Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. (ALR) entered into a partnership agreement with Real Estate Portfolio Management, LLC (REPM) to purchase, rehabilitate, and sell properties, splitting profits equally. ALR alleged that REPM breached the agreement by failing to pay over $800,000 in profits and also breached its fiduciary duties. ALR further claimed that Steve George, REPM’s sole member, was the alter ego of REPM. After REPM failed to pay the judgment, ALR conducted a debtor’s examination and asserted that postjudgment actions by George fraudulently drained REPM’s assets to avoid payment.The Superior Court of Sacramento County held a bench trial and found in favor of ALR on the breach of partnership and fiduciary duty claims, awarding nearly $1 million in damages and interest against REPM. However, the court found that ALR had not proven George was REPM’s alter ego and entered judgment accordingly. When ALR later moved to amend the judgment to add George as a judgment debtor based on alleged postjudgment fraudulent conduct, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the alter ego issue since it had already been decided.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel without considering whether new facts or changed circumstances had arisen since the prior decision. The appellate court clarified that collateral estoppel does not bar reconsideration of an issue if material facts have changed after the original judgment. The order denying ALR’s motion to amend the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to determine whether postjudgment events warrant a different outcome on the alter ego issue. View "Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. v. George" on Justia Law

A plaintiff alleged that, between 1965 and 1969, while he was a young child attending an elementary school in a California school district, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by the school’s principal. The complaint stated that school staff and faculty were aware or suspected the abuse, and that similar abuse occurred to other students. The plaintiff claimed ongoing psychological and emotional harm as a result. He brought four negligence-based causes of action against the school district, asserting that he was not required to present a government tort claim before filing suit due to statutory changes exempting such claims.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the school district’s demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement was fatal to his case, and concluded that legislative changes extending the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault did not alter the deadline for filing a claim against a public entity.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement for claims under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 violated the California Constitution’s gift clause. The appellate court held that the retroactive waiver did not create a new liability or cause of action, but merely removed a procedural barrier to suit. The court further found that the legislative purpose of aiding victims of childhood sexual assault served a valid public purpose and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe R.L. v. Merced City School District" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco, seeking $5,000,000 in damages for injuries sustained after falling from a scooter that struck a pothole. During discovery, the City sought information about the plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the incident. The plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide timely and complete responses to certain form interrogatories related to requests for admission about intoxication, despite repeated requests and meet and confer efforts by the City. Additionally, during an independent medical examination, observers chosen by the plaintiff’s attorney interfered with the process, preventing the examining doctor from completing the evaluation.The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County addressed two discovery disputes. First, it granted the City’s motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and imposed a $6,500 sanction against the plaintiff’s counsel for failing to provide timely, code-compliant responses. Second, it imposed a $1,500 sanction after finding that the plaintiff’s observers had improperly interfered with the medical examination. The parties settled the underlying action, but the plaintiff appealed the sanctions. The City moved to dismiss portions of the appeal, arguing that some orders were not appealable and that the sanctions for the medical exam were below the statutory threshold for appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, granted the City’s motion to partially dismiss the appeal, finding that the orders regarding the protective order and the $1,500 sanction were not appealable. The court affirmed the $6,500 sanction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it, as the plaintiff’s counsel lacked substantial justification for opposing the motion to compel. The appellate court also imposed $30,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff’s counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and referred the matter to the State Bar. View "Morales v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Steven Meads and Penny Lipking-Meads operated a business as a sole proprietorship before partnering with Jed Driggers in 2010 to expand the business. The parties formed Afterburner, LLC, with the Meadses and Driggers as members, and Driggers as manager. The Meadses contributed assets and goodwill, while Driggers provided capital and expertise. The LLC’s operating agreement included a provision stating that the LLC could only be dissolved by a vote of the members or bankruptcy/insolvency, and that members agreed not to take any other voluntary action to dissolve the LLC, effectively waiving the right to seek judicial dissolution under certain statutory circumstances.A decade later, the Meadses alleged Driggers had improperly diverted business funds and filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Siskiyou County seeking, among other relief, judicial dissolution of the LLC. Driggers and the LLC filed a cross-complaint for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that the Meadses violated the operating agreement’s waiver provision by seeking dissolution. The Meadses responded with a motion to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, contending that the waiver provision was unenforceable as contrary to law and public policy. The Superior Court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, finding the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Driggers could not show a probability of prevailing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that, under the Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act, an LLC operating agreement may not waive or vary a member’s statutory right to seek judicial dissolution in the circumstances specified by law. The court concluded that the waiver provision was void and unenforceable, and thus Driggers could not prevail on his cross-complaint. The order striking the cross-complaint was affirmed. View "Meads v. Driggers" on Justia Law

