Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to Government Code, section 945.5, before a suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity, the plaintiff must timely present a written claim to the public entity. In this case, plaintiff failed to timely present her personal injury claim to Ventura County within the six-month statutory period and failed to timely apply for leave to present a late claim within the one-year statutory period.The Court of Appeal denied the petition for review, concluding that plaintiff forfeited her contention that the trial judge should have disqualified herself. Plaintiff's other contention involves an issue of first impression concerning the meaning of Executive Order N-35-20, issued by Governor Newsom on March 21, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court concluded that the plain meaning of the unambiguous executive order requires the court to hold that the 60 day extension applies only to the six-month period for presenting a timely claim. In this case, plaintiff did not timely apply for leave to present a late claim within the unextended one-year statutory period, and thus the trial court did not err by denying her petition for relief. View "Coble v. Ventura County Health Care Agency" on Justia Law

Chaganti sought a writ of error. While his appeal of a civil judgment was pending, he discovered evidence, which was not in existence at the time of the judgment, that the superior court judge who had summarily adjudicated his claims owned stock worth between $10,000 and $100,000 in AT&T. The defendants in Chaganti’s civil action, Cricket and New Cingular, are wholly owned subsidiaries of AT&T. Chaganti argued that the judge was disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure 170.1, which provides: “A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following are true: ... The judge has a financial interest in the subject matter in a proceeding or in a party to the proceeding.” Financial interest means ownership of more than a one percent legal or equitable interest in a party, or a legal or equitable interest in a party of a fair market value in excess of $1,500.The action concerned a commercial lease; the named lessee was “AT&T Wireless PCS.” Rent was paid by checks from “AT&T.” The defendants were represented by “an Assistant Vice President and Senior Legal Counsel employed in the AT&T Legal Dept.” The court of appeal ordered the superior court to vacate the judgment, rejecting AT&T’s arguments that it was not a “party” to the proceeding and that Chaganti was precluded from obtaining a writ of error because he did not exercise due diligence in discovering the judge’s AT&T stock ownership. View "Chaganti v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Park sued his former attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with Park’s plan to purchase cardroom casinos. Park alleged that in 2003-2012, the defendants represented Park’s gaming businesses before the California Gambling Control Commission and the Bureau of Gambling Control. The attorney-client relationship ended with a dispute about monthly billing rates. Thereafter, the defendants allegedly thwarted Park’s efforts to secure ownership interests in the two cardroom casinos by using Park’s confidential information, assisting his competitors, and making disparaging remarks about Park to regulators and others.Park issued third-party subpoenas duces tecum to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and to Deputy Attorney General Torngren, who represents the Bureau of Gambling Control, requesting communications and documents pertaining to Park and the casinos. The DOJ reportedly reviewed several hundred thousand electronic documents but produced fewer than a hundred. During the production, the trial court ordered Park to pay $32,836.25 to defray the “undue burden or expense” of the DOJ’s compliance with Park’s subpoena. When the production was complete, the court ordered Park to pay the DOJ an additional $111,618.75. The court of appeal affirmed. The court properly exercised its discretion under the Electronic Discovery Act in the Code of Civil Procedure, section 1985.8(l). View "Park v. Law Offices of Tracey Buck-Walsh" on Justia Law

Cesar was shot and killed in 2016. Murder charges were filed against Santacruz, Cervantes, Alcantar, and Duran. Vallejo (Duran’s mother) was charged as an accessory after the fact. Judge Colin dismissed that charge against Vallejo in the interest of justice under Penal Code 1385 on February 20, 2020. Judge Colin later recused himself at the request of the prosecution. The case was assigned to Judge Clark, who found Judge Colin’s recusal to have been a concession to retroactive disqualification, and on June 22, 2020, granted the prosecution’s motion to set aside as void all rulings of Judge Colin dating back to January 9, including the February 20 dismissal, thereby reinstating the accessory count against Vallejo.The court of appeal vacated Judge Clark’s ruling, noting that whether the February 20 dismissal was an appropriate exercise of discretion was not before the court. Judge Colin’s order dismissing the charge against Vallejo was a final order terminating the trial court’s authority over her case. The prosecution had a clear remedy to address the trial court’s alleged bias or appearance of bias underlying the dismissal—an appeal under Penal Code 1238,(a)(8), but elected not to appeal. Judge Clark was without jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal. View "Vallejo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Scott filed suit in Alameda County Superior Court, alleging that Scott was involved in three separate automobile accidents in 2017 and could not determine which accident caused her injuries: a San Mateo County accident involving Jobs, an Alameda County accident involving Forni, and a Contra Costa County accident, involving Aquino, who was working for Pacific Auto. None of the defendants resided in Alameda County. The defendants filed answers and cross-complaints. Jobs, Aquino, and Pacific alleged an affirmative defense of improper venue. Scott settled with the Forni defendants. The court issued a good faith settlement determination and dismissed the Forni defendants.The remaining defendants unsuccessfully moved to transfer venue to Santa Clara County, where Aquino and Pacific reside (Code of Civil Procedure 397). The court found they had waived their challenge. The court of appeal denied their petition for relief. The superior court clerk’s service of a document containing both the order denying the motion to change venue and a declaration of service satisfied the requirements for written notice under section 1013a, thereby commencing the period for filing the petition under section 400. Petitioners’ failure to file their petition by the end of that period rendered their petition untimely, whether or not the real party in interest should have also given notice of the order under section 1019.5. View "Aquino v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Surety) provided a $30,000 bail bond for a criminal defendant who failed to appear in court as required, triggering the court to declare a forfeiture of the bond. When Surety failed to vacate the forfeiture within the statutorily specified “appearance period,” the court entered summary judgment against Surety in the amount of the bond. Surety argued on appeal that the trial court prematurely entered summary judgment because an emergency rule adopted by the Judicial Council in response to the COVID 19 pandemic (Emergency rule 9), which tolled “the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action,” also tolled the appearance period for vacating forfeitures of bail bonds. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Financial Casualty & Surety" on Justia Law

