Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, a fire destroyed the building where Cory Michael Hoehn and his roommate lived. The building’s insurer, California Capital Insurance Company, determined that careless smoking caused the fire and sued Hoehn and his roommate for negligence, seeking damages. The company attempted to serve Hoehn with the complaint and summons, but the service was allegedly improper. A default judgment was entered against Hoehn in April 2011. In January 2020, Hoehn learned of the default judgment when his wages were garnished and promptly moved to set aside the judgment, claiming he was never properly served.The Placer County Superior Court denied Hoehn’s motion, ruling it was time-barred because it was filed more than two years after the default judgment. The court also found no extrinsic fraud or mistake. The Court of Appeal affirmed, relying on precedent that a motion to vacate a judgment for improper service must be made within two years if the judgment is not void on its face.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the validity of the two-year time limit for such motions. The court held that the judicially created rule imposing a two-year limit on motions to vacate void judgments for improper service is not supported by the statute’s text, legislative intent, or sound justification. The court concluded that a motion to vacate a judgment void for lack of proper service under section 473(d) is not subject to a two-year limitation. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Cal. Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn" on Justia Law

Chad Sheller, as the personal representative of the estate of his son Daniel Elias Sheller, sought attorneys' fees after voluntarily dismissing a Vaccine Act petition. Daniel passed away at two months old, two days after receiving several vaccinations. Sheller filed for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, relying on the "Triple Risk Model" of vaccine-triggered sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) proposed by Dr. Douglas Miller. This model had previously been accepted in another case, Boatmon v. Secretary of Health & Human Services.The Special Master denied Sheller's request for attorneys' fees, concluding that the Triple Risk Model did not provide a reasonable basis for the claim. The United States Court of Federal Claims affirmed this decision. The Special Master also struck certain medical articles from the record, which were submitted after the petition was dismissed, deeming them irrelevant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Special Master abused his discretion by not considering whether the Triple Risk Model was a reasonable basis at the time of filing, given its prior acceptance in the Boatmon case. The court noted that the model was plausible and had succeeded before another special master, making it a reasonable basis for the petition when filed. The court also found that the Special Master did not abuse his discretion in striking the medical articles, as he assessed their relevance appropriately.The Federal Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for the Special Master to determine, in his discretion, whether attorneys' fees should be granted, considering the Vaccine Act's objective of maintaining access to qualified legal assistance. View "SHELLER v. HHS " on Justia Law

The case involves a First Amendment challenge to a policy in Caldwell County, Texas, which categorically excludes the press and the public from observing criminal pretrial proceedings known as magistrations. The plaintiffs, two nonprofit news organizations and an advocacy organization, argued that this policy violates their First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings. The district court agreed, finding the policy unconstitutional and granting a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the policy and demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim. The court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the County from enforcing its policy of closing magistrations to the press and public, except in extraordinary circumstances and as constitutionally permitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The County argued that the district court erred in finding that the plaintiffs had standing and in determining that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, agreeing that the plaintiffs had standing and that there is a presumptive First Amendment right of access to magistrations. The court applied the "experience and logic" test, finding that both historical practice and the positive role of public access in the functioning of bail hearings supported the plaintiffs' claim. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its determinations and upheld the preliminary injunction. View "Texas Tribune v. Caldwell County" on Justia Law

Allison Littlefield filed a verified petition against her brothers, Scott and David Littlefield, and her aunt, Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust. The petition sought their removal as co-trustees, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the Trust, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Allison claimed that the appellants misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, restricted her use of the Ranch, and failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who allegedly harassed Allison and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike the petition under California's anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the appellants failed to show that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that the petition was based on protected activity. The court noted that the appellants' motion failed to identify specific allegations of protected activity and improperly sought to strike the entire petition or all causes of action without distinguishing between protected and unprotected conduct.However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The court held that any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit, as it did not demonstrate that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

The case involves the San Diego City Attorney filing a complaint against Experian Data Corp. for violating the unfair competition law (UCL) by failing to promptly notify consumers of a data breach as required by Civil Code section 1798.82(a). The City Attorney sought civil penalties and injunctive relief. The UCL claim is subject to a four-year statute of limitations, and the key issue is whether the discovery rule can delay the accrual of this non-fraud civil enforcement action.The Superior Court of Orange County initially overruled Experian's demurrer, which argued the complaint was time-barred. The court found the complaint did not show on its face that the UCL claim accrued before March 6, 2014. However, the court later granted Experian's motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to civil penalties, concluding the discovery rule did not apply to the UCL claim because it was a non-fraud claim and an enforcement action seeking civil penalties. The court also denied the City Attorney's motion for reconsideration and motion to file a Third Amended Complaint.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the discovery rule can apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim. The court found that the nature of the claim, the enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the involvement of a governmental entity did not preclude the application of the discovery rule. The court noted that the discovery rule has been applied to various types of claims, including those involving civil penalties and enforcement actions by governmental entities.The appellate court reversed the trial court's orders granting Experian's motion in limine and denying reconsideration. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the application of the discovery rule and determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant actors. The trial court was also directed to reconsider the City Attorney's request to file a Third Amended Complaint. View "People v. Experian Data Corp." on Justia Law

