Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-appellant Sharlene Allen was a former employee of the San Diego Convention Center Corporation (SDCCC). After SDCCC terminated Allen, she filed a class action lawsuit against SDCCC alleging various violations of the California Labor Code. The trial court largely sustained SDCCC’s demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that the corporation was exempt from liability as a government entity. The court, however, left intact one claim for untimely payment of final wages under Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203,1 and derivative claims under the Unfair Competition Law and the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Allen then moved for class certification for her surviving causes of action. The trial court denied the motion based on Allen’s concession that her claim for untimely final payment was not viable because it was derivative of the other claims dismissed at the demurrer stage. Allen appealed the denial of the motion for class certification, which she claimed was the "death knell" of her class claims and thus, the lawsuit. She argued the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer was incorrect because SDCCC did not establish as a matter of law that it was exempt from liability. In response, SDCCC argued Allen’s appeal should have been dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order. Alternatively, SDCCC contended the trial court’s order sustaining its demurrer was correct, and the subsequent denial of class certification should be affirmed. The Court of Appeal rejected SDCCC’s assertion that the order was not appealable. However, the Court agreed that class certification was properly denied by the trial court and affirmed the order. View "Allen v. San Diego Convention Center Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue was whether hearsay evidence could be admissible at a hearing on a gun violence restraining order (GVRO) under California Penal Code section 18175. The Court of Appeal held that hearsay evidence was admissible at a GVRO hearing as it is in a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) and civil harassment restraining order (CHRO). The Court further concluded that the evidence submitted to the trial court was sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that appellant Geoffrey S. posed a significant danger of causing personal injury by gun violence. Because the Court rejected Geoffrey’s other claims, the Court affirmed the one-year GVRO issued against him. View "San Diego Police Department v. Geoffrey S." on Justia Law

Iris, incorporated in 1999, went public in 2007. In 2019, the SEC revoked the registration of Iris’s securities. Since its incorporation, Chin has been chairman of Iris’s three-member board of directors, its president, secretary, CEO, CFO, and majority shareholder. Chin’s sister was also a board member. Farnum was a board member, 2003-2014, and owned eight percent of Iris’s stock. In 2014, Farnum requested inspection of corporate minutes, documents relating to the acquisition of Iris’s subsidiary, and cash flow statements, then, in his capacity as a board member and shareholder, sought a writ of mandate. Before the hearing on Farnum’s petition, Farnum was voted off Iris’s board. The court denied Farnum’s petition (Corporations Code 1602) because Farnum no longer had standing to inspect corporate records due to his ejection from the board, and his request was “overbroad and lack[ed] a statement of purpose reasonably related to his interests as a shareholder.”Weeks later, Farnum served 31 inspection requests on Iris and subsequently filed another mandamus petition. The superior court denied the petition and Farnum’s associated request for attorney fees. On remand with respect to certain records, Farnum sought reimbursement of his expenses in enforcing his rights as a shareholder ($91,000). The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the request. Farnum scored “only a partial victory” given the scope of what he sought; there was no showing that on the whole, Iris acted without justification in refusing Farnum’s inspection demands. View "Farnum v. Iris Biotechnologies Inc." on Justia Law

The Teachers taught within the Salinas District before retiring and becoming members of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) Defined Benefit (DB) Program. Part of Teachers’ compensation was reported by the District as being deferred to Teachers’ respective DB accounts for their postretirement benefits. The Teachers challenged reductions that CalSTRS had made and continued to make to their monthly retirement benefits after determining that the District had erred in its reporting to CalSTRS; those errors resulted in the overstatement of Teachers’ monthly benefits. In 2019, the court of appeal held that CalSTRS’s claims were not time-barred, applying the continuous accrual theory. The court remanded for consideration of the defenses of equitable estoppel and laches. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of Teachers and directed that CalSTRS refrain from reducing Teachers’ monthly pension benefits or from seeking recovery of claimed overpayments.The court of appeal reversed. While equitable estoppel may be asserted in a proper case against a governmental entity, it “may not be invoked to directly contravene statutory limitations.” Applying equitable estoppel required CalSTRS to continue to miscalculate Teachers’ monthly pension benefits in contravention of the Education Code. Laches was unavailable to defeat the claims of law at issue and may not be asserted to negate the prior determination. View "Blaser v. California State Teachers' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Bernell Beco filed suit against his former employer, defendant Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (Fast Auto) alleging 14 causes of action relating to the termination of his employment. Plaintiff alleged causes of action under with), including claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), numerous wage and hour violations under the Labor Code, wrongful termination, unfair competition, and additional tort claims. Fast Auto moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Beco had signed a valid arbitration agreement at the time he was hired. The trial court found the agreement unconscionable to the extent that severance would not cure the defects and declined to enforce it. After its review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the agreement was unconscionable, and further rejected Fast Auto’s argument that the arbitrator, not the court, should have decided the issue of unconscionability. Additionally, because the agreement included numerous substantively unconscionable provisions, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to sever them. View "Beco v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Thai and defendant Newton Tran were partners in Richmond City Center, LP et al. (Richmond). Plaintiff agreed to sell defendant his 20.5 percent interest in Richmond. The parties signed a sales agreement in April 2019, in which plaintiff assigned defendant his interest in Richmond. A few months after the sales agreement was executed, plaintiff filed the underlying lawsuit against defendant, generally complaining that defendant still owed a portion of the purchase price, and asserted breach of contract and fraud claims. Defendant filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff, seeking declaratory relief, reformation, and rescission. Plaintiff issued two subpoenas: (1) a Deposition Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Documents to Ha Mach, Richmond’s property manager; and (2) a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Tien Van, Richmond’s accountant. Both subpoenas sought Richmond’s consumer records, so plaintiff served Richmond with a notice to consumer for each subpoena per California Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3. Richmond served objections to each subpoena. Neither Mach nor Van produced any records due to Richmond’s objections. Nearly two months after Richmond served the objections, plaintiff filed motions to compel Mach and Van to comply with the subpoenas and produce the requested records under section 2025.480. Plaintiff also requested sanctions against Richmond and its attorneys. Defendant opposed the motions, but Richmond did not. The trial court granted the motions and awarded plaintiff $1,245 in sanctions against Richmond and its attorneys. Richmond appealed, arguing: (1) plaintiff’s motions to compel were brought under the wrong section of the Code of Civil Procedure and were untimely; and (2) even if the motions were timely, sanctions were improper because it did not oppose the motions. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first argument and found the trial court erred by granting the motions: after the twenty-day deadline expires, the subpoenaing party cannot move to enforce the subpoena over the objection through a motion to compel under section 2025.480, which has a 60-day deadline. View "Thai v. Richmond City Center, L.P." on Justia Law

