Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (DCCMG) and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting five causes of action: negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, was exposed to HIV patient’s blood during a procedure due to Dr. Panguluri’s actions. The complaint did not allege that Glenn contracted HIV but claimed harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The Maniagos did not request oral argument and did not appear for the hearing. Subsequently, they voluntarily dismissed their entire action with prejudice to expedite an appeal of the adverse rulings.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal from a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs’ request without a final judicial determination of their claims. The court emphasized that a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff is a ministerial act and not appealable. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

A hospital in Siskiyou County, California, filed a lawsuit against the County of Siskiyou and other defendants, challenging the practice of bringing individuals with psychiatric emergencies to its emergency department under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act. The hospital argued that it was not equipped or licensed to provide the necessary psychiatric care and sought to prevent the county from bringing such patients to its facility unless they had a physical emergency condition. The hospital also sought reimbursement for the costs associated with holding these patients.The Siskiyou County Superior Court denied the hospital's motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to stop the county from bringing psychiatric patients to its emergency department. The court found that the hospital had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and that the burden on the county and the potential harm to the patients outweighed the hospital's concerns.The hospital's complaint included several causes of action, including violations of Medicaid laws, disability discrimination laws, mental health parity laws, and section 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The hospital also alleged breach of an implied-in-fact contract for the costs incurred in providing post-stabilization services to psychiatric patients. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend, finding that the hospital failed to identify any clear legal mandate that the county or the Department of Health Care Services had violated.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's judgment of dismissal. The appellate court concluded that the hospital had not identified any mandatory and ministerial duty that the county or the department had violated, which is necessary to obtain a writ of mandate. The court also found that the hospital's breach of contract claim failed because there were no allegations of mutual consent to an implied contract. Consequently, the hospital's appeal from the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot. View "Siskiyou Hospital v. County of Siskiyou" on Justia Law

In this case, Joely Ng filed a complaint against Los Alamitos Medical Center and several doctors, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death following the death of her husband, Kenneth Ng. Kenneth was admitted to the Medical Center due to a malfunction of his G-tube, which was improperly placed by Dr. McMahon. Subsequent negligence by other doctors led to Kenneth developing sepsis and dying three months later. Joely Ng sought noneconomic damages for both wrongful death and a survival claim.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the Medical Center's motion to strike portions of Ng's complaint that sought two separate caps on noneconomic damages under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). The court reasoned that the wrongful death claim was not separate from the medical negligence claim and thus could not be subject to a separate MICRA cap. The court denied leave to amend but allowed for the possibility of future amendments if Ng could allege facts supporting the claims as separate and distinct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that wrongful death and survival claims are separate and distinct, even when based on the same incident of medical malpractice. Therefore, Ng is entitled to seek two separate MICRA caps for noneconomic damages. The court granted Ng's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its previous order and issue a new order denying the Medical Center's motion to strike. View "Ng v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In September 2016, a high school student, almost 16 years old, was involved in a fistfight during an art class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had a back condition, intervened to stop the fight. While pulling one of the boys away, the teacher lost his balance and fell onto the plaintiff, breaking the plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for negligence, arguing that the teacher should not have intervened due to his physical condition and that the school district failed to train its teachers on safely handling physical altercations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a 15-day trial, during which the jury viewed a video of the incident multiple times. The jury concluded that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent and found that the plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for the harm. The plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a new trial was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The court also upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness on the grounds that the expert was not qualified to opine on classroom management and discipline. Additionally, the court found no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the plaintiff’s requested special jury instructions, as the standard instructions on negligence were deemed sufficient. The judgment and the order denying the plaintiff’s motion for JNOV and a new trial were affirmed. View "I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The Town of Apple Valley (TAV) sought to condemn a private water utility system through eminent domain. In November 2015, TAV passed two resolutions of necessity (RON) to acquire the system, which was owned by Carlyle Infrastructure Partners and operated by Apple Valley Ranchos Water (AVR). In January 2016, TAV filed an eminent domain action, and Carlyle sold the system to Liberty Utilities. After a 67-day bench trial, the trial court found that TAV did not have the right to acquire the system and entered judgment for Liberty, awarding attorney’s fees. TAV appealed.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Liberty only needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the public necessity elements were not met, and that the administrative record (AR) was irrelevant. The trial court allowed Liberty to present any evidence it deemed relevant, including post-RON evidence, and found in favor of Liberty.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review by not using the gross abuse of discretion standard. The trial court also erred by not admitting the AR, failing to start its analysis with the RON’s findings, and improperly allowing Liberty to rely solely on post-RON evidence. The appellate court emphasized that the rebuttable presumption in favor of TAV’s findings should have been the starting point for the trial court’s analysis.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, allowing the trial court to determine whether to permit TAV to take the water system, remand the matter to TAV for further administrative proceedings, or hold a new trial applying the correct standards. The judgment and attorney’s fees award were reversed, and TAV was allowed to recover its costs on appeal. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchose Water" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Caesar Elmi rejected a settlement offer from defendant Related Management Company, L.P. (Related) under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The case was resolved for less than the amount offered by Related, leading to a limitation on Elmi’s award of prejudgment costs and attorney fees to those incurred before the offer. Elmi later filed a motion seeking additional fees and costs incurred in enforcing the judgment, which the trial court denied, stating that Elmi was not entitled to any fees or costs after the date of the settlement offer.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Elmi’s motion for additional fees and costs, reasoning that section 998 precluded any fees or costs incurred after the settlement offer. Elmi appealed this decision, arguing that section 998 only applies to prejudgment costs and fees, not postjudgment costs incurred in enforcing the judgment.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Elmi, holding that postjudgment costs and fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not governed by section 998. The court noted that postjudgment costs and fees are distinct from prejudgment costs and fees and are governed by different laws, specifically section 685.040, which allows for the recovery of reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment, including attorney’s fees.The court reversed the trial court’s order denying Elmi’s motion for postjudgment fees and costs and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider the motion on its merits. Elmi was also entitled to recover his costs on appeal. View "Elmi v. Related Management Co., L.P." on Justia Law

