Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Horace Crump, an inmate at Lakeland Correctional Facility in Michigan, filed a § 1983 lawsuit against several prison employees, alleging they withheld treatment for his multiple sclerosis. The key issue at this stage is whether Crump can proceed with his lawsuit without paying the filing fee upfront, as he sought to proceed in forma pauperis due to his inability to pay.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed Crump's complaint, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act's three-strikes rule, which disqualifies prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim. Crump appealed, disputing two of the three strikes counted against him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether Crump's prior dismissals counted as strikes under the Act. The court found that Crump's previous cases, which included dismissals for failure to state a claim and decisions not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, did not count as strikes. The court reasoned that the Act's language refers to entire actions being dismissed on specific grounds, not individual claims. Additionally, dismissals based on Eleventh Amendment immunity do not count as strikes under the Act.The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Crump's lawsuit to proceed without the upfront payment of the filing fee. View "Crump v. Blue" on Justia Law

Tremonti Perry, while incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center, experienced a severe medical emergency that resulted in him being placed in a medically induced coma for a month. Several years after recovering, Perry filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison's warden, the Missouri Department of Corrections Director, and two medical-care contractors, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Perry admitted he did not use the prison’s administrative remedy, which required filing a complaint within fifteen days of the incident, but argued that his coma made it impossible to meet this requirement.The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Perry had not exhausted his available remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). They acknowledged that the grievance process was unavailable to Perry during his coma and a reasonable period afterward but contended that Perry should have made a diligent effort to exhaust his claims once he recovered. The district court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Perry could have filed a grievance after his medical conditions resolved.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court determined that the prison’s administrative grievance process was unavailable to Perry due to his physical incapacity during the coma and the prison’s rules not allowing late filings. The court rejected the Defendants' arguments that Perry could have filed an untimely grievance or that the grievance deadline was perpetually renewed due to ongoing medical issues. The court also denied the Defendants' motion to supplement the record with new evidence. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Perry’s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perry v. Precythe" on Justia Law

Robert Roberson, a death-row inmate, was scheduled for execution on October 17, 2024. On October 16, 2024, the Texas House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence issued a subpoena requiring Roberson to testify on October 21, 2024, creating a conflict between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The judicial branch had affirmed Roberson's sentence, and the executive branch had declined clemency. The committee sought to delay the execution to obtain Roberson's testimony, claiming legislative authority to compel testimony superseded the scheduled execution.The committee filed a lawsuit in a state district court, which granted a temporary restraining order to delay the execution. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (the department) sought relief from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which set aside the restraining order. The committee then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of mandamus to enforce the subpoena and delay the execution.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the legislative committee's authority to compel testimony does not override the scheduled legal process leading to an execution. The court emphasized the separation of powers, noting that the legislature's investigatory power must be balanced against the judiciary's authority to render judgments and the executive's authority to enforce them. The court held that the committee could have obtained Roberson's testimony earlier and that the legislative subpoena could not disrupt the execution process. Consequently, the court denied the committee's petition for writ of mandamus, allowing the execution to proceed as scheduled. View "IN RE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES" on Justia Law

Brian Herman and Skyler Herman sued Peter Tonn Enterprises, LLC, doing business as I39 Supply, for breach of contract. The Hermans alleged that they agreed to buy a livestock trailer from I39 Supply, but I39 Supply failed to honor the agreement. The Hermans served I39 Supply via certified mail, but I39 Supply did not respond, leading the Hermans to file for a default judgment. The district court granted the default judgment, ruling that I39 Supply was properly served and had failed to answer the complaint.I39 Supply, represented by its owner Peter Tonn, who is not an attorney, sent documents to the district court and participated in the default judgment hearing by telephone. The district court ruled that Tonn could not represent the LLC and entered a $19,000 judgment in favor of the Hermans. I39 Supply later retained counsel and filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, arguing that Tonn was unaware he could not represent the LLC. The motion did not mention personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to vacate the default judgment and set the matter for a pretrial conference.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that I39 Supply made a general appearance by filing the motion to vacate the default judgment without raising the issue of personal jurisdiction. This action conferred personal jurisdiction on the district court. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing the Hermans' complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herman v. Peter Tonn Enters." on Justia Law

