Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff-appellant David Salazar bought Walmart, Inc.’s “Great Value White Baking Chips” incorrectly thinking they contained white chocolate, he filed this class action against Walmart for false advertising under various consumer protection statutes. The trial court sustained Walmart’s demurrers without leave to amend, finding as a matter of law that no reasonable consumer would believe Walmart’s White Baking Chips contain white chocolate. The thrust of Salazar's claims was that he was reasonably misled to believe the White Baking Chips had real white chocolate because of the product’s label and its placement near products with real chocolate. Salazar also alleged that the results of a survey he conducted show that 90 percent of consumers were deceived by the White Baking Chips’ advertising and incorrectly believed they contained white chocolate. “California courts . . . have recognized that whether a business practice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision on demurrer. ... These are matters of fact, subject to proof that can be tested at trial, even if as judges we might be tempted to debate and speculate further about them.” After careful consideration, the Court of Appeal determined that a reasonable consumer could reasonably believe the morsels had white chocolate. As a result, the Court found Salazar plausibly alleged that “‘a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled’” by the chips' advertising. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Salazar v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against Comprehensive Print Group LLC and its subsidiary American Pacific Printers College, Inc. for pregnancy and gender and sex-and-gender-based harassment in violation of FEHA; interference with her leave rights and retaliation for attempting to exercise those rights under the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (PDLL) and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA); failure to prevent harassment, discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.   Respondent Los Angeles Superior Court, in a terse order, granted Malloy’s employers’ motion for change of venue, concluding venue was proper only in Orange County. The Second Appellate District disagreed and granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate and order respondent superior court to vacate its order granting the motion for change of venue and to enter a new order denying the motion, permitting Petitioner’s case to proceed in Los Angeles County.   The court reasoned that none of the real parties presented any evidence in the trial court disputing those allegations that Petitioner always worked from Orange County and would have been immediately required to return to the company’s Orange County office if she had not been fired. Further, Petitioner’s cause of action for interference with her PDLL rights—and, therefore, all her causes of action arising from the same set of operative facts— was properly filed in Los Angeles County. View "Malloy v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff-appellant David Salazar bought Target Corporation’s White Baking Morsels incorrectly thinking they contained white chocolate, he filed this class action against Target for false advertising under various consumer protection statutes. Salazar claimed he was reasonably mislead to believe the White Baking Morsels had real white chocolate because of the product’s label, its price tag, and its placement near products with real chocolate. To support his position, Salazar alleged that the results of a survey he conducted showed that 88 percent of consumers were deceived by the White Baking Morsels’ advertising and incorrectly believe they contained white chocolate. He also alleged that Target falsely advertised on its website that the “‘chocolate type’” of White Baking Morsels was “‘white chocolate,’” and placed the product in the “‘Baking Chocolate & Cocoa’” category. Target demurred to all three claims on the ground that no reasonable consumer would believe the White Baking Morsels contained real white chocolate. Target also argued that Salazar lacked standing to assert claims based on Target’s website because he did not view the website and did not rely on its representations. The court sustained Target’s demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for Target. “California courts . . . have recognized that whether a business practice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision on demurrer. ... These are matters of fact, subject to proof that can be tested at trial, even if as judges we might be tempted to debate and speculate further about them.” After careful consideration, the Court of Appeal determined that a reasonable consumer could reasonably believe the morsels had white chocolate. As a result, the Court found Salazar plausibly alleged that “‘a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled’” by the White Baking Morsels’ advertising. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Salazar v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

Yaning was president of the Alumni Association; Jin was the executive vice president, and Fuzu was the vice president. To incorporate the Association as a nonprofit, Jin filed documents, listing himself as Secretary and CFO, and Yaning as CEO. This information was hidden from Fuzu. Association members elected a new board of directors. Fuzu was elected as secretary. Fuzu did not attend the meeting and was not informed of his election. Jin filed the Association’s IRS application for tax-exempt status, listing Fuzu as a director. No notice was given to Fuzu. Months later, Fuzu learned that he had been listed on the IRS application and was upset that his personal information had been used without his consent and that he had not been told he was on the board. Fuzu posted a message in the Association Wechat group telling alumni about Jin's actions.Jin sued Fuzu, alleging defamation and false light. Fuzu filed a cross-complaint, alleging breach of charitable trust, constructive fraud, fraud, and intentional deceit, civil conspiracy, commercial misappropriation of likeness, common law misappropriation of likeness, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Each party filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. The court of appeal reversed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to Jin’s submission to the IRS application; that application is a protected activity. The trial court must whether Fuzu can demonstrate that his claims relating to the submission have minimal merit. View "Li v. Jin" on Justia Law

