Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Isaak, an 84-year-old retired farmer, was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2020 and suffers physical and mental impairments. He is wheelchair-bound and receiving palliative care. Several parties have sued the manufacturers of Paraquat alleging that the pesticide caused their Parkinson’s disease and successfully petitioned the Judicial Council to form a Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding (JCCP) in 2019. By March 2021, discovery was underway in the JCCP.Isaak filed a products liability lawsuit in May 2021. The case was coordinated with the JCCP. Isaak sought trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36; a party to a civil action is entitled to trial preference where the person is over 70 years of age and the court finds that the party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole and that the party’s health is such that preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation. Defendants argued that the law governing coordinated proceedings conflicted with, and took precedence over, section 36. The trial court denied Isaak’s motion but approved a special procedure for seeking preference that it found would balance the interests of parties for whom a preference might be warranted with the need to streamline coordinated proceedings. The court of appeal upheld the ruling. Section 36 does not supersede California Rules of Court, 3.504, which governs coordinated proceedings. View "Isaak v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Catlin sued Danko, alleging that Catlin settled one of the claims against its insured in a wrongful death lawsuit (Boolen case). Under the settlement, Catlin paid $180,000 to Danko's trust account )plaintiffs’ counsel in the Boolen case). Catlin then mistakenly paid the same amount again to the same account. The Boolen case went to trial on other claims, eventually resulting in a defense verdict. Catlin discovered its payment error and requested the return of the mistaken overpayment, but Danko declined, citing a release of future claims as part of the pretrial settlement.Responding to Catlin’s subsequent suit, Danko filed “anti-SLAPP” (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, asking the court to strike complaint and stating they would later request attorney fees under section 425.16(c). Catlin voluntarily dismissed its complaint. The Danko Appellants asked Judge Fineman to rule on the anti-SLAPP motions as a “predicate” for going forward with their fee motions. She declined. Danko never filed a fees motion. The judgment of dismissal was entered. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court had jurisdiction and had a duty to rule on the merits of the anti-SLAPP motions, despite the absence of any pending fee request. View "Catlin Insurance Co. v. Danko Meredith Law Firm" on Justia Law

Two months after Covert filed a lawsuit for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, FCA (an automaker) served Covert with a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 for $51,000, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Covert filed objections to that offer. Covert with a second section 998 offer, 15 months later, for $145,000 with identical terms. A jury awarded Covert $48,416 in damages and penalties.On appeal, FCA argued both of its section 998 offers were valid, and because the jury awarded Covert less than the amount of either offer, the trial court erred in awarding Covert attorneys’ fees and costs and denying FCA its costs.The court of appeal agreed that both offers were valid; the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider whether the first offer was made in good faith. Covert did not meet his burden to show the second offer was not in good faith. If the trial court finds the first offer was made in good faith, it shall award FCA its costs reasonably incurred after the first offer was served and deny Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs. If the court finds the first offer was not made in good faith, it shall award Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs reasonably incurred before the date the second offer was served and award FCA its costs, including expert witness fees, reasonably incurred thereafter. View "Covert v. FCA USA, LLC" on Justia Law

ACIC filed suit against Hernandez in January 2008. ACIC's Proof of Service described personal service by a registered process server on Hernandez on December 9, 2008, at a Palm Springs address. Hernandez filed no answer. Default judgment ($65,703.02) was entered in May 2009. Ten years later, on ACIC’s application, the court ordered the judgment renewed in the amount of $130,501.96. ACIC served Hernandez with notice by mail on April 19, 2019. The envelope was returned to ACIC on May 1, marked “Not Known Unable to Forward.” ACIC claims the application for renewal of judgment had been removed from the envelope, indicating Hernandez had removed it before sending the envelope back as undeliverable. Hernandez initially agreed in a sworn declaration that he received the application for renewal of judgment. He later changed attorneys and repudiated that declaration, claiming he never received any notice or application. Hernandez says he first learned of the existence of the lawsuit when a telemarketer contacted him about judgment negotiation services in October 2019.The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Hernandez’s motion to vacate. The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court was in a position to consider the credibility of Hernandez in asserting that he was not served, and the paralegal who disputed Hernandez’s claim that he never received the notices. View "American Contractors Indemnity Co. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

In 2017 and 2018, the California Legislature enacted two statutes, Government Code sections 17581.96 and 17581.97, in part to fulfill the state’s obligation to reimburse school districts under article XIII B, section 6 of the state constitution. Both statutes provided one-time funding to school districts in a certain year, either in fiscal year 2017-2018 or 2018-2019, and both stated that the provided funds “shall first satisfy any outstanding” amounts owed to the school districts under article XIII B, section 6. Appellants were nine school districts that objected to these two statutes in a suit against the State and the State Controller. In their view, article XIII B, section 6 prohibited the state from reimbursing school districts in the manner that sections 17581.96 and 17581.97 allowed. The trial court, however, disagreed, finding no merit to Appellants’ claim. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

