Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Robinson submitted an “uninsured driver” claim to State Farm for injuries sustained in an accident involving her car and an unidentified vehicle. Coverage was available only if the two cars came into contact. (Ins. Code 11580.2(b)(1).) In arbitration, State Farm propounded requests for admissions that there was either no contact between the two cars or that no damage resulted from any contact. Robinson failed to respond by the due date. After finding that Robinson had not “substantially complied” with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.220 or 2015.5, the court deemed the requests admitted and awarded sanctions. Robinson unsuccessfully moved to withdraw or amend the deemed admissions, citing inadvertence. The arbitrator entered an award in favor of State Farm, relying on the established admissions.The trial court confirmed the award. The court of appeal affirmed. In typical arbitration proceedings, discovery disputes are resolved by the arbitrator but in uninsured-motorist arbitration proceedings, discovery disputes are resolved by a trial court. Trial court discovery orders in these proceedings are not reviewable on appeal from a judgment confirming the arbitration award. A party’s recourse to challenge an allegedly improper discovery ruling in an uninsured-motorist arbitration proceeding is through a timely petition for a writ of mandamus. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

K.P. (mother) and D.P. (father) appealed juvenile court orders denying mother’s petitions to change the court’s order terminating her reunification services and thereafter terminating both of their parental rights, freeing the minors for adoption. The petition for termination involved the parents' five children, and recounted the parents’ past abuse of the minors, the parents’ history of drug abuse, three of the children having been born with drugs in their system, the parents’ history with the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency), and the parents’ criminal history. A 2020 disposition report recommended the parents be bypassed for services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(13), due to the physical abuse of the minors and the parents’ extensive drug abuse. Later that year, father and mother filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to change the court’s order denying them reunification services. The court summarily denied the parents’ section 388 petitions by written orders, finding for each: “[T]he request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstance” and “the proposed change of order . . . does not promote the best interest of the child.” After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying mother’s section 388 petitions, but reversed its orders terminating parents’ parental rights. The Appellate Court found some evidentiary support for each element of the beneficial parental relationship exception, therefore the juvenile court's ruling there was inadequate evidence to support the exception was an abuse of discretion under the controlling caselaw. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to weigh the evidence presented under the applicable standard and, in its discretion, consider additional evidence. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Hebah Abdelqader appealed an order following a bifurcated trial wherein the superior court denied Hebah’s request for a restraining order against her ex-husband, Abdo Abraham, and granted joint physical custody of the couple’s children, A.A. and G.A. Hebah claimed the court made multiple errors when determining she had not met her burden of proving domestic violence. In addition, Hebah claimed the court erred in failing to articulate, on the record or in writing, the reasons it found the presumption under Family Code section 3044 had been rebutted. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hebah’s request for a restraining order. However, in the published portion of the opinion, the Court agreed the trial court erred in failing to state the reasons, on the record or in writing, it found the presumption under section 3044 had been rebutted. As such, the judgment was reversed as to that issue only and the matter remanded for further consideration. View "Abdelqader v. Abraham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Officer David Meinhardt failed to timely appeal a trial court ruling that denied his petition for writ of administrative mandate in its entirety, completely resolved all of the issues in the matter, and contemplated no further judicial action. Although the ruling was denominated an “order,” it was, under case law, a final judgment. Instead, Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal from a document that the trial court subsequently entered, which was styled as a “judgment,” but merely restated the prior judgment. In light of a line of cases relating to the issue presented here, the Court of Appeal solicited supplemental briefing from the parties on the timeliness of Officer Meinhardt’s appeal. In his supplemental brief, Meinhardt contended that to dismiss his appeal would contravene applicable statutory language, conflict with certain case law, and be “patently inequitable.” Furthermore, Meinhardt contended Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist., 98 Cal.App.4th 579 (2002) and City of Calexico v. Bergeson, 64 Cal.App.5th 180 (2021) were distinguishable, and the Court of Appeal “should resist the impulse to extend Laraway’s questionable logic further.” The Court found Laraway and City of Calexico were directly on point and mandated dismissal of his appeal. The Court published this opinion to explain how Dhillon v. John Muir Health, 2 Cal.5th 1109 (2017) supported the conclusion that Laraway and City of Calexico were correctly decided, and to reiterate "the critical importance of determining whether a ruling on a petition for writ of mandate is a final judgment in seeking appellate review of such a ruling." View "Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale" on Justia Law