A clerk-magistrate decided to allow public access to show cause hearings for individuals accused of being clients of a prostitution ring but denied media requests for the underlying complaint applications before the hearings. The accused individuals, referred to as John Does, intervened to oppose the public access decision and sought to keep the hearings private. The media outlets filed a petition in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County to challenge the clerk-magistrate's decision to withhold the complaint applications.The single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to the clerk-magistrate for written findings on specific questions related to the public interest and privacy concerns. After reviewing the clerk-magistrate's responses, the single justice denied the petition, concluding that the clerk-magistrate did not commit an error of law or abuse her discretion in allowing public access to the hearings and denying access to the complaint applications.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the clerk-magistrate acted within her discretion. The court found that the public interest in transparency and accountability outweighed the privacy interests of the accused, especially given the significant public attention and the potential for favoritism if the hearings were held privately. The court also agreed that denying access to the complaint applications was appropriate to prevent the dissemination of potentially erroneous or extraneous information before the accused had an opportunity to respond at the hearings.The court further directed the Trial Court to provide notice to the accused when a request for public access to a show cause hearing is made and to offer the accused an opportunity to respond before deciding on the request. View "Trustees of Boston University v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Cambridge Division of the District Court Department" on Justia Law

The Comedy Store, a stand-up comedy venue in Los Angeles, was forced to close for over a year due to COVID-19 restrictions. In July 2021, the Store hired Moss Adams LLP, an accounting firm, to help apply for a Shuttered Venue Operator Grant from the U.S. Small Business Administration. The parties signed an agreement that included a Washington choice of law provision and a forum selection clause mandating disputes be resolved in Washington state courts, along with a predispute jury trial waiver. The Store alleged Moss Adams failed to inform it of the grant program's impending expiration, causing it to miss the application deadline and lose an $8.5 million grant.The Store initially filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Los Angeles, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Store then refiled in the Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting claims including gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Moss Adams moved to dismiss or stay the action based on the forum selection clause. The trial court granted the motion, contingent on Moss Adams stipulating that the Store could exercise its right to a jury trial in Washington. Moss Adams provided such a stipulation, and the trial court signed an order affirming the Store's right to a jury trial in Washington.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred by not properly applying the reversed burden of proof, which required Moss Adams to show that litigating in Washington would not diminish the Store's unwaivable right to a jury trial. The appellate court concluded that Moss Adams did not meet this burden, as Washington courts have enforced predispute jury waivers, and the stipulation offered by Moss Adams was not a binding modification of the agreement. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded with instructions to deny Moss Adams's motion to dismiss or stay the action. View "The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP" on Justia Law

The case involves a grandmother (Grandmother) who was adjudicated as an abusing and neglectful parent to her grandchildren, B.L.-1, B.L.-2, K.L., M.L., and M.S. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition against the children's parents in 2018, and the children were placed with Grandmother. In 2021, several referrals were made to Child Protective Services (CPS) regarding Grandmother's care, leading to the children's removal from her home in December 2021 due to safety concerns and Grandmother's failure to inform DHS of her marriage. The DHS filed a Sixth Amended Petition in April 2022, alleging various forms of abuse and neglect by Grandmother.The Circuit Court of Barbour County held several hearings, concluding with a final adjudicatory hearing in March 2023. The court found that Grandmother had abused and neglected the children, citing evidence of her excessive drinking, drug use, lack of supervision, inappropriate discipline, and instability. The court also noted Grandmother's failure to take responsibility for her actions. The court directed the Multidisciplinary Treatment Team (MDT) to discuss an improvement period for visitation purposes only, as it could not envision a scenario where the children would be returned to Grandmother's custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's rulings. The court found that Grandmother was not entitled to relief based on procedural delays, as she did not seek extraordinary relief through a petition for writ of mandamus. The court also upheld the circuit court's adjudication of Grandmother as abusing and neglectful, finding no clear error in the circuit court's findings. Additionally, the court found that consideration of Grandmother's status as a psychological parent was premature at the adjudicatory phase and that the current visitation arrangement served the best interests of the children. Finally, the court determined that any discussion of dispositional decisions was premature, given the procedural posture of the case. View "In re B.L.-1, B.L.-2, K.L., M.L., and M.S." on Justia Law

