Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, train dispatchers for Bombardier Mass Transit Corporation, filed claims for unpaid wages, alleging they were entitled to overtime wages and wage statement penalties for on-call time. Initially, they sought relief through the labor commissioner’s Berman hearing process, which was denied. Subsequently, they requested a de novo hearing in the San Diego Superior Court, where they prevailed, receiving over $140,000 in back wages and penalties. They then moved for attorney fees and costs, which the trial court granted, awarding $200,000.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the plaintiffs' claims were initially denied by the labor commissioner. Upon seeking a de novo trial, the superior court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them unpaid wages and penalties. The court also granted their motion for attorney fees and costs, amounting to $200,000, rejecting Bombardier’s argument that section 98.2, subdivision (c) was the exclusive statute for awarding attorney fees and costs in such cases.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Bombardier contended that section 98.2, subdivision (c) should be the sole basis for awarding attorney fees and costs in a de novo trial following a Berman hearing. The appellate court disagreed, affirming the trial court’s decision. The court held that prevailing plaintiffs in superior court actions for unpaid wages are generally entitled to an award of reasonable fees and costs under sections 218.5, 226, and 1194, and nothing in section 98.2 suggests otherwise. The court emphasized that the Berman process is designed to benefit employees and should not restrict their remedies. Thus, the order awarding $200,000 in attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was affirmed. View "Villalva v. Bombardier Mass Transit Corp." on Justia Law

Deari Cole was committed to a developmental center under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500, which allows for the commitment of individuals with developmental disabilities who are deemed a danger to themselves or others. Cole was charged with several crimes and found incompetent to stand trial. Subsequently, he was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for one year. Just before the expiration of his commitment, the People filed a petition to extend it, and Cole was held pending trial on the recommitment petition. Cole filed a petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus, arguing that equal protection principles required his release pending trial.The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Cole's request for release pending trial, relying on section 6506, which allows for interim placement at a suitable facility. Cole's petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal. Cole then petitioned for review, and the California Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its order and issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and rejected Cole's equal protection arguments. The court held that the statutory scheme under section 6500, which allows for continued confinement pending a hearing on a recommitment petition, did not violate equal protection principles. The court reasoned that the differences between individuals with developmental disabilities and those with mental health disorders or found not guilty by reason of insanity justified the different procedures. The court concluded that the legislative distinctions were reasonable and factually based. Consequently, the court dismissed Cole's petition as moot, as he had already been released from custody for unrelated reasons. View "Cole v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Town of Apple Valley (TAV) sought to condemn a private water utility system via eminent domain. In November 2015, TAV passed two resolutions of necessity (RON) to acquire the water system, which was owned by Carlyle Infrastructures Partners and operated by Apple Valley Ranchos Water (AVR). In January 2016, TAV filed an eminent domain action to acquire the system. A day later, Carlyle sold the system to Liberty Utilities. After extensive proceedings, including a 67-day bench trial, the trial court found that TAV did not have the right to acquire the system and entered judgment and awarded attorney’s fees to Liberty. TAV appealed.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Liberty bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of the required elements for eminent domain was not satisfied. The court also ruled that Liberty need not submit the administrative record (AR) underlying TAV’s RONs. The trial court held a bench trial and issued a Statement of Decision (SOD) finding that Liberty met its burden, rejecting TAV’s evidence and relying on Liberty’s post-RON evidence. TAV’s objections to the SOD were overruled, and the court entered judgment for Liberty and awarded attorney’s fees.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof and failed to give appropriate deference to TAV’s decision and findings. The trial court also improperly based its decision on post-RON facts and events. The appellate court remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the trial court to determine whether to allow TAV to take the water system, remand the matter to TAV for further administrative proceedings, or hold a new trial applying the correct burdens of proof and standard of review. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchose Water" on Justia Law

