Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was employed from April 2018 to August 2019 by Defendant EmployBridge, LLC, which does business in California as Select Staffing. In March 2018, as part of her employment application, Plaintiff electronically signed an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement (1) states it “is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,” and (2) contains a broad agreement to arbitrate claims. Plaintiff sued EmployBridge Holding Company, a Delaware corporation, solely to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations suffered by her or by other employees. The trial court determined that the agreement to arbitrate specifically excluded PAGA claims. This appeal challenges the denial of a motion to compel arbitration of claims to recover civil penalties.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the trial court correctly interpreted the agreement’s carve-out provision stating that “claims under PAGA … are not arbitrable under this Agreement.” This provision is not ambiguous. It is not objectively reasonable to interpret the phrase “claims under PAGA” to include some PAGA claims while excluding others. Thus, the carve-out provision excludes all the PAGA claims from the agreement to arbitrate. View "Duran v. EmployBridge Holding Co." on Justia Law

In 2002, the decedent wrote a letter purporting to be a will. No one witnessed the deceased sign the will. In the will, the decedent left certain property to her then-girlfriend. The couple broke up in 2003 and the decedent passed away in 2020, at which point her pastor found the letter. The pastor gave a copy of the letter to the decedent's daughters. The ex-girlfriend sought to probate the letter as the decedent's will.Finding that the letter did not comply with the requirements of a will, the probate court declined to probate the letter as the decedent's will.The Second Appellate District reversed the probate court's order declining to probate the letter as decedent's will, finding that a probate court may consider extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the document’s execution if the intent expressed by the document’s terms is unambiguous. Here, when reviewing the decedent's letter, the Second Appellate District determined that language was sufficient to exhibit her testamentary intent by clear and convincing evidence. View "Estate of Berger" on Justia Law

After defendants Frayba and William Tipton pled guilty to committing insurance fraud, they were ordered to pay victim restitution to Nationwide Insurance Company of America (Nationwide). Later, Nationwide petitioned the trial court to convert the criminal restitution orders to civil judgments against both defendants. Defendants opposed. Relying on Penal Code1 section 1214, the trial court granted Nationwide’s petition and entered civil judgments against the defendants. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred because (1) Nationwide “failed to provide citation to any . . . authority supporting” conversion of the victim restitution orders to civil judgment; and (2) Nationwide’s petition lacked supporting evidence. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tipton" on Justia Law

Petitioner Raji Rab contended that by allowing Los Angeles County workers to scan vote by mail ballots into the Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP) system (the computer hardware and software system used to capture and count votes in Los Angeles County) beginning 10 days before the March 2020 primary election, Dean Logan, the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk violated California Elections Code section 15101 (b)’s, prohibition on accessing and releasing a vote count prior to 8 p.m. on the day of an election. Rab alleged respondents the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors and its members (with Logan, the County) and the California Secretary of State, failed in their oversight of Logan, and, therefore, failed to protect the election process and aided and abetted in Logan’s alleged misconduct. Rab brought a petition for writ of mandate, seeking a manual recount of ballots from the March 2020 primary election, and claiming this matter was one “of [the] greatest public interest.” The trial court denied his petition. Specifically, in denying the petition, the trial court wrote, “[t]he Court interprets ‘machine reading’ to include, and thus to permit, scanning ballots. To leave no room for confusion in the future, the Court reiterates: Elections Code section 15101(b) allows the County to start scanning ballots on the 10th business day before the election.” Rab appealed, arguing the trial court misinterpreted Elections Code section 15101(b). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Rab v. Weber" on Justia Law

Ring manufactures and sells home security and smart home devices including video doorbells, security cameras, and alarms. The plaintiffs purchased video doorbell and security camera products from Ring and subsequently filed a class action complaint against Ring asserting claims under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, false advertising law, and Unfair Competition Law. They sought injunctive relief requiring Ring to prominently disclose to consumers certain information about its products and services.Ring moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in its terms of service. The plaintiffs did not dispute that they agreed to Ring’s terms of service but argued the arbitration provision violates the California Supreme Court’s 2017 “McGill” holding that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable under state law insofar as it purports to waive a party’s statutory right to seek public injunctive relief.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Ring's motion to compel arbitration. The parties did not “clearly and unmistakably" delegate to the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide whether the arbitration provision is valid under McGill. The contract language at issue is commonly understood to preclude public injunctive relief in arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, does not preempt McGill’s holding. The contract’s severability clause means the plaintiffs’ claims cannot be arbitrated and may be brought in court. View "Jack v. Ring LLC" on Justia Law