This case was one of many "disagreements" about the control of the multi-million-dollar estate of Thomas Tedesco. Plaintiff-respondent Laura White was one of Thomas’s three biological daughters and a cotrustee of his living trust. Defendant-appellant Debra Wear (aka Debbie Basara Wear) was one of Thomas’s stepdaughters. In 2013, Thomas suffered serious health issues, which resulted in significant cognitive impairment, leaving him susceptible to being unduly influenced by anyone close to him. Gloria Tedesco, Thomas’s second wife, began denying White and her sisters access to their father, causing him to believe that they were stealing from him. Wear assisted Gloria, her mother, in unduly influencing Thomas via contacting, or facilitating access to, attorneys in order to change Thomas’s estate plan to disinherit his biological family in favor of Gloria and her family. In 2015, a permanent conservator of Thomas’s estate was appointed. Despite the existence of the conservatorship, Wear continued to assist Gloria in taking actions to unduly influence Thomas to change his 30-plus-year estate plan. Consequently, upon White’s petition, the superior court issued an elder abuse restraining order (EARO), restraining Wear for three years from, among other things, financially abusing Thomas, contacting him (either directly or indirectly), facilitating any change to his estate plan, coming within 100 yards of him, and possessing any guns, other firearms, and ammunition. Wear contended the EARO was void because: (1) the judge was disqualified; and (2) he violated due process by substantially amending the allegations in the petition and prohibiting her from possessing firearms and ammunition. She further claimed the petition failed to state a cause of action for elder financial abuse. The Court of Appeal agreed the court erred in including a firearms and ammunition restriction in the EARO and directed the trial court to strike it. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "White v. Wear" on Justia Law

Claude Rogers, a former resident of a residential care facility for the elderly known as Meadow Oaks of Roseville, died after experiencing heatstroke. His wife and successor-in-interest Kathryn and sons Jeffrey, Phillip and Richard sued Meadow Oaks of Roseville, Roseville SH, LLC, CPR/AR Roseville SH Owner, LLC, DCP Investors Roseville SH, LLC, DCP Management Roseville SH, LLC, Westmont Living, Inc., Tanysha Borromeo, Ana Rojas, and Andrew Badoud for elder abuse, fraud, and wrongful death. Defendants appealed an order denying their petition to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement that was part of the Residency Agreement Richard signed as Claude’s representative. Although defendants filed a notice of appeal, the appellate briefs were filed on behalf of Roseville SH, LLC only. Roseville SH, LLC contended that in denying the petition to compel arbitration: (1) the trial court erroneously believed defendants had to show that Claude lacked mental capacity to consent before they could prove that Richard had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement for Claude; (2) the trial court erred in concluding that Richard did not act as Claude’s actual or ostensible agent when he signed the arbitration agreement on Claude’s behalf; and (3) the trial court’s order violated the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Roseville SH, LLC misconstrued the trial court’s analysis; (2) the trial court did not err in denying the petition to compel arbitration; and (3) the trial court’s order did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Rogers v. Roseville SH, LLC" on Justia Law

