Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Paul Kendall's second amended complaint made several types of class-wide claims that challenged the billing and collection practices of the health facility operating an emergency room where he received care, defendant and respondent Scripps Health (Scripps). Kendall contended that "selfpay" patients, who signed a form during the reception process at the emergency room (an "Agreement for Services at a Scripps Facility"), were being unfairly billed under that contractual agreement at prescribed rates that are listed on a publicly available "charge description master" (Charge Master). This appeal arose out of the trial court's order denying Kendall's motion to certify a proposed class of self-pay patients for the pursuit of two overriding legal theories that applied to both the declaratory relief and statutory claims. Scripps opposed the motion, arguing a class action was not shown to be an appropriate method to pursue the case because of a lack of predominant common issues and of any convincing showing of an ability to ascertain the identity of all the proposed class members. The trial court denied the motion for class certification, concluding that Kendall had not presented any substantial evidence showing there were predominant common issues of law and fact among the putative class members. On appeal, Kendall contends the trial court's order denying class certification of his statutory claims reflects the use of improper criteria and an incorrect legal analysis. Finding no abuse of discretion or lack of substantial evidence, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying class certification. View "Kendall v. Scripps Health" on Justia Law

The trust that was intended to establish a charitable foundation. When Shine became trustee, its value was about $40 million. The conservator of the incompetent trustor sought an accounting, which revealed a significant loss in value and that Shine had not funded the foundation. The Attorney General sought Shine’s removal and surcharge based on his mismanagement, Gov. Code 12598. An interim substitute trustee was appointed. Shine successfully sought advanced fees from the trust for defense of the petition, subject to repayment if he was ultimately found not entitled to indemnification. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the probate court applied an incorrect legal standard in focusing on the “inequity of forcing the former trustees to fund their own defense against the unlimited resources of the Attorney General’s office” but did not expressly weigh the balance of relative harms to Shine, the People, and the charitable beneficiaries of the Trust. A mere imbalance in resources is not, alone, a proper equitable consideration supporting an award of interim fees; the court must consider whether Shine will be unduly prejudiced by having to bear his own attorney fees until resolution of the petition and whether the charitable beneficiaries would be unduly prejudiced if the fees were advanced and not repaid. View "Harris & Becerra v. Shine" on Justia Law

While working as a crane operator, plaintiff George Sutherland sustained injuries when his crane tipped over. Sutherland filed his original complaint, which included a negligence cause of action against real party in interest, Curtis Engineering Corporation (Curtis), a provider of engineering services. Sutherland's original complaint did not include a certificate, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 411.35, subdivisions (a) and (b). Sutherland filed and served a first amended complaint which included a certificate. The original and amended complaint were identical, except for two additional paragraphs in the amended complaint stating that: (1) a certificate is attached as an exhibit to the amended complaint and is incorporated by reference, and (2) a claim was sent to defendant Oregon State University. Curtis demurred to the amended complaint arguing, among other things, that Sutherland failed to file the required certificate within the limitations period. The trial court overruled the demurrer. As relevant here, the court concluded that the amended complaint related back to the filing date of the original complaint. In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that a certificate filed after expiration of the statute of limitations and more than 60 days after filing the original pleading did not relate back to the filing of the original pleading. The trial court erred when it overruled a demurrer alleging noncompliance with the certificate requirement of section 411.35. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of mandate. View "Curtis Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Appellants Gordon and Donna Runyon were once married. In 2010, respondent Comerica Bank (Comerica) obtained a joint and several judgment for breach of guaranty against Gordon and some other defendants. Gordon and Donna then divorced, the other judgment debtors settled with Comerica, and post-divorce, Comerica obtained an order to show cause why real property that was formerly community property but then owned as separate property by Donna, should not be sold to satisfy the remaining debt owing on the judgment. Donna and other debtors each paid certain sums, and eventually the judgment was satisfied in full. Gordon filed an application for order of contribution contending he paid more than his proportional share of the judgment through his community property interests. He requested contribution from the cojudgment debtors. The court denied the motion on grounds the application failed to demonstrate it was timely filed. In this appeal, Gordon argued he satisfied the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 881 through 883 under which he sought contribution, because when his application was heard Comerica had not yet filed a satisfaction of judgment and therefore it was timely filed. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed as to Gordon. However, the Court found Donna lacked standing, so her appeal was dismissed. View "Comerica Bank v. Runyon" on Justia Law