Appellant AIDS HealthCare Foundation (AHF) challenges land use decisions by the Los Angeles City Council planning and land use management (PLUM) committee, made while two of its members allegedly were the beneficiaries of an extensive, ongoing bribery scheme directed at PLUM committee projects. AHF contends the three-year catch-all statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), applies to those PRA claims. Respondents City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles City Council (collectively the City) asserted that the more specific 90-day statutes of limitation in Government Code sections 65009 and 66499.37 apply. The trial court, following precedent involving a predecessor statute to section 65009, agreed with the City, sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed the case.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the application of the pre-existing shorter statute of limitations does not “practically amend” section 91011 subdivision (b), or any other part of the PRA. Section 65009 does not conflict with, or otherwise take away from, the original PRA, practically or otherwise. Further, the court held that the trial court properly dismissed AHF’s complaint as time-barred by section 65009, the applicable 90-day statute of limitations in this action. View "AIDS HealthCare Foundation v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The trial court dismissed a shareholder derivative complaint for failure to bring the action to trial within five years (Code Civ. Proc., 583.310, 583.360) and awarded attorney’s fees. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in its calculation of the five-year deadline, improperly failing to exclude a period of approximately six months between when the parties signed a settlement agreement and when the defendants abandoned the settlement. The court noted the distinction between contract formation and conditions precedent to contract performance. The trial court erroneously viewed the failure to satisfy a condition precedent (a unanimous consent requirement) to performance as a bar to valid contract formation. In addition, the trial court’s ruling preventing the plaintiffs from relying on section 583.340(c), applicable when “bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile” because of their alleged failure to act diligently later in the five-year period was contrary to the intent behind section 583.340 that a period of impossibility “be excluded even if the plaintiff has a reasonable time remaining after the period to bring the case to trial.” View "Seto v. Szeto" on Justia Law

An arbitrator determined that a borrower and lender were liable to each other for similar amounts, each roughly two and a half million dollars. He then offset the awards against each other, resolving the disputed issue of whether a setoff was proper. A bank, however, had also lent money to the borrower. The bank was not a party to the arbitration, but believed the setoff effectively circumvented the agreement among it, the borrower, and the other lender that the bank’s loan had priority and would be paid back first. Instead of being offset against the other lender’s award, the bank believed, the borrower’s award should have gone toward satisfying the bank’s loan. It thus convinced the trial court to correct the arbitrator’s award by eliminating the setoff. The Court of Appeal held that on the facts presented, the correction affected the merits of the arbitrator’s decision. Accordingly, the correction was improper, and the Court reversed. View "E-Commerce Lighting, Inc. v. E-Commerce Trade LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a restitution order imposed in connection with his conviction for battery with serious bodily injury. The trial court ordered Defendant to pay restitution to the victim, L.W., including for various expenses she incurred in relocating away from her home where the assault took place. Defendant argues the restitution order here violates section 1202.4(f)(3)(I) because there was no verification by law enforcement or a mental health treatment provider supporting the necessity of L.W.’s relocation costs.   The Second Appellate District agreed with Defendant and reversed the order of restitution insofar as it included relocation expenses. The court explained that relocating away from Defendant and relocating to prevent Defendant from finding the victim again are two ways of saying the same thing, section 1202.4(f)(3)(I) applies regardless of which descriptor is used. To read the first sentence of section 1202.4, subdivision (f) as permitting imposition of moving-related costs for relocating away from Defendant without giving force to the verification requirement set forth in section 1202.4(f)(3)(I) renders section 1202.4(f)(3)(I) surplusage and a nullity. Section 1202.4(f)(3)(I) is undoubtedly an example of expenses subject to restitution, but when the facts fit the example set forth in section 1202.4(f)(3)(I), compliance with its terms is required. The court reasoned that did not occur here, and thus the failure to comply with this statutory requirement mandates reversal. View "P. v. Baudoin" on Justia Law