Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Adriana Ramirez and her family were involved in litigation with third parties, including Harvey Miller and Stockdale Villa Mobile Home Park, where Ramirez was a property manager. After settling employment and unlawful detainer claims, Ramirez alleged that opposing counsel, attorney Sandra McCormack and her law firm, interfered with the settlement by, among other things, disputing the mailing address for settlement checks and failing to ensure the dismissal and sealing of the unlawful detainer action as required by the settlement. Ramirez claimed these actions caused her significant damages and brought several tort and contract-related claims against McCormack and other attorneys involved.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied McCormack’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court relied on precedents involving non-attorney defendants and found that the alleged conduct did not constitute protected petitioning activity under the statute. The court did not address the applicability of Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, which specifically addressed claims against attorneys for litigation-related conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that McCormack’s actions as opposing counsel—such as negotiating settlements, communicating with other attorneys, and advising clients—were protected petitioning activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that Ramirez’s claims arose from McCormack’s representation of her clients in litigation, fitting squarely within the statute’s protections as articulated in Thayer. Furthermore, Ramirez failed to present evidence of minimal merit for her claims on appeal, effectively forfeiting the issue. The appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to grant the anti-SLAPP motion and determine the fees and costs Ramirez must pay. View "Ramirez v. McCormack" on Justia Law

Paul Kim, a California resident, purchased an Airstream motorhome from a dealer in California. The warranty agreement for the motorhome included an Ohio choice of law provision and an Ohio forum selection clause. Kim sued Airstream in California, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Consumers Warranty Act. Airstream moved to stay the lawsuit in favor of the Ohio forum, citing the forum selection clause. Kim opposed, arguing that enforcing the forum selection clause would diminish his unwaivable rights under the Song-Beverly Act.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County severed the choice of law provision as illegal under the Song-Beverly Act’s waiver prohibition but granted Airstream’s motion to stay, concluding that enforcing the forum selection clause would not diminish Kim’s unwaivable California rights. The court relied on Airstream’s stipulation to apply the Song-Beverly Act in the Ohio forum.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to sever the choice of law provision but reversed the decision to stay the case. The appellate court held that Airstream’s stipulation was insufficient to meet its burden of proving that enforcing the forum selection clause would not diminish Kim’s unwaivable rights. The court instructed the trial court to allow Airstream the opportunity to demonstrate that Ohio conflict of law principles would require the application of the Song-Beverly Act to Kim’s claims, thereby protecting his unwaivable rights. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Kim v. Airstream" on Justia Law

Michael J. Kiely, an Irish resident, and MDMK Ltd., an Irish corporation, filed a lawsuit against HYPH (USA), Inc., HYPH Corporation, XHAIL, Inc., and several individual defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to fraudulently induce Kiely to sell shares of a company he founded at a significant discount, subsequently transferring most of those shares to a new company, thereby depriving Kiely of any ownership interest in the new company.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion to stay or dismiss the action, determining that the case should be heard in Sweden based on a mandatory forum selection clause and traditional forum non conveniens grounds. The court found that Sweden was a suitable alternative forum and that both private and public interest factors weighed in favor of Sweden as the forum. The plaintiffs appealed the decision, contesting both grounds of the ruling.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that private and public interest factors favored Sweden as the forum. The appellate court held that the trial court properly stayed the action on the alternative independent ground of traditional forum non conveniens. Additionally, the appellate court addressed the impact of the California Supreme Court's decision in EpicentRx, Inc. v. Superior Court on the plaintiffs' claim that the enforcement of the forum selection clause operated as an "implied waiver" of their jury trial right. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order, finding that the enforcement of the forum selection clause did not violate California public policy regarding the right to a jury trial. View "Kiely v. Hyph (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

