Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Several residents of the City of Muscle Shoals filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking damages for negligence and trespass due to flooding caused by the City's management of a stormwater-drainage pond in their neighborhood. The plaintiffs claimed that heavy rainfall in February 2019 overwhelmed the pond, leading to the flooding of their homes. They argued that the City failed to plan adequately for such events and did not maintain the pond properly.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Colbert Circuit Court in March 2020, seeking damages for negligence, wantonness, and trespass. They later amended their complaint to drop the wantonness claim and added a request for injunctive relief, which the trial court denied. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, and that there was no substantial evidence to support the trespass claim. The trial court denied the City's motion, leading the City to file a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the City was immune from the plaintiffs' claims under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975. The Court found that the City's decision to plan for 25-year rainfall events was within common municipal practice and did not constitute neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness. Additionally, the Court concluded that the City's design and maintenance of the pond were not defective within the meaning of the statute. As a result, the Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the City, effectively barring the plaintiffs' claims for damages. View "In re: Burrell v. City of Muscle Shoals" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Lorraine Bellmar, as the personal representative of her deceased husband Harry Bellmar's estate, filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death action against Dr. Robert Moore and his medical practice. Harry Bellmar had been Dr. Moore's patient for approximately ten years, suffering from morbid obesity, hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, and high cholesterol. In December 2006, an abnormal EKG was performed, but Dr. Moore did not order any follow-up cardiac testing over the next ten years. Harry Bellmar died in June 2016 from cardiac arrhythmia.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the seven-year statute of repose under G. L. c. 260, § 4, because the claim was based on the 2006 EKG, which occurred more than seven years before the filing of the lawsuit in December 2017. The Appeals Court affirmed the decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the statute of repose does not shield later negligent acts if the medical malpractice claim is not predicated on acts or omissions that took place more than seven years before the filing of the claim. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Dr. Moore's treatment of the decedent within the seven-year period was negligent, independent of the 2006 EKG. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. View "Bellmar v. Moore" on Justia Law

