Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency due to the spread of COVID-19. On March 16, the Legislature enacted an emergency amendment to the Budget Act, appropriating $500 million, and authorizing additional disbursements for any purpose related to the state of emergency upon order of the Director of Finance, with notice to the Legislature, but without requiring statutory approval of each individual project. On April 15, Governor Newsom announced a $75 million Disaster Relief Fund to “support undocumented Californians impacted by COVID-19 who are ineligible for unemployment insurance and disaster relief, including the CARES Act, due to their immigration status.” Approximately 150,000 undocumented adult Californians would receive a one-time cash benefit of $500 per adult with a cap of $1,000 per household to deal with specific needs arising from the pandemic.On April 29, the plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Project as an unlawful expenditure of public funds (Code Civ. Proc. 526a.), reasoning that federal law provides that undocumented immigrants are not eligible for state public benefits, with exceptions, 8 U.S.C. 1621(a), including the enactment of a state law after the date of the enactment of the federal act. Plaintiffs alleged that the Project was not enacted by a state law and sought a temporary restraining order. The court of appeal dismissed, as moot, an appeal from the denial of a TRO. The spending has already occurred; there is no indication it will be reauthorized. View "Cerletti v. Newsom" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, Paula and Christopher LeRoy lost their 15-year-old son, Kennedy LeRoy, to suicide two days after finishing his sophomore year at Ayala High School in Chino. The LeRoys sued the Chino Valley Unified School District, Ayala’s principal, Diana Yarboi, and its assistant principal, Carlo Purther (collectively, Respondents). The LeRoys alleged Respondents were liable for Kennedy’s suicide because of their inadequate response to his complaints of bullying by his classmates. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, and the LeRoys timely appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Respondents were statutorily immune from liability and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Leroy v. Yarboi" on Justia Law

In her complaint, plaintiff Pamela Chambers alleged that she received a written communication from a debt collector contracted by Crown that failed to comply with the CFDBPA’s notice formatting requirement. She filed a putative class action lawsuit against Crown Asset Management, LLC. Crown moved to compel arbitration, relying on an affidavit from an employee of Chambers’s original creditor, Synchrony Bank (Synchrony), who stated in part that “Synchrony’s records” showed a credit card account agreement containing an arbitration clause was mailed to Chambers. Chambers objected to the affidavit on various evidentiary grounds. The trial court sustained the objections and denied Crown’s motion to compel arbitration. Crown appealed, contending the trial court erred by sustaining Chambers’s evidentiary objections and denying the motion to compel. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Chambers v. Crown Asset Management, LLC" on Justia Law

One beverage distributorship sued another and ultimately narrowed its lawsuit to a single tort claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage premised solely on the theory that the defendant had engaged in independently wrongful conduct by breaching a nondisclosure and non-circumvention agreement. This is an invalid theory as a matter of law under California Supreme Court precedent; an actor’s breach of contract, without more, is not “wrongful conduct” capable of supporting a tort, including the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. No one caught the error until the jury returned a special verdict in the plaintiff’s favor that was premised solely on the breach of the agreement.The court of appeal reversed. A jury’s special verdict for the plaintiff, based on conduct that does not constitute an actionable tort, cannot stand. Just as a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment for conduct that does not violate a criminal or civil statute, a trial court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment for allegedly tortious conduct, fashioned by common law, that the state’s highest court has determined is not tortious. A party’s conduct cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court, so the defendant’s delay in objecting is irrelevant. View "Drink Tank Ventures LLC v. Real Soda in Real Bottles, Ltd." on Justia Law

Guzman, driving a truck for his employer (Progressive), rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle. The plaintiff was driving a truck for his employer. Following the accident, the plaintiff returned to work for three weeks, but then left his employment. During the following months, the plaintiff continued to receive treatment. His former employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Liberty, paid for the treatment.Plaintiff sued The defendants served a $200,000 offer to settle (Code of Civil Procedure 998). Plaintiff rejected the offer. The parties stipulated that a $256,631.76 workers’ compensation lien existed and that the defendants would admit negligence, but not causation as to the plaintiff’s injuries. The jury returned a verdict of $115,000.Opposing the plaintiff’s fee petition, the defendants argued that the plaintiff should not recover fees and post-offer costs because the verdict did not exceed the section 998 offer. Defendants’ costs totaled $174,830.29. The court awarded the plaintiff $50,600 in attorney fees and the $475.98 pre-offer filing fee in costs. Although Labor Code section 3856 requires costs to be paid from the judgment, the court added the fees and costs to the verdict, then concluded the defense had a net gain over the plaintiff and was the prevailing party and entered an $8,754.22 final judgment in favor of the defendants.The court of appeal affirmed. The court erred by adding attorney fees to the verdict when calculating the net judgment. A $59,354.31 defense judgment should have been entered there was no “judgment for damages recovered” from which the plaintiff’s reasonable litigation expenses and attorney fees or Progressive’s workers’ compensation lien could be paid. (Lab. Code 3856(b)). The defendants had not challenged their $8,754.22 judgment. View "Oakes v. Progressive Transportation Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Kremerman sued his former tenant, White. After a registered process server filed three non-service reports, Kremerman unsuccessfully sought to accomplish service by publication. In the subsequent proof of service, the process server stated that he left a copy of the summons and complaint with “a competent member of the household (at least 18 years of age) at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the party” and identified said person as Plowden, an “authorized employee” at the Postal Annex where White maintained a private mailbox. The process server “thereafter mailed (by first-class, postage prepaid) copies of the documents” to the “authorized employee at ‘Postal Annex’.” The trial court entered a default judgment against White. White unsuccessfully moved to vacate the default judgment, alleging she was never effectively served with the summons and complaint.The court of appeal reversed. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 (d), and section 473.5, the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction over White because service of summons was defective. Kremerman did not undertake diligent efforts to serve White. With respect to substituted service, the Postal Annex is not White’s household or usual place of abode, nor was Plowden a competent member of White’s household. Kremerman was aware that White had another address, as he included that address on the security deposit itemization. View "Kremerman v. White" on Justia Law

