Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Steven Gomes filed a lawsuit to invalidate ordinances regulating groundwater use in Mendocino, adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district). The district argued that Gomes’s claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior case, Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist. (2019) (Gomes I), which challenged the district’s groundwater management program. The trial court found the ordinances contained an invalid attorney’s fee provision but rejected Gomes’s other claims.In Gomes I, the trial court denied Gomes’s petition challenging the district’s 2007 groundwater measures, but the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found the district had authority to limit groundwater extraction and that the 2007 measures were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory procedures. The district subsequently adopted new ordinances in 2020, which Gomes challenged in the present case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Gomes argued the ordinances imposed fees for groundwater extraction that required voter approval, which the district did not obtain. The court concluded that the claim was not barred by Gomes I, as it involved different ordinances and provisions. The court held that the fees imposed by the district were not for the extraction of groundwater and thus did not require voter approval under section 10710. The judgment was affirmed, except for the invalid attorney’s fee provision. View "Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist." on Justia Law

In 2009, John Roe DZ 20, John Roe DZ 21, and John Roe DZ 22 (Plaintiffs) sued an employee of Doe 3, Family Services Organization (Family Services), alleging childhood sexual assault. The trial court dismissed the claims against the employee with prejudice due to the statute of limitations. In 2022, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint against Family Services based on the same allegations, relying on the revival provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.Family Services demurred to the complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims could not be revived under section 340.1, subdivision (q), because they were derivative of the claims litigated to finality in the 2009 action. The trial court overruled the demurrer. Family Services then petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a claim for derivative liability against a principal is considered “litigated to finality” under section 340.1, subdivision (q), if a previous suit against the agent for the same damages based on the same operative facts was dismissed with prejudice. Consequently, the court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain the demurrer but allowed Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to potentially allege new facts that could support a cause of action against Family Services. View "Doe 3 v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, a tenured professor at a community college, filed a complaint alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and related claims against the Los Angeles Community College District and a vice president of student services. The alleged harassment occurred over an eight-month period in 2017, during which the vice president made inappropriate comments and advances towards the plaintiff. The plaintiff also claimed retaliation when she did not comply with his demands, including attempts to move her program and firing her staff.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over the trial, where a jury awarded the plaintiff $10 million in noneconomic damages. The defendants filed motions for a new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict, citing prejudicial errors in the admission of evidence and excessive damages. These motions were denied by the trial judge, who made inappropriate and irrelevant comments during the post-trial hearing, leading to his disqualification for cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found significant errors in the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The appellate court determined that the admission of 20-year-old newspaper articles and evidence of the vice president's misdemeanor convictions were prejudicial and irrelevant. Additionally, the testimony of a student who had filed a separate harassment complaint against a different administrator was improperly admitted, as it was not closely related to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case.The appellate court concluded that these errors, combined with the excessive damages awarded, warranted a new trial. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Odom v. L.A. Community College Dist." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Melissa Mandell-Brown, filed a complaint against Novo Nordisk, Inc. and Zamaneh Zamanian, asserting 16 causes of action, including claims for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code, as well as common law claims for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a separate statement of 161 undisputed facts, attorney declarations, and witness declarations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after the plaintiff failed to file an opposition or a separate statement in response to the motion. The court granted two continuances to the plaintiff, but she still did not file the required documents or appear at the continued hearing. The court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her causes of action.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), by granting the motion based on the plaintiff’s failure to file the requisite separate statement. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, noting that the trial court had the discretion to grant the motion for summary judgment due to the plaintiff's non-compliance with the procedural requirements, especially given the complexity of the case and the multiple continuances already granted. View "Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk Inc." on Justia Law

Allan Gumarang entered into a lease agreement with Braemer on Raymond, LLC (Lessor) to operate an ice cream parlor. The lease included provisions requiring the Lessor to maintain the property and for Gumarang to obtain liability insurance and indemnify the Lessor against claims arising from his use of the property. In October 2017, a fire destroyed the property, and Gumarang alleged that the Lessor and its management (Management) failed to ensure the property had adequate fire prevention systems.Gumarang filed a lawsuit against the Lessor and Management for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. In response, the Lessor and Management demanded that Gumarang defend and indemnify them under the lease terms. When Gumarang refused, they filed a cross-complaint for indemnity and breach of contract. Gumarang filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, arguing it arose from his protected activity of filing the lawsuit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion in part, striking the cross-claims for comparative indemnity and equitable indemnity but denied it for the contractual indemnity and breach of contract claims. The court found that the latter claims did not arise from protected activity and that the indemnity provision in the lease was enforceable. The court also denied Gumarang’s request for attorney fees, finding he did not achieve a practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that the cross-claims for contractual indemnity and breach of contract did not arise from Gumarang’s protected activity of filing the lawsuit but from his alleged breach of the lease’s indemnity provision. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees, concluding that Gumarang did not obtain a significant practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion. View "Gumarang v. Braemer on Raymond, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Bakersfield operates multiple weirs on the Kern River to divert water for its use and for several water agencies, including the North Kern Water Storage District (NKWSD) and the Buena Vista Water Storage District. Environmental groups, including Bring Back the Kern (BBTK) and Water Audit California (WAC), sought and obtained a preliminary injunction from the Superior Court of Kern County. The injunction prohibited Bakersfield from operating the weirs in a manner that reduced Kern River flows below the volume sufficient to keep fish downstream in good condition. The trial court refused to consider the potential harm to the City or the water agencies in determining the applicability of the injunction.The water agencies filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the injunction and the subsequent order setting a flow rate were issued without proper consideration of their interests. The trial court stayed the flow rate order and modified the injunction, but the water agencies appealed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that under the self-executing provisions of article X, section 2 of the state Constitution, courts must always consider the reasonableness of water use when adjudicating such cases. The court found that the trial court's failure to consider the reasonableness of the water use it was ordering in the injunction was a constitutional error. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also addressed issues related to the bond requirement and the due process rights of the water agencies, concluding that the trial court erred in setting a nominal bond and in issuing an implementation order that affected the water agencies without their agreement. View "Bring Back the Kern v. City of Bakersfield" on Justia Law

