Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Defendant Reid & Hellyer, APC (Reid & Hellyer) moved for sanctions against plaintiff Transcon Financial, Inc. (Transcon) and its counsel, Ronald Talkov. Reid & Hellyer filed two motions, one under California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 and one under section 128.7. Transcon and Talkov appealed the orders granting the sanctions motions. After review, the Court of Appeal held the trial court erred by concluding that the sanctions motions could be filed on the last day of the 21-day safe harbor period, rather than on the first day after the 21-day period expired. Reid & Hellyer filed their sanctions motions on the last day of the 21-day period and therefore did not comply with the safe harbor provisions of the governing statutes. The trial court therefore erred by granting the motions. View "Transcon Financial, Inc. v. Reid & Hellyer, APC" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review in this case centered on whether California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.4 authorized the trial court to stay a plaintiff’s action on the basis of a pending arbitration to which the plaintiff was not a party. Ann Leenay brought an action against her former employer, Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC (Lowe’s), under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court granted a petition to coordinate her action with a number of other PAGA actions against Lowe’s. Lowe’s then moved to stay the coordinated actions under section 1281.4. Lowe’s based the motion on over 50 arbitration proceedings against it, but Leenay and the other plaintiffs in the coordinated actions were not parties in any of those arbitration proceedings. The trial court granted the motion to stay, and Leenay filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to vacate the order. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by granting the motion to stay. "[S]ection 1281.4 applies only when a court has ordered parties to arbitration, the arbitrable issue arises in the pending court action, and the parties in the arbitration are also parties to the court action. Under those circumstances, the court must stay the action (or enter a stay with respect to the arbitrable issue, if the issue is severable)." Those circumstances did not exist in this case. The Court therefore granted Leenay’s writ petition. View "Leenay v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner-mother J.J. petitioned for extraordinary relief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, seeking review of an order denying family reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argued the juvenile court improperly bypassed reunification services, and that real party in interest the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (the Agency) failed to comply with the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. The Agency disputed both contentions. Because the order denying reunification services was not supported by sufficient evidence, the Court of Appeal granted the petition as to mother’s first contention. Because the ICWA issue was premature, the Court rejected mother’s second contention. View "J.J. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

This case (1) involved the legal issue of whether an employee who settled individual claims against the employer for alleged Labor Code violations was subsequently barred by claim preclusion from bringing a Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA") enforcement action against the employer for the same Labor Code violations when, prior to settlement, the employee could have added the PAGA claims to the existing action; and (2) required the application of claim preclusion principles. The Court of Appeal determined that because the two actions involved different claims for different harms and because the State, against whom the defense was raised, was neither a party in the prior action nor in privity with the employee, the requirements for claim preclusion were not met. View "Howitson v. Evans Hotels" on Justia Law

Appellant, then proceeding pro se, brought an action against Respondent, her brother, alleging he had falsely accused her of committing crimes against him and their elderly parents. Respondent emailed the attorney in this matter (“Attorney”), who was Appellant’s husband since June 2015, her former coworker at his law firm, and later her counsel in this action, warning that if Appellant did not settle the action, Respondent would file a cross-complaint the next day.   The court subsequently dismissed Respondent’s cross-complaint. Appellant retained Attorney to represent her pro bono or at a discounted rate, having been advised by Attorney that he would likely need to testify at trial, and having executed informed written consent to Attorney’s representation notwithstanding his expected dual role as advocate and witness   Two months before trial, Respondent moved to disqualify Attorney as Appellant’s counsel under California’s advocate-witness rule, viz., rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 3.7). The trial court disqualified Attorney from all phases of the litigation.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standards, and thereby abused its discretion, in disqualifying Attorney from representing Appellant under the advocate witness rule. The court explained that the trial court failed to apply Rule 3.7’s informed-consent exception. Indeed, the trial court failed even to cite Rule 3.7, instead applying the ABA Rule, which is not binding and lacks any informed-consent exception. The trial court further abused its discretion in failing to apply Rule 3.7’s limitation to advocacy “in a trial.” View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Wang sued her former attorney Nesse, alleging professional malpractice in his representation of Wang in her marital dissolution action. Following Nesse’s death, his estate moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Wang’s complaint, filed on December 21, 2015, was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. According to Nesse’s estate, although Wang and Nesse filed a substitution of attorney form on December 30, 2014, Nesse’s representation of Wang had actually ended earlier, on December 3 or December 17 at the latest, when Wang “discharged” Nesse or “consented” to his withdrawal. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed. There is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Nesse continued to represent her on December 21, 2014, so Nesse’s estate failed to establish that the statute of limitations bars her complaint as a matter of law. View "Wang v. Nesse" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a sales associate at an AutoZone auto parts store operated by Defendant AutoZoners, (AutoZoners). Plaintiff filed the present suit asserting one claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, Section 2699 et seq.) (PAGA). She asserted AutoZoners failed to provide suitable seating to employees at the cashier and parts counter workstations, as to which some or all of the work required could be performed while sitting. AutoZoners moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff lacked standing to bring a representative action under PAGA because she was not aggrieved by AutoZoners’s seating policy.   The trial court agreed with AutoZoners and granted the motion. The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that no published California authority has considered what steps should be taken by an employer to “provide” suitable seating within the meaning of the wage order seating requirement. Thus, the court concluded that where an employer has not expressly advised its employees that they may use a seat during their work and has not provided a seat at a workstation, the inquiry as to whether an employer has “provided” suitable seating may be fact-intensive and may involve a multitude of job and workplace-specific factors.   Accordingly, resolution of the issue at the summary judgment stage may be inappropriate, because the undisputed facts create a triable issue of material fact as to whether AutoZoners “provided” suitable seating to its customer service employees at the front of the store by placing seats at other workstations in a separate area of the store. View "Meda v. Autozone" on Justia Law