Defendants-respondents the City of Davis (City) and the City Council of the City of Davis (City Council) approved a conditional use permit authorizing the use of a single family home in a residential zoning district as professional office space for three therapists. Petitioner-appellant and next door neighbor Michael Harrington, filed a petition for an administrative writ of mandate asking the trial court to set aside the conditional use permit. The trial court denied the petition. Harrington appealed, arguing: (1) the conditional use permit violated an ordinance prohibiting parking in the front yard setback; (2) the issuance of the conditional use permit resulted in a change in occupancy triggering accessible parking requirements under the California Building Standards Code (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24, pt. 2); (3) the conditional use permit contemplated alterations triggering the accessible parking requirements; (4) the City Council failed to make sufficient findings to support a conclusion that compliance with accessible parking requirements would be technically infeasible, and the findings are not supported by substantial evidence; and (5) the City Council failed to make sufficient findings to support a conclusion that the permitted use is consistent with the zoning designation, and the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the conditional use permit did not require parking in the front yard setback; (2) the City’s reasonable construction of the Building Code is entitled to deference, and its determination that the issuance of the conditional use permit did not result in a change in occupancy is supported by substantial evidence; (3) Harrington forfeited the argument that the conditional use permit contemplated alterations within the meaning of the Building Code; (4) technical infeasibility findings were not necessary, as the City Council did not rely on that theory; and (5) the City Council’s consistency findings were legally sufficient and supported by substantial evidence. View "Harrington v. City of Davis" on Justia Law

In 2001, Michael Durkin, through two limited liability companies, purchased two lots directly adjacent to the McClellan Palomar Airport (Airport) in the City of Carlsbad (City). His development plans for the two lots were initially successful despite determinations by the San Diego County Regional Airport Authority (Authority) that the proposed projects were not compatible with the Airport. Overriding the Authority's objections, the City issued a planned industrial permit and Durkin completed the construction of a commercial building on one of the lots in 2005. He also obtained a permit from the City for construction of a second building on the other lot. Both permits included provisions in which Durkin agreed to hold the City harmless for any liability arising out of approval of the projects. Durkin's permit on the second lot expired in 2012 without the commencement of any construction. By the time Durkin sought to restart the permitting process with the City, the Authority had adopted an Airport Land Use Compatibility Plan (ALUCP) that designated Durkin's properties as being within a Safety Zone that carried specific limiting recommendations for compatible land uses. Despite having approved Durkin's previous permit application, the City now refused to override the recommendations in the ALUCP. Durkin filed an inverse condemnation action against the Authority and San Diego County, arguing the value of his property was depressed by the Authority’s adoption of the ALUCP and that decrease in value constituted a governmental taking. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the County and the Authority on the ground that undisputed evidence shows there was no taking by these defendants. View "Dryden Oaks v. San Diego County Regional Airport Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John PD Doe was sexually abused by a Boy Scout master beginning in 1998 and continuing for a number of years at a ranch owned and operated by defendants, San Diego-Imperial Council and Boy Scouts of America. In 2013, after Doe obtained psychological therapy, he filed this action against the defendants. Defendants ultimately demurred to Doe's complaint on the ground that he failed to file a certificate of merit, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer on this ground, without leave to amend. Doe appealed the trial court's judgment, and the Court of Appeal court affirmed the judgment in favor of defendants. Following the issuance of the remittitur, defendants moved for an award of attorney fees with respect to the fees incurred in defendant Doe's appeal pursuant to subdivision (q) of section 340.1. The trial court awarded defendants the fees that they requested without analyzing the statutory provision or stating the court's reasoning as to why such fees were appropriate. Doe appealed the trial court's award of attorney fees resulting from the prior appeal, contending section 340.1(q) was designed to permit an award of attorney fees only in situations in which there is some indication that the plaintiff's claim of sexual abuse is without merit, such that the conclusion of the litigation may be deemed to constitute a "[']favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to[']" the defendants for whom a certificate of merit was filed or should have been filed. Doe asserted that in this case, where the trial court acknowledged that Doe's claim was not frivolous, and there was no indication that the claim lacked merit, defendants were not eligible for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 340.1(q). Defendants argued that because they obtained a dismissal of the action, and, as a result, they were prevailing parties and were entitled to attorney fees. The Court of Appeal concluded that a defendant is eligible for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 340.1(q) only where the litigation has resulted in a "favorable conclusion" for that defendant, and that a "favorable conclusion" requires a result that is reflective of the merits of the litigation. In this case, the dismissal of Doe's action was procured as a result of a procedural defect that did not reflect on the merits of the action. As a result, there was no "favorable conclusion" with respect to defendants, and they were therefore not eligible to be awarded their attorney fees. View "Doe v. San Diego-Imperial Council" on Justia Law