In 2001, the City issued China Shipping a permit to build the Container Terminal, within the Port of Los Angeles. The settlement of a suit under the California Environmental Quality Act required the City to prepare an environmental impact report. The resulting 2008 Report found the project “would have significant and unavoidable adverse environmental impacts to air quality, aesthetics, biological resources, geology, transportation, noise, and water quality sediments and oceanography.” The City adopted more than 50 mitigation measures and several lease measures to reduce these impacts. China Shipping’s lease was never amended to incorporate the mitigation measures. Several measures were partially implemented; others were ignored entirely. In 2015, the City began a revised environmental analysis for the Terminal. The Board of Harbor Commissioners certified the final supplemental report in 2019. The City Council approved it in 2020, allowing the Terminal to operate under revised conditions. China Shipping refused to implement or to pay for any new measures. The Air District filed suit, seeking to set aside the Terminal's approvals and permit and nullification of the certification of the 2020 Report, to disallow continued operation of the Terminal.The Union sought permissive intervention, claiming that up to 3,075 of its members could lose their jobs. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the Union’s motion. The Union’s interest in the case was speculative and consequential—not direct and immediate, as required for permissive intervention—and the prejudice to existing parties outweighed the reasons supporting intervention. Other parties can be counted upon to support the jobs issue. Unlike the Attorney General and the California Air Resources Board, which were permitted to intervene, the Union has no legal interest in the CEQA issues. Another intervening party would complicate the litigation. View "South Coast Air Quality Management District v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Mitchell swallowed 60 Naproxen tablets. With her husband, she arrived at the Hospital emergency department on May 27, 2017, alert, oriented, and with no acute distress. The physician noted no motor deficits or sensory deficits. A nurse placed an IV catheter in Mitchell’s forearm. Nearly two hours later, Mitchell walked to the toilet with assistance from her husband, then walked back to her bed without assistance. On the way back, Mitchell fell, causing abrasions to her face and severely injuring her knee. The nursing staff had no reason to suspect Mitchell presented a high fall risk because she did not complain of dizziness; they had no observed balance problems. An x-ray and CT scan of Mitchell’s knee showed serious injuries. Mitchell was referred to physical therapy and was discharged from Hospital.Mitchell filed her complaint, alleging general negligence and premises liability on May 17, 2019. The hospital argued that the complaint alleged professional negligence, rather than general negligence or premises liability, and was barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5’s one-year limitations period. Mitchell acknowledged that the condition of the floor did not contribute to her fall. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The nursing staff’s decision to not assist Mitchell in walking to the restroom was “integrally related” to her medical care. View "Mitchell v. Los Robles Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sued a school district for negligently supervising the fourth-grade teacher who molested her in 2010-2011. Before trial, the court admitted evidence that the woman had been sexually abused by someone else in 2013, reasoning that the evidence fell outside of the scope of Evidence Code sections 1106 and 7831 which regulate the admission of “the plaintiff’s sexual conduct” and that its probative value to contradict the plaintiff’s anticipated testimony attributing all of her emotional distress to the teacher’s molestation was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.The court of appeal dissolved a stay of proceedings and directed the trial court to either assess any prejudice flowing from the empaneled jury’s exposure to the mentioning of the 2013 incident during opening statements or begin the trial with a new jury. The term “plaintiff’s sexual conduct” in sections 1106 and 783 (and Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.220) encompasses sexual abuse to which a plaintiff has been involuntarily subjected as well as the plaintiff’s voluntary sexual conduct. Section 783 requires a trial court, after following certain procedures, to engage in a section 352 analysis identical to the one the trial court undertook. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the subsequent sexual abuse was not outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. View "Doe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an application by State Farm General Insurance Company (SFG) to increase its homeowners’ insurance rates, under the prior approval system implemented by Proposition 103. Nonprofit Consumer Watchdog (CW) intervened in the proceeding, and challenged SFG’s proposed rates. The Commissioner relied on regulation section 2644.20, addressing projected yield, to use the combined annual statement of SFG’s parent company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm Mutual) and its property-casualty affiliates. The Commissioner ordered SFG to decrease its rate retroactively and issue refunds (Rate Order). SFG filed a petition for writ of mandate. The superior court determined Insurance Code section 1861.05(a) required the rate to mathematically reflect the applicant insurer’s income, and the Commissioner’s interpretation and application of regulation Insurance Code section 2644.20 to use the income of SFG’s affiliates conflicted with the statute. The court entered judgment for SFG, issued a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the Rate Order be set aside, and remanded remaining issues to the Commissioner, including the propriety of the retroactive rate and refund. The Commissioner and CW (Appellants) appealed the judgment and writ of mandate, contending the Commissioner properly interpreted the statute and regulation and had authority to set an earlier effective date and require refunds. SFG cross-appealed the order directing remand to the Commissioner, which it argued was unnecessary in light of the impropriety of the retroactive rate and refund as well as a subsequent rate change for SFG. The Court of Appeal concluded the superior court correctly determined section 1861.05(a) required use of the applicant insurer’s income, and the Commissioner erred in interpreting and applying Regulation 2644.20 here. Furthermore, the Court concluded the retroactive rate and refund were impermissible, and remand was not warranted under the circumstances. The superior court was directed to modify the writ of mandate to require the Rate Order be vacated in its entirety, and affirmed the judgment and writ of mandate in all other respects. View "State Farm General Insurance Company v. Lara" on Justia Law