A Monongalia County deputy sheriff responded to a domestic dispute involving John D. Stewart, Jr., who suffered from mental illness. The deputy, after advising against backup, pursued Mr. Stewart, who allegedly threatened with a knife. The deputy shot Mr. Stewart, fatally wounding him. Amanda F. Stewart, Mr. Stewart’s daughter, filed a wrongful death action against the Monongalia County Commission and the deputy, alleging excessive force and negligence.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed claims against the Commission for direct liability but allowed claims for vicarious liability and against the deputy to proceed. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the demand for punitive damages, stating it was premature.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss the vicarious liability claim against the Commission, finding the Commission is not immune from vicarious liability for the deputy’s negligence. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the negligence claim against the deputy, as the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to suggest the deputy acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.However, the court reversed the lower court’s decision regarding punitive damages. It held that the Tort Claims Act prohibits punitive damages against the Commission and the deputy, as the deputy was sued in his official capacity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Monongalia County Commission A/K/A Monongalia County Sheriff's Department and John Doe Deputy v. Amanda F. Stewart, Individually and/or as Administrator of the Estate of John D. Stewart, Jr." on Justia Law

M.D., a high school soccer player, sought a waiver from the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (WVSSAC) to play for both her high school and club soccer teams during the same season. The WVSSAC denied her request, leading M.D. and her parents to file a lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the WVSSAC's Non-school Participation Rule, which prohibited participation in non-school teams during the school season for team sports but not for individual sports.The Circuit Court of Ohio County granted M.D. a preliminary injunction, allowing her to play for both teams. Subsequently, the court granted her summary judgment and a permanent injunction, ruling that the Non-school Participation Rule was arbitrary and capricious because it unfairly differentiated between team and individual sports without a rational basis.The WVSSAC appealed the circuit court's decision. While the appeal was pending, the WVSSAC's Board of Control amended the Non-school Participation Rule to eliminate the distinction between team and individual sports, applying the same restrictions to all student athletes regardless of the type of sport.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and determined that the amendments to the Non-school Participation Rule rendered the appeal moot. The court found that the substantive changes to the rule addressed the issues raised by M.D., and there were no sufficient collateral consequences or issues of great public interest that warranted further review. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission v. David D. and Elizabeth D., Parents and Legal Guardians of M.D." on Justia Law

Silvia Villareal created a revocable living trust in 2005, which she amended twice. The 2018 restatement of the trust, prepared with an attorney, provided that her three children, Leticia Linzer, Arturo Villareal, and Sonia Godoy, would each receive a one-third interest in her home upon her death. In 2019, Silvia amended the trust again, without an attorney, to state that her children could only sell their shares to each other for $100,000, aiming to keep the home within the family. After Silvia's death, Arturo and Sonia petitioned the probate court to declare the 2019 amendment void, arguing it unreasonably restrained their ability to sell their interests.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of Arturo and Sonia, determining that the 2019 amendment imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation in violation of Civil Code section 711. The court declared the amendment void and upheld the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document. Leticia, the trustee, objected, arguing that section 711 did not apply to testamentary gifts and that the 2019 amendment did not impose an unreasonable restraint.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the probate court's decision, holding that section 711 applies to testamentary instruments and that the 2019 amendment imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The court found that the amendment's restrictions on selling the property only to siblings for a fixed price were unreasonable and void. The court also rejected Leticia's argument that the 2019 amendment created a new testamentary trust, concluding that Silvia intended to add to the existing trust rather than create a new one. The court affirmed the probate court's order, maintaining the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document. View "Godoy v. Linzner" on Justia Law