Appellants Patricia Flores and Angelica Sanchez appealed after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor defendant City of San Diego (the City). Flores and Sanchez sued the City for wrongful death and negligence, respectively, in connection with the death of William Flores, who was operating a motorcycle that was the subject of a police vehicle pursuit when he crashed and was killed. The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from liability under the grant of immunity provided for in Vehicle Code section 17004.7. The Court of Appeal concluded that the vehicle pursuit policy training required by section 17004.7 had to meet certain basic standards that were set forth in California Code of Regulations, title 11, section 1081, as adopted by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (the POST Commission), including an annual one-hour minimum time standard set out in that regulation, before a governmental entity was entitled to immunity under the statute. "Not only did the City fail to present undisputed evidence that the training it provided in the year prior to the incident at issue met the annual one-hour standard, but the City failed to dispute the fact, put forth by appellants, that the training implemented by the City comprised a single video of less than half the required one-hour duration." In the absence of training that met the standards imposed by Regulation 1081, as required by section 17004.7, the City was not entitled to immunity under that statute, as a matter of law. Summary judgment in favor of the City was therefore erroneously granted, and the judgment had to be reversed. View "Flores v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, surgeon Aram Bonni sued his employers, defendants Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center and St. Joseph Hospital of Orange, as well several other related entities and physicians (collectively, the Hospitals) for retaliation under California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5. Bonni alleged he made whistleblower complaints, which caused the Hospitals to retaliate against him by, among other things, suspending his medical staff privileges and initiating peer review proceedings to evaluate his privileges. In response, the Hospitals filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing Bonni’s retaliation cause of action arose from the peer review proceedings, which were protected activity, and that his claims had no merit. The trial court agreed and granted the motion in its entirety. Bonni appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding Bonni’s retaliation claim did not arise from protected activity. The California Supreme Court then granted review, determining Bonni’s retaliation cause of action was composed of 19 distinct retaliation claims. Of these claims, it found eight arose from protected activity while the remainder did not. It remanded the matter back to the Court of Appeal to determine whether Bonni had shown a probability of prevailing on those eight claims. On remand, the appellate court concluded Bonni has not met the requisite burden because the eight claims at issue were all precluded by the litigation privilege. Based on this finding and the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the Hospitals’ anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The trial court was directed to enter an order granting the motion as to the eight claims at issue and denying it as to the remaining retaliation claims. View "Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System" on Justia Law

Under California law, the Privette doctrine holds that there is a strong presumption that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for workplace safety. SMC Contracting, Inc. (SMC) hired Tyco Simplex Grinnell, Inc. (Tyco) to install an automatic fire sprinkler system for a development in South Lake Tahoe. On one date during installation, a Tyco employee, Tommy Ray McCullar, arrived at work and found the floor covered in ice. While trying to use a ladder on the ice, he slipped and suffered injuries. McCullar later sued SMC based on these events. But the trial court, relying on the Privette doctrine, granted summary judgment in SMC’s favor. Challenging this decision on appeal, McCullar’s contended the Privette doctrine did not protect SMC because SMC retained control over Tyco’s work and negligently exercised this control in a way that affirmatively contributed to his injuries. That was so, he reasoned, because SMC caused the ice to form on the floor and then told him to go back to work after he notified it about the ice. Based on the Privette doctrine, and because McCullar failed to raise a triable issue of material fact, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "McCullar v. SMC Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

Elouise Harber and Delores Williams filed cross-petitions to be appointed as guardians of two children. The trial court ordered them to exchange lists of the witnesses they intended to call, specifically including party witnesses; it also specifically ordered that they would not be permitted to call a witness who was not on their lists. Harber failed to exchange a witness list. When the case was called for trial, her counsel explained that her only witness was Harber herself, and that counsel mistakenly believed that the pretrial order did not require her to list party witnesses. Pursuant to its pretrial order, the trial court dismissed Harber’s petition and granted Williams’s petition. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a terminating sanction View "Guardianship of A.H." on Justia Law

Defendants are OS Restaurant Services, LLC and Bloomin’ Brands, Inc. Plaintiff worked there as a server. Plaintiff sued, alleging Defendants regularly failed to give Plaintiff her full uninterrupted rest periods, and that Defendants wrongfully terminated Plaintiff in retaliation.   The court explained that the Labor Code mandates an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action brought for the nonpayment of wages if any party requests attorney fees at the initiation of the action. Here, the trial court awarded Plaintiff $280,000 in attorney fees under section 218.5, and the employer appealed the award. The Second Appellate District affirmed the award of attorney fees   In the court’s original opinion, the court held that an action brought for failure to provide rest breaks or meal periods is not an action brought for the nonpayment of wages. The court also held that a plaintiff could not recover penalties for waiting time and wage statement violations based on claims of rest break and meal break violations, and so could not recover attorney fees based on those penalties.   In Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held otherwise. That court concluded that “extra pay for missed breaks constitutes ‘wages’ that must be reported on statutorily required wage statements during and paid within statutory deadlines when an employee leaves the job. After the issuance of its opinion, the Supreme Court transferred this case to the Second Appellate District with directions to reconsider its opinion in light of Naranjo. Having done so, the court affirmed the award of attorney fees. View "Betancourt v. OS Restaurant Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant made a request for pendente lite attorney fees was made early in the marriage dissolution proceedings and had been pending for over a year when the trial started. By that time, Appellant was unemployed and representing herself. Nonetheless, her request for pendente lite attorney fees was never ruled on by the family court. Instead, the court waited until after the trial to address attorney fees in its final judgment of reserved issues.   The Fifth Appellate District explained that Appellant has demonstrated the family court’s failures to comply with its obligations under section 2030 were prejudicial. To remedy this prejudicial error, the court explained it must reverse the judgment (which places all reserved issues at large) and remand the case for further proceedings. Those proceedings shall include a hearing on Appellant’s request for pendente lite attorney fees and a decision on that request before the new trial is started. Because over four years have passed since Appellant filed her May 2018 request for an order awarding pendente lite attorney fees and costs, the court shall allow Appellant to file a new request for order and shall allow Blair to file a response before hearing the request for pendente lite attorney fees and costs. View "Marriage of Knox" on Justia Law