Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Hamzah Ali, a legal immigrant from Yemen and Dubai, retained Azhar Chaudhary as his attorney in February 2017 and paid him $810,000 over three months. Chaudhary claimed this was a nonrefundable retainer, while Ali asserted it was for hourly billing. The bankruptcy court found that Chaudhary did little work of value for Ali and that much of his testimony was false. Ali fired Chaudhary in October 2017 and later learned from another attorney that most of Chaudhary’s advice was misleading or false.Ali sued Chaudhary and his law firm in Texas state court in 2018 for breach of contract, quantum meruit, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and gross negligence. In October 2021, Riverstone Resort, an entity owned by Chaudhary, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In May 2022, Ali sued Chaudhary, his law firm, and Riverstone in bankruptcy court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, and seeking a constructive trust over Riverstone’s property. The bankruptcy court dismissed Ali’s claims against Chaudhary and his firm, citing lack of jurisdiction or abstention, and granted a take-nothing judgment for Riverstone based on the statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all appeals and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment. Ali appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in not equitably tolling the statute of limitations and that Chaudhary had fraudulently concealed his cause of action.The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeals of Chaudhary, his law firm, and Riverstone, as they were not aggrieved parties. The court reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Riverstone and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to consider whether equitable tolling should apply due to Chaudhary’s alleged misconduct. View "Azhar Chaudhary Law v. Ali" on Justia Law

Paul Prinkey Jr. was injured while working for Emerine’s Towing, Inc. on January 19, 2015. His workers' compensation claim was allowed for myocardial infarction, substantial aggravation of pre-existing coronary artery disease, and major depressive disorder. Prinkey filed his first application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation on February 4, 2019, which was denied by the Industrial Commission of Ohio based on medical evaluations indicating he was capable of sedentary work. Prinkey filed a second application for PTD compensation on June 4, 2021, citing worsening symptoms.The Industrial Commission denied Prinkey’s second application, stating he failed to present evidence of new and changed circumstances as required by the amended R.C. 4123.58(G). The commission's staff hearing officer (SHO) found no jurisdiction to address the application due to the lack of new evidence. Prinkey sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which returned the matter to the commission for further proceedings, finding the SHO's order lacked adequate explanation and evidence.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Tenth District's decision. The court held that the SHO failed to comply with the requirements of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., which mandates that the commission must specifically state the evidence relied upon and briefly explain the reasoning for its decision. The court found that the SHO did not provide sufficient reasoning or cite specific evidence to support the conclusion that Prinkey failed to present new and changed circumstances. Consequently, the case was returned to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings. View "State ex rel. Prinkey v. Emerine's Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) changing its air-quality standard for ozone under the Clean Air Act, which required states to amend their state plans. The EPA issued guidance memoranda to assist states, suggesting specific modeling and a minimum threshold for interstate emissions. Kentucky proposed a plan based on this guidance, but the EPA delayed action on the plan for two years and then disapproved it using different modeling and a lower threshold than initially recommended. Kentucky petitioned the court to vacate the EPA's disapproval.The EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The EPA sought to transfer the case to the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the disapproval was a nationally applicable final action. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion, stating that the EPA's disapproval was not nationally applicable and was based on Kentucky's unique facts. The court also found that the EPA's action violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by acting arbitrarily and inconsistently with its prior guidance.The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA failed to adequately explain its departure from prior guidance and did not consider Kentucky's reliance on the initial recommendations. The court vacated the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized the importance of consistency and the need for the EPA to justify its actions when changing its approach. View "Kentucky v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners (Board) manages state trust lands for the benefit of public schools. In Teton County, the Board issued temporary use permits to Basecamp Hospitality, LLC and Wilson Investments, LLC for commercial activities on state trust lands. Teton County challenged these permits, arguing they should be subject to local land use regulations. The district court dismissed Teton County's challenge, stating the county lacked standing for judicial review. Subsequently, Teton County issued abatement notices to the permit holders, which led the Board to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming sovereign immunity from local regulations.The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (Teton County) filed a petition for review, which was dismissed by the Ninth Judicial District Court. The Board then filed for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the First Judicial District, Laramie County, Wyoming. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Teton County's enforcement actions. Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands (CRUSL), formed by local property owners, sought to intervene, claiming their interests were directly impacted by the use of the state trust lands.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. CRUSL argued it had a significant protectable interest due to the proximity of its members' properties to the state trust lands. However, the court found CRUSL's interests were contingent on the outcome of the sovereign immunity issue and thus not significant protectable interests. Additionally, the court held that Teton County adequately represented CRUSL's interests, as both sought to enforce local regulations on state trust lands. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of CRUSL's motion to intervene as a matter of right under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). View "Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands v. State" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife married in 2012 and purchased a home in Cheyenne, Wyoming, in 2014. They shared the residence and paid the mortgage from a joint account. In 2021, they refinanced the home, and in December 2021, they separated. They discussed the division of their marital property without attorneys and obtained two appraisals for the home. Wife retained counsel to draft a stipulated divorce decree, which both parties signed. The decree awarded the home to Husband, with a provision that Wife would receive half the net proceeds if the home was sold or refinanced.The District Court of Laramie County granted the divorce and entered the Stipulated Decree in June 2022. Husband refinanced the home but did not pay Wife her share of the equity. Wife filed a motion for relief, claiming the decree entitled her to half the equity regardless of whether the home was sold or refinanced. The district court granted Wife relief under Rule 60, correcting the decree to reflect that any equity recognized through sale or refinance was to be equally divided.Husband appealed, and the Wyoming Supreme Court found the decree ambiguous and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The district court held a hearing and found that both parties intended to split the equity in the home equally. The court awarded Wife half the equity, amounting to $106,323.40, and Husband appealed again.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the clarification under Rule 60(a) was appropriate and did not modify the original judgment. The court also found that the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were sufficient and supported by the record. View "Van Vlack v. Van Vlack" on Justia Law

