Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former driver for Defendant Lyft, Inc., filed suit against Lyft under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). He alleged that Lyft misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, thereby violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Lyft moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the “Terms of Service” (TOS) that it required its drivers to accept. The trial court denied the motion, finding the PAGA waiver in the arbitration provision unenforceable under then-controlling California law. Lyft appealed, and the Second Appellate District affirmed the denial of Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration. Lyft petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted Lyft’s petition and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022).   The Second Appellate District reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s order. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to (1) enter an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate his individual PAGA claim and (2) conduct further proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s non-individual claims. The court explained that it is not bound by the analysis of PAGA standing set forth in Viking River. PAGA standing is a matter of state law that must be decided by California courts. The court explained that until it has guidance from the California Supreme Court, its review of PAGA and relevant state decisional authority leads the court to conclude that a plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims simply because their individual PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration. View "Seifu v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

Santa Clara Valley Water District was insured by Century. In 2000, the District notified Century that it had been advised by the federal government of potential claims for natural resource damages resulting from mercury contamination in the Guadalupe River Watershed (NRD Claim). Century requested additional information, including the status of negotiations. Century made several similar requests to the District between 2000-2002. In 2001, Century indicated that it had no duties under the primary policies because there was no lawsuit pending, had no duty to indemnify the District under the excess policies until the underlying limits of the policies had been exhausted, and was reserving its rights under the policies. The District subsequently signed a tolling agreement, was sued in federal court, and entered a Consent Decree without notifying Century.In 2008, the District notified Century of the existence of the lawsuit and the Consent Decree and stated that it had incurred $4 million in costs to comply with the Consent Decree. Century cited a No Voluntary Payment (NVP) provision. The District did not contact Century until 2014, when it completed its required Consent Decree work. In 2015, the District sued Century.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment for Century. The NVP provisions barred the District from seeking indemnification for the expenses it incurred under the Consent Decree, without notifying Century or obtaining its consent. Those provisions apply to the settlement even though it was achieved through a consent decree rather than a traditional settlement agreement. Because the NRD Claim was disposed of by that settlement, there was no “adjudication” that gave rise to an “ultimate net loss” that gave the District the right to pay and seek indemnification. View "Santa Clara Valley Water District v. Century Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

In October 2016, the mother filed a request to reinstate joint legal and physical custody of her minor daughter, after a lengthy period in which the father exercised sole legal and physical custody based on a child welfare referral that, according to the mother, had recently been “overturned.” The parents had a long-running custody battle. In May 2019, she was ordered to share in the expense of a court-ordered child custody evaluator who was appointed under Evidence Code section 730. The payment order was entered over the mother’s continuing objection that she cannot afford to pay any of the evaluator’s fees. She argued that, given her financial condition, the court erred when it reallocated a portion of that expense to her after the fact.The court of appeal remanded, In allocating the costs of a court-appointed child custody evaluator, the court must consider the parties’ ability to pay, whether the child custody evaluator is appointed by the court under Evidence Code section 730 or the more specific provisions of the Family Code (sections 3111-3112). The record does not indicate that the trial court considered all of the mother’s expenses before ordering her to contribute to the costs. View "Peterson v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In 2002, plaintiffs M.D. Doe, A.J. Doe, and S. Doe (together, plaintiffs) sued defendant Marysville Joint Unified School District (the District) and at least one District employee, alleging their school counselor sexually abused them. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the District after finding that plaintiffs failed to timely file a government claim before filing their complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review. In 2019, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 to extend the statute of limitations for victims bringing childhood claims of sexual assault. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this action against the District and certain individuals predicated on the same set of facts as their 2002 suit. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer without leave to amend as to plaintiffs, finding that the prior dismissal was res judicata, and that allowing section 340.1 to reopen a final judgment would run afoul of constitutional separation of powers principles. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred because their prior claims were not “litigated to finality” within the meaning of section 340.1 and could therefore be revived, and because dismissing plaintiffs’ claims violated equal protection. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed an order granting plaintiffs' motion to compel compliance with prior discovery orders and imposing monetary and issue sanctions. The trial court imposed 11 potentially case-dispositive issue sanctions and $37,575 in monetary sanctions against defendants for having “repeatedly disregarded their obligations in Discovery” and having “repeatedly fought the Court Orders that tell them they must comply.” The court-appointed discovery referee, who recommended those sanctions, commented that in his almost 20 years of service as a neutral, mediator, arbitrator, and referee he had never seen “such blatant disregard of discovery and discovery orders.” In their notice of appeal, defendants asserted their appeal included both the monetary sanctions and the issue sanctions. The Court of Appeal found the order imposing monetary sanctions was directly appealable under California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(11) and (12). However, the order imposing issue sanctions was not directly appealable. The issue sanctions were not inextricably intertwined with the monetary sanctions. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal regarding issue sanctions. The Court also found defendants failed to establish the trial court should have found they acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances made the imposition of monetary sanctions unjust. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the award of monetary sanctions and dismissed the appeal in all other respects. View "Deck v. Developers Investment Co., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue here was the 2015 “public health goal” (PHG) defendant Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) set for the contaminant perchlorate, a chemical found in rocket fuel. After OEHHA set the PHG for perchlorate at 1 part per billion (ppb), plaintiff California Manufacturers & Technology Association (CMTA) filed a petition for a writ of mandate ordering OEHHA to withdraw the PHG. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, CMTA argued: (1) OEHHA violated the statutory mandate in arriving at the PHG; and (2) the PHG was void based on the common law conflict of interest doctrine because its author, Dr. Craig Steinmaus, had a conflict of interest. The Court of Appeal concluded OEHHA complied with the statutory requirements under Health & Safety Code section 116365 (c)(1)(A), and that the common law conflict of interest doctrine did not apply here. View "California Manufacturers etc. v. Off. of Environmental Health etc." on Justia Law

