Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between Carol Sperry Smith and Dale Preston Smith. The key issue is the classification of a tract of land located at 4080 Racetrack Road in Grifton, North Carolina. Dale Preston Smith purchased this property before the marriage. The parties signed stipulations in January 2019, designating the property as marital property. However, Dale later filed a motion to set aside these stipulations, claiming the property was his separate property.In the District Court of Pitt County, the trial court approved a pretrial order that listed Racetrack Road as a disputed property, with Carol claiming it was a mixed asset and Dale asserting it was his separate property. The trial court classified the property as Dale's separate property and distributed it to him. Carol appealed, arguing that the stipulations were binding since the trial court never ruled on Dale's motion to set them aside.The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court's order. The majority held that the pretrial order showed the parties did not agree that Racetrack Road was marital property. The dissenting judge argued that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion to set aside the stipulations meant the stipulations remained binding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court held that Carol invited any error by agreeing to proceed with the equitable distribution hearing without a direct ruling on the motion to set aside the stipulations. Therefore, she could not use this as a basis for a new hearing. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, though it did not adopt its reasoning. The invited error doctrine barred Carol from obtaining a new equitable distribution hearing. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

A fourteen-year-old boy, Tanner Smith, was vaccinated against COVID-19 at his school clinic without his or his mother Emily Happel's consent. The school clinic, operated in partnership with Old North State Medical Society (ONSMS), administered the vaccine despite lacking the required parental consent. Plaintiffs, Smith and Happel, sued the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS for battery and violations of their state constitutional rights.The Superior Court of Guilford County dismissed the case, agreeing with the defendants that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, granting them immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PREP Act's broad immunity shielded the defendants from liability for all of the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the PREP Act's immunity only covers tort injuries and does not bar state constitutional claims. The court concluded that the PREP Act does not preempt claims brought under the state constitution, specifically those related to the right to control a child's upbringing and the right to bodily integrity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the battery claim but reversed the dismissal of the state constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Diana Delgado owed money on a department store credit card, and Midland Credit Management, Inc. purchased the debt and sued her in Minnesota state court. Delgado did not respond to the summons, leading to a default judgment in favor of Midland. Instead of seeking reconsideration or appealing the default judgment, Delgado filed a federal lawsuit against Midland, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, including that Midland tried to collect the debt without owning it.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Delgado's case, concluding that the issue of debt ownership had already been resolved in the state-court action and gave the default judgment issue-preclusive effect. Delgado appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a Minnesota state-court default judgment can have issue-preclusive effect in a subsequent federal lawsuit. The court relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Herreid v. Deaver, which established that a default judgment is conclusive on the facts essential to its existence, even if the defendant did not participate in the proceedings. The court found that Midland's ownership of the debt was essential to the default judgment and that Delgado had a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue in state court.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the default judgment was a final determination on the merits and that applying collateral estoppel did not work an injustice in this case. View "Delgado v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Jahn Patric Kirlin and Sara Louise Kirlin filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Christian William Jones, Dr. Barclay A. Monaster, and Physicians Clinic Inc. d/b/a Methodist Physicians Clinic – Council Bluffs. Jahn Kirlin experienced severe neck pain and headaches, and despite seeking medical help, an MRI was delayed. Dr. Monaster, who had returned from treatment for alcohol abuse, refused to order an MRI, and Kirlin later suffered a stroke after a chiropractic adjustment. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants altered medical records and that Dr. Monaster was intoxicated during treatment.The Pottawattamie County District Court initially dismissed the case due to a defective certificate of merit. The plaintiffs refiled with a new certificate, but the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed this decision, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed.Upon remand, the district court did not set new deadlines, leading to confusion about the applicable expert certification deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment again, arguing the plaintiffs missed the deadline. The district court agreed, finding no good cause to extend the deadline, and granted summary judgment to the defendants.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion by not finding good cause for the plaintiffs' delayed expert certification. The court noted the confusion about deadlines, lack of prejudice to the defendants, the plaintiffs' diligence, and the defendants' actions. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kirlin v. Monaster" on Justia Law

Nancy Walker executed a will in 2011, leaving personal property to her stepchildren and sister, Beatrice Land, and specific real property to Beatrice. In 2020, Nancy executed a new will and a deed, leaving the same property to her stepgranddaughter, Magen Grimes, and Magen's husband, Joseph Culpepper. Nancy died three weeks later. Beatrice contested the validity of the 2020 will and deed, claiming Nancy lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence.The Russell Circuit Court held a jury trial, which found the 2020 will and deed invalid. The court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict and denied post-judgment motions from the proponents of the 2020 will and deed. Beatrice's request for costs incurred in challenging the will was also denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court's judgment invalidating the 2020 will, finding sufficient evidence that Nancy lacked testamentary capacity. However, it reversed the judgment invalidating the 2020 deed, citing jurisdictional limitations. The court also reversed the denial of Beatrice's request for costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of costs and attorney fees, and who should pay them. View "Boykin v. Land" on Justia Law

