Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Moniz managed a staffing firm's (Adecco’s) relationship with Google. Correa was assigned to work at Google. Moniz and Correa sued Adecco to recover civil penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code. Under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), an employee aggrieved by alleged Labor Code violations may act as an agent of the Labor Workforce and Development Agency (LWDA) to bring an action to recover civil penalties. If an aggrieved employee settles such an action, the court must review and approve the settlement; civil penalties are distributed 75 percent to the LWDA and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees.Moniz settled her case first. The court approved the settlement. Correa challenged the settlement process and approval, including the manner in which the court treated Correa's and LWDA's objections to the settlement, the standard used by the court to approve the settlement, numerous alleged legal deficiencies, and the trial court’s ruling denying her attorney fees and an incentive payment. The court of appeal reversed. While the court applied an appropriate standard of review by inquiring whether the settlement was “fair, adequate, and reasonable” as well as meaningful and consistent with the purposes of PAGA, it is not possible to infer from the record that the trial court assessed the fairness of the settlement’s allocation of civil penalties between the affected aggrieved employees or whether such allocation comports with PAGA. View "Moniz v. Adecco USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased Berkeley property intending to demolish an existing structure and build a new residence. Richards, a licensed contractor, demolished the structure but did not build the new house. Plaintiffs sued Richards alleging breach of oral contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel. Richards propounded requests for admission (RFAs) asking the plaintiffs to admit the parties did not enter into an oral contract and did not have a meeting of the minds. Plaintiffs denied the RFAs.The trial court denied Richards’s motion for summary judgment finding triable issues of material fact. After the close of evidence, Richards unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict. The jury returned a defense verdict, concluding that Richards did not make a promise with clear and unambiguous terms. Richards moved for attorney fees and costs (Code of Civil Procedure 2033.420), arguing that the plaintiffs had no reasonable basis to deny the RFAs and “failed to realistically evaluate their claims and perform a reasonable investigation.” The court awarded Richards $239,170.86 in attorney fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed. the trial court was well-positioned to evaluate the reasonableness issue as it presided over the case from start to finish. Neither the denial of summary judgment nor the denial of a directed verdict precluded the award. View "Spahn v. Richards" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roy Kumar appealed a trial court’s order imposing terminating and monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The trial court found that Kumar’s first amended complaint was factually and legally frivolous because no reasonable attorney could conclude that Kumar’s claims against defendants Kelly Ramsey and Elizabeth Pintar were timely under the applicable four-year limitations period. On appeal, Kumar argued the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion. Finding ample legal and factual support to conclude that Kumar made a plausible, nonfrivolous argument that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar his suit, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order. View "Kumar v. Ramsey" on Justia Law

Elation sued Fenn and Shi for breach of a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) (against Shi only) entered during the course of Shi’s prior employment with Elation and breach of a confidential settlement agreement and mutual release (Settlement Agreement) (against both defendants) entered to resolve a prior action between the parties. The defendants filed a cross-complaint, alleging Elation’s breach of the Settlement Agreement. Elation admitted to liability and stipulated to $10,000 in liquidated damages on the cross-claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. A jury found that Shi had breached the NDA and harmed Elation, and awarded Elation $10,000 in damages. The court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), denied Elation’s motion for injunctive relief, and awarded defendants $700,000 in attorney fees.The court of appeal reversed in part. The trial court should have awarded Elation nominal damages on its NDA claim, as defendants’ JNOV motion did not challenge the jury’s finding that Shi breached the NDA. Substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding in Elation’s favor on its Settlement Agreement claim. The court affirmed the order granting JNOV as to Elation’s Settlement Agreement claim and vacated the award of attorney fees. View "Elation Systems, Inc. v. Fenn Bridge LLC" on Justia Law

The Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (the Hospital) terminated the employment of registered nurse Kimberly Wilkin (Wilkin) after discovering she had violated the Hospital’s policies governing the handling and documentation of patient medications. Wilkin sued the Hospital, alleging her discharge constituted disability discrimination, retaliation, and otherwise violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); resulted in the unlawful denial of medical leave and retaliation in violation of the Moore- Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA); and constituted a wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Over a year after Wilkin filed her complaint, the Hospital moved for summary judgment, producing undisputed evidence, including Wilkin’s deposition testimony, showing she had violated policies governing the handling of medication, and, for over a year before she was discharged, had been regularly counseled for her chronic absenteeism and other issues. The trial court concluded the Hospital carried its burden of producing evidence showing its decision was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. After Wilkin did not produce any evidence showing the Hospital’s reasons were fabricated or otherwise pretextual, the trial court concluded a reasonable trier of fact could not find in favor of Wilkin on any of her claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital. To this, the Court of Appeal affirmed. "As all of Wilkin’s claims depended on there being a triable issue of fact regarding the lawfulness of her discharge, and our record does not show such a triable issue of fact exists, summary judgment was properly granted." View "Wilkin v. Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula" on Justia Law

