Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

K.W.’s one-year conservatorship (Welf. & Inst. Code 5000) was established in 2015 following a contested bench trial. The Conservator petitioned for reappointment in 2016. K.W. requested a jury trial. Bravo, certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, testified as an expert in forensic psychiatry. He was a consulting member of K.W.’s treatment team and conducted a 50-minute face-to-face interview with K.W. Bravo had previously interviewed K.W. and personally observed K.W. at the county’s psychiatric emergency facilities. Bravo consulted medical records and spoke to K.W.’s former psychiatrist, a social worker, and others. Bravo diagnosed K.W. as suffering from a schizoaffective disorder with “disorganized thinking and behaviors” resulting in lack of impulse control, impaired judgment, and “paranoid and grandiose” delusions. Bravo opined that K.W. lacked insight into his mental illness and that K.W met the Act's criteria for grave disability and was unable to care for himself. The jury found K.W. gravely disabled; the court ordered reestablishment of the conservatorship. The court of appeal affirmed. Any error by the trial court in permitting the jury to consider case-specific hearsay testimony of K.W.’s behavior was harmless. The only medical evidence before the jury was an unimpeached opinion from a well-qualified expert. The jury could reasonably have rejected K.W.’s contrary view of his own abilities. View "Conservatorship of the Person of K.W." on Justia Law

Marlene Baker LaBerge, a 73-year-old woman, was a resident and patient of a 24- hour skilled nursing facility owned by Italian Maple Holdings, LLC dba La Paloma Healthcare Center (La Paloma). LaBerge's heirs, Paul LaBerge, Suzanne Marx, and Talmadge Baker (collectively Plaintiffs) sued La Paloma and Plum Healthcare, LLC (together Defendants) for elder abuse, violations of the Patient's Bill of Rights as codified at Health and Safety Code section 1430, negligence, and wrongful death. In response, Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration based on the two arbitration agreements that LaBerge had executed. The two arbitration agreements included language required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, subdivision (c), requiring such agreements to include a 30-day "cooling off" period, during which the parties to the agreement may rescind it. Ten days after LaBerge signed the agreements (and therefore, prior to the expiration of the statutorily-required 30- day rescission period), LaBerge passed away. The superior court denied the petition to compel arbitration, relying on Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 176 Cal.App.4th 1461 (2009) to conclude that the agreements were not effective until the 30-day rescission period passed without either party rescinding the agreements; because LaBerge died before the expiration of the 30-day rescission period, the agreements could not be given effect. On appeal, Defendants contended the trial court’s interpretation was wrong, and the Court of Appeal should decline to follow Rodriguez because that case was factually distinguishable from this case. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in interpreting section 1295, subdivision (c), and that the arbitration agreements were valid and enforceable. Pursuant to the plain language of section 1295, subdivision (c), the terms of those agreements governed the parties' relationship upon their execution; the fact that one signatory died before the expiration of the statutory 30-day rescission period does not render the terms of the parties' agreements unenforceable in the absence of other grounds for not enforcing them. View "Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings" on Justia Law

