Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479, the court held that under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq., a party alleging that a discriminatory act led to the termination of his or her employment has until one year from the date the employment terminated to file an administrative claim. In light of Romano, the Court of Appeal held that the one year limitations period for plaintiff to file a timely Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) complaint began to run from the last day of his employment. Because he filed his DFEH complaint within that period, his claim was timely. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the third amended complaint. View "Aviles-Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Community College District" on Justia Law

Paternal great-grandparents Ed and Yvonne H. appealed an order denying their request for joinder and petition to seek visitation with their great-grandchildren. Ed and Yvonne's argued the court erred in finding they lacked standing to join as parties seeking visitation. Specifically, they argued the court erred by determining that Family Code sections 3103 and 3104, which allow a court to grant visitation rights to grandparents if certain conditions are met, did not permit great-grandparent visitation. Alternatively, Ed and Yvonne contend the court erred by not considering that their grandson, the father of the great-grandchildren, consented to and joined in their request for visitation, and by not considering whether they had standing as psychological or de facto parents. The Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature did not intend section 3104 of the grandparent visitation statutes to authorize great-grandparents to petition for visitation, and thus the court did not err by concluding Ed and Yvonne lacked legal standing to seek visitation. View "Ed H. v. Ashley C." on Justia Law

Riddell filed suit against Insurers, alleging that they owed Riddell a defense and indemnity in third party actions by former professional football players claiming that they suffered personal injuries resulting from Riddell's helmets. Insurers subsequently moved to compel further discovery seeking information related to prior claims against Riddell. The trial court granted the motions to compel and denied the motion for a protective order. The Court of Appeal granted Riddell's petition for a writ of mandate, holding that the discovery at issue was logically related to factual issues in the third party actions and that a stay of that discovery was thus appropriate. However, Riddell must provide privilege logs of documents withheld in document productions that have already occurred. Accordingly, the court directed the trial court to vacate its order on Insurers' motions to compel and enter a new order granting the motions as to the privilege logs only. The court directed the trial court to grant Riddell's request for a stay of the discovery at issue. View "Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Amber Retzloff, James Franklin, and Nancy Stewart sued defendant Moulton Parkway Residents’ Association No. One (the association), twice for alleged violations of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act. The first suit was dismissed without prejudice by plaintiffs; the trial court sustained the association’s demurrer to the second suit without leave to amend. The court further concluded that plaintiffs’ second action was frivolous and awarded the association costs and attorney fees under Civil Code section 52351(c). Plaintiffs appealed the award. Finding no abuse of discretion in dismissed the second action as frivolous, thereby making the association entitled to fees, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Retzloff v. Moulton Parkway Residents' Assn." on Justia Law

In 1990, appellant Matthew Albert Parker and respondent Mary Katherine Parker divorced. Mary and Matthew shared two children. In 2014, Matthew sought an order (1) requiring respondent San Bernardino County Department of Child Support Services (the Department) to prepare an accounting of the child support arrears owed by Matthew; and (2) discharging the child support arrears for the period in which the children resided with Matthew (Trainotti credits). The family court denied Matthew’s requested order. Matthew appealed, arguing: (1) res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar an award of Trainotti credits; and (2) the family court erred by not applying the doctrine of laches to discharge the arrears owed to the Department. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Marriage of Parker" on Justia Law

D.H. was removed from, and failed to reunify with, his paternal grandparents, who had been caring for him under a probate guardianship. The entire case, from the petition, to removal, to termination of services, focused on the grandparents, not the child’s father. In this dependency appeal, D.H., Sr. (father), the presumed father of D.H., argues on appeal of that decision, the juvenile court violated due process by terminating his parental rights without making an unfitness or detriment finding against him by clear and convincing evidence at any point in the proceedings. Respondent Riverside Department of Social Services (DPSS) urged the Court of Appeal to adopt, in the dependency context, the best interest of the child standard for terminating parental rights under Probate Code section 1516.5. The Court declined: Probate Code section 1516.5 applied when a legal guardian seeks to have the child declared free from the custody and control of one or both parents and was designed to “mak[e] it easier for children in probate guardianships to be adopted by their guardians.” That provision did not apply in a case like this, where the only reason the court was considering terminating parental rights was because the state brought a successful dependency action against the guardians. “Father’s entitlement to the constitutional safeguards articulated in Gladys L. does not vanish simply because D.H. was under a legal guardianship at the outset of the dependency.” View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