An elderly plaintiff with significant disabilities inherited her home and, facing a tax sale due to unpaid property taxes, responded to a flyer offering help. She met with the defendant, who had her sign documents that transferred ownership of her home to him, allegedly under the pretense of providing a loan. The documents did not provide for any payment to the plaintiff, only that the defendant would pay the back taxes. The plaintiff later attempted to cancel the transaction, believing it had been voided when the defendant returned her documents and she received no loan. Several years later, the defendant served her with an eviction notice, prompting her to file suit alleging fraud, undue influence, financial elder abuse, and other claims, seeking cancellation of the transfer and damages.The case was heard in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The defendant, representing himself, filed an answer and a cross-complaint, asserting that he had purchased the property and that the plaintiff had lived rent-free for years. The litigation was marked by extensive discovery disputes, with the plaintiff filing nine motions to compel and for sanctions due to the defendant’s repeated failures to provide timely and adequate discovery responses, appear for depositions, and pay court-ordered sanctions. The court issued incremental sanctions, including monetary and issue sanctions, before ultimately imposing terminating sanctions by striking the defendant’s answer and cross-complaint, leading to a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions after the defendant’s persistent and willful noncompliance with discovery orders. The court also found that the plaintiff’s complaint provided sufficient notice of damages, and that the award of damages and attorney fees was supported by substantial evidence. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed in all respects. View "Atlas v. Davidyan" on Justia Law

In 2021, a plaintiff filed a complaint against a public school district, alleging that she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a teacher while attending middle and high school. The complaint asserted that the teacher’s abusive conduct was widely known within the school and that the district either knew or should have known about the abuse but failed to act, allowing the teacher to remain employed. The plaintiff brought claims for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, relying on statutory provisions that exempt certain childhood sexual assault claims from the usual requirement to present a claim to the public entity before filing suit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case after the school district moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district argued that the plaintiff’s claims were only possible due to Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218), which retroactively eliminated the claims presentation requirement for childhood sexual assault claims against public entities. The district contended that AB 218 violated the gift clause of the California Constitution by imposing liability for past acts where no enforceable claim previously existed. The trial court agreed, finding that AB 218 retroactively created liability and constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that AB 218 does not violate the gift clause because it did not create new substantive liability; rather, it removed a procedural barrier to enforcing pre-existing liability for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with directions to deny the school district’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "O.B. v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

A sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court applied to be appointed as the San Diego County Public Defender in 2023. The County informed him that he was ineligible for the position, citing Government Code section 27701, which requires that a person must have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the State for at least the year preceding the date of election or appointment. The judge, acting in his individual capacity, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial determination that the statute only required one year of prior practice at any time before appointment, not necessarily the year immediately preceding.The case was initially filed in the San Diego County Superior Court but was reassigned to the Orange County Superior Court due to the nature of the parties. The parties agreed to resolve the statutory interpretation issue through a motion. The plaintiff argued that his interpretation avoided absurd results and constitutional issues, while the County maintained that the statute’s plain language required the one year of practice to be immediately before appointment. The Orange County Superior Court ruled in favor of the County, finding the statutory language unambiguous and declining to rewrite the statute.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The appellate court held that the language of section 27701 is unambiguous: eligibility for the office of public defender requires that the candidate has been a practicing attorney in all courts of the State for at least the one year immediately preceding election or appointment. The court rejected arguments regarding ambiguity, absurdity, and constitutional avoidance, finding no basis to depart from the statute’s plain meaning. The judgment of the Orange County Superior Court was affirmed. View "Washington v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