Spanish Peaks is a 3000-acre luxury resort in Big Sky Country, Montana. Development began in 2002; featured residences were to be “high-end settlement cabins,” close to a massive lodge, containing restaurants, stores, recreation facilities, and other amenities. Beginning in 2004 the five plaintiffs acquired eight undeveloped lots in Spanish Peaks and five with cabins--one cost over $3,000,000. By July 2011 all but two of the 13 properties had been lost, usually by foreclosure. The developer was bankrupt. Plaintiffs alleged fraud and negligence in construction and in soil remediation, asserting that Spanish Peaks was a “landslide complex.” Plaintiffs made numerous procedural mistakes: though four of the five plaintiffs had taken title via LLCs, the lawsuit was brought in their individual names; their statement of facts did not comply with the Rules of Court, despite two opportunities to comply. The court granted the defendants summary judgment based on plaintiffs’ noncompliance. The court of appeal affirmed; the trial court did not abuse its discretion. “The trial court specified deficiencies in appellants’ initial filing, identified the precise manner in which those deficiencies could be rectified, and afforded appellants ample opportunity to prepare new papers in compliance with applicable rules. Precisely this and no more was required.” View "Rush v. White Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants Beachcomber Management Crystal Cove, LLC (Management) and Douglas Cavanaugh (collectively, Defendants) challenged a trial court’s order disqualifying the law firm of Kohut & Kohut LLP (Kohut) from continuing to represent Defendants in the underlying matter. In March 2016, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on behalf of Beachcomber at Crystal Cove, LLC as a shareholder derivative action against Defendants. The complaint named the Company as a nominal defendant and alleged claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, abuse of control, gross negligence and mismanagement, breach of duty of honest services, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, and accounting. Plaintiffs alleged Defendants abused their position as the Company’s managers by diverting Company funds to other Cavanaugh entities, paying themselves unauthorized management fees, misallocating expenses the Company shares with other entities, and refusing to provide Plaintiffs complete access to the Company’s books and records. Defendants hired Kohut to represent them in this lawsuit, and the Company hired independent counsel, the law firm of Corbin, Steelman & Specter, to represent it in this lawsuit. In May 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify Kohut “from any further participation in this case” based on conflicts of interests arising from its past and present representation of the Company and Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued disqualification was required based on the conflicts of interest arising from: (1) Kohut’s concurrent representation of the Company and Defendants; (2) Kohut’s successive representation of the Company and Defendants concerning the disputes over the Company’s operations; and (3) the need for Kohut to testify in this lawsuit about the services it provided to the Company and Defendants. Here, the trial court concluded disqualification was mandatory because: (1) Defendants and the Company had conflicting interests because the Company is the true plaintiff in this derivative suit that Plaintiffs brought against Defendants on the Company’s behalf; and (2) Kohut previously represented the Company concerning some of the issues raised in this suit, and a substantial relationship therefore existed between that representation and Kohut’s representation of Defendants in this lawsuit. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred because it failed to apply a more specific line of cases that governed an attorney’s successive representation of clients in a derivative lawsuit brought on a small or closely held company’s behalf against the insiders who run the company. View "Beachcomber Management Crystal Cove v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Nathan Minnick sued his former joint employers, Automobile Creations, Inc. and Dynamic Auto Images, Inc. (defendants), alleging their vacation policy violated state law because it required employees who worked for less than one year to forfeit vested vacation pay. Minnick brought the action individually and on behalf of all similarly situated employees, and sought penalties under California's Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The court sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend on Minnick's second amended complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding defendants' vacation policy lawfully provided that employees did not begin to earn vacation time until after their first year. Because Minnick's employment ended during his first year, he did not have any vested or accrued vacation pay. Thus, he was not owed any vacation wages. View "Minnick v. Automotive Creations, Inc." on Justia Law

Mission Bay Park was the largest man-made aquatic park in the country. While Lorin Toeppe was walking through Mission Bay Park with her boyfriend, a branch fell off a eucalyptus tree and struck her. Toeppe sustained serious injuries. She filed suit against the City of San Diego (City) alleging the existence of a dangerous condition on public property, namely a negligently maintained eucalyptus tree. The City prevailed on summary judgment, arguing that Toeppe was struck by the tree branch while standing on a trail; thus, the City could not be liable under Government Code section 831.4 (trail immunity). Toeppe appealed the subsequent final judgment following the City's successful motion for summary judgment. Toeppe argued: (1) trail immunity did not apply under the facts of this case because her claim of a dangerous condition was based on a negligently maintained eucalyptus tree, not the condition of the trail passing through the park; and (2) even if trail immunity did apply, a disputed issue of material fact existed as to where she was located when the branch struck her. The Court of Appeal agreed with her on both grounds, and thus reversed. View "Toeppe v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Aram Bonni, a surgeon, sued St. Joseph Hospital of Orange (St. Joseph), Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center (Mission), and other defendants for, inter alia, retaliation under Health and Safety Code, section 1278.5 (the whistleblower statute). Plaintiff alleged defendants retaliated against him for his whistleblower complaints by summarily suspending his medical staff privileges and conducting hospital peer review proceedings. In response to plaintiff’s complaint, defendants filed a special motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) to strike plaintiff’s retaliation cause of action, asserting his claim arose from the protected activity of hospital peer review proceedings. The court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to both St. Joseph and Mission. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the whistleblower statute arose from defendants’ alleged acts of retaliation against plaintiff because he complained about the robotic surgery facilities at the hospitals, and not from any written or oral statements made during the peer review process or otherwise. “Discrimination and retaliation claims are rarely, if ever, good candidates for the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion. This case is no exception.” Defendants’ motion to strike failed on prong one of the anti-SLAPP test (probability to prevail), and the Court reversed the order granting defendants’ motion on that basis. View "Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Valerie Kizer and Sharal Williams filed this putative class action against their former employer, defendant and respondent Tristar Risk Management (Tristar), alleging Tristar failed to pay Plaintiffs and its other claims examiners overtime compensation because it misclassified them as exempt from California’s overtime laws. The court found Tristar’s alleged misclassification of the proposed class members suitable for class treatment, but it denied the motion because misclassification does not give rise to liability on an overtime claim unless the employees first show they worked hours or days that required overtime compensation. Plaintiffs contended the trial court erred because the amount of overtime worked by the individual class members was a damages issue, and the need for individual proof of damages was not a proper basis for denying class certification. To satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification, Plaintiffs were required to show their liability theory could be established on a classwide basis through common proof. Plaintiffs presented no evidence of any such policy or practice. Without commonality, plaintiffs’ unfair competition law claim also failed. View "Kizer v. Tristar Risk Management" on Justia Law

