Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Steven Meads and Penny Lipking-Meads operated a business as a sole proprietorship before partnering with Jed Driggers in 2010 to expand the business. The parties formed Afterburner, LLC, with the Meadses and Driggers as members, and Driggers as manager. The Meadses contributed assets and goodwill, while Driggers provided capital and expertise. The LLC’s operating agreement included a provision stating that the LLC could only be dissolved by a vote of the members or bankruptcy/insolvency, and that members agreed not to take any other voluntary action to dissolve the LLC, effectively waiving the right to seek judicial dissolution under certain statutory circumstances.A decade later, the Meadses alleged Driggers had improperly diverted business funds and filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Siskiyou County seeking, among other relief, judicial dissolution of the LLC. Driggers and the LLC filed a cross-complaint for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that the Meadses violated the operating agreement’s waiver provision by seeking dissolution. The Meadses responded with a motion to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, contending that the waiver provision was unenforceable as contrary to law and public policy. The Superior Court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, finding the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Driggers could not show a probability of prevailing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that, under the Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act, an LLC operating agreement may not waive or vary a member’s statutory right to seek judicial dissolution in the circumstances specified by law. The court concluded that the waiver provision was void and unenforceable, and thus Driggers could not prevail on his cross-complaint. The order striking the cross-complaint was affirmed. View "Meads v. Driggers" on Justia Law

A manufacturer of fasteners and related parts entered into a long-term supply agreement with a home appliance company, which later spun off its outdoor products division into a separate entity. The agreement, intended to make the manufacturer the exclusive supplier for a broad range of parts, quickly became the subject of disputes over its scope and the parties’ obligations. The parties attempted to resolve their disagreements through a settlement memorandum and a consent order, but further conflicts arose regarding price increases, performance, and payment for inventory.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia was first asked to interpret the scope of the parties’ agreements. It found the original contract too indefinite to enforce in its entirety but held that subsequent agreements and the parties’ course of performance clarified which parts were covered. The district court also sanctioned the manufacturer for discovery violations, specifically for failing to produce product-level cost data, and struck its lost profits claim. The court denied the manufacturer’s motion for sanctions against the defendants for alleged spoliation, finding the motion untimely and the missing evidence irrelevant. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the manufacturer’s price increase claim, finding insufficient evidence to support the requested increases, and denied the manufacturer’s motion to amend its complaint to add a claim for prejudgment interest due to undue delay.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed each of the manufacturer’s challenges. The court held that the district court properly interpreted the scope of the agreements, did not abuse its discretion in imposing or denying discovery sanctions, correctly granted summary judgment on the price increase claim, and appropriately excluded certain evidence at trial. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all orders and the final judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Whitesell Corporation v. Husqvarna Outdoor Products, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee suffered a severe hand injury, including the amputation of a finger, while operating a table saw without a safety guard at work. After receiving some worker’s compensation benefits, the employee filed a civil tort action against the employer, alleging that the employer’s requirement to use the saw without a guard constituted “willful or unprovoked physical aggression,” which, under Idaho law, would allow a lawsuit outside the worker’s compensation system. The employer did not respond to the lawsuit, and the employee obtained a default judgment for damages.Several months later, the employer moved to set aside the default judgment, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the employee’s worker’s compensation claim had been filed first. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District agreed, stayed enforcement of the default judgment, and directed the parties to seek a determination from the Idaho Industrial Commission on whether the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception applied. The Commission concluded that the exception did not apply, and the district court then set aside the default judgment and dismissed the civil action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the district court erred by deferring to the Commission on the applicability of the statutory exception and by setting aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court clarified that district courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the exception to the exclusive remedy rule applies, even if a worker’s compensation claim was filed first, unless the Commission has already decided the issue. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, vacated the Commission’s findings, and remanded with instructions to reenter the default judgment in favor of the employee. View "Tyler v. Masterpiece Floors, Inc." on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Defense Logistics Agency in Hawaii, who had served in the National Guard and developed post-traumatic stress disorder, alleged that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. After a series of workplace incidents, the agency suspended him indefinitely, citing concerns about his access to sensitive information. The employee claimed that the agency failed to provide reasonable accommodations and improperly deemed him a direct threat.The employee filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, which eventually led to a final agency decision (FAD) against him. The agency transmitted the FAD and related documents electronically using a secure system, but made several errors in providing the necessary passphrase to decrypt the document. As a result, the employee’s attorney was unable to access the FAD for several weeks, despite repeated requests for assistance and clarification. The attorney finally received an accessible, decrypted copy of the FAD by email on December 5, 2022. The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 88 days later. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary of Defense, finding the complaint untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the initial electronic transmission, and denied equitable tolling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the 90-day limitations period for filing suit under the Rehabilitation Act did not begin until the attorney received effective notice of the agency’s decision, which occurred when he received the decrypted FAD on December 5. Alternatively, the court held that equitable tolling was warranted because the attorney diligently sought access to the FAD and was prevented by extraordinary circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "ASUNCION V. HEGSETH" on Justia Law

