Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Rodrigo Rodriguez Preciado, Norma Janeth Banda Arreola, Alejandro Rodriguez Banda, and Haydee Antonieta Zumaeta appealed a trial court order quashing service of summons filed by defendant Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (FCCC). This litigation arose from a February 22, 2020 bus accident that occurred on Interstate 15 in San Diego County, resulting in the death of Cynthia Karely Rodriguez Banda (Cynthia) and injury to Zumaeta. Approximately one year later, Zumaeta, along with Cynthia’s parents and brother (as survivors), filed a lawsuit against several defendants. As specifically relevant here, the defendants also included FCCC, which manufactured the bus’s chassis. All of the causes of action asserted against FCCC were based on various theories of products liability. FCCC argued that Plaintiffs could not “meet their burden of establishing the requisite connection between FCCC, California, and this litigation to justify general or specific jurisdiction over FCCC.” Plaintiffs contended the trial court erred in concluding that they failed to establish that California had general or specific jurisdiction over FCCC in this action. The Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiffs’ arguments lacked merit, and accordingly it affirmed the order granting FCCC’s motion to quash and dismissing it from this action. View "Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp." on Justia Law

Chen sued BMW for breach of warranty and for violating the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code 1790) and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (section 1750). After the suit was pending for about a year, the defendants communicated an offer under Code of Civil Procedure Section 998, to have a $160,000 judgment entered against them; the defendants would pay Chen’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, as determined by the court. Chen would return the vehicle. Chen rejected the offer as “fatally vague and uncertain. The litigation continued for another two years. The parties settled on the day of the trial. The terms of the settlement were essentially identical to the section 998 offer.Chen moved as a prevailing party for attorney fees and costs of $436,071.82. The trial court awarded only $53,509.51, including only fees and costs accrued through July 2017, 45 days after the section 998 offer was made. The court of appeal affirmed. BMW’s offer complied with the statutory requirements and Chen did not achieve a result more favorable than its terms. The statute, therefore, disallowed recovery of attorney fees and costs accrued after the offer was made. View "Chen v. BMW of North America" on Justia Law

D.S. and A.S. were married and have children, ages 14 and eight. A.S. filed a petition for legal separation and an ex parte request for temporary emergency orders related to child custody and visitation, property control, and “an order that all contact between Mother and Father be peaceful and neither party disparage the other, alienate the children nor discuss details of the custody case with the child.” She alleged that D.S. had a “trigger temper” and that the “children and I have had to flee the home multiple [times] when his anger has gotten out of control.” She stated that she did not have access to the family’s bank accounts. After the court denied her ex parte request, A.S. filed, and was granted, a peremptory challenge against the judge who issued the denial. A week later, A.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), which sought personal conduct orders and a stay-away order. A.S. identified two dates on which she and her children had suffered abuse. D.S. denied the allegations and appealed the DVRO. The court of appeal reversed. The family court abused its discretion in granting the DVRO without holding an evidentiary hearing compliant with Family Code section 217. View "Marriage of D.S. & A.S." on Justia Law

After a woman developed mesothelioma, she and her husband (Plaintiffs) brought this action in 2020 against a number of entities, including respondent Avon Products, Inc. (Avon). Relying on a declaration (Gallo Declaration) from an employee who did not begin work at Avon until 1994, halfway through the woman’s alleged exposure period, Avon moved for and obtained summary judgment in its favor.   Plaintiffs appealed, contending the trial court erred in overruling their objections to the Gallo Declaration. The trial court found this declaration was the sole evidence which shifted the burden to Plaintiffs to produce evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact. Avon contends that even if the Gallo Declaration was erroneously admitted, summary judgment should still be affirmed on the ground that Plaintiffs’ discovery responses were factually devoid   The Second Appellate District agreed with Plaintiffs that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Plaintiffs’ objections. The court found that Avon failed to adequately develop this theory in the trial court and on appeal. The court found that Avon did not shift the burden to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court wrote that it need not and do not consider Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in finding they failed to create a triable issue of material fact when they did not offer a statistical analysis showing it was more likely than not asbestos was in the Avon containers actually used by the woman. View "LAOSD Asbestos Cases" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and appellant, a contractor, prevailed in an arbitration against its client, the Defendant and Respondent. After finding that Plaintiff was not duly licensed because its responsible managing employee (RME) did not meet the criteria required by law, the trial court granted Defendant's petition to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded her powers.Plaintiff made two main arguments on appeal. It first contends the trial court misapplied the burden of proof regarding whether Plaintiff was a duly licensed contractor. The Second Appellate District rejected this argument, finding that the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiff had the burden of proof on this issue.Plaintiff also argued the trial court erroneously denied it an evidentiary hearing. In the trial court, however, Plaintiff did not seek an evidentiary hearing. It instead argued that such a hearing was not authorized by law. Therefore, the Second Appellate District held that Plaintiff forfeited the issue on appeal. View "Vascos Excavation Group LLC v. Gold" on Justia Law

