Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Chris Welsh, representing CAL SD, LLC, entered into a purchase agreement with Interwest Leasing, LLC to buy commercial real estate, with a $30,000 earnest money deposit. Welsh passed away before closing, and CAL SD refused to close. Interwest sold the property to another buyer for the same price but did not return the earnest money. CAL SD filed a declaratory judgment action to recover the deposit, claiming the agreement was void due to their inability to obtain financing.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County, South Dakota, treated the declaratory judgment as a breach of contract action and set it for a jury trial. The jury found in favor of CAL SD, and the court ordered the return of the earnest money deposit. Interwest appealed, arguing the action was equitable and should not have been decided by a jury, and also claimed the court gave erroneous jury instructions.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the declaratory judgment action was legal, not equitable, because it sought to enforce contractual rights under the purchase agreement, which was void if financing was not obtained. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to submit the case to a jury for a binding verdict, as the issue was whether CAL SD breached the contract by failing to secure financing. The court concluded that the jury's determination that CAL SD was unable to obtain financing rendered the purchase agreement void, entitling CAL SD to the return of the earnest money deposit. View "Cal SD, LLC v. Interwest Leasing, LLC" on Justia Law

Erik Schnibbe, an attorney, worked at the law firm of Magleby, Cataxinos, and Greenwood. After a client of the firm won a large damages award, the firm paid Schnibbe $1 million for his share of the contingency fee via direct deposit. Schnibbe believed he was promised a greater share and kept the $1 million. Years later, after leaving the firm, he sued for the additional money he claimed he was owed.The Defendants, including the firm and two of its attorneys, moved for summary judgment, arguing that Schnibbe had accepted the $1 million as full settlement of his share of the contingency fee, thus barring his claims under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to the Defendants.The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that all three elements of accord and satisfaction were met: an unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute over the amount due, a payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute, and acceptance of the payment as full settlement of the dispute. The court focused on the acceptance element, determining that Schnibbe's retention of the $1 million for four years without attempting to return it or registering a protest constituted acceptance of the payment as full settlement.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case on certiorari. The court agreed with the lower courts that Schnibbe's conduct indicated acceptance of the payment as full settlement. The court clarified that acceptance could be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including the creditor's retention of the funds, even if the payment was received passively via direct deposit. The court held that Schnibbe's knowing retention of the $1 million for several years, without attempting to return it, constituted acceptance of the proposed accord as a matter of law. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Magleby v. Schnibbe" on Justia Law

A former police officer, the petitioner, sought to annul the Comptroller's decision denying him accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits. The petitioner was injured while on desk duty when his rolling chair tipped due to a rut in the floor, causing him to grab his desk and injure his shoulder and neck. He applied for ADR benefits, claiming the injury was accidental.The Comptroller denied the application, concluding that the petitioner could have reasonably anticipated the hazard. The petitioner testified that he was aware of the ruts in the floor and had been working desk duty for months. Photographs documented the floor's condition. The Comptroller determined that the injury was not the result of an "accident" as defined for ADR benefits.The petitioner challenged this decision through a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division confirmed the Comptroller's determination and dismissed the proceeding, stating that an event is not an accident if it could have been reasonably anticipated. One Justice dissented, arguing that the "reasonably anticipated" standard was inconsistent with precedent and that the chair tipping was a sudden, unexpected event.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment. The court held that a precipitating event that could or should have been reasonably anticipated by a person in the claimant's circumstances is not an "accident" for ADR benefits. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Comptroller's determination that the petitioner could have reasonably anticipated the near-fall from his desk chair, given his familiarity with the ruts in the floor and the documented condition of the precinct floor. The judgment was affirmed with costs. View "Bodenmiller v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