In September 2016, a high school student, almost 16 years old, was involved in a fistfight during an art class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had a back condition, intervened to stop the fight. While pulling the larger boy away, the teacher lost his balance and fell onto the plaintiff, breaking the plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for negligence, arguing that the teacher should not have intervened due to his physical condition and that the school district failed to train teachers on safely handling physical altercations.The case was tried in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. After a 15-day trial, the jury viewed a video of the incident multiple times and concluded that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The jury found that the plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for the harm. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a motion for a new trial, both of which were denied by the trial court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, finding no error in the trial court’s decisions. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The court also found no error in the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness and the refusal to give several special jury instructions requested by the plaintiff. The appellate court concluded that the standard instructions given were sufficient and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s rulings. View "I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist. et al." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive.The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law

Kristin Casey, a former employee of D.R. Horton, Inc., filed a lawsuit against the company and one of its employees, Kris Hansen, alleging sexual harassment and other claims. D.R. Horton moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement that included an arbitration clause governed by California law. Casey opposed the motion, citing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which allows plaintiffs to invalidate arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual harassment. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the EFAA was inapplicable due to the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially reviewed the case and granted the motion to compel arbitration, accepting Hansen's joinder. The court concluded that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement meant that California law, not the EFAA, applied. Casey then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the EFAA preempts state law attempts to compel arbitration in cases related to sexual harassment disputes. The court determined that the EFAA applies to the parties' transaction because it sufficiently involved interstate commerce. The court also concluded that the EFAA's rule of unenforceability of arbitration agreements in sexual harassment cases preempts the state law and that parties cannot contract around the EFAA through a choice-of-law provision. Consequently, the court granted Casey's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Casey v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Humane officers from the Humane Society of the Sierra Foothills seized animals from Matthew C. Bakos's property under a search warrant issued pursuant to Penal Code section 597.1. Bakos subsequently sued the officers and a volunteer veterinarian, alleging negligence and abuse of process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that although the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity due to the lack of a postseizure administrative hearing, Bakos could not establish essential elements of his causes of action.The Superior Court of Placer County found that Bakos could not prove negligence because he could not establish a duty of care or breach of duty owed to him. The court also concluded that Bakos could not establish negligence per se because he was not a member of the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted, and the harm he suffered was not the type of harm the statute was designed to prevent. Regarding the abuse of process claim, the court found no evidence that any defendant harbored an ulterior motive. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that summary judgment was proper as to the veterinarian, Fritz, and summary adjudication was proper as to all defendants on the abuse of process cause of action. However, the court found that there were triable issues of material fact regarding the negligence cause of action against the Humane Society, Roach, and Frieborn because Bakos was not afforded the opportunity for a postseizure administrative hearing, and the defendants did not establish entitlement to qualified immunity. The appellate court reversed the judgment as to the negligence cause of action against the Humane Society, Roach, and Frieborn, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "Bakos v. Roach" on Justia Law