Defendant and cross-complainant Fitness International, LLC (Fitness) appealed a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and cross-defendant SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC (SVAP) on SVAP’s breach of contract claim for Fitness’s non-payment of rent under the parties’ lease. Fitness contended the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because its obligation to pay rent was excused due to the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting government orders prohibiting it from operating its fitness facility for several months. Specifically, Fitness contended the court should have found that the obligation to pay rent was excused based on: (1) SVAP’s own material breach of the lease; (2) the force majeure provision in the lease; (3) Civil Code section 1511;1 (4) the doctrines of impossibility and impracticability; and (5) the doctrine of frustration of purpose. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded these contentions lacked merit and affirmed the judgment in favor of SVAP. View "SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness Internat., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six individuals employed by the County of Imperial, and the three unions representing them (the Imperial County Sheriff’s Association (ICSA), the Imperial County Firefighter’s Association (ICFA), and the Imperial County Probation and Corrections Peace Officers’ Association (PCPOA)), brought a class action lawsuit against the County of Imperial, the Imperial County Employees’ Retirement System, and the System’s Board alleging that the defendants were systematically miscalculating employee pension contributions. After two years of failed mediation, plaintiffs moved for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the conflicting interests of two primary groups of employees, those hired before the effective date of the Public Employee Pension Reform Act and those hired after, precluded the court from certifying a class. The court found that because the employees hired before PEPRA took effect were entitled to an enhanced pension benefit unavailable to those hired after, the two groups’ interests were antagonistic and the community of interest among the proposed class members required for certification could not be met. The trial court also concluded the proposed class representatives had failed to show they could adequately represent the class. On appeal, plaintiffs contended insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was an inherent conflict among the class members that precluded class certification and that the court’s legal reasoning on this factor was flawed. The plaintiffs also argued they should have been given an opportunity to show they could adequately represent the interests of the class. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning concerning the community of interest among the proposed class, and agreed with plaintiffs they should be provided an opportunity to demonstrate their adequacy. Accordingly, the order denying class certification was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to allow the proposed class representatives to file supplemental declarations addressing their adequacy to serve in this role. Thereafter, if the trial court approves of the class representatives, the court was directed to grant plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, including the creation of the subclasses identified by the Court. View "Imperial County Sheriff's Assn. v. County of Imperial" on Justia Law

A building owner operates a building in Los Angeles with retail space on the ground floor and office space, storage units, and parking on the roof. In 2012, the owner contracted with Western Waterproofing Company, Inc. to remove the roof parking surface and recoat it. The owner filed the first suit on theories of breach of an express warranty against product failure and breaches of implied warranties. The owner alleged the entire coating was beginning to fail and demanded the company remove and replace it all rather than merely undertake a leak-by-leak repair. After a jury found the company that coated the roof was not at fault, the building owner sued a second time when more leaks appeared. The trial court rightly found claim preclusion barred the new lawsuit and granted summary judgment for the company.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the owner should have brought all claims about the company’s installation in its first suit. The owner neither alleged nor presented evidence of a new or latent way the company’s work could have harmed the owner. The court explained that the second suit simply tried to relitigate a resolution the owner disliked and would prefer to escape. Claim preclusion bars this repetitive attack on finality. View "5th AND LA v. Western Waterproofing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, appellant Destiny C. (Mother) petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to her husband Justin C. (Father). Six years later, following a six-day trial on custody and visitation issues, the family court made final custody orders, directing both parents to share joint legal and physical custody of the couple’s then-seven-year-old daughter. Mother disputed that order, relying primarily on the Family Code section 3044 presumption against the award of joint legal or physical custody to a party who is found to have committed domestic violence “within the previous five years.” She contended the five-year period provided for in section 3044 ran backwards from the filing of the dissolution petition, not from the date of the family court’s custody ruling. The trial court rejected this "impractical construction." The Court of Appeal also rejected appellant's construction and affirmed the custody order. View "Marriage of Destiny C. & Justin C." on Justia Law

Aguilar incurred debt from a consumer credit account with OneMain Financial, which assigned the account to OneMain Trust. The debt was later sold to CACH, which sued to collect the charged-off debt. CACH dismissed that action without prejudice, following Aguilar’s attempt to file a cross-complaint alleging violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civ. Code, 1788), premised on incorporated provisions of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and an alleged violation of the California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act, based on CACH’s apparent misidentification of the charge-off creditor as OneMain Financial rather than OneMain Trust.Aguilar sued CACH and its counsel, alleging false or misleading representations in the collection action, in violation of the Rosenthal Act. The defendants filed a successful anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court struck the Rosenthal Act claim. The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court correctly considered whether Aguilar made a prima facie showing of a material misrepresentation under the Rosenthal Act, insofar as the alleged violation is premised on a purported failure to comply with FDCPA requirement, and found the complaint lacked minimal merit. Materiality is a proper consideration under the Rosenthal Act where the alleged state law violation is premised on enumerated provisions of the federal statute, which federal courts uniformly interpret as incorporating a materiality requirement. View "Aguilar v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP" on Justia Law