Horace Crump, an inmate at Lakeland Correctional Facility in Michigan, filed a § 1983 lawsuit against several prison employees, alleging they withheld treatment for his multiple sclerosis. The key issue at this stage is whether Crump can proceed with his lawsuit without paying the filing fee upfront, as he sought to proceed in forma pauperis due to his inability to pay.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed Crump's complaint, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act's three-strikes rule, which disqualifies prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim. Crump appealed, disputing two of the three strikes counted against him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether Crump's prior dismissals counted as strikes under the Act. The court found that Crump's previous cases, which included dismissals for failure to state a claim and decisions not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, did not count as strikes. The court reasoned that the Act's language refers to entire actions being dismissed on specific grounds, not individual claims. Additionally, dismissals based on Eleventh Amendment immunity do not count as strikes under the Act.The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Crump's lawsuit to proceed without the upfront payment of the filing fee. View "Crump v. Blue" on Justia Law

Tremonti Perry, while incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center, experienced a severe medical emergency that resulted in him being placed in a medically induced coma for a month. Several years after recovering, Perry filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison's warden, the Missouri Department of Corrections Director, and two medical-care contractors, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Perry admitted he did not use the prison’s administrative remedy, which required filing a complaint within fifteen days of the incident, but argued that his coma made it impossible to meet this requirement.The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Perry had not exhausted his available remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). They acknowledged that the grievance process was unavailable to Perry during his coma and a reasonable period afterward but contended that Perry should have made a diligent effort to exhaust his claims once he recovered. The district court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Perry could have filed a grievance after his medical conditions resolved.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court determined that the prison’s administrative grievance process was unavailable to Perry due to his physical incapacity during the coma and the prison’s rules not allowing late filings. The court rejected the Defendants' arguments that Perry could have filed an untimely grievance or that the grievance deadline was perpetually renewed due to ongoing medical issues. The court also denied the Defendants' motion to supplement the record with new evidence. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Perry’s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perry v. Precythe" on Justia Law

Robert Roberson, a death-row inmate, was scheduled for execution on October 17, 2024. On October 16, 2024, the Texas House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence issued a subpoena requiring Roberson to testify on October 21, 2024, creating a conflict between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The judicial branch had affirmed Roberson's sentence, and the executive branch had declined clemency. The committee sought to delay the execution to obtain Roberson's testimony, claiming legislative authority to compel testimony superseded the scheduled execution.The committee filed a lawsuit in a state district court, which granted a temporary restraining order to delay the execution. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (the department) sought relief from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which set aside the restraining order. The committee then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of mandamus to enforce the subpoena and delay the execution.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the legislative committee's authority to compel testimony does not override the scheduled legal process leading to an execution. The court emphasized the separation of powers, noting that the legislature's investigatory power must be balanced against the judiciary's authority to render judgments and the executive's authority to enforce them. The court held that the committee could have obtained Roberson's testimony earlier and that the legislative subpoena could not disrupt the execution process. Consequently, the court denied the committee's petition for writ of mandamus, allowing the execution to proceed as scheduled. View "IN RE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES" on Justia Law

Brian Herman and Skyler Herman sued Peter Tonn Enterprises, LLC, doing business as I39 Supply, for breach of contract. The Hermans alleged that they agreed to buy a livestock trailer from I39 Supply, but I39 Supply failed to honor the agreement. The Hermans served I39 Supply via certified mail, but I39 Supply did not respond, leading the Hermans to file for a default judgment. The district court granted the default judgment, ruling that I39 Supply was properly served and had failed to answer the complaint.I39 Supply, represented by its owner Peter Tonn, who is not an attorney, sent documents to the district court and participated in the default judgment hearing by telephone. The district court ruled that Tonn could not represent the LLC and entered a $19,000 judgment in favor of the Hermans. I39 Supply later retained counsel and filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, arguing that Tonn was unaware he could not represent the LLC. The motion did not mention personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to vacate the default judgment and set the matter for a pretrial conference.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that I39 Supply made a general appearance by filing the motion to vacate the default judgment without raising the issue of personal jurisdiction. This action conferred personal jurisdiction on the district court. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing the Hermans' complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herman v. Peter Tonn Enters." on Justia Law

A clerk-magistrate decided to allow public access to show cause hearings for individuals accused of being clients of a prostitution ring but denied media requests for the underlying complaint applications before the hearings. The accused individuals, referred to as John Does, intervened to oppose the public access decision and sought to keep the hearings private. The media outlets filed a petition in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County to challenge the clerk-magistrate's decision to withhold the complaint applications.The single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to the clerk-magistrate for written findings on specific questions related to the public interest and privacy concerns. After reviewing the clerk-magistrate's responses, the single justice denied the petition, concluding that the clerk-magistrate did not commit an error of law or abuse her discretion in allowing public access to the hearings and denying access to the complaint applications.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the clerk-magistrate acted within her discretion. The court found that the public interest in transparency and accountability outweighed the privacy interests of the accused, especially given the significant public attention and the potential for favoritism if the hearings were held privately. The court also agreed that denying access to the complaint applications was appropriate to prevent the dissemination of potentially erroneous or extraneous information before the accused had an opportunity to respond at the hearings.The court further directed the Trial Court to provide notice to the accused when a request for public access to a show cause hearing is made and to offer the accused an opportunity to respond before deciding on the request. View "Trustees of Boston University v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Cambridge Division of the District Court Department" on Justia Law