Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff River’s Side at Washington Square Homeowners Association was established to manage a development consisting of 25 residential units and common areas. It sued Defendants River’s Side LLC et al. for construction defects in the residential units. Defendants demurred to six of the seven causes of action asserted against them, arguing a homeowners association lacked standing to sue on behalf of its members for defects in residential units that it did not own and had no obligation to repair. Plaintiff alleged it had standing to bring this action on behalf of its members pursuant to Civil Code section 945, Civil Code section 5980, and Code of Civil Procedure section 382. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing under Civil Code sections 945 and 5980, and that Code of Civil Procedure section 382 was inapplicable. Because the order sustaining the demurrer left one cause of action remaining, it was not immediately appealable, and Plaintiff thus challenged the order by petition for writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiff had standing to bring claims for damages to the common areas pursuant to Civil Code sections 945 and 5980, and that it at least nominally alleged such damages. The Court further concluded Plaintiff might have standing to bring claims for damages to the residential units that sound in contract or fraud if it could meet the requirements for bringing a representative action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382. The Court also determined Plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend to cure any standing defect. The Court thus granted the petition for mandamus relief and directed the trial court to reversed its order granting the demurrer. View "River's Side at Washington Sq. Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Southern California Edison Company (Edison), an investor-owned public utility, filed a complaint in eminent domain to condemn an easement across a landowner’s property for the purpose of accessing and maintaining existing power transmission lines. Edison also filed a motion for order of prejudgment possession under the quick-take provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.1 The trial court granted the motion. The landowners filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting the court vacate the order granting Edison prejudgment possession.   The Fifth Appellate District vacated the order of prejudgment possession and directed the trial court to conduct further proceedings on the motion. Because the maintenance of power transmission lines is a matter of urgency, the court issued a peremptory writ in the first instance. The court explained a trial court evaluating a quick-take motion in the absence of a timely opposition shall grant the motion “if the court finds each of the following: (A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain (B) The plaintiff deposited pursuant to Article 1 an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.”   Here, the trial court did not make express findings. Among other things, the court did not expressly find that it was necessary for the access easement to be 16 feet wide, that the 16-foot-wide access easement was compatible with the least private injury, or that it was necessary for Edison to have the right to move guy wires and anchors, crossarms, and other physical fixtures onto the property. View "Robinson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff (Mother) appealed from the post-judgment order modifying the parenting plan between her and her former husband, Defendant (Father) with respect to their two minor children. Mother contends the family court abused its discretion in ordering the children to participate with Father in a therapy program operated by Family Bridges, which mandated no contact with Mother for a minimum of 90 days.   The Second Appellate District agreed and reversed the order. The court explained that nothing in the record supports the court’s finding that this significant disruption to the children’s established living arrangement with Mother was in their best interest. The order requires the children, for a minimum period of three months, to be moved out of their home and either moved across the country to Los Angeles if the Family Bridges program can be completed during a school break or moved into a new home in New York with Father until the program can be completed there during the school year. The children would not be allowed any contact with Mother during this disruptive period. Without evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to remove them from Mother’s custody for a period of at least 90 days in order to participate in the Family Bridges program, the court abused its discretion in issuing its order of December 22, 2021. View "Johnston-Rossi v. Rossi" on Justia Law

Olga Marcela Escobar-Eck was the President and Chief Executive Officer of Atlantis, a land use and strategic planning firm in San Diego. Atlantis helped submit an application, on behalf of All People’s Church (Church) to the City of San Diego (City) for the development of a church campus. The Church hired Atlantis around 2019 to guide it through the City's review and approval process. To this end, Escobar-Eck attended public meetings concerning the Church project and identified herself as a representative of the Church. Plaintiff Joshua Billauer lived in San Diego and worked for Wells Fargo. He was a neighborhood activist, and owned property in the Del Cerro area where the Church project was proposed. Billauer did not favor the Church project, emphasizing the project’s lack of housing despite the “ ‘major housing crisis’ ” in San Diego and speaking against it at community meetings. In 2020, Escobar-Eck was making a presentation on Zoom to a community planning group on behalf of the Church. During the a person who only was identifiable by the name "JJ" sent private messages to her through Zoom’s chat function, accusing Escobar-Eck of being dishonest about a house purchase that occurred near the Church. At the time of the message, Escobar-Eck did not know JJ’s true identity. Later, she learned JJ was Billauer. On December 10, 2020, Escobar-Eck posted a tweet on Twitter that was directed at Billauer’s employer, Wells Fargo, asserting Billauer was “[a] racist person who is engaging in cyberbullying.” On February 16, 2021, Billauer sued Escobar-Eck. The operative complaint includes a single cause of action entitled “Recovery of Damages.” Billauer claims that Escobar-Eck’s December 10 tweet constituted libel per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Billauer appealed an order denying his special motion to strike a cross-complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. In denying the motion, the court found that Billauer’s alleged posts were protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute, but Escobar-Eck had shown a probability of success on the merits for her libel per se claim. The Court of Appeal concluded Escobar-Eck has satisfied her burden to establish a probability of success on the merits, and Billauer has not provided evidence to defeat her claims as a matter of law. View "Billauer v. Escobar-Eck" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a qui tam case on behalf of the State of California alleging Defendants and Respondents engaged in medical insurance fraud. Plaintiff asserted the alleged fraud victimized the state workers’ compensation system, including the State Compensation Insurance Fund, as well as Medi-Cal, and brought her action under the California False Claims Act (CFCA) and the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA). Plaintiff filed her qui tam complaint under seal and in camera as statutorily required. Before the matter reached trial, however, the trial court dismissed the action pursuant to the “five-year rule” set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.   The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment of dismissal, reinstated the action, and remanded it. The court held that the 962 days the action was kept under seal should have been excluded from the five-year period pursuant to Section 583.340(b). Further, the five-year period had not expired at the time the court dismissed the action. A five-year period totals 1,825 days. Adding to that period, the 962 days during which the action was under seal, the 712 days of the first stay and the 236 days of the second stay total 3,735 days. The date 3,735 days from the date Plaintiff filed her complaint (July 13, 2012) is October 3, 2022. Adding six months due to the COVID-19 emergency rule extends the period to April 3, 2023. Therefore, the trial court erred in prematurely dismissing Plaintiff’s action on February 24, 2021. View "State of Cal. ex. rel. Sills v. Gharib-Danesh" on Justia Law

