Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A lawsuit filed primarily to chill the valid exercise of free speech is called a "SLAPP" suit and, if without merit, such an action may be dismissed early under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In this anti-SLAPP case, investigative newsource (inewsource), an independent, nonprofit journalism organization, entered into contracts with KPBS, San Diego's public radio and television station, to gather and produce news stories with and for KPBS, in exchange for the right to use KPBS offices, media equipment, and related news facilities. KPBS was a department of San Diego State University (SDSU), and inewsource and KPBS have jointly created hundreds of news stories. In February 2015 inewsource began publishing articles critical of attorney Cory Briggs. After inewsource published about a dozen more critical stories about Briggs, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), an entity inewsource reported is controlled by Briggs, sued inewsource, along with its founder, Loretta Hearn, and also SDSU, California State University (CSU), and San Diego State University Research Foundation (SDSURF), alleging the contracts between KPBS and inewsource violate statutory prohibitions on self-dealing involving public funds because Hearn was allegedly influencing both sides of the transaction - for SDSU as a faculty member, and for inewsource as its executive director. SDOG also alleged inewsource and Hearn misappropriated the names KPBS and SDSU. Asserting SDOG's lawsuit was based on the exercise of their constitutionally protected speech rights and lacked merit, Defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions. The trial court granted the motions. SDOG appealed, contending the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because: (1) its lawsuit is a public interest lawsuit, exempt from the anti-SLAPP law under section 425.17, subdivision (b); and (2) the exception to that exemption for media defendants under section 425.17, subdivision (d) was inapplicable because its lawsuit has "nothing to do with stopping news reporting" but was instead directed to stopping "self-dealing by a public employee." The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State" on Justia Law

When defendant HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC) notified plaintiff Stanley P. Berman in writing that HSBC was denying his application for a loan modification, HSBC told him he had 15 days to appeal the denial. Under the law, however, Berman actually had 30 days to appeal. Berman brought this action for injunctive relief under Civil Code section 2924.12 on the theory that “the denial letter . . . [wa]s a material violation of sub[division] (d) [of section 2923.6] in that [the letter] only provide[d] fifteen days for appeal.” The trial court sustained HSBC’s demurrer to Berman’s complaint without leave to amend based on the conclusion that Berman had not alleged a violation of section 2923.6. On Berman’s appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred: the denial letter constituted a material violation of section 2923.6 because it substantially misstated the time Berman was allowed by the law to appeal HSBC’s denial of his application for a loan modification. Moreover, the Court found no merit in any of HSBC’s alternate arguments for affirming the trial court. View "Berman v. HSBC Bank" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of mandate and concluded, among other things, that the scope of questions asked by a judgment creditor in a third party judgment debtor examination may include the location of assets no longer in the possession of the third party. Whatever the scope of the original order for examination, KGCRE and James Goveia now have more than adequate notice of the trial court's subsequent discovery order, and are required to comply fully and completely with that order. View "Yolanda's, Inc. v. Kahl & Goveia Commercial Real Estate" on Justia Law

The Sixth Appellate District directed the superior court to reconsider its denial of a motion to dismiss or stay a personal injury lawsuit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The suit was filed by a Canadian citizen and resident of British Columbia against Fox, a California corporation that manufactures bicycle parts. The plaintiff was injured while mountain biking in Canada on a custom-built bicycle that included parts manufactured by Fox. The plaintiff filed another court action in Vancouver, naming other defendants. Fox argued that British Columbia, where the Canadian case was ongoing, was a suitable forum because plaintiff was a British Columbia resident, the accident took place in British Columbia, and all relevant evidence, medical personnel, and percipient witnesses were located there. Fox believed it was at an unfair disadvantage because it had no way to compel the appearance of crucial Canadian witnesses, and that the cases should be tried together to prevent piecemeal litigation. Fox stipulated that it would subject itself to jurisdiction in British Columbia. The superior court applied the “seriously inconvenient forum” standard in denying Fox’s motion. The court of appeal stated “a foreign, noncitizen plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to less deference.” View "Fox Factory, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaza de Panama Committee (the Committee) appealed the denial of its motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Committee filed the motion after it successfully appealed a judgment granting a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Save Our Heritage Organisation (SOHO), in which SOHO challenged the approval by the City of San Diego (City) of a site development permit for a revitalization project in Balboa Park (the project). This appeal presented two related issues for the Court of Appeal’s review: whether the Committee, as a project proponent, could obtain a section 1021.5 attorney fees award and, if so, whether the court could impose such an award against SOHO. After review, the Court concluded a project proponent may obtain a section 1021.5 attorney fees award if the project proponent satisfies the award's requirements. Furthermore, the Court concluded while SOHO did not dispute the Committee satisfied the award's requirements, SOHO was not the type of party against whom the court may impose such an award because SOHO did nothing to compromise public rights. The Court, therefore, affirmed the order. View "Save Our Heritage Org. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2006, the City of San Diego (City) obtained a Site Development Permit (SDP) to construct a new lifeguard station on Mission Beach. The SDP stated that failure to utilize the permit within 36 months of its issuance would automatically void the permit. Over the ensuing years, the City worked to secure a permit from the California Coastal Commission (Commission) and to obtain funding for the project. Largely because of the economic downtown, the City struggled to find financing for the project and no construction occurred until 2015. At that time, the City notified nearby residents that its contractor would begin construction in March. The City issued building permits in April and its contractor began initial work on the project, then stopped before the summer moratorium on beach construction. In August 2015, before the end of the moratorium, Citizens for Beach Rights (Citizens) brought a petition for writ of mandate and claim for declaratory relief seeking to halt construction on the grounds that the SDP issued in 2006 had expired. The trial court agreed with Citizens and issued a permanent injunction, preventing further construction without a new SDP. The City appealed, arguing Citizens' claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations or the doctrine of laches and, even if the action was not time barred, the SDP remained valid in 2015 under the City's municipal code and policies. The City also argued Citizens improperly sought declaratory relief. After review, the Court of Appeal held Citizens' action was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and, even if Citizens' claims had been timely pursued, the SDP remained valid when construction began. View "Citizens for Beach Rights v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her three siblings, on behalf of her 88-year-old mother. Plaintiff claimed that her siblings' actions individually and while serving as trustees of her mother's revocable living trust constituted financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The siblings demurred. The mother, separately represented by counsel, intervened and joined the demurrer to the amended complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the elder abuse action on standing grounds. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the elder abuse action because she has not be personally aggrieved by her siblings' actions. The court rejected plaintiff's claims to the contrary and affirmed the judgment. View "Tepper v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, the issues presented for the Court of Appeal’s review related to a confidential attorney-client communication. The trial court found that plaintiff and real party in interest Richard Hausman, Sr. (Dick), did not waive the attorney-client privilege by forwarding a confidential e-mail he received from his personal attorney to his sister-in-law because Dick inadvertently and unknowingly forwarded the e-mail from his iPhone, and therefore lacked the necessary intent to waive the privilege. The trial court also impliedly found that Dick’s sister-in-law did not waive the privilege when she forwarded the e-mail to her husband, who then shared it with four other individuals, because neither Dick’s sister-in-law nor his brother-in-law could waive Dick’s attorney-client privilege, and Dick did not consent to these additional disclosures because he did not know about either his initial disclosure or these additional disclosures until a year after they occurred. In a separate order, the trial court disqualified Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Gibson Dunn) from representing defendants-petitioners McDermott Will & Emery LLP and Jonathan Lurie (collectively, Defendants) in the underlying lawsuits because Gibson Dunn failed to recognize the potentially privileged nature of the e-mail after receiving a copy from Lurie, and then analyzed and used the e-mail despite Dick’s objection that the e-mail was an inadvertently disclosed privileged document. The Court of Appeal denied the petition in its entirety. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s orders and the court did not abuse its discretion in selecting disqualification as the appropriate remedy to address Gibson Dunn’s involvement in this matter. “[R]egardless of how the attorney obtained the documents, whenever a reasonably competent attorney would conclude the documents obviously or clearly appear to be privileged and it is reasonably apparent they were inadvertently disclosed, the State Fund rule requires the attorney to review the documents no more than necessary to determine whether they are privileged, notify the privilege holder the attorney has documents that appear to be privileged, and refrain from using the documents until the parties or the court resolves any dispute about their privileged nature. The receiving attorney’s reasonable belief the privilege holder waived the privilege or an exception to the privilege applies does not vitiate the attorney’s State Fund duties.” View "McDermott Will & Emery v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Deanna Huntley challenged the trial court's denial of her motion to divide unadjudicated community property. Deanna filed her motion more than two years after entry of a default judgment that dissolved her marriage to Frank Huntley. The trial court denied the motion on grounds Deanna had not first moved to set aside the default judgment. On appeal, Deanna argued: (1) Family Code section 2556 conferred the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate omitted community property without having to first move to set aside the judgment; (2) the dissolution judgment's silence as to the division of any property meant all of the community property remained to be divided; and (3) the trial court's error should have been reversed for proper division of the parties' community property. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded section 2556 provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to divide omitted or unadjudicated community property. The default judgment's silence as to any division of property required reversal and the Court remanded for further proceedings under Family Code sections 2550 and 2556. View "In re Marriage of Huntley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the City's finding that a project was exempt from formal environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act, Pub. Resources Code, 21084, subd. (a); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, 15061, subd. (b)(3). The trial court entered judgment for the City. Plaintiff then filed a motion under section 473, subdivision (b) asserting that both discretionary and mandatory relief should be granted, relying on its attorney's sworn affidavit in which he admitted to his neglect in failing to lodge the administrative record. The trial court denied discretionary relief, but granted mandatory relief. The court agreed with the City that the trial court erred by granting the mandatory relief request under section 473, subdivision (b). The court explained that the section 473, subdivision (b) mandatory relief provision only applies to a default, a default judgment, or a dismissal. In this case, the plaintiff did not seek a default, default judgment, or dismissal. Because the section 473, subdivision (b) mandatory relief provisions did not apply in this case, the court reversed the order setting aside the judgment. View "Urban Wildlands Group v. City of L.A." on Justia Law