Brian Prahl filed a petition to compel arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, alleging he was involved in a multiple vehicle accident in March 2016 while insured by Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Company. The insurance proceeds from the at-fault drivers were insufficient to cover his damages, leading him to seek arbitration for his underinsured motorist claim. Allstate agreed to arbitration in May 2018, but the arbitration was delayed and not concluded within the five-year deadline set by Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i). Prahl argued that Judicial Council Emergency Rule 10 extended this deadline by six months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Prahl's petition, concluding that the five-year deadline had expired and that Emergency Rule 10 did not apply to extend the deadline for arbitration. Prahl also contended that the court should have granted his petition because Allstate's opposition was not filed timely. However, the court found good cause to consider the late opposition, noting that Prahl had filed a reply on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Emergency Rule 10, which extends the time to bring a civil action to trial by six months, did not apply to arbitration proceedings. The court reasoned that the term "civil action" refers to court actions and does not include arbitration, which is an alternative to a civil action. Consequently, Prahl's failure to conclude the arbitration within the statutory five-year period resulted in the loss of his right to compel arbitration. The appellate court also upheld the lower court's decision to consider Allstate's late opposition, finding no undue prejudice to Prahl. View "Prahl v. Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

K.T. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-partner, E.S., with whom she shares three daughters. K.T. alleged that E.S. had subjected her to physical and sexual abuse over several years, including incidents where the children were present. She also claimed that E.S. had abducted the children from Texas to California without her consent. K.T. sought to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO, citing their exposure to E.S.'s abusive behavior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted K.T. a temporary restraining order (TRO) against E.S. but did not include the children as protected parties, citing a lack of imminent risk of harm to them. During the hearing on K.T.'s DVRO request, the court reviewed her declaration and testimony, which detailed the abuse and the children's exposure to it. The court granted the DVRO protecting K.T. but did not include the children, stating there was no credible evidence of physical or sexual abuse of the children.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had used the wrong legal standard by requiring evidence of direct abuse of the children. The appellate court held that the correct standard was "good cause" based on the totality of the circumstances, which includes the children's exposure to domestic violence. The appellate court found that K.T. had provided sufficient evidence of good cause to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing it to modify the DVRO to include the children as protected parties. The court otherwise affirmed the trial court's order and awarded costs to K.T. View "K.T. v. E.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting claims for negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, alleged that Dr. Panguluri’s mishandling of a syringe containing an HIV patient’s blood caused the blood to splash into his face and eye. The complaint did not claim that Glenn contracted HIV but stated that both plaintiffs suffered harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the plaintiffs' claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The plaintiffs did not amend their complaint but instead filed a voluntary dismissal of their entire action with prejudice, intending to expedite an appeal of the trial court’s adverse rulings.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ appeal. The court held that a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs' request, without a final judicial determination of their claims, is not an appealable order. The court emphasized that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

Kamran Ghadimi, M.D., filed a collection action against his former patient, Eileen Talbott, for unpaid medical bills. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations, and Ghadimi's counsel indicated acceptance of a $9,500 settlement. However, Ghadimi later backed out of the agreement. Talbott filed a cross-complaint to enforce the settlement. Ghadimi missed the deadline to respond, and the trial court entered his default. Ghadimi moved to set aside the default under the mandatory relief provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), but the trial court denied the motion, finding the default was due to a calculated litigation strategy by Ghadimi’s lawyers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Ghadimi's motion to set aside the default, concluding that the default was caused by a deliberate litigation strategy rather than neglect or mistake. The court also found that Ghadimi's counsel's declaration seeking an extension to respond to the cross-complaint was not credible and that the default was not due to any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that Ghadimi was entitled to relief under the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b). The court held that the default was caused by the actions of Ghadimi’s lawyers, not by Ghadimi himself, and that the mandatory relief provision should be applied to relieve the innocent client of the consequences of the attorney’s fault. The court reversed the judgment and the postjudgment order granting Talbott’s motion for attorneys’ fees, directing the trial court to vacate the default judgment and enter a new order granting Ghadimi’s motion to set aside the default. View "Talbott v. Ghadimi" on Justia Law