Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2021, the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 8, known as the Texas Heartbeat Act, which prohibits physicians from performing abortions if a fetal heartbeat is detected. The Act allows enforcement only through private civil actions. Plaintiffs, including Allison Van Stean and various Planned Parenthood entities, alleged that Texas Right to Life (TRTL) organized efforts to sue those violating the Act. They filed multiple suits challenging the Act's constitutionality and sought injunctions to prevent TRTL from enforcing it. The cases were consolidated, and TRTL filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), both challenging the plaintiffs' standing. The trial court denied both motions.TRTL appealed the denial of the TCPA motion, but the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed the trial court's order, stating that the TCPA did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims. The court did not address the standing issue raised by TRTL. TRTL then petitioned for review.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred by not addressing the standing issue, which is a prerequisite for subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdictional questions must be resolved before addressing the merits of a case. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue. If the plaintiffs lack standing, the case should be dismissed; if they have standing, the Court of Appeals should then address the merits of the TCPA motion. View "TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE v. STEAN" on Justia Law

Several landowners owned a tract of land near the intersection of a highway and Interstate 35. The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) planned to modernize the interchange and condemned a strip of the landowners' property. The landowners anticipated being able to install a commercial entrance to the highway based on prior discussions with the DOT. However, the DOT's formal notice of condemnation indicated that all rights of direct access to the highway would be taken. The landowners filed actions challenging the condemnation after being informed that commercial access would not be allowed.The Iowa District Court for Story County dismissed the landowners' actions as untimely, citing the thirty-day deadline for challenging the exercise of eminent domain authority under Iowa Code section 6A.24(1). The landowners also delayed filing their notice of appeal in the district court, which was filed fifty-seven days after the dismissal order, although it was served on the DOT within twenty-two days.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the delay in filing the notice of appeal was not fatal, as the thirty-five days from service to actual filing was deemed a reasonable time under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.101(4). However, the court found that the landowners' challenge to the condemnation was untimely under Iowa Code section 6A.24(1), which requires actions to be commenced within thirty days after service of notice of assessment. The court held that this statute is the exclusive method for challenging the exercise of eminent domain authority and does not allow for exceptions or the application of a discovery rule. Consequently, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the landowners' case. View "Brendeland v. Iowa Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

A landowner in Hardin County, Iowa, refused to allow a surveyor for a pipeline developer to enter his private property. The developer, Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC, sought access under Iowa Code section 479B.15, which governs hazardous liquid pipelines. The district court ordered the landowner to allow the surveyor temporary access, rejecting the landowner’s claims that the statute was unconstitutional under the “takings” clauses of the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions and that carbon dioxide in a supercritical state is not a “hazardous liquid.”The Iowa District Court for Hardin County ruled that the statute was facially constitutional and that Summit was a “pipeline company” with access rights under section 479B.15. The court found that Summit had provided proper statutory notice to the landowner and that the landowner’s claim of having a tenant who did not receive notice was not credible. The court granted Summit’s request for injunctive relief to compel access for surveying.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that section 479B.15 is a lawful pre-existing limitation on the landowner’s title, consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property rights, and does not constitute a taking under the Federal or Iowa Constitutions. The court also held that supercritical carbon dioxide is a “hazardous liquid” within the meaning of section 479B.2, making Summit a pipeline company with access rights under the statute. The court found that Summit had complied with the statutory notice requirements and that no additional showing of irreparable harm was required for the injunction. The judgment and injunctive relief granted by the district court were affirmed. View "Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC v. Kasischke" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. ("Woods Construction") entered into a contract with John David Jordan and Carol S. Jordan to construct a house and a metal building. Woods Construction claimed the Jordans failed to pay for the work performed, leading the company to sue them in the Dallas Circuit Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Jordans moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that Woods Construction's lack of a required residential-home-builder's license barred the company from bringing civil claims. They also filed counterclaims alleging improper and negligent work by Woods Construction.The Dallas Circuit Court denied the Jordans' motion to dismiss but later granted their motion for summary judgment, finding that Woods Construction, as an unlicensed residential home builder, was barred from enforcing the construction contract under § 34-14A-14(d) of the Alabama Code. The court also declared Woods Construction's "Notice of Lis Pendens/Lien" null and void. The court certified its judgment as final under Rule 54(b), despite the Jordans' counterclaims remaining pending.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. The court noted that the claims and counterclaims were closely intertwined, as both concerned the same contract and construction work. Additionally, the resolution of the Jordans' counterclaims could potentially moot Woods Construction's claims. Therefore, the court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the judgment as final and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Gary Everett Martin obtained a home-equity line of credit (HELOC) from BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc. (BBVA) in May 2008, secured by a mortgage on his residential property. In June 2008, Martin hired Joseph T. Scarborough, Jr., and Scarborough & Griggs, LLC (S&G) for legal representation in a divorce action. In June 2012, Martin executed a promissory note in favor of S&G for legal fees, secured by a second mortgage on the property. The attorney-client relationship ended in June 2013, and the promissory note and mortgage were later assigned to Scarborough. In June 2019, BBVA foreclosed on the property, and Scarborough purchased it at the foreclosure sale.The Lee Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Scarborough, S&G, and BBVA, dismissing Martin's counterclaims and awarding possession of the property to Scarborough. The court found Martin's claims against the Scarborough parties time-barred under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act (ALSLA) and dismissed his claims against BBVA as time-barred or unsupported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the foreclosure sale, as the sale price was significantly lower than the property's fair market value, potentially indicating fraud or unfairness. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Scarborough on his ejectment claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Scarborough parties and BBVA regarding Martin's counterclaims, finding them time-barred or unsupported by substantial evidence. View "Martin v. Scarborough" on Justia Law

Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC (Active Spine) and its owners, Sara and Nicholas Muchowicz, were sued by 132 Ventures, LLC (Ventures) for breach of contract and personal guarantee after failing to pay rent and common area maintenance (CAM) charges under a lease agreement. Ventures had purchased the property in a foreclosure sale and sought damages for unpaid rent and CAM charges from June 2020 to February 2021. Active Spine argued that the lease was invalid due to fraudulent inducement and that they were under a COVID-19-related rent abatement.The district court initially ordered restitution of the premises to Ventures and denied Active Spine's request for a temporary injunction. A separate bench trial found Active Spine and the Muchowiczes liable for breach of contract. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order but reversed the breach of contract judgment, remanding for a jury trial.At the jury trial, Ventures presented evidence of unpaid rent and CAM charges, while Active Spine argued that Ventures failed to provide notice of budgeted direct expenses, a condition precedent to their obligation to pay CAM charges. The jury found in favor of Ventures, awarding $593,723.82 in damages. Active Spine and the Muchowiczes moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing errors in the jury's damage calculations and the lack of notice of budgeted direct expenses.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits as business records and not summaries under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1006. The court also held that Active Spine and the Muchowiczes failed to preserve their arguments for appeal regarding the costs of new tenancy, COVID-19 abatement, and the amended lease. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for new trial or JNOV, concluding that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. View "132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy" on Justia Law

The case involves Ofek Rachel, Ltd. and M.M.N. Yad David, USA Ltd. (judgment creditors) who obtained a 2016 judgment from an Israeli court against Suki Ben Zion (Zion). They then filed a lawsuit in New York state court to enforce the Israeli judgment, resulting in a 2017 judgment against Zion for $5.5 million. Despite claiming to have no assets, Zion was living lavishly, with his expenses being paid by his friend Chaim Cohen (Cohen). The judgment creditors served a document subpoena on Cohen for his American Express statements, which Cohen initially quashed due to procedural defects. A second subpoena led to a court order compelling Cohen to comply, but Cohen's responses were heavily redacted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the judgment creditors' motion to compel Cohen to provide unredacted statements. When Cohen failed to comply, the judgment creditors filed a motion to hold him in contempt. The trial court found Cohen guilty on multiple counts of contempt and imposed a $3,000 fine, along with ordering Cohen to pay $185,095.20 in attorney’s fees and $8,964.71 in costs.Cohen appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, challenging the trial court's authority to impose attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that section 1218 allows for the imposition of attorney’s fees against a person who violates a court order in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, even if that person was not a party to the underlying litigation. The court reasoned that the statutory language, legislative intent, and consistency with other post-judgment enforcement remedies supported this interpretation. View "Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion" on Justia Law

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim for being untimely, as it was not presented within six months of accrual. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which was also denied. He then filed a petition for relief in the trial court, arguing that his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misled by three attorneys who advised him that the one-year period applied.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify filing a late claim.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and was subject to the six-month claims period under section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant for negligence related to a motor vehicle accident. The original action was dismissed due to insufficient service of process, as the defendant had moved from the address where service was attempted. The plaintiff then filed a new action under the accidental failure of suit statute, § 52-592.The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the original action was not commenced within the time limited by law because the defendant did not receive the summons and complaint within the statutory period. The Appellate Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant did not have actual or effective notice of the original action within the required time frame.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. The court held that for an action to be "commenced" under § 52-592, the defendant must receive the summons and complaint within the time permitted by law, even if the service was improper. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant or her agent received the summons and complaint within the statutory period. Therefore, the original action was not commenced within the meaning of § 52-592, and the plaintiff could not rely on the savings statute to file a new action. View "Laiuppa v. Moritz" on Justia Law

Appellee filed a complaint against Appellant alleging breach of written agreements for the lease of oil storage tanks. During the bench trial, the district court amended the complaint to include an oral guarantee to pay for the leases, which Appellant was not allowed to rebut. The court found Appellant breached the oral guarantee and awarded damages to Appellee.The District Court of Campbell County initially found in favor of Appellee, determining that Appellant breached the oral guarantee and awarded $114,537.56 in damages. Appellant raised multiple issues on appeal, including the admission of evidence, the application of the statute of frauds, and the effect of a settlement with a co-defendant.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting various exhibits into evidence. The court also held that the statute of frauds defense was waived as it was not raised at trial. Additionally, the court found that the settlement with the co-defendant did not preclude Appellee from pursuing claims against Appellant.However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming determined that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing Appellant to testify regarding the oral guarantee. The court affirmed the district court's rulings on the other issues but reversed and remanded the case for the limited purpose of allowing Appellant to testify about the oral guarantee. The remand is specifically for reconsideration of the personal guarantee and to provide both parties an opportunity to introduce evidence on that issue. View "Sorum v. Sikorski" on Justia Law