In January 2021, Gregory Steshenko was declared a vexatious litigant in a prior civil action and was subject to a prefiling order requiring him to obtain permission from the presiding judge before filing any new litigation. Despite this, in November 2021, while his appeal in the prior action was pending, Steshenko filed a new civil action against the Foothill-De Anza Community College District and others. The College District filed a notice regarding the prefiling order, and Steshenko objected, claiming the order was stayed pending his appeal. The College District and others moved to have Steshenko declared a vexatious litigant again and to require him to furnish security.The trial court determined that the prefiling order was not stayed on appeal and that Steshenko was required to request leave before filing the new action, which he failed to do. Consequently, the court dismissed the action. Alternatively, the court found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant again, issued a new prefiling order, required him to furnish security, and dismissed the action when he refused to provide the security.On appeal, Steshenko argued that the judgment of dismissal should be reversed. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the January 2021 prefiling order remained in effect while on appeal and that the trial court properly dismissed the action based on Steshenko’s failure to obtain permission before filing the action and the denial of permission after the action was filed. The appellate court struck the June 2024 orders that again found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant and required him to obtain leave before filing new litigation. However, Steshenko continues to be designated as a vexatious litigant and subject to the January 2021 prefiling order. View "Steshenko v. Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

Owners of timeshare estates in a resort sued the County of Riverside, challenging the legality of the annual fee charged for separate property tax assessments. The owners argued that the fee exceeded the reasonable cost of providing the assessment, constituting a tax requiring voter approval, which had not been obtained.The Superior Court of Riverside County rejected the owners' argument and entered judgment for the County. The court ruled that the fee did not exceed the reasonable cost of the assessment and was not a tax requiring voter approval. The court also considered additional costs not included in the original fee calculation, such as costs related to assessment appeals and a new computer system.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the County's methodology for setting the fee was flawed. The County had used the assessor's entire budget for a previous fiscal year to calculate the fee, which included costs unrelated to the separate timeshare assessments. The court also noted that the County had not provided evidence of the actual cost of the separate assessments and had improperly included costs for services provided to all property owners.The Court of Appeal concluded that the County did not meet its burden to prove that the fee was not a tax. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate refund amount and to address the owners' requests for declaratory, injunctive, and writ relief. The court emphasized that the fee must be limited to the reasonable cost of the separate assessments and must bear a fair relationship to the benefits received by the timeshare estate owners. View "Scott v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tidrick purchased a vehicle from FCA US LLC (FCA) and experienced transmission issues, leading her to request FCA repurchase the vehicle under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. FCA initially declined, prompting Tidrick to file a lawsuit in Orange County Superior Court. The parties eventually settled, with FCA agreeing to repurchase the vehicle, pay restitution, and cover attorney fees and costs. Tidrick sought $82,719.33 in attorney fees and costs, but the trial court awarded her only $15,000, a significant reduction.The Orange County Superior Court, where the case was initially filed, awarded Tidrick $15,000 in attorney fees and costs, applying hourly rates prevailing in Fresno County, where Tidrick resided and purchased the vehicle. The court justified this by referencing Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (b), which it interpreted as mandating venue in Fresno County. The court also criticized the number of hours billed and the lack of a settlement agreement copy, suggesting the litigation was unnecessarily prolonged.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in applying Fresno County rates instead of Orange County rates, as venue was proper in Orange County where FCA's principal place of business is located. The appellate court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by not properly applying the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees and failing to specify the amount of costs awarded. The appellate court reversed the trial court's award and remanded the case with directions to recalculate the attorney fees using Orange County rates and to clarify the costs awarded. View "Tidrick v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

Jonathan Yu filed a petition for a civil harassment restraining order against Lorain Pozniak-Rice on October 27, 2023, alleging harassment by Pozniak-Rice and her daughter following the end of his relationship with the daughter. Yu claimed that the harassment included phone calls, trespassing, threats, and false statements to authorities. The court issued a temporary restraining order and set a hearing date, requiring Yu to personally serve Pozniak-Rice with the petition and other documents.At the initial hearing on November 21, 2023, Yu reported unsuccessful attempts to serve Pozniak-Rice, leading the court to continue the hearing to December 19, 2023, and extend the temporary restraining order. Yu again failed to serve Pozniak-Rice personally and requested authorization for alternative service methods. The court granted this request based on a declaration from a service provider, allowing service by email and mail. Yu filed proofs of service indicating partial compliance with the court's order.Pozniak-Rice did not appear at the January 8, 2024, hearing, and the court granted Yu a five-year restraining order, finding clear and convincing evidence of harassment. Pozniak-Rice later filed a motion to set aside the restraining order, claiming she was never served, but the court denied the motion as procedurally defective.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and found that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding that Yu made a diligent effort to personally serve Pozniak-Rice. The appellate court reversed the restraining order, reinstated the temporary restraining order, and directed the trial court to give Yu another opportunity to serve Pozniak-Rice and conduct further proceedings on the petition. The appeal from the order denying the motion to set aside the restraining order was dismissed as moot. View "Yu v. Pozniak-Rice" on Justia Law

