Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Lujan had a Chase credit card account, governed by an agreement with a provision stating “federal law and the law of Delaware” govern the agreement and a provision for attorney’s fees. When Lujan’s account had an unpaid balance in 2007, Chase assigned its claim to interim assignees. In 2011, PCC filed suit, alleging a debt of $8,831.90. PCC Vice President Shields verified the complaint. Lujan cross-complained against PCC, Shields, and interim assignees seeking damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S. C. 1692, and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices. The court granted Lujan summary judgment as to PCC, applying Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations. On the cross-complaint, the court granted the other defendants summary judgment, finding that none met the statutory definition of a debt collector. The judgment is silent om statutory damages, leaving Lujan with only “attorney fees and costs" as provided by statute. The court awarded Lujan $140,550.51 in fees against PCC but denied the other defendants fees because the cross-complaint was not an action “on a contract” under Civil Code 1717. The appeals court affirmed Lujan’s summary judgment against PCC, Lujan’s award of attorney’s fees, and the interim assignees’ summary judgment and denial of fees. The court reversed summary judgment in favor of Shields and PCC’s attorney. View "Professional Collection Consultants v. Lujan" on Justia Law

After defendant Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (Coastal Pacific) terminated plaintiff Terri Raines from her employment there, she sued Coastal Pacific for age and disability discrimination and other related claims. In addition, she sought recovery, both individually and in a representative capacity under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) for Coastal Pacific’s failure to provide and maintain accurate wage statements as required by statute. Raines appealed after the trial court reversed its original ruling denying Coastal Pacific’s motion for summary adjudication and instead granted the motion as trial was about to begin. Raines contended triable issues of fact remained: (1) on her individual claim for statutory penalties; (2) whether she sustained an injury; and (3) whether Coastal Pacific’s failure to provide accurate wage statements was knowing and intentional. Raines also argued the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on her PAGA claim by improperly finding injury was required, and that the trial court erred in reversing its original order denying summary adjudication. The Court of Appeal found merit in only Raines' PAGA claim: a representative PAGA claim for civil penalties for a violation of Labor Code section 226(a) did not require proof of injury or a knowing and intentional violation. "This is true even though these two elements are required to be proven when bringing an individual claim for damages or statutory penalties under section 226(e). Because the trial court erroneously required proof of injury on the PAGA claim, the grant of summary adjudication was improper and we therefore reverse the judgment as to that claim." View "Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and cross-defendant Duncan Prince obtained a judgment of $647,706.48 against defendant and cross-complainant Invensure Insurance Brokers, Inc. (Invensure). Invensure took nothing on its cross-complaint against Prince and his related business entity, cross-defendant ERM Insurance Brokers, Inc. (ERM). Invensure appealed, arguing the trial court wrongly decided issues related to the statute of limitations and numerous issues with respect to substantial evidence to support the judgment. It also claimed the court abused its discretion when admitting certain evidence. Prince and ERM also appealed two postjudgment orders, arguing the court erroneously granted a motion to tax costs and to deny them attorney fees. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred with respect to the validity of Prince’s offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, and remanded that issue for further consideration. In the unpublished portion of its opinion with respect to attorney fees, Prince argued he was entitled to attorney fees under Penal Code section 502. Invensure asserted a cause of action against him for violating this section, which included an attorney fee provision. The court denied the motion, deciding the attorney fees under the Penal Code section 502 cause of action and the cross-complaint’s remaining claims could not be apportioned. The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding the causes of action in the cross-complaint all related to a common core of facts. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying attorney fees. View "Prince v. Invensure Ins. Brokers" on Justia Law