A judgment creditor seeks delivery of her debtor’s Academy Award statuette, commonly known as the Oscar, under the Enforcement of Judgments Law (EJL). Respondent Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (AMPAS) intervened in the litigation. The EJL allowed the trial court to determine if AMPAS has a right to property (the Oscar) that came to light in a debtor’s examination.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the creditor’s request for delivery of the Oscar. It correctly found that AMPAS has the right to purchase the Oscar for $10 pursuant to a written agreement with the Oscar winner and AMPAS’s bylaws. The court explained that a judgment creditor’s interest is derivative of the judgment debtor’s interest: The creditor acquires only the interest a judgment debtor has in personal property at the time of the levy. View "Juarez v. Ward" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, respondent Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Kaiser). The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment. The court explained that as part of a round of employee layoffs, Kaiser planned, at least tentatively, to terminate Plaintiff before Plaintiff became disabled. Kaiser’s plan to terminate Plaintiff before she became disabled, by itself, was not discrimination against Plaintiff because of a disability. But Kaiser did not complete its layoff plans—or, a reasonable jury could find, make its final determination to terminate Plaintiff—until after Plaintiff had become disabled. On the record here, there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Kaiser’s ultimate decision to terminate Plaintiff was motivated, at least in substantial part, by concerns Kaiser had about Plaintiff’s disability. That allows Plaintiff’s complaint to survive summary judgment. View "Lin v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

This appeal from summary judgment in favor of Sequoia Insurance Company (Sequoia) was one of thousands of cases nationwide involving a claim for business interruption coverage arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic. The outcome here turned on whether there was evidence creating a triable issue that the insured, Best Rest Motel, Inc. (Best Rest), sustained lost business income “due to the necessary ‘suspension’ ” of its operations “caused by direct physical loss of or damage” to the insured property. Best Rest contended its case fell directly within the exception discussed by the Court of Appeal in Inns-by-the-Sea v. California Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Cal.App.5th 688 (2021). Though the Court found Inns might undermine, if not entirely foreclose Best Rest’s case, the Court limited its holding by positing in dicta a “hypothetical scenario” where “an invisible airborne agent would cause a policyholder to suspend operations because of direct physical damage to property.” Here, the Court determined Best Rest's argument failed because the record contained no evidence creating a triable issue that the hotel “could have otherwise been operating” but for the presence of COVID-19 on the premises. Best Rest’s own evidence established the exact opposite was true: its vice president and operating partner testified that the phones were “ringing off the hook[ ]” with cancellations—not because of COVID-19 in the hotel, but because of government shut down orders and travel restrictions that shuttered tourism. Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment in the insurance company's favor because there was no evidence creating a triable issue that COVID-19 in the hotel caused the claimed lost income. View "Best Rest Motel, Inc. v. Sequoia Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The last clause of section 248.5 (e) of California’s Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014 (the Act) (Labor Code, § 245 et seq.) was the focus of this appeal. Plaintiff Ana Wood filed a Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA) action against her former employer Kaiser Foundation Hospitals seeking penalties for alleged violations of the Act. The trial court sustained Kaiser’s demurrer without leave to amend, determining that a PAGA action was one brought “on behalf of the public” and since it sought only civil penalties, was prohibited by section 248.5 (e). After its independent review, the Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion: the statute’s text and history provided compelling evidence that the phrase “on behalf of the public as provided under applicable state law” in section 248.5 (e) was intended to refer to actions prosecuted under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL)—not PAGA. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was reversed. View "Wood v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

The City of Palm Springs closed off one of its downtown streets to all vehicular traffic for a period of three years to allow a tourism organization to install and display a large statue of Marilyn Monroe in the middle of the street. A citizens’ group called the Committee to Relocate Marilyn ("the Committee") petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the street closure, alleging the City did not have the statutory authority to close the street. Additionally, the Committee alleged the City erroneously declared the street closure categorically exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City demurred to the petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing it had the authority to close the street for three years under Vehicle Code section 21101(e), and its local equivalent, Palm Springs Municipal Code section 12.80.010. The City claimed the street closure was temporary, and therefore permissible. Further, the City argued the CEQA cause of action was untimely. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the City. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Committee pleaded allegations sufficient to establish: (1) the City exceeded its authority under the Vehicle Code and Municipal Code; and (2) the timeliness of its CEQA cause of action. After the notice of exemption was filed, the City abandoned its plan to vacate vehicular access to the street and elected to close the street instead. Because the City materially changed the project after it filed its notice of exemption, and it did not afford the public an opportunity to consider the revised project or its environmental effects, the notice of exemption did not trigger a 35-day statute of limitations. Instead, the CEQA cause of action was subject to a default statute of limitations of 180 days, measured from the date the Committee knew or should have known about the changed project. The Court determined the Committee timely filed its CEQA cause of action. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the judgment of dismissal, vacated the demurrer ruling, and instructed the trial court to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to these three causes of action. View "Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law