Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC (Active Spine) and its owners, Sara and Nicholas Muchowicz, were sued by 132 Ventures, LLC (Ventures) for breach of contract and personal guarantee after failing to pay rent and common area maintenance (CAM) charges under a lease agreement. Ventures had purchased the property in a foreclosure sale and sought damages for unpaid rent and CAM charges from June 2020 to February 2021. Active Spine argued that the lease was invalid due to fraudulent inducement and that they were under a COVID-19-related rent abatement.The district court initially ordered restitution of the premises to Ventures and denied Active Spine's request for a temporary injunction. A separate bench trial found Active Spine and the Muchowiczes liable for breach of contract. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order but reversed the breach of contract judgment, remanding for a jury trial.At the jury trial, Ventures presented evidence of unpaid rent and CAM charges, while Active Spine argued that Ventures failed to provide notice of budgeted direct expenses, a condition precedent to their obligation to pay CAM charges. The jury found in favor of Ventures, awarding $593,723.82 in damages. Active Spine and the Muchowiczes moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing errors in the jury's damage calculations and the lack of notice of budgeted direct expenses.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits as business records and not summaries under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1006. The court also held that Active Spine and the Muchowiczes failed to preserve their arguments for appeal regarding the costs of new tenancy, COVID-19 abatement, and the amended lease. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for new trial or JNOV, concluding that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. View "132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy" on Justia Law

The case involves Ofek Rachel, Ltd. and M.M.N. Yad David, USA Ltd. (judgment creditors) who obtained a 2016 judgment from an Israeli court against Suki Ben Zion (Zion). They then filed a lawsuit in New York state court to enforce the Israeli judgment, resulting in a 2017 judgment against Zion for $5.5 million. Despite claiming to have no assets, Zion was living lavishly, with his expenses being paid by his friend Chaim Cohen (Cohen). The judgment creditors served a document subpoena on Cohen for his American Express statements, which Cohen initially quashed due to procedural defects. A second subpoena led to a court order compelling Cohen to comply, but Cohen's responses were heavily redacted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the judgment creditors' motion to compel Cohen to provide unredacted statements. When Cohen failed to comply, the judgment creditors filed a motion to hold him in contempt. The trial court found Cohen guilty on multiple counts of contempt and imposed a $3,000 fine, along with ordering Cohen to pay $185,095.20 in attorney’s fees and $8,964.71 in costs.Cohen appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, challenging the trial court's authority to impose attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that section 1218 allows for the imposition of attorney’s fees against a person who violates a court order in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, even if that person was not a party to the underlying litigation. The court reasoned that the statutory language, legislative intent, and consistency with other post-judgment enforcement remedies supported this interpretation. View "Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion" on Justia Law

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim for being untimely, as it was not presented within six months of accrual. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which was also denied. He then filed a petition for relief in the trial court, arguing that his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misled by three attorneys who advised him that the one-year period applied.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify filing a late claim.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and was subject to the six-month claims period under section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant for negligence related to a motor vehicle accident. The original action was dismissed due to insufficient service of process, as the defendant had moved from the address where service was attempted. The plaintiff then filed a new action under the accidental failure of suit statute, § 52-592.The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the original action was not commenced within the time limited by law because the defendant did not receive the summons and complaint within the statutory period. The Appellate Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant did not have actual or effective notice of the original action within the required time frame.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. The court held that for an action to be "commenced" under § 52-592, the defendant must receive the summons and complaint within the time permitted by law, even if the service was improper. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant or her agent received the summons and complaint within the statutory period. Therefore, the original action was not commenced within the meaning of § 52-592, and the plaintiff could not rely on the savings statute to file a new action. View "Laiuppa v. Moritz" on Justia Law

Appellee filed a complaint against Appellant alleging breach of written agreements for the lease of oil storage tanks. During the bench trial, the district court amended the complaint to include an oral guarantee to pay for the leases, which Appellant was not allowed to rebut. The court found Appellant breached the oral guarantee and awarded damages to Appellee.The District Court of Campbell County initially found in favor of Appellee, determining that Appellant breached the oral guarantee and awarded $114,537.56 in damages. Appellant raised multiple issues on appeal, including the admission of evidence, the application of the statute of frauds, and the effect of a settlement with a co-defendant.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting various exhibits into evidence. The court also held that the statute of frauds defense was waived as it was not raised at trial. Additionally, the court found that the settlement with the co-defendant did not preclude Appellee from pursuing claims against Appellant.However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming determined that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing Appellant to testify regarding the oral guarantee. The court affirmed the district court's rulings on the other issues but reversed and remanded the case for the limited purpose of allowing Appellant to testify about the oral guarantee. The remand is specifically for reconsideration of the personal guarantee and to provide both parties an opportunity to introduce evidence on that issue. View "Sorum v. Sikorski" on Justia Law