After Royals’ father, Adams, died at age 99, Royals became the successor trustee and sole beneficiary of the Adams Trust. Lu, Adams’s second wife, was 59 years old when she married Adams, then 95. Royals alleged that Adams intended to leave none of his assets to Lu. Lu claims Adams intended to provide for her support by depositing certain funds in certain accounts under Lu’s control outside of the Trust. A pretrial right to attach order was issued against Lu under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600).The court of appeal reversed. The prospect of punitive recovery on a financial elder abuse claim (exemplary damages or statutory penalties) may not be secured by the extraordinary remedy of pretrial attachment. A financial elder abuse claimant may obtain an attachment for potential compensatory damages and an award of attorney fees and costs associated with those damages only if the request for it complies with all applicable provisions of the statutory scheme governing pretrial attachments (Code Civ. Proc. 481.010). Royals’s attachment application did not comply with four provisions of the Attachment Law. Royals failed to support her prayer for compensatory damages with competent evidence; to the extent she sought an attachment for prospective recovery of punitive damages and statutory penalties in addition to compensatory damages, her attachment request also failed to comply with the attachable amount, attachable claim, and claimed indebtedness requirements. View "Royals v. Lu" on Justia Law

Ghuman befriended the Shokers, becoming familiar with their rental properties and promising higher returns on an investment in a technology company.. Relying on his representations, the Shokers provided Ghuman with $1.5 million and then sold 10 of their rental properties to a purported cash buyer identified by Ghuman—Phangureh. Ghuman handled the negotiations and transactions. The Shokers paid Ghuman the proceeds for investment in the technology company. Years later, after learning of the fraudulent scheme, the Shokers sued and sought “an order declaring that [Ghuman and Phangureh] hold the [Shokers’ rental properties] in trust for [the Shokers],” and an order compelling Ghuman and Phangureh to convey the properties back to the Shokers. They recorded a notice of lis pendens for each of the rental properties.The trial court expunged the lis pendens, finding that the Shokers did not assert a “real property claim” under Code of Civil Procedure section 405.4. The court of appeal reversed. Section 405.4 defines a “real property claim" as a cause action that could "affect . . . title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property.” In their constructive trust claim, the Shokers claim a present right to title in the same real properties they claim were wrongfully obtained by Phangureh. View "Shoker v. Superior Court of Alameda County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Floyd Chodosh appealed the dismissal of his case against defendants the Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission), the Department of Justice, and former Attorney General Xavier Becerra (together with the Department of Justice, the Attorney General; and with the Commission, defendants) after the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to Chodosh’s second amended complaint. Chodosh was a resident or owner of property in a senior-owned mobile home park. Prior to bringing this action, Chodosh was one of several plaintiffs involved in litigation concerning the mobile home park in Orange County Superior Court. The Honorable Robert Moss, Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, was assigned to the case. Chodosh submitted a complaint to the Commission in April 2016, alleging Judge Moss committed judicial misconduct in the mobile home park case by reassuming jurisdiction over the case after being disqualified. The Commission acknowledged receipt of the complaint. Chodosh alleged he heard nothing further from the Commission about it, leading him to conclude no action was taken with respect to Judge Moss. Chodosh then pressed his complaint to the Attorney General. The Attorney General likewise acknowledge the complaint, but replied it could not investigate further. Chodosh thereafter filed this lawsuit, alleging Judge Moss committed judicial misconduct by “fixing” the mobile home park case against Chodosh and the other plaintiffs thereto. Having carefully considered the record and the parties’ arguments, The Court of Appeal concluded Chodosh failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against any defendant. View "Chodosh v. Commission on Judicial Performance, et al." on Justia Law