Dionicio Rodriguez, an employee of SIR Electric LLC (SIR), was injured while working and filed for workers' compensation benefits under SIR's policy with Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company (Hartford). After receiving benefits, Rodriguez filed a personal injury lawsuit against SIR, alleging negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and intentional wrongdoing. SIR requested Hartford to defend against the lawsuit, but Hartford refused, citing policy exclusions. SIR then filed a third-party complaint against Hartford, claiming wrongful disclaimer of defense coverage.The trial court granted Hartford's motion to dismiss SIR's complaint, ruling that the policy excluded intent-based claims. SIR's motion for reconsideration and to amend its complaint, arguing that the policy's enhanced intentional injury exclusion (EII exclusion) violated public policy, was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that Hartford has no duty to defend SIR. The court determined that Rodriguez's claims of negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness are subject to the workers' compensation exclusivity bar and are not covered under Part One of the policy. These claims are also excluded from coverage under Part Two of the policy. Additionally, Rodriguez's claims of intentional wrongdoing are excluded under the policy's EII exclusion.The court concluded that the trial judge properly denied SIR's motion to amend its third-party complaint, as the EII exclusion does not violate public policy. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, upholding the dismissal of SIR's third-party complaint against Hartford. View "Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC" on Justia Law

Sarah Staab purchased a condominium unit at a foreclosure sale conducted by the condominium association to recover unpaid fees. She later challenged two Superior Court orders that ruled the sale of the unit to her was barred by the Federal Foreclosure Bar, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), and thus void, and granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. on its claims for judicial foreclosure, declaratory judgment, and quiet title. Staab did not contest that the property was encumbered by a deed of trust owned by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and serviced by Wells Fargo, nor did she dispute the application of the Federal Foreclosure Bar. Instead, she raised three procedural arguments.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ruled in favor of Wells Fargo, determining that the bank's claims were timely, the foreclosure and sale of the property to Staab were void under the Federal Foreclosure Bar, and the condominium association was not an indispensable party. Staab argued that the court applied the incorrect statute of limitations, abused its discretion by allowing Wells Fargo to amend its complaint years after filing, and erred by not joining the condominium association as an indispensable party.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that Wells Fargo's initial action for judicial foreclosure was timely and that the additional facts and arguments raised in the amended complaint were in direct response to Staab's affirmative defense. The court also concluded that any error in granting Wells Fargo leave to amend its complaint was harmless, as the bank could have raised the same arguments at the summary judgment stage. Finally, the court determined that the condominium association was not an essential party under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 19(a)(1), as the court could grant complete relief without its involvement. View "Staab v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Spring Siders, a Christian evangelist, sought to share her religious message outside a public amphitheater in Brandon, Mississippi. The City of Brandon had enacted an ordinance restricting protests and demonstrations near the amphitheater during events. Siders challenged the constitutionality of this ordinance after being directed by police to a designated protest area, which she found unsuitable for her activities. She argued that the ordinance infringed on her First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Siders' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the ordinance. The court found that Siders had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim, relying on a similar case, Herridge v. Montgomery County, which upheld restrictions on street preaching near a concert venue for public safety reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. It found that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest of public safety and traffic control during events at the amphitheater. The court also determined that the ordinance left open ample alternative channels for communication, as Siders could still engage in her activities in the designated protest area and other locations outside the restricted area.The Fifth Circuit concluded that Siders had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. View "Siders v. City of Brandon" on Justia Law