National Western Life Insurance Company (NWL) appealed after it was held liable for negligence and elder abuse arising from an NWL annuity sold to Barney Williams by Victor Pantaleoni. In 2016, Williams contacted Pantaleoni to revise a living trust after the death of Williams’ wife, but Pantaleoni sold him a $100,000 NWL annuity. When Williams returned the annuity to NWL during a 30-day “free look” period, Pantaleoni wrote a letter over Williams’ signature for NWL to reissue a new annuity. In 2017, when Williams cancelled the second annuity, NWL charged a $14,949.91 surrender penalty. The jury awarded Williams damages against NWL, including punitive damages totaling almost $3 million. In the Court of Appeal's prior opinion reversing the judgment, the Court concluded Pantaleoni was an independent agent who sold annuities for multiple insurance companies and had no authority to bind NWL. The Court determined that Pantaleoni was an agent for Williams, not NWL. The California Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded, asking the appeals court to reconsider its finding that Pantaleoni did not have an agency relationship with National Western Life Insurance Company in light of Insurance Code sections 32, 101, 1662, 1704 and 1704.5 and O’Riordan v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company, 36 Cal.4th 281, 288 (2005). Upon remand, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment finding NWL liable for negligence and financial elder abuse. However, punitive damages assessed against NWL were reversed. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s calculation of the attorney fee award, but remanded the case for the court to reconsider the award in light of the reversal of punitive damages. View "Williams v. Nat. W. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Pappas sued Dr. Chang for malpractice. During mediation, they agreed that Chang would pay Pappas $100,000. Both parties and their counsel signed a settlement agreement, which provided that Pappas “will execute a release of all claims ... in a more comprehensive settlement agreement ... to include a provision for mutual confidentiality as to the facts ... the terms and amount of this agreement.” The parties unsuccessfully negotiated the “more comprehensive settlement agreement” and “provision for mutual confidentiality” for months. Pappas discharged her attorney and, representing herself, advised Chang’s attorney that she would only comply with a confidentiality provision if she received $525,000, then sued Chang for breach of contract.The trial court ruled against Pappas “because she has not signed a ‘more comprehensive settlement agreement’ and release which includes a provision for mutual confidentiality.” In consolidated appeals, the court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that a confidentiality provision would be against public policy and violate the Business and Professions Code. The court also rejected Chang’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of her attorney fees as costs of proof at trial (Code Civ. Proc., 2033.420) based on its finding that Pappas’s denial of two requests for admission was based on a good faith belief she would prevail at trial and that the requests went to the ultimate issue. View "Pappas v. Chang" on Justia Law

LGCY is a Utah limited liability company formed in Delaware and headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah. The real party in interest is a California resident who worked for LGCY as a sales representative and later a sales manager. After the real party in interest and six other LGCY executives and managers left LGCY and formed a competing company, LGCY filed suit in Utah state court against all seven individuals. Instead of joining the cross-complaint, the real party in interest filed a complaint in Fresno County Superior Court alleging virtually identical claims as those of his codefendants in their Utah cross-complaint.The Court of Appeal concluded that California Labor Code section 925 provides an exception to California's compulsory cross-complaint statute (Code Civ. Proc., section 426.30) such that an employee who comes within section 925's purview may file a complaint in California alleging claims that are related to the causes of action their employer has filed against them in a pending action in a sister state. The court also concluded that the Clause does not compel a state court (here, California) to extend credit to and apply the sister state's compulsory cross-complaint statute. In this case, LGCY has not demonstrated that the Fresno County Superior Court erred in overruling its demurrer, and the court therefore denied its petition for writ of mandate. View "LGCY Power, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Mark Shenefield filed a request for order (RFO) seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child he shared with Jennifer Shenefield. In his declaration, Mark quoted from and referenced the contents of a confidential, court-ordered psychological evaluation undertaken during Jennifer’s previous marital dissolution. Mark’s attorney Karolyn Kovtun filed the paperwork. Jennifer opposed Mark’s request and sought sanctions for violations of Family Code sections 3111(d) and 3025.5, for unwarranted disclosure of the confidential custody evaluation. The trial court ordered the sanctions issue be heard at trial. Jennifer’s trial brief detailed her arguments for why the court should impose sanctions on both Mark and Kovtun. Mark did not file a trial brief. Following trial, the court issued sanctions against Mark in the amount of $10,000 and Kovtun in the amount of $15,000. Kovtun challenged the sanctions, filing a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d). A different court heard Kovtun’s request to vacate the sanctions imposed against her and denied the request. On appeal, Kovtun argued the court improperly sanctioned her because: (1) attorneys could not be sanctioned under section 3111; (2) the notice she received did not comply with due process standards; (3) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her; (4) the court failed to enforce the safe harbor provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7; and (5) the court improperly admitted and relied on a transcript of a meeting between Kovtun, Mark, and Jennifer. The Court found Kovtun’s arguments meritless, and affirmed the sanctions. View "Shenefield v. Shenefield" on Justia Law