Jonathan Egelston, a youth correctional officer, was dismissed from his position by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation after he allegedly assaulted and harassed his girlfriend, J.G., and subsequently lied about the incident. The State Personnel Board (SPB) upheld his dismissal following an evidentiary hearing. Egelston then petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse the SPB's decision, but the trial court denied his petition.The family law court had previously dismissed J.G.'s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Egelston without prejudice. Egelston argued that this dismissal should bar the findings of assault and dishonesty under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. However, the trial court found that the SPB's credibility determinations, which favored J.G.'s testimony over Egelston's, were entitled to great weight.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Egelston's contention regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel was forfeited because it was not raised in the lower court. Additionally, the court found that the claim lacked merit. The family law court's dismissal of the DVRO without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the merits, and thus had no preclusive effect. The causes of action in the DVRO proceeding and the SPB proceedings were different, and the parties were not in privity.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding Egelston's dismissal from his position. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Egelston v. State Personnel Board" on Justia Law

D’Andre Lampkin, a deputy at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), filed a complaint alleging whistleblower retaliation after he reported an interaction with Michael Reddy, a retired deputy sheriff. Lampkin claimed that Reddy’s friends at LASD retaliated against him, leading to his suspension, a search of his residence, and termination of medical benefits. Lampkin sought monetary damages and other relief. The case went to trial, and the jury found that while Lampkin engaged in protected whistleblowing activity and this was a factor in LASD’s actions against him, LASD would have made the same decisions for legitimate, independent reasons. Consequently, the jury awarded no damages.Lampkin moved to amend his complaint to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, but the trial court denied the motion. He then filed a motion to be declared the prevailing party and sought attorney’s fees, arguing that the same-decision defense should not preclude a fee award, as held in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA cases. The trial court agreed, declared Lampkin the prevailing party, and awarded him costs and attorney’s fees.The County of Los Angeles appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The appellate court held that Lampkin did not bring a “successful action” under Labor Code section 1102.5 because he obtained no relief due to the County’s successful same-decision defense. Therefore, he was not entitled to attorney’s fees. The court also found that the County was the prevailing party under section 1032, as neither party obtained any relief, and thus Lampkin was not entitled to costs. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and order awarding fees and costs to Lampkin and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of the County. View "Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In March 2021, the district attorneys of Riverside, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Santa Clara counties filed a civil enforcement action against Credit One Bank, N.A. (Credit One) on behalf of the People of the State of California. The lawsuit alleged that Credit One engaged in debt collection practices that violated California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Unfair Competition Law. The People sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, restitution, and other equitable relief. Credit One responded with written discovery requests and later noticed the deposition of the People’s person most qualified (PMQ) to testify on 25 topics, including two document requests.The trial court denied the People’s motion to quash the deposition notice but instructed them to refile it as a motion for a protective order. The court granted the protective order in part, limiting the deposition topics and document requests but requiring the People to designate a PMQ. The People challenged this order, arguing that they should not be subject to deposition under the Code of Civil Procedure and that the deposition would be tantamount to deposing opposing counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the People, represented by government agencies, are subject to deposition under section 2025.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the court agreed that deposing the People in this context is effectively deposing opposing counsel. Therefore, the court applied the standard from Carehouse Convalescent Hospital v. Superior Court, requiring Credit One to demonstrate “extremely” good cause for the deposition. The trial court had not applied this standard, so the appellate court granted the petition and ordered the trial court to reconsider the People’s motion for a protective order using the correct standard. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Credit One Bank)" on Justia Law