The public guardian, C.O.'s conservator under Welf. & Inst. Code 5000, sought reappointment. A written citation for conservatorship was served on C.O., stating: “You have the right to a court or jury trial on the issue of grave disability. The request for a jury trial must be made within five days of the hearing.” C.O. did not request a jury trial. At an initial hearing, C.O. was represented by counsel. Before C.O. was in the courtroom, C.O.’s attorney stated that he had informed his clients of the right to a jury trial, and "they’ve waived these rights.” With C.O. in the courtroom, his attorney stated (in C.O.’s presence) that C.O. was requesting a court trial. The court did not advise C.O. on the record of his right to a jury trial or elicit a personal waiver of that right. During the subsequent trial, neither C.O. nor his attorney requested a jury trial. The judge found “beyond a reasonable doubt, that [C.O.] has both been advised in writ[]ing of his right to a jury trial [and] that he remains a gravel[]y disabled person,” then granted the reappointment petition.The court of appeal affirmed. C.O. does not dispute the conclusion that he is gravely disabled. It is not reasonably probable that an outcome more favorable to C.O. would have resulted had the court personally advised him of his jury trial right. Nothing suggests that C.O. would have elected a jury trial if the court had advised him personally of that right. View "Conservatorship of C.O." on Justia Law

Neurelis, Inc. (Neurelis) and Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (Aquestive) were pharmaceutical companies developing their own respective means to administer diazepam, a drug used to treat acute repetitive seizures (ARS). Neurelis was further along in the development process than Aquestive. According to Neurelis, Aquestive engaged in a “multi-year, anticompetitive campaign to derail the Food and Drug Administration” (FDA) from approving Neurelis’s new drug. Based on Aquestive’s alleged conduct, Neurelis sued Aquestive for defamation, malicious prosecution, and violation of the unfair competition law. In response, Aquestive brought a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. The superior court granted in part and denied in part Aquestive’s motion, finding that the defamation cause of action could not withstand the anti-SLAPP challenge. However, the court denied the motion as to Neurelis’s other two causes of action. Aquestive appealed, contending the court erred by failing to strike the malicious prosecution action as well as the claim for a violation of the UCL. Neurelis, in turn, cross-appealed, maintaining that the conduct giving rise to its defamation cause of action was not protected under the anti- SLAPP statute. The Court of Appeal agreed that at least some of the conduct giving rise to the defamation action was covered by the commercial speech exception and not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, the Court held the superior court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion as to the defamation action. Some of this same conduct also gave rise to the UCL claim and was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute too. However, the Court noted that Neurelis based part of two of its causes of action on Aquestive’s petitioning activity. That activity was protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute, and Neurelis did not show a likelihood to prevail on the merits. Thus, allegations relating to this petitioning conduct had to be struck. Finally, the Court found Neurelis did not show a probability of success on the merits regarding its malicious prosecution claim. As such, the Court held that claim should have been struck under the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc." on Justia Law

On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency due to the spread of COVID-19. On March 16, the Legislature enacted an emergency amendment to the Budget Act, appropriating $500 million, and authorizing additional disbursements for any purpose related to the state of emergency upon order of the Director of Finance, with notice to the Legislature, but without requiring statutory approval of each individual project. On April 15, Governor Newsom announced a $75 million Disaster Relief Fund to “support undocumented Californians impacted by COVID-19 who are ineligible for unemployment insurance and disaster relief, including the CARES Act, due to their immigration status.” Approximately 150,000 undocumented adult Californians would receive a one-time cash benefit of $500 per adult with a cap of $1,000 per household to deal with specific needs arising from the pandemic.On April 29, the plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Project as an unlawful expenditure of public funds (Code Civ. Proc. 526a.), reasoning that federal law provides that undocumented immigrants are not eligible for state public benefits, with exceptions, 8 U.S.C. 1621(a), including the enactment of a state law after the date of the enactment of the federal act. Plaintiffs alleged that the Project was not enacted by a state law and sought a temporary restraining order. The court of appeal dismissed, as moot, an appeal from the denial of a TRO. The spending has already occurred; there is no indication it will be reauthorized. View "Cerletti v. Newsom" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, Paula and Christopher LeRoy lost their 15-year-old son, Kennedy LeRoy, to suicide two days after finishing his sophomore year at Ayala High School in Chino. The LeRoys sued the Chino Valley Unified School District, Ayala’s principal, Diana Yarboi, and its assistant principal, Carlo Purther (collectively, Respondents). The LeRoys alleged Respondents were liable for Kennedy’s suicide because of their inadequate response to his complaints of bullying by his classmates. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, and the LeRoys timely appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Respondents were statutorily immune from liability and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Leroy v. Yarboi" on Justia Law

In her complaint, plaintiff Pamela Chambers alleged that she received a written communication from a debt collector contracted by Crown that failed to comply with the CFDBPA’s notice formatting requirement. She filed a putative class action lawsuit against Crown Asset Management, LLC. Crown moved to compel arbitration, relying on an affidavit from an employee of Chambers’s original creditor, Synchrony Bank (Synchrony), who stated in part that “Synchrony’s records” showed a credit card account agreement containing an arbitration clause was mailed to Chambers. Chambers objected to the affidavit on various evidentiary grounds. The trial court sustained the objections and denied Crown’s motion to compel arbitration. Crown appealed, contending the trial court erred by sustaining Chambers’s evidentiary objections and denying the motion to compel. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Chambers v. Crown Asset Management, LLC" on Justia Law