Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sued directors and staff of a structured sober living facility, including a real party in interest Peter Schuster, for dependent adult abuse. The trial court found Petitioner failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 because his statement of compliance in response to Schuster’s document requests failed to identify which documents would relate to which specific requests. The court imposed sanctions against Petitioner and his attorney in the amount of $910 for misusing the discovery process. Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of mandate directing the court to reverse the sanctions order. He argued that a statement of compliance in response to a production demand need not identify which document pertains to which request; such identification need only occur when the documents are produced.   The Second Appellate District granted Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that based on the plain language of section 2031.210, a statement of compliance need not identify the specific request to which each document will pertain. Because Petitioner substantially complied with his discovery responsibilities in this regard, the court’s imposition of sanctions was an abuse of discretion. View "Pollock v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The trial court entered a default judgment against Defendant Wanu Water Inc. on June 16, 2020, and on December 7, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to set aside its default and vacate the default judgment under the mandatory attorney-fault provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)). The trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling.   The Second Appellate District vacated the default judgment. The court explained that the mandatory provision requires the court to vacate the default judgment if the application is filed “no more than six months after entry of judgment,” is “in proper form,” and is accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault unless the court finds the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Here, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling. The record shows the filing was timely and was accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault. Thus, the only bases for denying the motion to vacate the default judgment were that the application was not “in proper form” or that the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s neglect. View "Dollase v. Wanu Water Inc." on Justia Law

In 2019, several dozen plaintiffs sued Massage Envy (a franchisor) and Massage Envy franchisees alleging that as adults they were sexually assaulted by massage therapists at California Massage Envy locations from 2003-2014. The trial court dismissed 18 claims as untimely. Just as the appellate briefing was about to be completed, the Governor approved Assembly Bill 2777, which amended section 340.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revive certain claims that relate to sexual assault provided that the claims had not been litigated to finality or compromised by a written settlement agreement before January 1, 2023.The court of appeal reversed the dismissals. The new law revives some, if not all, of the claims but the operative complaints and motions were drafted before the revival statute was enacted. Remand to the trial court is necessary to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaints and to give the defendants the opportunity to make further arguments regarding the effect of the revival statute on each of the claims. View "Doe v. CFR Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

A healthcare provider contended it was underpaid for substance abuse treatment that it rendered to 29 patients. Seeking to recover the difference directly from the insurance company, the provider filed suit alleging the insurer entered into binding payment agreements during verification of benefits and authorization calls with the provider and otherwise misrepresented or concealed the amounts it would pay for treatment. The trial court entered summary judgment against the provider. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the court did not err in determining one or more elements of the provider’s causes of action could not be established. View "Aton Center v. United Healthcare Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Mother has seven children by several different fathers: the child at issue in this case—Jayden M. (born 2021). On November 19, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over Jayden on two grounds. On May 2, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing. The court removed Jayden from Mother’s custody and also bypassed reunification services under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. More specifically, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that bypass was proper under these provisions because (1) Mother’s reunification services or parental rights for Jayden’s older half-siblings had been terminated, and (2) Mother’s most recent four months of effort to address her drug addiction—did not eliminate the court’s “concerns” in light of her 20-year history of drug abuse problems and prior dependency cases. On appeal, Mother’s chief argument on appeal is that the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services was not supported by the record.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court held that the juvenile court’s finding is further supported by evidence that Mother has repeatedly relapsed after treatment and/or periods of sobriety in the past. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and practical reality that short and recent periods of sobriety are often not enough to counter a longstanding pattern of use and relapse. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the effort underlying Mother’s brief period of sobriety after decades of drug abuse is not “reasonable.” View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law

After obtaining a judgment against Defendants in a prior case, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants, their attorney, and others for fraudulent transfer, quiet title, and declaratory relief. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the entire complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. At issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling Defendants failed to meet their initial burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity and the claims for relief supported by them. Further, the issue is whether the trial court’s earlier order granting the Defendants’ attorney’s anti-SLAPP motion compels the same outcome here.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The court explained that where a defendant moves to strike the entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned argument, specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from protected activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden so long as the complaint presents at least one claim that does not arise from protected activity. Here, Defendants not only failed to identify specific claims for relief arising from protected activity, they expressly asked the court to perform the type of gravamen analysis disapproved in Bonni. At no point did the Defendants “identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” And there are obviously claims in the complaint that do not arise from anti-SLAPP protected activity. View "Park v. Nazari" on Justia Law