On November 3, 2020, the voters of San Bernardino County passed Measure K, amending the county charter so as to: (1) limit a supervisor to a single four-year term; and (2) limit a supervisor’s compensation to $5,000 a month. At the same time, the voters also elected three new supervisors. The trial court ruled that the one-term limit was unconstitutional, but that the compensation limit was constitutional. The court ruled that because Measure K was not severable, it, too, had to be struck down. Finally, it ruled that Measure K did not apply to the new supervisors (although it acknowledged that the issue was moot, in light of its other rulings). Nadia Renner, proponent of Measure K, appealed.The San Bernardino County Board of Suprervisors (Board) cross-appealed, contending: (1) Supervisors’ compensation could not be set by initiative; (2) the compensation limit violated minimum wage laws; alternatively, if it effectively forced supervisors to work part-time, it impaired governmental functions; and (3) the compensation limit improperly acted as a referendum on San Bernardino County Code section 13.0614. After determining the trial court’s ruling was appealable, the Court of Appeal concluded the one-term limit was constitutional. Further, the Court held that the supervisors’ compensation could be set by initiative, and the Board did not show the limit violated minimum wage laws. The Board also did not show the limit conflicted with section 13.0614. “Even assuming that it does, the voters can amend or abrogate an ordinance not only by referendum, but also by initiative.” Because the Court held the one-term and compensation limits were valid, the Court did not reach the issue of whether Measure K was severable. The Court was split as to whether Measure K applied to new supervisors: the term limit applied, but the compensation limit did not. View "San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors v. Monell" on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence and not intentional wrongdoing, and it denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district was under the duty to preserve the video when it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). The Court of Appeal concluded the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f) did not shield a party from sanctions for the spoliation of electronic evidence if the evidence was altered or destroyed when the party was under a duty to preserve the evidence. The Court found the record supported the trial court’s ruling that the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, the safe-harbor provision did not apply. The Court granted the real parties’ petition in part and directed the trial court to reconsider whether the form of sanctions imposed were warranted. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kamiya Perry appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) after a jury found in favor of Kia in her automobile defect trial. On appeal, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that Kia had concealed evidence (certain engineering documents) during discovery; (2) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Kia’s paralegal who verified discovery requests relevant to the engineering documents; and (3) she was not given a fair trial because the jurors were required to deliberate in a small room, which, in the midst of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, incentivized the jury to complete their deliberations quickly. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Perry v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a $425,562 jury verdict in his favor on his claim that the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (the Department) retaliated against him for filing an internal complaint with its Equal Opportunity Office (EEO). The Department appealed, contending that four erroneous evidentiary rulings by the trial court deprived it of a fair trial.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court agreed that the trial court erred in admitting evidence about activity that occurred before the filing of his EEO complaints. The court also concluded that admission of the first EEO complaint and supplement was prejudicial and prevented the Department from receiving a fair trial. The court explained that there is no doubt that the fact that Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint for age and race discrimination is highly relevant. It is the protected activity needed for his claim; more colloquially, it provides a motive for the retaliation. The details of the discrimination are not relevant. This was not a trial about whether Plaintiff’s co-worker engaged in race or age discrimination; Plaintiff waived those claims in the prior settlement agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court wrote that it need not and does not reach the Department’s other claims of error. View "Kourounian v. Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration" on Justia Law

EBMUD, a municipal utility, provides water and wastewater services to the residents of Alameda and Contra Costa counties. The plaintiffs have paid for EBMUD water service since before July 2018. In 2017, EBMUD adopted the water rates for fiscal years 2018 and 2019; in July 2019, EBUMD adopted the rates for fiscal years 2020 and 2021. The plaintiffs alleged EBMUD determines the cost of service based on the volume of water used. There are three tiers of water usage; each successive tier is charged a higher rate than the previous tier. They allege that this rate structure violates the requirement of the California Constitution article XIII D, 6(b)(3) that the amount charged for water service shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.In July 2019, plaintiffs mailed EBMUD a claim under the Government Claims Act, seeking a refund of service charges collected in violation of section 6(b) since July 17, 2018. In January 2020, after the statutory time period for response had lapsed, plaintiffs filed suit. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal without leave to amend, citing the 120-day statute of limitations (Public Utilities Code section 14402). Plaintiffs cannot avoid the statute of limitations by characterizing their claim as merely seeking a refund of excess fees. The complaint frames a challenge to the “disproportionate rate structure.” Any time requirements imposed by the Government Claims Act did not extend the limitations period. View "Campana v. East Bay Municipal Utility District" on Justia Law