory 180-day clock never began to run. The court emphasized that the MDDA's requirements must be strictly followed unless prison officials' actions prevent compliance, which was not the case here. Consequently, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, reversed the district court's ruling, and remanded the case with directions to reinstate the theft charge against Munoz. View "State v. Munoz" on Justia Law

Patricia Nicholson filed a garnishment action after her husband was killed in an accident involving Ava Mercer, who was insured by Key Insurance Company. Key provided Mercer with an attorney but did not actively defend her. Nicholson attempted to settle for the policy limit, but Key delayed. Nicholson then filed a wrongful death suit, and Key offered to settle for the policy limit, which Nicholson rejected. Instead, Nicholson and Mercer agreed that Mercer would assign her rights to sue Key for bad faith to Nicholson, and Nicholson would not execute any judgment against Mercer. Mercer waived her right to a jury trial and did not present a defense. Nicholson won a $3 million verdict.The Leavenworth District Court ruled against Key on the merits, finding that Key acted in bad faith and ordered garnishment for the $3 million judgment. Key did not argue that garnishment was statutorily unavailable due to the assignment of rights at the district court level. On appeal, Key raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction for the first time, arguing that garnishment was impossible following an assignment of rights, thus the district court lacked jurisdiction.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court clarified that subject-matter jurisdiction is the constitutional power of courts to decide disputes and does not disappear due to a flawed claim. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear Nicholson's garnishment action on the merits. The court emphasized that Key's statutory arguments should have been presented as a motion to dismiss at the district court level and could not be raised for the first time on appeal under the guise of a jurisdictional argument. The judgment of the Court of Appeals and the district court was affirmed. View "Nicholson v. Mercer" on Justia Law

Three registered electors from Bridgeport filed a writ of error challenging a trial judge's decision to deny their applications for arrest warrants for two individuals who allegedly violated election laws during the 2023 Democratic primary for the mayoral office. The plaintiffs claimed that the trial judge misinterpreted the relevant statute, General Statutes § 9-368, which they argued mandated the issuance of arrest warrants upon their complaint. The state of Connecticut, the defendant in error, argued that the writ should be dismissed because the plaintiffs were neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved by the denial of their applications.The Superior Court for the judicial district of Fairfield, with Judge Thomas J. Welch presiding, denied the applications for arrest warrants. The judge concluded that § 9-368 was inconsistent with the federal and state constitutions and the rules of practice, as it allowed for the issuance of arrest warrants based on a standard less than probable cause and without coordination with the Division of Criminal Justice. The judge did not reach the substantive merits of the applications and suggested that the matter could be referred to a prosecuting authority.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs in error were not required to establish statutory aggrievement to bring a writ of error. However, the court dismissed the writ on the grounds that the plaintiffs were not classically aggrieved. The court determined that the plaintiffs lacked a specific, personal, and legal interest in the arrest and prosecution of those who allegedly violated election laws, as they were private citizens without a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Consequently, the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the trial judge's denial of their arrest warrant applications. View "In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant" on Justia Law

Brandon Williams was involved in a series of interactions with Norfolk, Virginia police officers. Initially, Officer John D. McClanahan falsely charged Williams with misdemeanor trespassing and perjured himself at trial to secure a conviction. Williams appealed and used a recording to expose McClanahan's perjury, leading to the dismissal of the charge by the state appellate court. Two weeks later, Williams was hit by a speeding drunk driver, and responding officers, including McClanahan, allegedly falsified the accident report to deprive Williams of his right to sue the other driver.Williams filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting claims of retaliation for exercising his First and Sixth Amendment rights, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court dismissed Williams' retaliation claim, finding he failed to plead an adverse action, and dismissed his conspiracy claim for lack of a constitutional violation. The court also dismissed Williams' state law IIED claims without prejudice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Williams adequately alleged that the officers' intentional misrepresentation on the accident report would likely deter him from recording police activity and defending himself at trial in the future. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of his retaliation claim. The court also vacated the dismissal of his conspiracy claim, finding a plausible constitutional violation, and remanded the claim for reconsideration. Finally, the court vacated the dismissal of Williams' IIED claims and remanded them for further consideration. View "Williams v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Grace Smith, a high school junior, was repeatedly suspended from Laramie High School for refusing to comply with a COVID-19 indoor-mask mandate imposed by the Albany County School District No. 1 Board of Trustees. After her suspensions, she was arrested for trespassing on school grounds. Grace and her parents, Andy and Erin Smith, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming against the Board members, the superintendent, and the principal, alleging violations of Grace’s constitutional rights and state law claims.The district court dismissed the federal claims for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that Grace did not suffer an injury in fact necessary for standing. The court reasoned that her injuries were hypothetical because the mask mandate had expired and she was no longer a student at LHS, and that her injuries were self-inflicted. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Grace had standing to bring her claims because she suffered concrete and particularized injuries from the enforcement of the mask mandate, including suspensions and arrest. The court found that her injuries were directly inflicted by the defendants’ actions and were not self-inflicted. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Smith v. Albany County School District No. 1" on Justia Law

In 2001, Alphonse Fletcher, Jr. acquired property associated with two apartment units in a residential cooperative corporation controlled by The Dakota, Inc. In 2008, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. approved a loan to Fletcher, secured by his rights in the property. Fletcher, Chase, and The Dakota entered into an agreement recognizing The Dakota's priority to proceeds from any sale or subletting of Fletcher's apartments. In 2011, Fletcher sued The Dakota for racial discrimination, and The Dakota counterclaimed for legal fees and costs based on Fletcher's proprietary lease.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota in the Fletcher action and awarded attorneys' fees and costs. While this action was pending, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP initiated a CPLR 5225 proceeding against Chase, The Dakota, and Fletcher to seize and sell Fletcher's apartments to satisfy a judgment for unpaid legal fees. The Dakota claimed a superior interest in Fletcher's property based on the fee judgment, while Chase argued that The Dakota's lien was not superior and that the lease provision authorizing attorneys' fees was either inapplicable or unconscionable.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that Chase's contentions were an impermissible collateral attack on The Dakota's judgment. Chase moved for leave to appeal and to intervene and vacate the judgment in the Fletcher action. The Supreme Court denied Chase's motion, but the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals held that Chase, as a nonparty to the original action, was not barred from challenging the fee award in a separate proceeding. The court concluded that Chase was not required to intervene in the Fletcher action to protect its interests and that doing so would violate Chase's due process rights. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the matter was remitted for further proceedings. View "Matter of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law