In 2016 Martin Mariano, an employee of plaintiff L & S Framing Inc., was working on a residential house under construction when he fell from the second floor onto the concrete ground floor below, sustaining serious injuries. Following an investigation, real party in interest California Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) issued a citation, which eventually included a serious accident- related citation for violation of California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 1626(b)(5). Plaintiff appealed the citation. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the Division’s mid-hearing request to amend the citation to allege a violation of section 1632(b)(1), denied the Division’s post-hearing motion to amend to allege violation of section 1626(a)(2), and concluded the Division failed to prove the alleged violation of section 1626(b)(5). The Division filed a petition for reconsideration with the defendant California Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Appeals Board). The Appeals Board concluded the ALJ improperly denied the two requests to amend and upheld the citation based on violation of both section 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2). Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court: (1) erred in permitting the Appeals Board to amend the citation; (2) incorrectly concluded sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) applied; and (3) incorrectly concluded section 1716.2 did not apply and did not supersede the other regulations on the facts of this case. The Court of Appeal surmised that second and third of these contentions depended on the question whether the specific location from which Mariano fell qualified as a floor opening (§ 1632(b)(1)) and/or a stairwell (§ 1626(a)(2)), or instead an “unprotected side[] or edge[]” (§ 1716.2(f)). After review, the Court affirmed, finding the Appeals Board properly allowed the Division to amend the citation, the Appeals Board reasonably deemed the location at issue to fall within the scope of sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) and that determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the Appeals Board properly determined section 1716.2 did not apply. View "L & S Framing Inc. v. Cal. Occupational Saf. & Health Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Nicole Woodworth was a registered nurse at Loma Linda University Medical Center (the medical center) from December 2011 to June 2014. In June 2014, she filed this putative class action against the medical center, alleging a host of wage and hour claims on behalf of herself and other employees. She later amended her complaint to add a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). After several years of litigation, only her individual claim for failure to provide rest periods remained. The trial court had granted four motions for summary judgment in favor of the medical center, denied Woodworth’s motion for class certification, and denied her motion to strike putative class members’ declarations. Woodworth appealed those orders, which disposed of the putative class members’ claims, the PAGA claims, and all of her individual claims (apart from her claim about rest periods). The medical center moved to dismiss most of Woodworth’s appeal, but the Court of Appeal denied the motion, affirming the orders in large part. Specifically, the Court reversed in part the order denying class certification: the court erred with respect to Woodworth’s proposed wage statement class, which consisted of employees who received allegedly inaccurate wage statements. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider certification of that class. View "Woodworth v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Center" on Justia Law

Barber Group, Inc., doing business as Barber Honda (Barber)—a car dealer in Bakersfield, California—brought an establishment protest to the California New Motor Vehicle Board (Board), challenging a decision by American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) to open a new dealership about nine miles away. The Board overruled Barber’s protest, and the trial court denied Barber’s petition for administrative mandate challenging the Board’s decision. On appeal, Barber argued the Board prejudicially erred when it: (1) relied on Honda’s dealer performance standards at the protest hearing without first deciding whether those standards were reasonable; (2) permitted the proposed new dealership to exercise a peremptory challenge to an administrative law judge initially assigned to the protest hearing, contrary to notions of fairness and the Board’s own order in the matter; and (3) denied Barber’s request that it take official notice of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Barber Group, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a privately compensated temporary judge’s ruling that Plaintiff’s former husband, provided an accounting as to certain stock that was the subject of a marital settlement agreement (MSA). Among other things, Plaintiff contends Judge Johnson erred in issuing her ruling because she had withdrawn her request for an order for an accounting of her stock interest before the ruling.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiff’s notice withdrawing her accounting RFO was effective when made on June 26, 2020. Judge Johnson’s ruling granting Chris’s restoration RFO tacitly supports our holding. That is, if Plaintiff’s withdrawal of her accounting RFO had not been effective when made, Judge Johnson would not have later had to order that RFO restored. Plaintiff’s ex-husband does not cite any case that holds that a party needs a trial court’s approval to withdraw a motion. Because Plaintiff withdrew her accounting RFO, Judge Johnson did not have jurisdiction to rule on it. Her ex-husband’s restoration RFO did not restore her withdrawn accounting RFO and Judge Johnson’s jurisdiction because her ex-husband filed it after April 1, 2020, the date Judge Johnson’s appointment terminated under the parties’ stipulation. View "Marriage of DeWolfe" on Justia Law