Garret Hirchak, Manufacturing Solutions, Inc., and Sunrise Development LLC (plaintiffs) appealed a trial court's order dissociating Garret from Hirchak Brothers LLC and Hirchak Group LLC (defendants) and requiring the LLCs to pay over $900,000 in equity interest, unpaid compensation, and reimbursements. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in not recognizing oppression by the majority members of the LLCs, treating a $300,000 down payment made by Garret as gratuitous, declining to order reimbursements for certain services and cash advances, and refusing to assess prejudgment interest on any of the reimbursements. Defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred in awarding compensation to Garret after he breached his fiduciary duties.The Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, found that Garret had breached his fiduciary duties by failing to make explicit agreements on service rates and withholding financial records. The court ordered Garret's dissociation from the LLCs and required the LLCs to pay Garret $375,000 for his equity interest, $215,430 for cash advances made before March 2020, and $213,591.84 for unpaid compensation from October 2019 to January 2021. The court also ordered reimbursement of $71,537.64 and $50,214.57 for unpaid invoices from MSI and Sunrise, respectively, before March 2020. The court denied prejudgment interest on any reimbursements and rejected Garret's claim for the $300,000 down payment.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that Garret was not entitled to reimbursement for the $300,000 down payment or for cash advances and invoices after March 2020 due to his breach of fiduciary duties. The court also upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, finding it was within the trial court's discretion. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of compensation to Garret after March 2020, concluding that his breach of fiduciary duties forfeited his right to compensation during that period. The case was remanded for a recalculation of the compensation due to Garret. View "Hirchak v. Hirchak" on Justia Law

Michael Boren applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to have an unimproved airstrip on his property recognized as a designated county airstrip. Gary Gadwa, Sarah Michael, and other concerned citizens opposed Boren’s application, but it was ultimately approved. Following the approval, Boren sued Gadwa, Michael, and others for defamation, defamation per se, conspiracy to commit defamation, and declaratory relief, alleging they made false statements about the airstrip and his use of it. Boren filed an amended complaint, and Gadwa and Michael moved to dismiss the claims, arguing their statements were protected by litigation privilege and constitutionally protected petitioning activity.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho dismissed Boren’s claims, agreeing with Gadwa’s and Michael’s arguments. The court also denied Boren’s motion to file a second amended complaint, concluding it would be futile. Boren appealed the district court’s decisions.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Boren’s civil conspiracy claim and declaratory judgment claim. However, it reversed the dismissal of most of Boren’s defamation claims, finding that the applicability of the absolute and qualified litigation privileges was not evident on the face of the complaint. The court also held that neither the First Amendment nor the Idaho Constitution provides absolute protection for defamatory statements made in the course of protected petitioning activity. The court reversed the district court’s decision denying Boren’s motion to amend his complaint, as the amendment would not be futile. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court declined to disqualify the district judge on remand and did not award attorney fees to any party. View "Boren v. Gadwa" on Justia Law