Emmett Hotard acquired two lots in Hancock County in 2006 and used one as security for a loan from The Peoples Bank. After defaulting on the loan and failing to pay property taxes, Lot 17 was sold at a tax sale to Ken Foreman in 2012. The bank later assigned its interest to Emmett's brother, Eric Hotard, who initiated foreclosure proceedings. Eric's company, DHP1, LLC, purchased the lots at a foreclosure sale in 2014. The chancery clerk sent a notice of the tax sale to Emmett, which was returned undelivered. Notices were also sent to lienholders, including Eric.The Hancock County Chancery Court found that the chancery clerk failed to satisfy statutory notice requirements for the tax sale and declared the sale void. The court granted summary judgment in favor of DHP1, LLC, and voided the tax deed to Ken Foreman and the subsequent quitclaim deed to Baron Foreman, who had acquired Lot 17 from Ken.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that Emmett, as the record owner 180 days before the redemption period expired, was entitled to notice. The chancery clerk failed to provide proper notice by certified mail or personal service and did not conduct a diligent search for Emmett's address, which was easily discoverable in the land records. The court emphasized that any deviation from the statutory notice requirements renders a tax sale void. Consequently, the tax sale was declared void, and summary judgment in favor of DHP1, LLC, was affirmed. View "Foreman v. DHP1, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2019, New Hampshire filed two lawsuits in state court against 3M Company and other chemical companies, alleging that they produced defective PFAS products, negligently marketed them, and concealed their toxicity, leading to widespread contamination of the state's natural resources. One lawsuit sought damages for PFAS from aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF), while the other sought damages for non-AFFF PFAS contamination. The latter, referred to as the "Non-AFFF Suit," is the subject of this appeal.The Non-AFFF Suit proceeded in state court, and over the next three years, the court dismissed some of New Hampshire's claims. In August 2021, New Hampshire filed a second amended complaint. In December 2021, New Hampshire disclosed over 200 sites allegedly contaminated with non-AFFF PFAS. In April 2022, 3M removed the case to federal court, arguing that the contamination involved MilSpec AFFF PFAS, which it produced for the U.S. military, thus invoking the federal officer removal statute. New Hampshire moved to remand the case, and the district court agreed, citing that 3M's removal was untimely and did not meet the federal officer removal statute requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction. The court assumed, without deciding, that the alleged commingling of MilSpec AFFF PFAS and non-AFFF PFAS satisfied the nexus requirement for federal officer removal. However, it found that 3M's removal was untimely. The court determined that New Hampshire's filings in 2019 and 2020 provided sufficient information for 3M to ascertain removability, starting the 30-day removal clock well before 3M filed for removal in April 2022. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "New Hampshire v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between several plaintiffs, who are independent distributors for Nu Skin Enterprises Inc., and the defendants, which include Nu Skin and its affiliates. The plaintiffs allege that Nu Skin operates an unlawful pyramid scheme, making it difficult for distributors to profit from product sales alone, and instead requiring them to recruit new distributors to earn money. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Spokane County Superior Court, asserting claims under various state and federal laws.In the lower courts, Nu Skin filed a motion to dismiss the case for improper venue based on a forum-selection clause in the parties' contract, which designated Utah as the exclusive forum for dispute resolution. The Spokane County Superior Court denied Nu Skin's motion, ruling that the case did not fall within the contractual definition of a "Dispute" and that Spokane County was a proper venue. Nu Skin sought reconsideration, which was also denied, and then moved for discretionary review.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed whether CR 12(b)(3) is the correct procedural mechanism to enforce a contractual forum-selection clause designating a non-Washington forum. The court held that CR 12(b)(3) is not the appropriate procedure for such enforcement. The court reasoned that the plain language of CR 12(b)(3) authorizes dismissal only when venue is "improper" according to Washington's venue statutes and court rules, which do not account for contractual forum-selection clauses. Therefore, a forum-selection clause cannot render a statutorily authorized venue "improper" under CR 12(b)(3). The court affirmed the denial of Nu Skin's motion to dismiss and remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Raab v. Nu Skin Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

The Randy W. Stevens Living Trust owns land in Saratoga, Wyoming, bordered by an alleyway owned by the Town of Saratoga. Randy Stevens, the trustee, and Quality Landscape & Nursery, Inc., which uses the land, have had various disputes with the Town over the years. In 2019, a judgment was issued in favor of the Town, which the Stevens parties did not appeal. In 2023, the Stevens Trust and Quality Landscape filed a motion for an order to show cause and for a writ of mandamus, which the district court dismissed, citing res judicata and the parties' contractual limitations period. The court also found mandamus was not available under the circumstances.The district court of Carbon County had previously ruled on several issues between the parties, including the reconstruction of the alleyway, installation of utilities, and access to the property. The court found that the Town had acted in good faith and that the Stevens parties had failed to prove damages. The Stevens parties did not appeal these rulings. In 2023, they sought to revisit these issues, but the district court dismissed their motion, finding that the claims were barred by res judicata and the contractual limitations period.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the claims raised by the Stevens parties were barred by res judicata, as they had been or could have been litigated in prior proceedings. The court also agreed that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy, as the duties in question were not ministerial. Finally, the court found that judicial estoppel did not apply, as the Town had not taken inconsistent positions. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Stevens parties' motion. View "Stevens v. The Governing Body of the Town of Saratoga, Wyoming" on Justia Law

Charlene Monfore petitioned for guardianship and conservatorship over her mother, Gerda Flyte, who suffers from dementia. Gerda’s son, Roger Flyte, objected and requested to be appointed instead. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found it was not in Gerda’s best interests to appoint either Charlene or Roger and instead appointed Black Hills Advocate, LLC (BHA), a for-profit corporation. Charlene appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by not appointing her and lacked statutory authority to appoint a for-profit organization.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, South Dakota, initially appointed Charlene as temporary guardian and conservator. Roger objected, raising concerns about Gerda’s care under Charlene, including medical neglect and financial mismanagement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found both Charlene and Roger unsuitable due to various concerns, including Charlene’s failure to provide necessary medical care and financial mismanagement, and Roger’s financial irresponsibility and anger issues. The court appointed BHA as guardian and conservator.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Charlene, given the evidence of her inadequate care and financial mismanagement. However, the Supreme Court found that SDCL 29A-5-110 does not authorize the appointment of for-profit entities as guardians or conservators, except for qualified banks or trust companies as conservators. Therefore, the appointment of BHA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also awarded Roger one-half of his requested appellate attorney fees. View "Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte" on Justia Law