Two individuals applied for jobs at a retail liquor store chain in Washington after a new state law required employers to include wage and benefit information in all job postings. Both applicants submitted their applications through a third-party website, Indeed.com, where the postings did not include the required pay information. One of the applicants also interviewed in person and discussed pay with the store manager but ultimately declined a job offer. Both individuals then filed a class action lawsuit, seeking statutory damages for the employer’s failure to comply with the disclosure requirements.The case was initially brought in King County, Washington. The employer argued that the plaintiffs were not the type of “job applicants” the law was intended to protect, asserting that only those with a genuine or “bona fide” interest in the job should be eligible for remedies. The parties disagreed on the meaning of “job applicant” under the Washington Equal Pay and Opportunities Act (EPOA). The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, faced with this dispute, certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court, asking what a plaintiff must prove to be considered a “job applicant” under the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that, under RCW 49.58.110(4), a person qualifies as a “job applicant” if they apply to a specific job posting, regardless of their subjective intent or whether they are a “bona fide” or “good faith” applicant. The court concluded that the plain language of the statute does not require proof of genuine interest in the position, and that the legislature intentionally omitted such a requirement. The court’s answer clarified that subjective intent is irrelevant for eligibility to seek remedies under the EPOA. View "Branson v. Washington Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC" on Justia Law

The appellant alleged that, after attending Long Island University and New York University and repaying her student loans, her name was fraudulently used in 1993 to certify additional federal student loans without her consent. She claimed that the universities signed her name on false loan applications, withheld refunds, and that the United States Department of Education attempted to collect on these fraudulent loans through debt collectors who used unlawful practices. The Department of Education ultimately garnished her tax refund and threatened to garnish her Social Security checks. The appellant filed suit against the Department of Education, the universities, the debt collectors, and others.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against the universities and debt collectors for lack of personal jurisdiction, relying on the government-contacts exception. The court dismissed claims against other defendants on different grounds. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the other defendants but, regarding the dismissal based on the government-contacts exception, certified questions to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals about the scope of that exception under District law.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that, under the District’s long-arm statute, the government-contacts exception to personal jurisdiction applies only if a defendant can establish that asserting jurisdiction based on the conduct at issue would violate the First Amendment. The court clarified that its prior decision in Rose v. Silver is binding and limits the exception to circumstances implicating First Amendment rights, even if this interpretation is arguably in tension with an earlier case, Environmental Research International, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc. The court declined to address whether the contacts alleged in this case fell within the exception, as that would depend on a First Amendment analysis. View "N'Jai v. U.S. Department of Education" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two companies, one a contractor and the other a developer, over a construction project in Maui. The disagreement was submitted to binding arbitration, resulting in an award in favor of the developer. The developer sought to confirm the award in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, but the contractor challenged the award, alleging the arbitrator was evidently partial due to undisclosed relationships. The circuit court initially confirmed the award, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the partiality claim. After the hearing, the circuit court found evident partiality, denied confirmation, vacated the award, and ordered a rehearing before a new arbitrator.Following this, the contractor moved for taxation of costs incurred on appeal, which the circuit court granted. The developer sought to appeal the costs order, but the circuit court denied an interlocutory appeal. A new arbitration was held, again resulting in an award for the developer, which was confirmed in a new special proceeding with a final judgment entered. The developer then appealed the earlier costs order from the first special proceeding.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal as untimely, reasoning that the circuit court’s order vacating the first arbitration award and ordering a rehearing was an appealable final order under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 658A-28(a)(3), making the subsequent costs order also immediately appealable.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is not an appealable order under HRS § 658A-28(a). The court clarified that such orders lack finality, regardless of whether the rehearing is full or partial, and reaffirmed the majority rule previously adopted in State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers (SHOPO) v. County of Kauai. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s dismissal and remanded the case for entry of a final judgment, so the merits of the appeal could be addressed. View "Nordic PCL Construction, Inc. v. LPIHGC, LLC" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Garry Douglas Seaman shot and killed James Preston Freeman and seriously wounded Heidi Gabert, following the end of his romantic relationship with Gabert, with whom he shares a minor child. Seaman was criminally charged, and Gabert and Dawn Freeman, James’s spouse, filed a civil suit for damages. To prevent Seaman from transferring or selling assets during the litigation, Gabert and Freeman successfully sought a receivership over all of Seaman’s property. After negotiations, the parties reached a settlement memorialized in a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which included $10 million judgments for Gabert and Freeman, liquidation of Seaman’s assets, and a homestead exemption for Seaman.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, approved the creation of a designated settlement fund (DSF) to facilitate asset liquidation. Initially, the court’s DSF Order required the Liquidation Receiver to reserve funds from asset sales to pay Seaman’s capital gains taxes, interpreting the MOU’s tax payment provision as unambiguous. Gabert and Freeman moved to amend this order under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing the court erred in its interpretation and that the parties did not intend to reserve funds for Seaman’s capital gains taxes. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court agreed, finding the MOU ambiguous and, based on extrinsic evidence, concluded the parties did not intend to reserve such funds. The court amended its order, striking the provision requiring reservation for capital gains taxes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in amending the DSF Order. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, correctly found the MOU ambiguous, and its factual finding regarding the parties’ intent was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s amended order. View "Gabert v. Seaman" on Justia Law