As a vacation destination, the City of Palm Springs (City) has expressly allowed the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling, subject to various conditions designed to protect the interests of neighboring residents (as well as the City’s own interest in collecting transient occupancy taxes, a/k/a hotel taxes). In 2017, the City amended its short term rental ordinances, making specific findings that the amended ordinances were consistent with the City's Zoning Code. Meanwhile, Protect Our Neighborhoods (Protect), a membership organization opposed to short-term rentals, filed this action claiming among other things, that the 2017 version of the short-term rental ordinance (Ordinance) violated the City’s Zoning Code. The trial court disagreed and upheld the Ordinance. Protect appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Protect Our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

In 2018, plaintiff-appellant Monica Mayes was struck in the face by a foul ball while attending an intercollegiate baseball game between two private universities, Marymount University (Marymount) and defendant-respondent La Sierra University (La Sierra). Mayes suffered skull fractures and brain damage, among other injuries. When struck by the foul ball, Mayes was seated in a grassy area along the third-base line, behind the dugout, which extended eight feet above the ground, and there was no protective netting above the dugout. Mayes sued La Sierra for her injuries, alleging a single cause of action for negligence for its failure to: (1) install protective netting over the dugouts; (2) provide a sufficient number of screened seats for spectators; (3) warn spectators that the only available screened seats were in the area behind home plate; and (4) exercise crowd control in order to remove distractions in the area along the third-base line that diverted spectators’ attention from the playing field. La Sierra moved for summary judgment, claiming that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, observing that the case was “a textbook primary assumption of the risk case.” To this, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding La Sierra did not meet its burden of showing that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. In addition, Mayes showed there were triable issues of material fact concerning whether La Sierra was negligent for the reasons she alleged in her complaint. View "Mayes v. La Sierra Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Cirrincione appealed an order denying class certification in a wage-and-hour action he filed against his former employer, defendant American Scissor Lift, Inc. (ASL). On appeal to the Court of Appeal, plaintiff argued reversal was required for a number reasons, including that the trial court’s ruling rested upon improper merits determinations and incorrect assumptions. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of class certification. View "Cirrincione v. American Scissor Lift" on Justia Law

This case involved the purchase and leaseback of a vacant hotel and restaurant. Buyers-plaintiffs claimed the sellers-defendants surreptitiously substituted altered versions of the lease and financing instruments containing terms extremely adverse to the buyers, and which they alleged were neither bargained for nor agreed to. Acting under the misapprehension that plaintiffs’ theory was promissory fraud, the superior court sustained a demurrer brought by defendants Inn Lending LLC (Inn Lending) and Rajesh Patel on the grounds that “[i]nsufficient facts” were alleged showing they “made promises” upon which plaintiffs relied. The court also determined that related causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and financial elder abuse also failed. "Fraud in the execution is distinct from promissory fraud, which involves false representations that induce one to enter into a contract containing agreed- upon terms." The Court of Appeal found the allegations made in this case were "quite literally, a textbook cause of action for fraud in the execution," and reversed the superior court's judgment. View "Munoz v. PL Hotel Group, LLC" on Justia Law

JustAnswer LLC (JustAnswer) appealed an order denying its petition to compel arbitration. Tina Sellers and Erin O’Grady (together, Plaintiffs) used the JustAnswer website to submit a single question to an “expert” for what they believed would be a one-time fee of $5, but JustAnswer automatically enrolled them in a costlier monthly membership. After discovering additional charges to their credit cards, Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against JustAnswer, alleging it routinely enrolled online consumers like them in automatic renewal membership programs without providing “clear and conspicuous” disclosures and obtaining their “affirmative consent” as mandated by the California Automatic Renewal Law. Seeking to avoid the class action litigation, JustAnswer filed a petition to compel individual arbitration, claiming Plaintiffs agreed to their “Terms of Service,” which included a class action waiver and a binding arbitration clause, when they entered their payment information on the website and clicked a button that read, “Start my trial.” In a case of first impression under California law, the Court of Appeal considered whether, and under what circumstances, a “sign-in wrap” agreement was valid and enforceable. The Court concluded the notices on the “Start my trial” screens of the JustAnswer website were not sufficiently conspicuous to bind Plaintiffs, because they were less conspicuous than the statutory notice requirements, and they were not sufficiently conspicuous under other criteria courts have considered in determining whether a hyperlinked notice to terms of services was sufficient to put a user on inquiry notice of an arbitration agreement. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s order denying JustAnswer’s petition to compel arbitration. View "Sellers v. JustAnswer LLC" on Justia Law