LCPFV, LLC owned a warehouse with a faulty sewer pipe and hired Rapid Plumbing to fix it for $47,883.40. Rapid's work was unsatisfactory, so LCPFV hired another plumber for $44,077 to redo the job. LCPFV sued Rapid, its employee Marco Lopez, and the owner Abbas Pournahavandi. Rapid initially responded but later defaulted. LCPFV sought a default judgment of $1,081,263.80, including $308,376.75 in attorney fees and $500,000 in punitive damages. The trial court awarded a default judgment of $120,319.22, including attorney fees and other costs, and $11,852.90 in sanctions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, presided by Judge Mark V. Mooney, reviewed the case. The court rejected LCPFV's excessive default judgment request and awarded a more reasonable sum. The court also denied LCPFV's motion for additional sanctions and reduced the attorney fee request significantly, citing the simplicity of the case and the lack of opposition from the defendants.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, agreeing that the trial court acted appropriately as a gatekeeper in scrutinizing the default judgment package. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision to reject the use of requests for admissions as evidence of fraud, reduce the attorney fee award, and limit the sanctions. The court also agreed with the trial court's decision to award prejudgment interest from the date of the lawsuit filing rather than from the date of payment to Rapid.The main holding is that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding a reasonable default judgment, reducing attorney fees, and limiting sanctions, while ensuring that only appropriate claims were granted. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in all respects. View "LCPFV v. Somatdary Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a partition action concerning two properties in Charlestown, Rhode Island, owned by Peter Karasuk, Lee Karasuk Ingley, and Sandra Karasuk Puchalski as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. The properties were inherited from their mother’s estate in 2017. After failed negotiations to sell the properties to Puchalski, Karasuk and Ingley filed a partition action on May 3, 2021. Numerous continuances were granted due to Puchalski's complaints of hearing impairment. Despite accommodations, Puchalski expressed dissatisfaction and failed to appear at several hearings.The Superior Court dismissed Puchalski’s appeals, approved the commissioner’s petition for instructions, and quashed a statement she filed in the Town of Charlestown Land Evidence Records. Puchalski appealed these decisions. The Superior Court had granted plaintiffs' motion to sell the properties, appointed a commissioner, and issued a temporary restraining order against Puchalski. Puchalski failed to appear at critical hearings, leading to the dismissal of her appeals.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Puchalski received adequate notice of the motions and hearings. The court determined that the orders appealed from were interlocutory and not subject to review under the exceptions to the final-judgment rule. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decisions, including the dismissal of Puchalski’s appeals and the orders related to the partition and sale of the properties. The court emphasized that Puchalski’s continued attempts to delay the proceedings were unavailing and that the matter should proceed to finality. View "Karasuk v. Puchalski" on Justia Law

Aleksia Lindsay filed an amended class action complaint against Patenaude & Felix, APC, and Transworld Systems Inc., alleging unfair debt collection practices. Lindsay had defaulted on $60,000 in student loans, and after receiving incomplete and inaccurate information from Transworld, Patenaude initiated two debt collection lawsuits against her. Lindsay later discovered that both entities had a history of unethical collection practices, leading to actions by various regulatory bodies. After the lawsuits against her were dismissed, Lindsay received another demand for payment and subsequently filed the class action complaint.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County struck Lindsay's complaint, relying on the anti-SLAPP law, and ruled that the public interest exception did not apply. Lindsay argued that the trial court erred in this decision. The trial court concluded that although the three conditions of the public interest exception were met, the action was not brought solely in the public interest because Lindsay sought damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that the action was brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public, as the relief sought by Lindsay was identical to that sought for the plaintiff class. The court also found that seeking damages did not preclude the application of the public interest exception. The court concluded that the action met all three conditions of the public interest exception: it did not seek greater or different relief, it would enforce an important right affecting the public interest and confer a significant benefit, and private enforcement was necessary and placed a disproportionate financial burden on Lindsay.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, exempting Lindsay's action from the anti-SLAPP law and entitling her to costs on appeal. View "Lindsay v. Patenaude & Felix" on Justia Law

JHVS Group, LLC and its members, Jasanjot Singh and Harshana Kaur, purchased a 66.4-acre pistachio orchard from Shawn Slate and Dina Slate for approximately $2.6 million. The Slates agreed to carry a loan for $1,889,600, and JHVS made a $700,000 down payment. The agreement included provisions for interest payments and additional payments coinciding with expected crop payments. JHVS alleged that the Slates and their brokers, Randy Hayer and SVN Executive Commercial Advisors, misrepresented material facts about the property, including water rights and the value of the 2022 crop. JHVS claimed the actual value of the crop was significantly lower than represented, and they fell behind on payments, leading the Slates to record a notice of default.JHVS filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Madera County, raising seven causes of action, including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, intentional fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, rescission based on fraud or mutual mistake, and injunctive relief to stop the foreclosure process. JHVS filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure sale, arguing that the Slates and Hayer had lied about water restrictions and misrepresented the crop's value. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction after the defendants did not appear or file a response.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction over the Slates because they were never served with the summons and complaint. The appellate court determined that the trial court's order was void as to the Slates due to the lack of proper service and reversed the preliminary injunction order with respect to the Slates. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "JHVS Group, LLC v. Slate" on Justia Law