Abram J. Harris, a pro se plaintiff, sued the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) in the D.C. Superior Court, alleging fraud and abuse of process. Harris claimed that a female employee he hired, who also worked for FMCSA, turned the agency against him after their working relationship soured. The Superior Court dismissed the case sua sponte for failure to state a claim, and Harris appealed to the D.C. Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the DOT removed the case to federal court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after removal. Harris did not object to the removal or seek remand to the Superior Court. The district court dismissed the case, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because Harris's claims fell outside the Federal Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity and because Harris had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Alternatively, the court held that Harris had failed to state a claim. Harris timely appealed the dismissal as to DOT but not as to Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephanie Johnson, whom he had added as a defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), a federal defendant may remove a case from state appellate court to federal district court. The court also determined that Harris forfeited any arguments regarding procedural defects in the removal process by not objecting in the district court or moving for remand. Additionally, Harris forfeited any arguments that the district court erred in dismissing his case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim by failing to raise them in his briefs. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Harris v. Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration" on Justia Law

Several homeowners sued an irrigation district, claiming that the district's refusal to remove over twenty-year-old charges from the tax rolls was an ultra vires act, violating the Tax Code's twenty-year limitations period. The district argued that the charges were Water Code assessments, not taxes, and thus not subject to the limitations period.The trial court granted the district officials' jurisdictional plea without permitting discovery, dismissing the homeowners' claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed in part, concluding that the pleadings did not support an ultra vires claim under the Tax Code because the homeowners had not sought a refund from the tax assessor and the district had clarified that the charges were assessments under the Water Code.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the homeowners had sufficiently pleaded facts to demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction over their ultra vires claim. The court held that the homeowners' pleadings, viewed liberally, alleged that the charges were taxes, had been delinquent for more than twenty years, and that no related litigation was pending at the time of the request to remove the charges. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and did not implicate the district's governmental immunity.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the Tax Code ultra vires claim and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Herrera v. Mata" on Justia Law

Todd Halbur was terminated from his position as comptroller of the Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division (ABD). Halbur claimed he was fired in retaliation for reporting to his supervisor, Stephen Larson, that ABD was violating Iowa law by exceeding the 50% markup on liquor sales and for refusing to engage in illegal acts related to a service contract with Beverage Merchandising, Inc. (BMI). Halbur filed a lawsuit against Larson, asserting a statutory claim for wrongful discharge under Iowa Code section 70A.28 and a common law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The district court submitted the statutory claim to a jury but dismissed the common law claim, ruling that the statutory claim was the exclusive remedy. The jury awarded Halbur $1 million, which was reduced due to a statutory cap on damages.The Iowa District Court for Polk County dismissed Halbur’s common law wrongful discharge claim, reasoning that the statutory claim under section 70A.28 provided a comprehensive remedy. The court also dismissed the statutory claims against the State of Iowa and ABD, allowing the claim to proceed only against Larson in his official capacity. Larson’s motion for summary judgment was initially granted in part but later reconsidered, allowing the case to proceed to trial. The jury found in favor of Halbur, awarding him damages.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case. Larson argued that Halbur’s internal complaints did not constitute protected disclosures under section 70A.28. However, the court found that Larson failed to preserve this issue for appeal by not raising it during trial through a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On cross-appeal, Halbur argued that his common law claim should not have been dismissed. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the statutory remedy under section 70A.28 was exclusive and comprehensive, precluding the need for a common law claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Halbur v. Larson" on Justia Law