An Illinois attorney, employed by the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) from 2000 to 2020, filed a defamation lawsuit against Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC, and Tim Novak. The lawsuit stemmed from articles published in February and October 2020, which alleged that the attorney pressured PTAB staff to reduce property taxes on Trump Tower due to political motivations. The articles claimed the attorney was under investigation for these actions, which the attorney contended were false and damaging to his reputation.The Cook County Circuit Court denied the defendants' first motion to dismiss, finding that the attorney had adequately pled the falsity of the statements and special damages. The court also found that the fair report privilege and actual malice were questions of fact. The court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress count but allowed the defamation and false light claims to proceed.Defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing the lawsuit was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) under the Illinois Citizen Participation Act. The circuit court denied this motion, finding the defendants failed to show the lawsuit was solely based on their protected political speech activities and that the attorney's claims were meritless and retaliatory.The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, applying the Sandholm v. Kuecker test. The appellate court found that the defendants did not meet their burden to show the articles were published in furtherance of their rights to participate in government and that the attorney's lawsuit was solely based on these rights.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that the articles did not constitute acts in furtherance of government participation and thus were not protected under the Citizen Participation Act. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Glorioso v. Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Three petitioners sought to quiet title in mineral rights for parcels of real property in McKenzie and Williams Counties, North Dakota. They argued that the state relinquished any claim to these mineral rights when a specific chapter of the North Dakota Century Code became effective in 2017. The petitioners claimed that the state abandoned the minerals, leaving them "up for grabs," and that they claimed the minerals by filing the lawsuit.In the McKenzie County District Court, the petitioners attempted service of process by publication on "unknown persons." Wesley and Barbara Lindvig answered, claiming ownership of the mineral rights. The petitioners' motions to strike the Lindvigs' answer and for default judgment were denied. The court granted the Lindvigs' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and awarded attorney’s fees, concluding the petitioners' action was frivolous. The petitioners appealed.In the Williams County District Court, the petitioners filed a similar lawsuit. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig, along with Kenneth and Mary Schmidt, answered and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including non-compliance with procedural rules and lack of ownership by the petitioners. The court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded attorney’s fees, finding the petition frivolous. The petitioners appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that the petitioners had no interest in the disputed minerals and could not maintain a quiet title action. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Schmidts in the Williams County case. However, it reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs in both cases and remanded for further findings on whether the Lindvigs owned mineral interests subject to the petitioners' claims. View "Nelson v. Lindvig" on Justia Law

Jason Bott and Suzanne Bott married in 2008 and have two minor children. In November 2022, Suzanne initiated a divorce action. They entered into a stipulated settlement agreement, and a judgment reflecting the terms was entered in June 2023. Jason was awarded all real estate, including the marital home and a rental property, and was required to pay Suzanne $425,000 in two installments. Shortly after the judgment, Jason asked Suzanne to alter the terms due to financial difficulties. They signed a handwritten document without their attorneys' knowledge, agreeing that Suzanne would retain the marital home and Jason would not have to make the cash payment. Suzanne later rescinded the agreement, moved out, and filed a motion for contempt against Jason for not making the first payment.The District Court of Cavalier County denied Jason's motion to amend the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), finding that the parties intended to cancel the agreement. The court ordered Jason to make the cash payments as originally stipulated. Jason appealed, arguing the agreement was a valid contract and Suzanne failed to prove its rescission.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Jason's motion. The court noted that Jason did not argue the original stipulation was the result of mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, nor did he argue it was unconscionable. The court found that Jason did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying relief from the judgment. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Jason failed to show the court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in denying his motion. View "Bott v. Bott" on Justia Law

In April 2013, Michael Riste applied for a bail bond for his son, Michael Peterson, and signed an Indemnity Agreement and a Premium Agreement with Bad Boys Bail Bonds (Bail Agent). The agreements required Riste to pay a $10,000 premium in installments. Peterson signed identical documents after his release. The Bail Agent executed a $100,000 bail bond on behalf of The North River Insurance Company (Surety), ensuring Peterson's appearance at future court proceedings. Peterson failed to appear, leading to the forfeiture of the bail bond and a summary judgment against the Surety in October 2015.Two panels of the California Court of Appeal previously affirmed the denial of motions by the Surety and Bail Agent to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. In October 2020, a class action cross-claim in Caldwell v. BBBB Bonding Corp. argued that the Bail Agent's premium financing agreements were subject to Civil Code section 1799.91 and were unenforceable without proper notice to cosigners. The trial court and the Court of Appeal agreed, enjoining the Bail Agent from enforcing such agreements without the requisite notice.In September 2022, the Surety and Bail Agent filed a third motion to set aside the summary judgment, citing Caldwell and arguing that the premium was part of the consideration for the bail bond, making the bond void. The trial court denied the motion, and the Surety and Bail Agent appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's order. The court held that the bail bond was not void because the consideration for the bail bond was Peterson's release from custody, not the premium financing agreement. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction over the bond and properly denied the motion to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. View "People v. North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Jay Folse, a pro se litigant, attempted to initiate a lawsuit by faxing a complaint to a federal district court. The court clerk stamped the complaint as "filed," created an electronic docket, and added the complaint to the docket. However, two weeks later, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, citing local rules that did not permit filing complaints by fax and denying Folse's request for permission to do so.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed Folse's complaint without prejudice and without granting leave to amend. Folse appealed the decision, arguing that the district court's local rules should not have been enforced in a way that caused him to lose his right to file the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)(3)(B)(i) allows pro se litigants to file electronically only if permitted by court order or local rule. The court found that the relevant local rule, N.D. W. Va. LR Gen. P. 5.05(a), explicitly excluded complaints or petitions from being filed by fax. The court also determined that Folse did not identify any local rule or court order that authorized him to file his complaint via fax. Additionally, the court noted that the district court had the discretion to permit fax filing but did not abuse its discretion in denying Folse's request. The court concluded that the district court's enforcement of the local rules did not cause Folse to lose any right due to a nonwillful failure to comply, as the complaint was dismissed without prejudice, allowing for refiling. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Folse v. Hoffman" on Justia Law