Appellant M.B., mother of minor L.J., appealed the termination of her parental rights which freed L.J. for adoption. Mother contended the juvenile court erred by: (1) denying her request to admit self-made recordings of her visits with the minor to support her argument that the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (c)(1)(B)(i) beneficial parental relationship exception applied and to impeach the evidence of the visits; and (2) finding the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply to prevent the termination of parental rights. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the juvenile court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record and the court did not abuse its discretion in finding no detriment to termination of parental rights. View "In re L.J." on Justia Law

Unhappy with a Virginia court’s order regarding the custody of his minor daughter, appellant Paul Fishbein sought to modify that order only one month later in California family court. When the California court found it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to do so, Fishbein appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the California court was correct: the Virginia court that entered the governing child custody order had initial home state jurisdiction, and it never lost that jurisdiction. View "Segal v. Fishbein" on Justia Law

An insured’s general liability insurer defended under a reservation of rights, and paid out its $2 million policy limits to settle the lawsuit. The insured’s workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurer denied coverage and did not participate in the defense or settlement. This lawsuit followed, with the general liability insurer suing the workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurer for equitable contribution. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the general liability insurer, awarding roughly half the cost of defense and indemnity. The Court of Appeals reversed: an equitable contribution claim only lies if the two insurers share the same level of liability on the same risk as to the same insured. In this case, the general liability insurer is not entitled to equitable contribution because it did not insure the same risk as the workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurer. View "California Capital Ins. Co. v. Employers Compensation Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In August 2020, police went to a motel room to investigate child abuse. Three children were present: K.H. (an eight-year-old boy), A.H. (a five-year-old girl), and P.A. (an 18-month-old girl). The boy had visible bruises on his face and arms; the older girl had multiple bruises on her legs. Police arrested S.A. (“Mother”), and A.A. (“Husband” and father of the younger girl), who had brought the three children from Texas to California about three weeks prior. At that time, A.H. (“Father” of the two older children) was incarcerated in Texas for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The children were taken into protective custody. The next day, Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a dependency petition, and the juvenile court took “emergency jurisdiction . . . pursuant to UCCJEA.” About a week later, the court phoned a Texas state court judge who “cede[d] jurisdiction to the state of California.” SSA placed the children in foster care with Dana C. (“Caregiver”). Mother pleaded guilty to two counts of child abuse, served a 120-day jail sentence, and returned to Texas. Husband’s disposition and whereabouts were unknown. Father was no longer incarcerated and lived in Texas. In March 2021, the juvenile court sustained the dependency petition, declaring the children to be dependents of the court. Six months later, Mother moved to transfer the matter to Texas. In July 2022, the juvenile court again spoke to a Texas judge and found the state continued to decline to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Father appealed, contending the California juvenile court never had subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and all the juvenile court’s orders had to be reversed. The Court of Appeal denied the parents' requests, finding substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's ruling. View "A.H. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law