Appellants, Soncino (Celine’s brother), Celine, and Yoram (Celine’s husband) created for-profit organizations, that provided music enrichment and formed a nonprofit organization to contract with public entities. The for-profit organizations provided services, which the nonprofit paid for. The siblings sued Yoram and the businesses, alleging Yoram had misappropriated property belonging to the businesses. The complaint was joined to Celine's and Yoram's divorce proceedings. The parties filed a “Confidential Protective Order,” which prevented Celine from disclosing information and documents she obtained from Yoram’s desk and the marital residence without Yoram's knowledge.The court concluded that Soncino was a partner in the businesses and that the appellants used the business funds for personal expenses. The dissolution was finalized. The Attorney General subsequently filed a complaint against the family businesses and appellants and moved to unseal court records in the dissolution, alleging comingling of charitable funds and using those assets for personal expenses. Ultimately, the family court ordered that records from the dissolution and Soncino v. Tamir be unsealed, and the protective orders lifted.After holding that the family court had the authority to rule on the motion, that the Attorney General is entitled to seek the records on behalf of the public, and that the appellants failed to identify a privacy interest that outweighs the public right to access, the court of appeal reversed and remanded. The family court failed to assess whether the documents at issue were used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication, and erred in setting aside the protective orders. View "Marriage of Tamir" on Justia Law

The City of San Diego (City) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for the “Serra Mesa Community Plan [SMCP] Amendment Roadway Connection Project” (Project) and approved an amendment to the SMCP and the City’s General Plan to reflect the proposed roadway. Save Civita Because Sudberry Won’t (“Save Civita”) filed a combined petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (Petition/Complaint) against the City, challenging the City’s certification of the EIR and approval of the Project. Save Civita contended that the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), the Planning and Zoning Law, and the public’s due-process and fair-hearing rights. The trial court denied the Petition/Complaint in its entirety and entered a judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, Save Civita raised four claims related to the City’s certification of the EIR for the Project: (1) the City violated CEQA Guidelines section 15088.5, subdivision (g) in failing to summarize revisions made in the Project’s recirculated draft EIR (RE-DEIR); (2) the Project’s final EIR (FEIR) was deficient because it failed to adequately analyze, as an alternative to the Project, a proposal to amend the MVCP to remove the planned road from that community plan; (3) the FEIR is deficient because it failed to adequately analyze the Project’s traffic impacts; and (4) the FEIR failed to adequately discuss the Project’s inconsistency with the General Plan’s goal of creating pedestrian-friendly communities. In addition to its EIR / CEQA claims, Save Civita maintains that the Project will have a deleterious effect on the pedestrian-friendly Civita community and that the City therefore violated the Planning and Zoning law in concluding that the Project is consistent with the City’s General Plan. Finally, Save Civita maintains that the City acted in a quasi-adjudicatory capacity in certifying the FEIR and approving the Project and that a City Council member violated the public’s procedural due process rights by improperly advocating for the Project prior to its approval. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the City in its entirety. View "Save Civita Because Sudberry Won't v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Awana Ring was approximately 80 years old when her daughter Vickie Atiyeh died in November 2015. In her will, Atiyeh left a house to Ring. Roy Scott Robb (Scott Robb) and Zachary Robb were a son and an adult grandson of Ring, and father and son to one another. The Robbs were both named as defendants in this action, but were not party to this appeal. Defendants-respondents here were Richard Harmon and the corporation TSG Financial Corp. (TSG); Ring alleged that TSG was Harmon's alter ego. According to Ring, the Robbs, working together with respondents, used probate proceedings as a means to extract equity from the house to use for their own purposes. Scott Robb, in particular, in accordance with a plan designed through discussions with Harmon, caused a probate proceeding to be initiated regarding Atiyeh’s estate, orchestrated Ring’s appointment as personal representative of the estate, and then had Ring use that authority to enter into a loan to the estate secured by the house, with respondents serving as broker and lender. In addition to the loan having predatory terms, some of the loan funds were used to pay fees to respondents, and some were disbursed to an estate account, but then withdrawn by the Robbs for their own purposes. The Court of Appeal addressed whether a person who was both personal representative of a probate estate and a beneficiary of that estate, could maintain in her individual capacity, a claim for financial elder abuse (or any other claims) based on allegations that she was manipulated into taking actions as personal representative that damaged her interests as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled that she could not, sustaining the respondents’ demurrer on the view that the claims had to be brought in the person’s capacity as the personal representative. The Court of Appeal found plaintiff's financial elder abuse claim was adequately pleaded, therefore, reversing the trial court's judgment. View "Ring v. Harmon" on Justia Law

A political consultant designed two campaign mailers that were distributed to voters in a local city council election. The mailers included statements about a local real estate developer and his litigation history with the city, and linked the developer to certain candidates. The developer sued the political consultant for libel based on allegedly false statements about him in the mailers, and the political consultant in turn filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that although the complaint arose from protected conduct, the developer demonstrated a probability of prevailing. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Edward v. Ellis" on Justia Law