This case arose from competing claims to a portion of the Yuba Goldfields, a 10,000-acre valley on both sides of the Yuba River near Marysville. At issue was whether an arbitration award resolving a dispute between plaintiff Cal Sierra Development, Inc. (Cal Sierra), and Western Aggregates, Inc., served as res judicata to bar Cal Sierra’s lawsuit against Western Aggregates’ licensee George Reed, Inc., and the licensee’s parent Basic Resources, Inc. The Court of Appeal concluded yes. View "Cal Sierra Development v. George Reed, Inc." on Justia Law

Kho worked as a mechanic for One Toyota (OTO) from 2010-2014, when his employment was terminated. Kho filed a wage claim with the California Labor Commissioner. After settlement discussions failed, OTO filed a petition to compel arbitration. Under the arbitration agreement, which OTO required Kho to execute without explanation, the wage claim was subject to binding arbitration conducted by a retired superior court judge. Because the intended procedure incorporated many of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Code, the anticipated arbitration proceeding would resemble ordinary civil litigation. The trial court denied the petition to compel. Under the state supreme court’s 2013 “Sonic-Calabasas” decision, an arbitration agreement that waives the various advantageous provisions of the Labor Code governing the litigation of a wage claim is substantively unconscionable if it fails to provide the employee with an affordable and accessible alternative forum. The trial court concluded that the alternative anticipated by OTO’s arbitration agreement failed this standard because it effectively required Kho to retain counsel and did not expressly provide for him to recover his attorney fees if he prevailed. The court of appeal reversed, concluding the arbitration proceeding satisfies the Sonic requirements of affordability and accessibility. View "OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dennis Ponte demanded defendant County of Calaveras (County) to pay him over $150,000 to reimburse him for work purportedly performed on the County’s behalf pursuant to an oral contract. The contract did not contain any fixed payment, and no bid was submitted nor approved pursuant to relevant county ordinances governing public contracts. Ponte disregarded opportunities to abandon his claims after the County provided him with pertinent legal authority demonstrating that his claims lacked merit. After multiple sustained demurrers, the trial court granted summary judgment to the County on Ponte’s third amended complaint. The court later awarded substantial attorney fees, finding Ponte’s claims, including those based on promissory estoppel, were not brought or maintained in both subjective and objective good faith. Ponte appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Ponte v. County of Calaveras" on Justia Law

Litigation under the Public Records Act (PRA) (Gov. Code, sec. 6250 et seq.) is one of the rare instances where a losing party may still be deemed a prevailing party entitled to an attorney fee award. Ponani Sukumar appeals an order denying his motion for prevailing party attorney fees against the City of San Diego (City). Sukumar owns a home in San Diego (the Property). In about 1992, Sukumar's neighbors began complaining to the City about Sukumar's use of the Property. These complaints mostly involved parking issues and noise. In 2006 the City ordered Sukumar to take "immediate action to correct" municipal code violations occurring on the Property that constituted "a public nuisance." However, the City decided to not pursue the matter absent additional neighbor complaints. In 2015, Sukumar's attorney delivered a request to the City for "production of documents and information" under the PRA. The request sought 54 separate categories of documents, all relating to any neighbor's complaints about Sukumar. Twenty-four days after the request, the City wrote to Sukumar's attorney, stating that some potentially responsive documents were exempt from disclosure, and responsive, nonexempt records would be made available for Sukumar's review. Sukumar's attorney remained unconvinced that the City had produced all documents responsive to its request, and sought a writ of mandate or used other mechanisms to compel the documents' production. Though every time the City offered to certify it produced "everything," it would release additional documents. The trial court ultimately denied Sukumar's writ petition, finding that by 2016, the City had "in some fashion" produced all responsive documents. After stating Sukumar's writ petition was "moot" because all responsive documents had now been produced, the court stated, "Now, you might argue that you're the prevailing party, because the City didn't comply until after the lawsuit was filed. That's another issue." Asserting the litigation "motivated productions of a substantial amount of responsive public documents, even after the City represented to this [c]ourt there was nothing left to produce," Sukumar sought $93,695 in fees (plus $5,390 incurred in preparing the fee motion). Sukumar appealed the order denying his motion for prevailing party attorney fees against the City. The Court of Appeal reversed because the undisputed evidence established the City produced, among other things, five photographs of Sukumar's property and 146 pages of e-mails directly as a result of court-ordered depositions in this litigation. The Court remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees to which Sukumar is entitled. View "Sukumar v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law