A minor, L.W., suffered severe injuries when an Audi Q7, allegedly defective, surged forward and crushed him against a garage wall. L.W., his mother, and two siblings filed a products liability suit against Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (VWGoA), claiming the vehicle lacked necessary safety features. Audi AG, a German company, manufactures vehicles sold in the U.S. through VWGoA, which markets and sells them to authorized dealerships, including in California.The Superior Court of Placer County granted Audi's motion to quash service of summons, finding no personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Audi's purposeful availment of California's market or a substantial connection between Audi's activities and the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction would not be reasonable or consistent with fair play and substantial justice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Audi, through VWGoA, deliberately served the U.S. market, including California, and thus could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in California. The court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating Audi's purposeful availment and the relatedness of the controversy to Audi's contacts with California. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction over Audi would be fair and reasonable, given California's significant interest in providing a forum for its residents and enforcing safety regulations.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the motion to quash and remanded the case with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "L.W. v. Audi AG" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, ParaFi Digital Opportunities LP, Framework Ventures, L.P., and 1kx LP, invested in Curve, a decentralized cryptocurrency trading platform developed by Mikhail Egorov. They allege that Egorov fraudulently induced them to invest by making false promises about their stake in Curve and then canceled their investment, leading to claims of fraud, conversion, and statutory violations. Egorov, who developed Curve while living in Washington and later moved to Switzerland, formed Swiss Stake GmbH to manage Curve. The investment agreements included Swiss law and forum selection clauses.The San Francisco County Superior Court granted Egorov’s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Egorov did not purposefully avail himself of California’s benefits. The court noted that the plaintiffs initiated contact and negotiations, and the agreements specified Swiss jurisdiction. The court also denied plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that discovery would likely produce evidence establishing jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Egorov’s contacts with California were insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs had solicited the investment and Egorov had not directed any activities toward California. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ unilateral actions could not establish jurisdiction and that the agreements’ Swiss law and forum selection clauses further supported the lack of jurisdiction. The court also upheld the denial of jurisdictional discovery, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. View "ParaFi Digital Opportunities v. Egorov" on Justia Law

Sentinel Energy Center, LLC owns a power plant in North Palm Springs and hired DGC Operations, LLC (OPS) to manage and operate the plant. In 2017, during annual maintenance, five OPS employees failed to follow the new depressurization protocol for the fuel filter skid, leading to an explosion that killed Daniel Collins. Collins's family sued Diamond Generating Corporation (DGC), which has a 50% indirect ownership in Sentinel and is the parent company of OPS, claiming DGC's negligence in safety oversight led to Collins's death.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied DGC's request to instruct the jury on the Privette doctrine, which generally shields a hirer from liability for injuries to an independent contractor's employees. The jury found DGC 97% at fault and awarded the plaintiffs over $150 million. DGC's motions for nonsuit and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, based on the Privette doctrine, were also denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court declined to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict to DGC, citing unresolved factual questions about whether DGC retained control over the plant and negligently exercised that control. However, the court found that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the Privette doctrine and its exceptions, which could have led to a more favorable outcome for DGC. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial with instructions to include the Privette doctrine and its exceptions. View "Collins v. Diamond Generating Corp." on Justia Law

Pamela Pollock sued her supervisor, Michael Kelso, in 2018 for sexual harassment and racial discrimination, alleging that Kelso asked her for sexual intercourse in 2016 and, after she rejected him, promoted less qualified individuals of other races to positions she sought. The trial court initially ruled that Pollock’s suit was time-barred, a decision which was affirmed by the appellate court. However, in 2021, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the statute of limitations begins when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the adverse promotion decision, that the defense bears the burden on this issue, and that costs or fees on appeal cannot be awarded to a prevailing defendant without determining the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.Following the Supreme Court’s directions, the appellate court remanded the case and ordered costs for Pollock. Pollock then moved for attorney fees in the trial court, which awarded her $493,577.10. Kelso appealed this award. Before the trial date, Kelso and Pollock settled the bulk of their case, with Pollock moving to dismiss her underlying case with prejudice except for the attorney fee award, which Kelso was appealing. The trial court retained jurisdiction regarding the fee award.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court denied Pollock’s motion to dismiss Kelso’s appeal, affirming that Kelso was appealing from a final collateral order. On the merits, the court affirmed the fee award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Pollock as the prevailing party and in the amount awarded. The court found that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the fee award, including the use of a 1.8 multiplier, was reasonable. View "Pollock v. Kelso" on Justia Law