This appeal challenged the trial court's denial of defendant's special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings against property owned by plaintiff Crossroads Investors, L.P. (Crossroads), but Crossroads filed for bankruptcy protection, staying the proceedings. Its proposed reorganization plan called for selling the property to a third party, who would reinstate the loan but on different material terms less favorable to Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae would not be paid what it was owed in full. The bankruptcy court called the plan "dubious," and Crossroads' counsel agreed they were "trying to have our cake and eat it too." Crossroads failed to obtain confirmation of a reorganization plan, and the bankruptcy court granted Fannie Mae relief from the stay. Fannie Mae shortly thereafter sold the property, and it did so without providing prior notice to Crossroads. Crossroads filed suit for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, fraud, and other tort and contract causes of action. Fannie Mae filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending the actions on which Crossroads based its complaint arose from the exercise of its constitutional rights of speech and petition; specifically, statements and omissions made in, or concerning issues under review in, the bankruptcy action. The trial court denied the motion. The California Supreme Court granted Fannie Mae's petition for review, depublished the Court of Appeals' original opinion, and transferred the matter to back to the appellate court to reconsider the appeal in light of Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (2016). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and directed it to grant the anti-SLAPP motion: all of Crossroads' claims arose from Fannie Mae's constitutionally protected actions that were taken as part of, or related to, the bankruptcy action. Further, Crossroads did not establish a prima facie case in support of those claims, as all of its tort claims based on protected activity attacked statements privileged under Civil Code section 47, and its contract claims arising from protected activity were barred as a matter of law. View "Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Assn." on Justia Law

In a products liability case, plaintiffs Kawika and Sandra Demara appealed the grant of summary judgment granted in favor of defendants The Raymond Corporation (Raymond) and Raymond Handling Solutions, Inc. (RHSI). As pertinent to the appeal, Plaintiffs asserted claims for strict liability and negligence based on injuries Kawika suffered allegedly as a result of design defects in a forklift designed by Raymond and sold by RHSI. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled, in part: (1) Plaintiffs did not establish a triable issue of material fact as to causation; (2) the consumer expectation test did not apply as a matter of law; and (3) for purposes of applying the risk-benefit test, even if Plaintiffs had shown a triable issue of material fact as to causation, Defendants established the requisite elements for the application of the risk-benefit test, and Plaintiffs did not establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether the benefits of the design outweighed the risks of the design. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in these rulings: (1) because Plaintiffs' showing as to causation was more than negligible or theoretical, it was sufficient to defeat summary judgment; (2) Defendants did not meet their burden of establishing as a matter of law that the consumer expectation test does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims; and (3) in applying the risk-benefit test, Defendants failed to present sufficient evidence to shift the burden to Plaintiffs to show a triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to deny Defendants' motion. View "Demara v. The Raymond Corp." on Justia Law