A mobilehome park owner challenged the constitutionality of a California statute that limits annual rent increases for certain mobilehome parks located within the jurisdictions of two or more incorporated cities. The owner argued that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a procedural mechanism allowing property owners to seek rent increases above the statutory cap to ensure a fair return, which the owner claimed is required by the California and U.S. Constitutions. The owner asserted that the absence of such a mechanism results in a violation of due process, equal protection, and the prohibition against uncompensated takings.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the statute’s failure to provide a process for seeking exceptions to the rent cap violated due process and rendered the statute unconstitutional. The court rejected the owner’s takings argument but concluded that the legal issue was dispositive and denied the State’s request for leave to amend its answer. Judgment was entered in favor of the owner, and the State appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the owner failed to establish that the statute is facially unconstitutional, as the relevant legal precedents do not require a fair return adjustment mechanism in every rent control law. The court also found that the State’s general denial in its answer placed the owner’s standing at issue, precluding judgment on the pleadings. The court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the absence of a fair return adjustment mechanism does not, by itself, render the statute facially unconstitutional, and that the State’s answer raised material issues that should have prevented judgment on the pleadings. View "Anaheim Mobile Estates v. State" on Justia Law

Two minor plaintiffs attended a four-day overnight science camp operated by a private entity and organized by their public school district. After returning home, they and their parents alleged that, during the camp, they were exposed to discussions and lessons about gender identity, including being introduced to counselors who used “they/them” pronouns and being asked to state their own preferred pronouns. The plaintiffs also claimed they were not allowed to contact their parents to discuss these matters due to a camp policy prohibiting calls home. They asserted that these experiences caused them severe emotional distress and initiated professional therapy.The plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of Orange County, asserting claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) against both the camp operator and the school district. The camp operator responded with a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that the claims arose from protected speech on matters of public interest—specifically, gender identity discussions. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the claims were not based on protected activity but rather on the lack of disclosure to parents and the prohibition on contacting them. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees, finding the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The appellate court found that the IIED and NIED claims, to the extent they were based on exposure to gender identity discussions, arose from protected activity and lacked minimal merit, both factually and legally, under California public policy. However, claims based solely on the prohibition of calls home or sleeping arrangements did not arise from protected activity and could proceed. The order was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. View "Sandoval v. Pali Institute" on Justia Law

Gary Birdsall was stopped in traffic on the Bay Bridge when his van was rear-ended by Barton Helfet, resulting in serious injuries to Gary and a loss of consortium claim by his wife, Pamela. The Birdsalls’ attorney sent Helfet’s insurer a settlement demand for the $100,000 policy limit, specifying acceptance required delivery of a standard bodily injury release to be executed by both Gary and Pamela, a settlement check, and proof of policy limits by a set deadline. The insurer responded before the deadline with a letter accepting the offer, a release (which mistakenly listed Pamela as a releasee rather than a releasor), the check, and proof of policy limits. A corrected release was sent after the deadline. The Birdsalls’ attorney rejected the settlement, citing the release’s error and the late correction, and returned the check.The Birdsalls filed suit in the San Francisco County Superior Court. Helfet’s answer included affirmative defenses of settlement and comparative fault for Gary’s failure to wear a seat belt. The Birdsalls moved for summary adjudication on the settlement defense, which the law and motion judge granted. At trial, the assigned judge excluded evidence and jury instructions regarding Gary’s seat belt use. The jury found Helfet negligent, awarded substantial damages to both plaintiffs, and judgment was entered. Helfet’s post-trial motions were denied, and he appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that summary adjudication of the settlement defense was improper because there was a triable issue of material fact regarding mutual consent to the settlement. The court also found error in excluding seat belt evidence and instructions, holding that such evidence is admissible and, under the circumstances, expert testimony was not required. The judgment and amended judgment were reversed, with instructions for a new trial and denial of summary adjudication. View "Birdsall v. Helfet" on Justia Law