Defendant Darren Rose, a member of the Alturas Indian Rancheria, ran two smoke shops located in Indian country but far from any lands governed by the Alturas Indian Rancheria. In those smoke shops, Rose sold illegal cigarettes and failed to collect state taxes. California brought an enforcement action to stop illegal sales and collect civil penalties. Rose appealed, arguing: (1) California and its courts did not have jurisdiction to enforce California’s civil/regulatory laws for his actions in Indian country; and (2) the amount of civil penalties imposed was inequitable and erroneous. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) federal law and tribal sovereignty did not preempt California’s regulation and enforcement of its laws concerning sales of cigarettes; and (2) the superior court’s imposition of civil penalties was proper. View "California v. Rose" on Justia Law

Mainstay Business Solutions (Mainstay), a division of the Blue Lake Rancheria Economic Development Corporation, was a tribal government-sponsored entity of Blue Lake Rancheria, a federally recognized Indian tribe. Mainstay operated a temporary staffing business, assigning temporary workers to its clients. It also operated an employee leasing business in which employees of Mainstay’s clients were placed on Mainstay’s payroll and leased back to the clients. The California Self-Insurers’ Security Fund (SISF) assumed the workers’ compensation obligations when Mainstay defaulted on its obligations to self-insure. SISF then sued Mainstay, Mainstay’s clients and others to recover its costs and liabilities. Among other things, the trial court granted SISF’s motion for judgment on the pleadings against Mainstay’s clients. Mainstay’s clients filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition to challenge the trial court’s order. SISF argued on appeal: (1) writ review was not appropriate because the main issue presented was rendered moot by the enactment of Labor Code section 3701.9. On the merits, Mainstay’s clients argued: (2) SISF’s claim was subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers Compensation Act and should have been brought before the Workers Compensation Appeals Board; and (3) their agreements with Mainstay in compliance with Labor Code section 3602(d) serve to bar SISF’s civil action. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "American Cargo Express v. Super Ct." on Justia Law

The petition underlying this appeal challenged a trial court order summarily adjudicating a cause of action under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Act), a cause of action for fraud by concealment, and another for medical battery, while allowing other claims, including one for medical negligence, to proceed to trial. Petitioner Maxine Stewart was the representative of Anthony Carter, a man who died after admission to a hospital owned by real parties in interest, St. Joseph’s Health (et al.). She alleged the hospital “denied and withheld from Mr. Carter the right to refuse an unnecessary surgery, denied and withheld from Mr. Carter the right to be involved in secret hospital meetings to invalidate his designated consent, and denied and withheld from Mr. Carter his right to a second opinion prior to proceeding with an unwarranted surgery that resulted in a hypoxic injury, brain damage, cardiac arrest and his untimely death.” Having concluded the petition might have merit, the Court of Appeal stayed the action in the trial court and requested an informal response. Having received and read the “return by verified answer” that was filed by real parties in interest, the Court then set an order to show cause and requested further briefing on a specific issue. Real parties in interest decided to stand on their informal response in lieu of filing another brief, and Stewart declined to file a traverse. After review, the Court then granted the petition: in the published portion of this opinion, the Court discussed the cause of action for elder abuse to explain how, in its view, a substantial impairment of this right can constitute actionable “neglect” of an elder within the meaning of both the little-invoked catchall definition contained in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.57(a)(1), and two of the types of neglect set forth in section 15610.57(a)(2). View "Stewart v. Superior Court" on Justia Law