Pat Doe and Jarrod Burnham each filed complaints for protection from abuse against each other in December 2021. Doe's complaint was transferred to Portland for a consolidated hearing, where the court found that Burnham had abused Doe and granted her a two-year protection order effective until January 14, 2024. On January 4, 2024, Doe attempted to file a motion to extend the protection order in Bangor but was informed it needed to be filed in Portland. She mailed the motion on January 13, 2024, but it never arrived due to insufficient postage. Doe learned the order had not been extended on January 17, 2024, and filed a new protection from abuse action in Bangor.The District Court in Portland denied Doe's motion to extend the protection order, concluding it could not extend an expired order. Doe's motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the court finding that her failure to file on time was not excusable neglect and that the statute did not permit extending an expired order. Doe then filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing excusable neglect, which was also denied. The court stated that excusable neglect under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) did not apply to statutory deadlines.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decisions, holding that 19-A M.R.S. § 4111(1) unambiguously prohibits extending an expired protection order. The court also held that a motion for relief from judgment cannot be used to circumvent statutory authority, and thus the trial court did not err in denying Doe's motion for relief from judgment. View "Doe v. Burnham" on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights and an adoption proceeding. Jane Doe 1 ("Mother") and John Doe ("Father") had a child out of wedlock. Approximately eight months after the child's birth, Mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. Mother did not serve the petition on Father, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated Father's parental rights and granted the adoption. Father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. This appeal concerns Father's second motion.The magistrate court denied Father's second motion, finding it barred by res judicata. The district court disagreed, reversed the magistrate court's order, and remanded the matter for the magistrate court to consider the motion on its merits. Mother appealed, arguing that Father's motion was barred by procedural doctrines, including res judicata and waiver.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion alleged a fundamental error that deprived him of his right to procedural due process, which in turn violated his fundamental constitutional right to raise his child. The Court concluded that the fundamental error doctrine applies to create an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. The Court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the matter to the magistrate court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and, if so, whether the termination and adoption judgment is void. The Court also awarded partial attorney fees to Father for defending against certain arguments raised by Mother on appeal. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

Jon and Shawna Hill, along with their children, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Stuart Clive and his employer, Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A. (EMI), alleging that Clive misdiagnosed Jon Hill with vertigo when he was actually suffering from a stroke. This misdiagnosis led to severe physical and cognitive impairments for Jon Hill. The Hills claimed negligence, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, and respondeat superior liability. The district court dismissed the children's claims, ruling that Idaho does not recognize a claim for loss of parental consortium. The jury found in favor of EMI and Clive, and the district court denied the Hills' motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct.The Hills appealed the district court's dismissal of their children's claims, two evidentiary rulings, and the denial of their motion for a new trial. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the children's claims, agreeing that Idaho law does not recognize a claim for loss of parental consortium for non-fatal injuries. The court noted that creating such a cause of action involves significant policy considerations best left to the legislature.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision to allow expert testimony on "hindsight bias" by EMI's expert, Dr. Opeolu M. Adeoye, finding it irrelevant and prejudicial. The court held that this error affected the Hills' substantial rights, as the testimony improperly endorsed EMI's theme of hindsight bias, potentially influencing the jury's decision. Consequently, the judgment in favor of EMI and Clive was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The court did not address the Hills' other issues on appeal due to the remand. EMI's request for attorney fees on appeal was denied, as they were not the prevailing party. View "Hill v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A." on Justia Law