Defendants Peter Holt, Holt Law Firm, and Bethany Holt (collectively Holt) appealed the denial of their special motion to strike (also known as an anti-SLAPP--Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation--motion). Peter Holt and his law firm briefly represented Charles and Victoria Yeager and successfully sued Victoria Yeager to obtain his fees in an action known as Holt v. Yeager (Super. Ct. Nevada County, No. L76533). Yeager then sued Holt, alleging professional negligence, misappropriation of name, and other claims. Holt moved to declare Yeager’s suit to be a SLAPP suit. The trial court found this suit did not chill protected expressive conduct or free speech on an issue of public interest. The Court of Appeal agreed and affirmed. View "Yeager v. Holt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carl Taswell, M.D., who is certified in nuclear medicine, filed a complaint against the Regents of the University of California (the Regents). Taswell alleged he was retaliated against for his whistleblowing activities regarding patient safety at the brain imaging center during his employment by the University of California, Irvine. Taswell appealed after the trial court granted the Regents’ motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding that, following an administrative hearing, Taswell was not required to exhaust his judicial remedies (by seeking a writ of mandamus) to challenge the University’s rejection of his claims of retaliation. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Taswell was statutorily authorized to file this civil action and seek damages based on his statutory whistleblower retaliation claims; the administrative decision had no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on this action. Also, a triable issue of material fact existed as to whether the University’s decisions to place Taswell on an investigatory leave of absence and to not renew his contract had a causal connection to Taswell’s whistleblowing activities. Therefore, summary judgment and/or summary adjudication should not have been granted on the theory that no triable issue of fact existed. View "Taswell v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jorge Fierro filed a class action suit against defendant Landry's Restaurant Inc., seeking remedies for what Fierro alleged to be Landry's' violations of specified California labor laws and wage orders. Landry's demurred to the complaint on the basis that each of the causes of action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. As to Fierro's individual claims, the trial court overruled the demurrer, concluding that the statute of limitations defense did not appear affirmatively on the face of the complaint. As to the class claims, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the basis that a prior class action with identical class claims against Landry's had been dismissed for failure to bring the case to trial in five years as required by Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360. Under the "death knell" doctrine, Fierro appealed that portion of the order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer to the class claims. The Court of Appeals determined the trial court erred. From the record presented, the Court could not determine the basis of the dismissal of the prior action; and, in any event, because the dismissal of the prior action was not final for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel, it could not form the basis of a defense to the class claims in this action. Furthermore, because the Court agreed with the trial court that the statute of limitations defense did not appear affirmatively on the face of the complaint, there was no alternative basis on which to affirm the dismissal of the class claims. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded this matter with instructions to enter an order overruling Landry's' demurrer in its entirety. View "Fierro v. Landry's Restaurant Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Alysia Webb filed a verified petition for mandamus relief with the superior court, alleging the City of Riverside (Riverside) violated Propositions 26 and 218 when it began transferring additional revenue from electric utility reserve fund accounts into the general fund without approval by the electorate. Webb contended the court improperly dismissed her case without leave to amend on a demurrer because the 120-day statute of limitations arising under Public Utilities Code section 10004.52 did not apply to her challenge of Riverside's change in calculation of its electric general fund transfer. She further argued the fund transfers constituted a tax increase because they altered the methodology used to calculate the amount of money Riverside transfers from the electric utility reserve to the general fund. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the superior court. View "Webb v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

Appellant Han Jing Huang filed requests for civil harassment restraining orders against thirty-one defendants who were prominent entertainment personalities, business leaders, poloticians and religious leaders. Finding appellant’s claims to be “patently frivolous,” “patently frivolous on petition[’s] face,” or “frivolous on petition’s face,” the trial court denied with prejudice the applications for permanent injunctions prohibiting harassment. The Court of Appeal consolidated the 31 appeals for disposition. Appellant alleged defendants were “a lot of people with Hollywood background or Scientology background . . . or political background,” who “control[ a] mental department in Texas,” by which “they falsely accuse[ him] and use[] technology from mental department (mind reading) [to] attack[ him] secretly[,] . . . ask[ing] some adults to keep on stalking [him] and harass[ing] and threaten[ing him] by nano probes.” In dismissing the cases, the trial court cited no legal precedent or statute, but relied on its “inherent power” to control its proceedings. As best as could be surmised, the Court of Appeal found appellant raised three challenges to the trial court’s orders dismissing the applications for permanent injunctions prohibiting harassment: (1) that the trial court thrice refused to allow appellant to present evidence; (2) that the trial court interrupted the interpreter and the interpreter was not “professional;” and (3) that the trial judge was not impartial. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court. View "Huang v. Hanks" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals’ review centered on the trial court’s partial denial of a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, directed at causes of action arising out of the manner in which defendants, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Robert Barton, in his capacity as Inspector General, conducted interviews with five correctional officers who previously worked at High Desert State Prison. The interviews were conducted as part of an investigation into that institution’s “practices . . . with respect to (1) excessive use of force against inmates, (2) internal reviews of incidents involving the excessive use of force against inmates, and (3) protection of inmates from assault and harm by others.” As relevant here, these officers and the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) alleged in their first and second causes of action that defendants violated Penal Code section 6126.5 and Government Code section 3300 et seq. (the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights or the Act) by refusing the officers’ requests to be represented during the interviews. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to these causes of action, concluding: (1) defendants carried their threshold burden of demonstrating the gravamen of these causes of action arose from protected activity; but (2) plaintiffs established a probability of prevailing on the merits of these claims. The Court of Appeal agreed defendants carried their burden on the threshold issue, but concluded plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of these causes of action. The Court therefore reversed the portion of the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to the first and second causes of action and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter a new order granting the motion in its entirety and dismissing the complaint. View "Blue v. Cal. Office of the Inspector General" on Justia Law

The Contractors’ State License Board sought a writ of mandate and a stay to prevent the “apex deposition” of Forg, the Board’s Registrar of Contractors, a position which makes him the Board’s secretary and chief executive officer. Reversing the trial court, the court of appeal held that under well-established California law, the head of a government agency, such as Fogt, generally is not subject to deposition. “An exception to the rule exists only when the official has direct personal factual information pertaining to material issues in the action and the deposing party shows the information to be gained from the deposition is not available through any other source.” The exception does not apply in this case. View "Contractors' State License Board v. Superior Court" on Justia Law