After the death of the previous sheriff, the County Commissioners of Big Horn County appointed Jeramie Middlestead as interim sheriff in November 2023. Middlestead subsequently ran for election to retain the position. Lee A. Bartel filed a complaint in June 2024, alleging that Middlestead was ineligible to serve as sheriff because he was not a resident of, nor registered to vote in, Big Horn County, as required by Montana law. Bartel sought to prevent Middlestead from being sworn in, arguing that his appointment and potential election violated statutory requirements. Despite these allegations, Middlestead won the November 2024 election and was sworn in as sheriff in December 2024.The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn County, presided over by Judge Olivia Rieger after Judge Matthew J. Wald recused himself, considered Bartel’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Middlestead from assuming office. The District Court denied the motion in February 2025, finding that while there were unresolved questions about Middlestead’s qualifications, Bartel had not demonstrated irreparable harm, the equities weighed against granting the injunction since Middlestead had already been sworn in, and that removing the sheriff would not serve the public interest. The court also determined that the statutory standards for granting a preliminary injunction had not been met.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the matter was not moot because the District Court retained the authority to provide effective relief, including potentially ordering Middlestead’s removal if he was found ineligible. The Supreme Court further held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, affirming the lower court’s order and remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Bartel v. Middlestead" on Justia Law

Angel A. Perales-Muñoz was hired as a recruiter assistant by Document and Packaging Brokers, Inc. (Docupak), a contractor for the National Guard Bureau, to help recruit individuals for the Army National Guard. The Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) began investigating possible fraud in the recruiting program, which led to Perales being indicted on multiple federal charges related to conspiracy and fraud. After two years, the government moved to dismiss the charges against Perales, and the indictments were dismissed with prejudice. Perales and his wife subsequently filed administrative claims and then a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the CID’s investigation was negligent and caused them emotional distress.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico reviewed the case. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA barred the claims, as the investigation involved policy discretion. The district court ordered limited jurisdictional discovery and referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who found that the CID’s investigation did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act or Army Regulation 195-2. The district court adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation, dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the discretionary function exception applied because Perales failed to show that the CID’s investigation violated any binding federal law or regulation. The court found no violation of the Posse Comitatus Act or Army Regulation 195-2 and concluded that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the claims. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Perales-Munoz v. United States" on Justia Law