The case involves a failed business venture between longtime friends, resulting in a $20 million judgment against Stanley N. Cohen for negligent misrepresentation. Cohen, a professor at Stanford University, and his colleague discovered a genetic mutation related to Huntington’s disease and formed a company, Nuredis, with Moshe and Chris Alafi, who invested $20 million. The FDA later rejected Nuredis’s request to conduct human clinical trials for the drug HD106 due to its toxicity. The Alafis sued Cohen and his colleague for negligent misrepresentation and other related causes, alleging they failed to disclose the drug’s history of being withdrawn from the market due to toxicity.The Santa Clara County Superior Court held a bench trial and found in favor of the plaintiffs on the negligent misrepresentation claim against Cohen, awarding $20 million in damages. The court did not reach the other causes of action. Cohen appealed, arguing that the claim failed as a matter of law and that the trial court committed prejudicial error by not issuing a statement of decision upon his request.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that the trial court’s failure to issue the requested statement of decision was prejudicial error, as it prevented effective appellate review of the trial court’s factual and legal findings. Consequently, the appellate court did not address Cohen’s arguments on the merits and reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to issue the statement of decision. View "Alafi v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Shahriyar Shayan appealed an order denying his motion to quash a writ of execution for attorney fees filed by Zohreh McIntyre Shayan. Shahriyar argued that the writ should be quashed because it was sought more than ten years after the entry of judgment, violating Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020, and was subject to the renewal requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.130. He contended that judgments for attorney fees under the Family Code are not exempt from these requirements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shahriyar's request to set aside the writ of execution. The court found that the judgment for attorney fees, entered under the Family Code, was enforceable until satisfied in full and did not require renewal under Family Code section 291, subdivision (b). Shahriyar appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that when a judgment for attorney fees is entered under the Family Code, it is enforceable until paid in full, and failure to renew the judgment does not affect its enforceability. The court found that the plain language of Family Code section 291, its legislative history, and common sense supported this interpretation. The court affirmed the lower court's order, concluding that Family Code section 291's reference to money judgments includes those for attorney fees, exempting them from the ten-year limitation and renewal requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. View "In re Marriage of Shayan" on Justia Law

Govind Vaghashia and other plaintiffs appealed a trial court order denying their motion to vacate a settlement agreement with Prashant and Mita Vaghashia. The settlement involved a $35 million payment from the Govind Parties to Prashant and Mita, with specific terms about property collateral and a quitclaim deed for a residence. Disputes arose over the interpretation of the agreement, leading to motions to enforce it by both parties. The trial court enforced the agreement but not in the manner the Govind Parties desired.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially heard the case, where Prashant and Mita sued Govind and his affiliates, claiming a 50% interest in their business ventures. Govind counter-sued for mismanagement. A bench trial began but was paused for settlement discussions, resulting in the contested agreement. When disputes over the settlement terms emerged, both parties filed motions to enforce the agreement. The trial court ruled largely in favor of Prashant and Mita, enforcing the settlement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision, holding that the Govind Parties were judicially estopped from seeking to vacate the settlement agreement after previously moving to enforce it. The appellate court noted that the Govind Parties' positions were totally inconsistent and that they had been successful in asserting the enforceability of the agreement in their initial motion. The court affirmed the trial court's orders, including the denial of the motion to vacate the settlement agreement. View "Vaghashia v. Vaghashia" on Justia Law