In August 2022, Rebecca Henderson and her minor son were involved in an automobile collision in Alabama. Henderson, a Kentucky resident, had an insurance policy from Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Kentucky Farm Bureau) that provided uninsured-motorist (UM) benefits. In July 2024, Henderson filed a complaint in the Baldwin Circuit Court, asserting a negligence/wantonness claim against the other driver, Trey Allan Knapp, and a claim for damages by contract against Kentucky Farm Bureau, alleging entitlement to UM benefits as Knapp had no liability insurance.Kentucky Farm Bureau moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the Baldwin Circuit Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, as it only does business in Kentucky and has no contacts with Alabama. The motion was supported by an affidavit from a Kentucky Farm Bureau employee. Henderson opposed the motion, arguing that the insurance policy provided nationwide coverage, thus establishing sufficient contacts with Alabama. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss without explanation, leading Kentucky Farm Bureau to petition the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and concluded that Kentucky Farm Bureau did not have sufficient contacts with Alabama to establish personal jurisdiction. The court noted that the insurance policy was issued and delivered in Kentucky, and Kentucky Farm Bureau does not conduct business in Alabama. The court distinguished between providing liability coverage nationwide and being subject to contract claims in any state. Consequently, the court granted the petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss Henderson's claim against Kentucky Farm Bureau for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "In re: Henderson v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Earnest Charles Jones was severely injured by a bull on August 27, 2018, and was transported by helicopter to the University of South Alabama Hospital. During the transport, flight nurse Bryan Heath Wester allegedly removed a nasal-gastro tube from Jones's throat, causing further injuries. Nearly two years later, Ovetta Jones, on behalf of Earnest, filed a lawsuit against Wester and Air Evac EMS, Inc., alleging negligence and wantonness related to the care provided during the transport.The Dallas Circuit Court initially reviewed the case, where the Joneses filed their complaint on August 24, 2020. The complaint focused on the removal of the nasal-gastro tube by Wester. Nearly four years later, the Joneses amended their complaint to include new allegations that Wester had stolen and replaced ketamine with saline solution the day before the transport, and that other flight nurses failed to detect this and properly treat Earnest's pain. Air Evac moved for summary judgment, arguing that the amended complaint was time-barred and did not relate back to the initial complaint. The trial court denied the motion.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the amended complaint did not arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the initial complaint. The amended complaint introduced entirely new facts and allegations, including actions by different individuals on a different day. Consequently, the amended complaint could not relate back to the initial complaint and was time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and repose. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Air Evac's petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the summary judgment and to enter an order granting the motion. View "Ex parte Air Evac EMS, Inc." on Justia Law

Kilvert, a Rhode Island company, acquired a commercial property and claimed that SBC Tower, a Delaware company, breached their lease agreement by failing to pay fifty percent of the payments received from subleases. Kilvert filed a Commercial Property Eviction Complaint in Rhode Island district court, seeking eviction and damages. SBC Tower removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island based on diversity jurisdiction. Kilvert moved to remand, arguing that Rhode Island law grants exclusive jurisdiction over landlord-tenant disputes to state district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island agreed with Kilvert and granted the motion to remand, holding that Rhode Island law mandates that the state district court is the proper court for this action, making removal improper. SBC Tower appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the Rhode Island statute in question, R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8-3(a)(2), allocates jurisdiction among state courts and does not divest federal courts of jurisdiction in cases where diversity jurisdiction is present. The court held that the statute does not preclude removal to federal court and that the federal court has the authority to hear the case. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "289 Kilvert, LLC v. SBC Tower Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

Daniel Escamilla, a certified fugitive recovery agent, searched the home of Lan Ting Wu and Andy Yu Feng Yang in 2012, looking for Yang’s brother, who was wanted on felony drug trafficking charges. Yang, Wu, and their minor son sued Escamilla for assault, battery, trespass, false imprisonment, and emotional distress. Their lawyer, John Vannucci, represented them. Escamilla defended the search as supported by probable cause and cross-complained against Yang for abuse of process. In 2019, a jury found in favor of Escamilla on all claims and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On August 30, 2021, Escamilla filed a malicious prosecution action against Yang, Wu, and Vannucci.The Alameda County Superior Court granted Vannucci’s motion to strike Escamilla’s complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), agreeing that the one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys under section 340.6 applied, making the suit time-barred. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action against an attorney. The court held that section 340.6, which provides a one-year limitations period for certain suits against attorneys, does not apply to claims brought by parties who were never their clients or the intended beneficiaries of their clients. Instead, the two-year statute of limitations under section 335.1 applies to malicious prosecution claims brought by formerly adverse parties. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal to consider any unaddressed arguments in the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Escamilla v. Vannucci" on Justia Law

Oscar and Audrey Madrigal purchased a car from Hyundai Motor America in 2011 for $24,172.73. The car allegedly did not function as warranted, and repeated repair attempts failed. The Madrigals requested Hyundai to repurchase the car under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, but Hyundai refused, leading the Madrigals to sue for violations of the Act. Hyundai made two settlement offers under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which the Madrigals did not accept. On the first day of trial, after the court tentatively ruled against the Madrigals on pretrial motions, the parties settled for $39,000, with the Madrigals retaining the right to seek costs and attorney fees by motion.The Placer County Superior Court ruled that section 998 did not apply because the case settled before trial, and awarded the Madrigals $84,742.50 in attorney fees and $17,681.05 in other costs. Hyundai appealed, arguing that the Madrigals should not recover any postoffer costs because they settled for less than the second 998 offer. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section 998’s cost-shifting provisions applied and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court held that section 998’s cost-shifting provisions apply even when a case settles before trial but after a section 998 offer is rejected or deemed withdrawn. The Court reasoned that the statute’s language and purpose—to encourage the settlement of lawsuits before trial—support this interpretation. The Court clarified that parties are free to agree on their own allocation of costs and fees as part of a settlement agreement, but absent such an agreement, section 998’s default cost-shifting rules apply. View "Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law